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Modern evolutionary science has brought a sharp focus to bear on the problem of 
evil, and especially of natural evil and suffering in the natural world. Moreover, I 
believe that contemporary theodicy may benefit from engagement with the East 
Asian religion, Daoism. Therefore, I will comparatively examine the work of the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi. I will not 
cover all of the thought of Haught and Zhuangzi, but instead I will focus on their 
ideas concerning the problem of evil, and develop them in harmony with 
evolutionary science.  
In order to do this comparative study, I will suggest the necessity of a new 
methodology, and propose five steps for the comparative work between religion and 
science and between Christianity and Daoism: description, comparison, 
generalisation, differentiation and supplementation. Based on this methodology, I 
will generalise the ideas of Haught and Zhuangzi on evil into seven different 
theodicies (the natural state defence, the free action defence, the suffering God 
defence, the hidden God defence, the harmony defence, the progress defence, and the 
final fulfilment defence). I will then supplement the evolutionary theodicy of Haught 
with the Daoist ideas of Zhuangzi on the basis of their differences. 
The main aim of this study is to develop Christian theodicies to inform both the 
West and the East in a scientific age by comparing the evolutionary theology of 
Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi. I will suggest that Western 
evolutionary theodicies would benefit from engagement with the Daoist philosophy 
of Zhuangzi, and that the evolutionary theodicy of John Haught might be of benefit 
in an Asian Christian context. I also expect that the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi 
can be seen in a new light through conversation with the evolutionary theology of 
Haught and evolutionary science generally. I hope that this thesis can be a catalyst 












This thesis is dedicated to my loving and supportive parents, 








In completing this thesis, I owe many people my heartfelt thanks. My primary 
supervisor, Dr. Mark Harris, the best supervisor a doctoral student could ask for, has 
supported and encouraged me in my work and life, offering much inspiration in my 
entering into science and religion scholarship. It was because of Dr. Harris that I 
could win the ‘Peacocke Prize’ in the Science and Religion Forum in 2015, publish 
my academic pieces in the book Issues in Science and Theology: Are We Special? 
(2017) and the journals Theology in Scotland (Autumn 2016) and Korean Journal of 
Christian Studies (2016), and present papers at the European Society for the Study of 
Science and Theology (2016) and the Theology and Ethics Seminar at New College 
(2017). It was truly an honour to translate his book The Nature of Creation: 
Examining the Bible and Science into Korean (2016).  
I also give thanks to Prof. Joachim Gentz, my secondary supervisor, who 
provided guidance concerning Daoist philosophy as featured in this thesis. Former 
President Jongcheon Park and Prof. Jeongbae Lee of Methodist Theological 
University in Korea, Prof. Jongseo Kim and Prof. Cheolhyeon Bae of Seoul National 
University, Prof. Sehyeong Lee of Hyeopseong University, and Prof. David 
Fergusson, Dr. Alexander Chow and Dr. David Grumett of New College, University 
of Edinburgh, all provided useful insights for the benefit of my thesis and for which I 
am grateful. The examiners present at my viva voce, Dr. Michael Fuller and Prof. 
Christopher Southgate, undoubtedly made this thesis stronger with their great 
recommendations.  
Besides academic thanks, I want to express my gratitude to Rev. Sun-Kyun Lee 
and Ahyun Jungang Church, the Korean Students Association at New College and 
also the Korean Church (Ross Chapel) in Edinburgh. Most of all, I could not finish 
this without the support of my parents Youngun Jang, Junghee Lim, my sisters, and 
my parents-in-law, Youngbae Jun, Soonjo Kwon. My loving wife Soeun Jun and 
upcoming baby (who is expected to arrive in this world on Christmas eve) has been 





1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
(1) The Necessity and Purpose of This Study ....................................................... 6 
(2) Methods of Study .......................................................................................... 15 
PART Ⅰ. THE EVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY OF JOHN HAUGHT ........... 24 
2. Evolutionary Science and Christian Theology in Haught ............................... 25 
(1) What are ‘Evolution’ and ‘Evolutionary Theology’? ................................... 26 
(2) The Evolution of Life and a Creator God ..................................................... 35 
(3) Natural Selection and Divine Providence ..................................................... 38 
(4) Contingency, Law, Time and a Transcendent Personal God ........................ 41 
(5) Cosmic Evolution and Divine Promise ......................................................... 46 
(6) Evolutionary Science and Ecotheology ......................................................... 50 
(7) Summary ....................................................................................................... 52 
3. The Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Haught .................................................. 55 
(1) Christian Theodicies related to Haught ......................................................... 59 
(2) Haught on Evil .............................................................................................. 64 
(3) The Evolutionary Theodicy of Haught .......................................................... 70 
(4) Summary ....................................................................................................... 85 
PART Ⅱ. THE DAOIST PHILOSOPHY OF ZHUANGZI ................................ 87 
4. Daoism and Zhuangzi’s Philosophy .................................................................. 88 
(1) What are ‘Dao’ and ‘Daoism’? ..................................................................... 89 
(2) The Daoist Philosophy of Zhuangzi .............................................................. 95 
(3) Dao in Daoism and God in Christianity ...................................................... 102 
(4) Summary ..................................................................................................... 112 
5. Zhuangzi on Evil ............................................................................................... 114 
(1) East Asian Religions on Evil: Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism ............. 114 
(2) Zhuangzi on Evil ......................................................................................... 131 




COMPARISON ..................................................................................................... 146 
6. Evolution and Natural/Moral Evil .................................................................. 148 
(1) Evolution and the Emergence of Life: 
Information and Qi (氣, vital energy) ......................................................... 148 
(2) The Natural State Defence: 
The Grace of God and Ziran (自然, spontaneity) ....................................... 159 
(3) The Free Action Defence: 
Free Will and Wuwei (無爲, non-action) .................................................... 172 
7. Continuous Creation and the Theodicy of Harmony .................................... 182 
(1) The Suffering God Defence: 
The Kenotic God and Dao’s Omnipresence ............................................... 183 
(2) The Hidden God Defence: 
The Self-Absenting of God and the Hiddenness of Dao ............................. 192 
(3) The Harmony Defence:  
The ‘Dark Side’ and Yin (陰, the shadow side) .......................................... 203 
8. New Creation and the Theodicy of the Metaphysical Future ....................... 216 
(1) The Progress Defence: Purpose/Direction of Evolution ............................. 217 
(2) The Final Fulfilment Defence: New Creation  
and Tianrenyitong (天人一通, the unity of heaven and human being) ...... 226 
9. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 241 
 




Dates and Main Terms 
 
 
Confucius, Laozi and Zhuangzi 
 
Confucius 孔子 551–479 BCE Lunyu (Analects) 
Laozi 老子 c.5th–4th century Daodejing 
Zhuangzi 莊子 c.350–300 BCE Zhuangzi 
 
Key Daoist Terms mentioned 
 
Dao 道 the Way 
daojiao 道敎 Daoism 
daojia 道家 Daoist philosophy 
wuwei 無爲 (无为) non-action, effortless action 
ziran 自然 spontaneity, nature 
de 德 Virtue, power of Dao 
qi 氣 (气) vital energy 
tian 天 Heaven 
yin 陰 (阴) the shadow side 
yang 陽 (阳) the bright side 
ming 命 fate 
tianming 天命 mandate of Heaven 
tianrenyitong 天人一通 the unity of heaven and human 
being 
zhenren 眞人 (真人) true man 
shengren 聖人 (圣人) sage 
shenxian 神仙 one who achieves immortality 
zuowang 坐忘 siting in forgetfulness 
wuhua 物化 the transformation of things 
xianjie 縣解 (县解) freeing of the bound 
junzi 君子 the exemplary person 
xiangsheng 相生 being-born-together 
to engender one another 
heping 和平 universal peace 
pinghe 平和 inner peace 
hundun 混沌 chaos 
huangdi neijing 黃帝內經 The Emperor’s Inner Canon 
Taiping Dao 太平道 Dao of the Great Peace 






Human life cannot be experienced without pain and suffering, and yet our individual 
and collective struggle with this fact is evident in the world’s philosophies and 
religions. In Christianity, St. Paul says, ‘We know that the whole creation has been 
groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time’ (Rom. 8:22). Paul 
understands that suffering is not only applicable to certain creatures, of whom human 
beings first come to mind, but that ‘the whole creation’ undergoes suffering. In 
Buddhism, pain and suffering are arguably even more central: Buddha is reputed to 
have taught just two things: dukkha (suffering) and the cessation of dukkha.1 Damien 
Keown describes the ultimate goal of Buddhism as putting an end to suffering and 
rebirth.2 The Buddhist path culminates in reaching a state of nirvana, a state of 
freedom from suffering. The Zhuangzi, a classical Chinese Daoist text states, ‘Man 
lives his life in company with worry, and if he lives a long while till he’s dull and 
doddering, then he has spent that much time worrying instead of dying, a bitter lot 
indeed!’3 
Pain and suffering seem to be an inevitable aspect of life. We nonetheless tend 
to look for both for their explanation and a method for their cessation. In particular, 
religious believers usually understand their pain and suffering in relation to their 
beliefs in ultimate realities.4 The experience of pain and suffering are the root of 
what is theologically and philosophically known as problem of evil, we can ask: 
what exactly is evil? Answering this question will help us to understand and how 
humans have striven to settle the problem of evil (the apparent inconsistency 
between God’s existence and the existence of arbitrary evil and suffering) throughout 
history. 
                                                 
1 Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 59. 
2 Damien Keown, Buddhism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 43. 
3 Zhuangzi, chap. 18. (人之生也, 與憂俱生. 壽者惛惛, 久憂不死. 何故也!) Cited by Burton 
Watson, The Complete Works of Zhuangzi (New York: Colombia University Press, 2013), 139. Own 
translations when another translation is not cited.  
4 When I refer to ‘ultimate reality’ in this thesis, it means the supreme being or principle of each 
religion, e.g. God in Christianity and Dao in Daoism.  
 2 
The problem of evil has arguably become the most pressing issue for 
theologians and theist philosophers. Alfred North Whitehead says, ‘All 
simplifications of religious dogma are shipwrecked upon the rock of the problem of 
evil’.5 This one sentence from Whitehead reveals how important the problem of evil 
has been for religious believers. Many theologians have tried to settle the problem of 
evil throughout Christian history,6 and their efforts have been responses to these 
questions: how can we continue to affirm the lordship of God in the face of 
horrendous evil and if God is both omnipotent and good, why is there so much evil in 
the world? In confronting evil, some religions, such as Confucianism and Daoism, 
call upon fate (in Chinese, ming) as the answer, and others, like Buddhism, focus on 
the afterlife, or least, subsequent modes of consciousness to this particular 
consciousness we possess now. Philosophers have long been interested in the 
definition of evil and the origin of evil. Christian theologians, however, in addition to 
these questions, must also answer the problem of evil in relation to God’s existence, 
nature, and His relationship to human beings.  
 I believe that a study of the problem of evil should not overlook pain and 
suffering as it is experienced. Theodicies, if they are to be relevant, must not only be 
theoretically sound but also practically valuable, efficacious in remedying the 
psychological pain involved in experiencing pain and suffering. That the problem of 
evil is an existential problem and not just a theoretical one for theists and non-theists 
alike is illustrated by Elie Wiesel who introduces an episode from the death camp of 
Auschwitz in his book Night. One day, a young boy was hanged in front of all the 
prisoners because of a minor mistake. When the boy was dangling from the rope, 
Wiesel was asked by someone. ‘Where is God now?’ And a voice within him 
replied, ‘Where is He? Here He is – He is hanging here on this gallows’.7 Wiesel’s 
story, by focusing on the profound crisis of faith that suffering and death can bring 
about, demonstrated that the problem of evil is an existential problem, experienced 
by people here and now, challenging their most fundamental beliefs. My interest in 
                                                 
5 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 
1954), 74.  
6 See Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, eds., The Problem of Evil (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990); John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 2nd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, [1966] 2010). 
7 Elie Wiesel, Night (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 62. 
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the problem of evil started when I was in the military as a chaplain in South Korea. 
North Korea attacked the Cheonan warship and killed 46 naval men in 2010. In 
November of the same year, North Korea fired about 160 missiles at Yeonpyeong 
Island, and two South Korean soldiers died. Soldiers also died during training or 
while on duty, with some fighter pilots dying in jet crashes because of weather 
conditions deteriorating unexpectedly. As a military chaplain, I had to interpret this 
tragedy for Christian soldiers and the bereaved as they sought not only consolation 
but answers. This thesis is a product of my own practical experience of the problem 
of evil – not perhaps, as a victim, but as someone who needs to know how to respond 
practically to those who face pain and suffering and for whom retaining their 
Christian faith becomes an excruciating ordeal itself. 
 As a Korean, I would like to approach the problem of evil and theodicy not only 
from a Christian perspective but also from that of Asian traditions because Korean 
Christian history has been closely connected to East Asian religions, whose history in 
the region is much longer than Christianity since its arrival there. The Scottish 
United Presbyterian missionary John Ross published the first Korean translation of 
the New Testament in 1887.8 In this version, he translated John 1:1 like this: ‘In the 
beginning was Dao, and Dao was with God, and Dao was God’. Ross thought that 
the best Korean word for Logos was Dao (도, 道). Although Dao in Daoism and God 
in Christianity are very different – one being the impersonal or supra-personal 
principle of all that is and the other being the personal Creator and Lord of all 
contingent creation – Dao can be identified with God insofar as both are the ground 
of being or the source of all creatures, as I will argue in Chapter 4:3.  
Se Hyoung Lee explains that both God and Dao can be understood as the source 
of being, both being and becoming, both transcendent and immanent, and both 
female and male.9 According to Lee, Dao is Ultimate Reality, comparable to the 
Christian God for Asians. For this reason, a degree of syncretism between Daoism 
and Christianity in Asian contexts such as Korea is an important part of religious 
culture there. Koreans still use the word Dao in ordinary life, and people often read 
the Daoist Scriptures regardless of their religion. When preaching, many pastors 
                                                 
8 Harvie M. Conn, "Ross, John," in Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions, ed. Gerald H. 
Anderson (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 1998), 577. 
9 Se Hyoung Lee, “A Reinterpretation of God and Evil from the Taoist Perspective” PhD dissertation, 
Drew University, 1997, Drew Library Catalog (drew.a297522), 124-60. 
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often quote Daoist texts to support Biblical passages. It seems that regardless of their 
religion, Koreans accept and feel comfortable with Daoist teachings.10 
An interest in evil as a practical experience and my identity as a Korean 
Christian led me to ask this question: how can I develop the most relevant Christian 
theodicy for both the West and the East in a scientific age? To answer this question, 
among the various Christian theodicies, I will focus on evolutionary theodicy 
because of its relevance in today’s scientific age. Because the ideas of evolutionary 
theologians vary and a thesis such as this is limited in scope, I have chosen a 
prominent scholar, John Haught, as one of the most significant and prolific voices in 
bringing Christian theology and evolutionary biology into dialogue with one another. 
The main reason I chose Haught as interlocutor for a conversation with Daoism is 
that I think a case can be made to show that his evolutionary theology connects with 
Daoist philosophy very well – especially due to his understanding of creation as 
‘letting be’, his notion of the self-absenting of God, divine kenosis and the dark side 
of creation, as I will expound in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Haught has also expressed his 
interest in Daoist philosophy in his book11 and an interview, which suggests that he 
would have thought about such similarities himself.12 Among Asian religions, I have 
chosen Daoism in virtue of the fact that it has been closely related to Christianity in 
Korean Christian history.13  
Daoism, originating in China and whose sources are still in much dispute with 
regard to their date and composition, is an ancient and extremely rich tradition. 
Today, scholars and practitioners agree on a very broad distinction of ‘philosophical’ 
                                                 
10 I will explain the relationship between the Christian God and Dao in Daoism in Chapter 4.  
11 John F. Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO.: Westview 
Press, 2008), 81-84. 
12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgu4OkZ0brY&t=726s, 11'40"–15'40", accessed 22/10/17. 
13 When Christianity first spread to Korea around the latter half of the 19th Century, Daoism was 
prevalent among the lower classes, and Confucianism was the dominant religion among the powerful. 
Because Christianity spread first among the poorest and most powerless people in society, it became 
indigenized by Daoist culture. For example, Korean Christians call God ‘Hanŏnim (하느님)’, and 
Hanŏnim is the name of the Daoist god in Korea. Moreover, Korean churches have a dawn worship 
service every day at 4 or 5 a.m., which is very important for Daoism because Daoists believe that gods 
descend to the earth at dawn. Korean Christians also offer rice at church, calling it ‘elaborate rice 
(성미, 誠米)’, and this rice is used for community lunches on Sunday, pastors’ meals, and helping 
poor people. This practice originated from Wudoumi Dao (五斗米道, Dao of Five Pecks of Rice), 
which was a powerful denominations of Daoism. [Changsam Yang, "Dogyowa Hankuk Gidokkyowae 
Goangyesunge Dahan Yeongu (A Study on the Relationship between Daoist Rituals and Korean 
Christian Practices)," Minjokkoa Monhwa (People and Culture) 2, no. 0 (1994): 411-13.] 
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or ‘contemplative’ Daoism and so-called ‘religious’ Daoism. The first major Daoist 
texts that have been passed down to us in varying degrees of purity, the Daodejing 
and the Zhuangzi, are regarded as constituting the philosophical foundations for later 
religious embellishments and practices. I will focus on the Zhuangzi, which was 
written by the famous Daoist Zhuangzi (ca. 369–289 BCE) and his followers,14 
developing the central insights of Laozi (ca.570–479 BCE). Obviously Haught and 
Zhuangzi are writers from very different parts of the world, writing at very different 
times, but I believe meaningful dialogue between the two is possible for the reason 
that their subject matter is very similar, including cosmology, life and death, theory 
of creation, and transcendental being. This is in contrast to Laozi to some extent.15 
Korean Christian rituals have clearly been influenced by religious Daoism, but 
can the same be said of philosophical Daoism? Religious Daoism is vanishing as 
time goes by, but Daoist philosophical ideas have, in fact, merged with Koreans’ way 
of thinking at the most general level, placing the Daoist notions of wuwei (non-action 
or effortless action) and ziran (spontaneity or nature) at the heart of Korean 
vocabulary, forming a generic perspective that the things that happen in life are to be 
attributed to ming, and an ideal of the spiritual life of detachment partly based on the 
life and teaching of Zhuangzi – with many people still enjoying reading the 
Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Because philosophical Daoism remains palatable for 
most Koreans and still influences Koreans today, I believe it, rather than religious 
Daoism, is the most prudent choice for comparative work serving as the basis for an 
integral and relevant theodicy. Although Haught and Zhuangzi belonged to different 
                                                 
14 Among 33 chapters of the Zhuangzi, the first seven or Inner Chapters are generally considered to be 
genuine, and the Mixed Chapters (11) and the Outer Chapters (15) are recognized as Zhuangzi’s 
followers’ work. [Robert E. Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the 
Inner Chapters (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 6; A. C. Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 2001), 3.] 
15 While Laozi and Zhuangzi are often grouped together in virtue of their being the foundational 
Chinese Daoist writers, both the style and the content of their writings are different. Concerning death 
and life, for instance, while accepting death as the decree of fate (ming), Laozi aspires to live a long 
life and sees premature death in a negative way, that is, as the result of living in disharmony with Dao. 
On the other hand, Zhuangzi teaches passivity regarding life and death, advising against grief. The 
core notions of Dao and De in either thinker also appear quite different in terms of emphasis. Laozi 
emphasizes the nature of wuwei of Dao and De. Zhuangzi emphasizes the Dao’s nature of conceptual 
and metaphysical boundlessness and De’s nature of adapting fate. [Taik-Yong Lee, "Sasangguaneul 
Tonghae Bon Noza Zangza Cheolhakei Bigyo Yeongu (A Comparative Study on the Philosophy of 
Laozi and Zhuangzi through the View of Death and Life)," Dongyang Cheolhak Yeongu (Journal of 
Eastern Philosophy 77, no. 0 (2014): 130.] 
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times and cultures, I believe their thoughts can give us ideas for developing the most 
relevant theodicy for both the West and the East in a scientific age.  
 
(1) The Necessity and Purpose of This Study 
The Necessity of This Study 
Comparative study between science and religion is a growing field, but technically 
speaking, it is for the most part the comparative study between science and theology. 
Even though Christianity is perhaps the major and most familiar religion for Western 
scholars, it is obviously not homogeneous in the world, given the plurality of 
religions, religious denominations, worldviews and systems of thought. The 
discourse of Western scholars concerning Christian theology also does not apply well 
to East Asian religions which have different conceptions of ultimate reality and the 
good life. Here, I will briefly discuss the necessity of this comparative study between 
theology, science and Daoism.  
The first reason for the necessity of this study is raised by the question of 
whether science and religion are clearly distinct. The catch-all notion of ‘science’, 
which is employed in the science–religion dialogue, mainly denotes the natural 
sciences in their present mature state after their initial development in the 
seventeenth century. Modern people often assume that science and religion exist in 
conflict with each other, but many early scientists, or what were called ‘natural 
philosophers’ were also religious believers, and found that there was no essential 
conflict between their work and their religion. 
However, the relationship between natural philosophy and religion started to 
change with the emergence of a fully-fledged natural science based on physics, led 
by Nicolaus Copernicus, Johannes Kepler, Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Isaac 
Newton and Galileo Galilei, despite the fact that they would not have seen 
themselves as establishing what has now come to be seen by many people as an 
opposition between science and religion. Descartes classified mind and body in the 
Sixth Meditation of his Meditations on First Philosophy as two different 
substances.16 The Newtonian mechanistic paradigm assumed that the nature of 
                                                 
16 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 50-62. 
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(physical) reality, as mind-independent is nonetheless susceptible to systematic 
reduction to its essential components17 – a view which has been very influential in 
Western society at large and which is philosophically known as the view of 
‘reductionism’.18 These ideas have been of paramount important in our 
understanding of the relationship between science and religion, in establishing 
seemingly intractable dichotomy between science, dealing with what is mind-
independent (including the body) and religion, dealing with what is subjective or 
under the purview of the soul. Science and religion thus became entirely different 
fields, inevitably leading to either conflict or necessary reconciliation.  
In contrast, in East Asian thought, science and religion are not so clearly 
divided, and are not viewed in terms of conflict per se. Technically speaking, East 
Asian religions have contributed to the development of science in East Asia. Science 
in East Asia has often been developed out of religious necessity. For example, 
religious Daoism, which purses immortality and the elixir of life, led to the 
development of mineralogy, chemistry and medicine in China. Huangdi Neijing 
(黃帝內經, The Emperor’s Inner Canon), an important Daoist text, which probably 
dates to the first century BCE,19 has been regarded as the fundamental doctrinal 
source for Chinese medicine for more than two millennia, and is still used by 
practitioners of traditional medicine, including herbal medicine and acupuncture. 
If science and religion are not divided so clearly in some religions, or, to be 
more exact, if some people do not accept that science and religion are different or 
constitute different realms of thought and enquiry, dialogue and conflict models 
between science and religion constructed by Western scholars may be insufficient 
and in need of rectification. In other words, there are people for whom there is no 
sharp distinction between science and religion, and for these people there is no 
conflict between science and religion, in contrast to those in the West who are feel 
either that science and religion are in conflict or that science and religion are not in 
conflict and endeavour to demonstrate such. Therefore, the conversation between 
                                                 
17 Lous Heshusius, "The Newtonian Mechanistic Paradigm, Special Education, and Contours of 
Alternatives: An Overview," Journal of Learning Disabilities 22, no. 7 (1989): 405. 
18 Steven Horst, Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23. 
19 Nathan Sivin, "Huang Ti Nei Ching," in Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide, ed. Michael 
Loewe (Berkeley, CA: Society for the Study of Early China & the Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California, 1993), 199-201. 
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science and religion should not be restricted to the paradigms of Western systems of 
thinking, but should be also open to Eastern ways of thinking.  
The second reason for the necessity of this study is the divergence in religious 
beliefs and practices to the extent that what a religion actually may be is a matter of 
contention. Can religions be defined in one sentence or one paragraph? Consider the 
fact that according to the most accurate studies available, what westerners would 
classify as ‘religious’ beliefs and practices such as veneration of ancestors and 
ritualistic offerings to gods and spirits immanent in the world are not considered by 
most Chinese citizens today as religious practices at all.20 
Most scholars in the Western science–religion dialogue presuppose that some 
identifiable or at least conceptually conceivable Ultimate Reality exists, and that 
Ultimate Reality is most often the Christian God, albeit differently conceived. The 
following questions are important issues in the science and religion dialogue, but 
they presuppose some Ultimate Reality about which we can talk about and debate: 
‘Does science rule out a personal God? Does evolution exclude God’s existence? 
Was the universe created? Does the universe have a purpose?’ 
However, whether there is an Ultimate Reality posited in other religions such as 
Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism is debatable. Tian (天, Heaven) in 
Confucianism and Dao (道, Way) in Daoism are entirely different from the God of 
Christianity, Islam and Judaism, who is usually regarded as a personal reality with 
certain wants and intentions for the world it made. If the existence and nature of 
Ultimate Reality is vague in some religions, and if it has totally different manifest 
properties to the Christian God (even if It does exist), we have to raise new questions 
for the conversation between science and religion, for key notions which usually 
feature in that dialogue, such as divine ‘purpose’, ‘intervention’, and ‘causality’ have 
to be re-interpreted. 
Moreover, the Western science–religion dialogue usually assumes, following 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, that Ultimate Reality created the world in the 
                                                 
20 For modern Chinese, to be ‘religious’ is to be a member of a centralised institution, which their 
practices and days of veneration of qingming fall outside the realm of. Another surprising fact is that 
only 0.6 of modern Chinese identify themselves as Daoist. This is in spite of the fact that Daoist 
philosophy and symbolism is ubiquitous in China as the home of Daoism both philosophically and 
religiously. [Rodney Stark and Xiuhua Wang, A Star in the East: The Rise of Christianity in China 
(West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press, 2015), 7.] 
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‘beginning’ – positing an absolute beginning of all reality other than Ultimate 
Reality, created by It ex nihilo. In fact, the Western scientific revolution has 
challenged such traditional ideas of Christianity, especially since the evolutionary 
biology of Darwin. This is because evolution is often regarded as the theory that 
definitively contradicts the biblical story of creation.21 In contrast, the creation of 
Dao in Daoism can be seen as compatible with evolution. According to the 
Daodejing, ‘Dao produced the One. The One produced two. Two produced three. 
Three produced all creatures’.22 Creation in Daoism is an evolutionary creation in 
which each entity originated from the Ultimate One or Oneness. But for Daoism, 
Ultimate Reality also transcends the Being/Becoming dichotomy present in Western 
philosophy and theology. The One of Christianity is modelled on the Platonic One of 
the immutable Form of Beauty (which in turn was modelled on the immutable 
Parmenidean One), standing in opposition to pure change or becoming, as 
exemplified in the Heraclitean flux23 or the Bergsonian élan vital (vital force) or 
‘duration’24 – philosophical schools which believed that no thing exists, only 
constant change which can be experienced but not known. 
Yet another issue in the Western science–religion dialogue that I would like to 
raise is the problem of so-called ‘natural’ evil, by which is traditionally meant that 
which ‘naturally’ or by inevitability causes suffering and death, such as earthquakes 
and floods. The reason why natural evil is a severe problem in the discussion is that 
the Christian God is assumed to be perfectly good or ‘omnibenevolent’ and to have 
created the world itself as ‘good’ given that anything that God does cannot not be 
good. The Dao in Daoism is not so defined and, we might say, imprisoned by the 
categories of good and evil. According to the Daodejing, ‘Heaven and earth are not 
benevolent (jen, humane)’.25 The expression ‘heaven and earth’ is a different 
expression of Dao, meaning that which is the province of human action and influence 
                                                 
21 Some evolutionary theologians argue that the Big Bang theory of modern cosmology can be seen to 
support the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, in the sense that the Big Bang suggests a beginning of both 
space and time. 
22 Daodejing, chap. 42. (道生一, 一生二, 二生三, 三生萬物.) 
23 Gay Watson, A Philosophy of Emptiness (London: Reaktion Books, 2014), 63. 
24 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme, New ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1999), 12-13. 
25 Daodejing, chap. 5. (天地不仁.) 
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(earth) and that which is uninterested or beyond the influence of the actions of 
human beings (heaven) – revealing a property of Dao. In light of its different 
conception of Ultimate Reality and the different conceptual frameworks underlying 
its moral universe, Daoism forces us to rethink whether we can actually ask Ultimate 
Reality to account for evil. 
This is not to say that any particular religion is better-suited than another for the 
conversation with science. Rather, I suggest that science–religion dialogue should 
subdivide according to properties of religions – their underlying conceptual 
frameworks and conceptions of Ultimate Reality – and the dialogue between science 
and particular religions can help the dialogue between science and other religions 
globally. The conversation between science and Christian theology can learn from 
the conversation between science and Daoism. For these reasons, this comparative 
study between theology, science and Daoism is necessary for us in developing an 
integral theodicy for a pluralistic and scientific age.  
 
The Purpose of This Study 
The main aim of this study is to develop Christian theodicies to inform both the West 
and the East in a scientific age by comparing the evolutionary theology of Haught 
and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi. I will suggest that Western evolutionary 
theodicies would benefit from engagement with the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi, 
and that the evolutionary theodicy of John Haught might be of benefit in an Asian 
Christian context. I also expect that the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi can be seen in 
a new light through conversation with the evolutionary theology of Haught and 
evolutionary science generally. I hope that this thesis can be a catalyst for 
comparative study between religion and science and between Christianity and 
Daoism.  
With regard to evolutionary theology, many scholars have discussed the 
problem of evil over the last 30 years. Jeff Astley,26 David Bradnick,27 Jonathan 
                                                 
26 Jeff Astley, "Evolution and Evil," in Reading Genesis after Darwin, ed. Stephen C. Barton and 
David Wilkinon (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 163-80. 
27 David Bradnick, "Entropy, the Fall, and Tillich: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Original Sin," 
Theology & Science 7, no. 1 (2009): 67-83. 
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Chappell,28 David Fergusson,29 Robert Fleck,30 Michael Fuller,31 John Haught, Mark 
Harris,32 Jürgen Moltmann,33 Arthur Peacocke,34 Ted Peters,35 John Polkinghorne,36 
                                                 
28 Jonathan Chappell, "Raymund Schwager: Integrating the Fall and Original Sin with Evolutionary 
Theory," Theology & Science 10, no. 2 (2012): 179-98; Jonathan Chappell, "Rethinking the Historical 
Fall in the Light of Evolution: F.R. Tennant and After," Science & Christian Belief 25, no. 2 (2013): 
131-54. 
29 David Fergusson, The Cosmos and the Creator: An Introduction to the Theology of Creation 
(London: SPCK, 1998); David Fergusson, "Darwin and Providence," in Theology after Darwin, ed. 
Michael S. Northcott and R. J. Berry (Milton Keyes: Paternoster, 2009), 73-88. 
30 Robert K. Fleck, "Natural Selection and the Problem of Evil: An Evolutionary Model with 
Application to an Ancient Debate," Zygon 46, no. 3 (2011): 561-87. 
31 Michael Fuller, Atoms and Icons: A Discussion of the Relationships between Science and Theology 
(London: Mowbray, 1995). 
32 Mark Harris, The Nature of Creation: Examining the Bible and Science (Durham: Acumen 
Publishing Ltd, 2013); Mark Harris, "Will Resurrection Be a Law of Nature? Science and Divine 
Action at the End of the World," in Chance or Providence? Religious Perspectives on Divine Action, 
ed. Louise Hickman (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 21-44; Mark 
Harris, "Do the Miracles of Jesus Contradict Science?," in Reason and Wonder: Why Science and 
Faith Need Each Other (London: SPCK Publishing, 2016), 169-84. 
33 Jürgen Moltmann, Creating a Just Future: The Politics of Peace and the Ethics of Creation in a 
Threatened World, trans. John Bowden (London ; Philadelphia: SCM Press ; Trinity Press 
International, 1989); Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic 
Dimensions, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1990); Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: 
The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R.A. Wilson and 
John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). 
34 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); Arthur Peacocke, "A Map of Scientific Knowledge: Genetics, 
Evolution, and Theology," in Science and Theology: The New Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 189-210; Arthur Peacocke, "The Cost of New Life," in The Work of 
Love, ed. John Polkinghorne (Mich. ; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001), 21-42. 
35 Ted Peters, "Science and Theology: Toward Consonance," in Science and Theology: The New 
Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 11-42; Ted Peters, "Constructing 
a Theology of Evolution: Building on John Haught," Zygon 45, no. 4 (2010): 921-37. 
36 John Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1987); John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1998); John Polkinghorne, Faith, Science and Understanding (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000); John Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter 
with Reality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: 
God's Interaction with the World (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, [1989] 2005); John 
Polkinghorne, Quarks, Chaos & Christianity: Questions to Science and Religion, Rev. and updated 
ed. (New York: Crossroad Pub. Co., 2005); John Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of 
Science and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); John Polkinghorne, Theology in the 
Context of Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); John Polkinghorne, "Reflections of a 
Bottom-up Thinker," in God and the Scientist: Exploring the Work of John Polkinghorne, ed. Fraser 
Watts and Christopher C. Knight (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2012), 1-12. 
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Holmes Rolston,37 Michael Ruse,38 Robert Russell,39 Gloria Schaab,40 Christopher 
Southgate,41 Thomas Tracy42 and Wesley Wildman43 (in alphabetical order) are 
representative scholars. John Haught has been one of the leading thinkers throughout, 
                                                 
37 Holmes Rolston, "Kenosis and Nature," in The Work of Love, ed. John Polkinghorne (Mich. ; 
Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001), 43-65; Holmes Rolston, "Naturalizing and Systematizing Evil," in Is 
Nature Ever Evil? Religion, Science, and Value, ed. Willem B. Drees (London: Routledge, 2003), 67-
86. 
38 Michael Ruse, "Atheism, Naturalism and Science: Three in One?," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Science and Religion, ed. Peter Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 229-43; 
Michael Ruse and Joseph Travis, Evolution: The First Four Billion Years (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 2009). 
39 Robert J. Russell, "Does the "God Who Acts" Really Act in Nature?," in Science and Theology: The 
New Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 77-102; Robert J. Russell, 
Cosmology, Evolution, and Resurrection Hope: Theology and Science in Creative Mutual Interaction, 
ed. Carl S. Helrich (Kitchener, Ont.; South Australia: Pandora Press; ATF Press, 2006); Robert J. 
Russell, "Recent Theological Interpretations of Evolution," Theology & Science 11, no. 3 (2013): 169-
84. 
40 Gloria L. Schaab, "The Creative Suffering of the Triune God: An Evolutionary Panentheistic 
Paradigm," Theology & Science 5, no. 3 (2007): 289-304. 
41 Christopher Southgate, ed. God, Humanity and the Cosmos: A Textbook in Science and Religion 
(London: T & T Clark, 1999); Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and 
the Problem of Evil (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008); Christopher Southgate, "Re-
Reading Genesis, John, and Job: A Christian Response to Darwinism," Zygon 46, no. 2 (2011): 370-
95; Christopher Southgate, "Divine Glory in a Darwinian World," Zygon 49, no. 4 (2014): 784-807; 
Christopher Southgate, "God's Creation Wild and Violent, and Our Care for Other Animals," 
Perspectives on Science & Christian Faith 67, no. 4 (2015): 245-53; Christopher Southgate, "Cosmic 
Evolution and Evil," in The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil, ed. Chad Meister and Paul 
K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 147-64. 
42 Thomas F. Tracy, "Evolutionary Theologies and Divine Action," Theology & Science 6, no. 1 
(2008): 107-16. 
43 Wesley J. Wildman, "Incongruous Goodness, Perilous Beauty, Disconcerting Truth: Ultimate 
Reality and Suffering in Nature," in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem 
of Evil in Nature, ed. Nancey Murphy, Robert J. Russell, and William Stoeger (Berkeley, CA & 
Vatican City: CTNS & Vatican Observatory, 2007). According to Wildman, ‘determinate-entity 
theism’ affirms that the world we inhabit is the best of all possible worlds—a view which is 
fundamentally optimistic and undeniably anthropocentric (but not to the detriment of other species).. 
‘Process theism’ has the intention of delivering us from an unhealthy obsession with an illusory image 
of God, arguing that divine omnipotence is a concept which needs to be dropped from our 
categorisations about God. ‘Ground-of-being theism’ tends to regard suffering as ontologically co-
primal with creativity by refusing that God can be unambiguously morally good. This view does not 
regard suffering as an unwanted side effect of creation (or natural processes) and regards God as the 
One who is beyond narrowly human concepts of goodness and justice. Wildman argues that among 
these theisms, ground-of-being theism can best deal with the problem of suffering in nature.  
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authoring many books 44 and articles45 about evolutionary theology. In addition, his 
work has received critical appreciation from other scholars.46 I will not cover all of 
the thought of either Haught or Zhuangzi, but instead I will focus on their ideas 
concerning the problem of evil, and develop them in harmony with evolutionary 
science. This is primarily because modern evolutionary science has brought a sharp 
focus to bear on the problem of evil, especially when it comes to ‘natural’ evil in the 
natural world and this is what Haught’s evolutionary theology can be used to 
approach most directly. 
In his work, Haught argues first that evolution does not rule out God’s existence 
but reveals the God of grace ‘letting the world be itself’, second that there is purpose 
or direction in evolution, third that the ‘Christ-event’ shows the self-emptying or 
kenosis of God for all creatures, and fourth that God’s creation was not complete at 
the outset but will be completed in the eschatological future (new creation). In my 
view, Haught has thereby suggested comprehensive solutions to the most important 
issues of evolutionary theology. Peters’ assessment of Haught’s work suggests that 
Haught has helped ‘to draw a blueprint to guide the construction of a healthy theistic 
                                                 
44 John F. Haught, The Promise of Nature: Ecology and Cosmic Purpose (New York: Paulist Press, 
2004); John F. Haught, Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1995); John F. Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution (New York: 
Paulist Press, 2001); John F. Haught, Deeper Than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in the Age of 
Evolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2003); John F. Haught, Is Nature Enough? Meaning and 
Truth in the Age of Science (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John F. 
Haught, Christianity and Science: Toward a Theology of Nature (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
2007); John F. Haught, God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris, and 
Hitchens (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008); Haught, God after Darwin: A 
Theology of Evolution; John F. Haught, Making Sense of Evolution: Darwin, God, and the Drama of 
Life (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010); John F. Haught, Science and Faith: A 
New Introduction (New York: Paulist Press, 2012). 
45 John F. Haught, "In Search of a God for Evolution: Paul Tillich and Pierre Teilhard De Chardin," 
Zygon, no. 3 (2002): 539-54; John F. Haught, "The Boyle Lecture 2003: Darwin, Design and the 
Promise of Nature," Science & Christian Belief 17, no. 1 (2005): 5-20; John F. Haught, "True Union 
Differentiates: A Response to My Critics," Science & Christian Belief 17, no. 1 (2005): 57-70; John F. 
Haught, "Darwin and Contemporary Theology," Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture & Ecology 
11, no. 1 (2007): 44-57; John F. Haught, "Theology, Evolution, and the Human Mind: How Much Can 
Biology Explain?," Zygon, no. 4 (2009): 921-31; John F. Haught, "Is Physics Fundamental? Robert 
Russell on Divine Action," Zygon, no. 1 (2010): 213-20; John F. Haught, "Darwin, Teilhard, and the 
Drama of Life," Teilhard Studies, no. 63 (2011): 1-22. 
46 Ann M. Michaud, "John Haught - Finding Consonance between Religion and Science," Zygon 45, 
no. 4 (2010): 905-20; Peters, "Constructing a Theology of Evolution: Building on John Haught," 921-
37; Gloria L. Schaab, "An Evolving Vision of God: The Theology of John F. Haught," Zygon 45, no. 
4 (2010): 897-904; Robert E. Ulanowicz, "From Pessimism to Hope: A Natural Progression," Zygon 
45, no. 4 (2010): 939-56. 
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evolution’.47 Other scholars, such as Gloria Schaab, Robert Ulanowicz and Ann 
Michaud, likewise praise his work.48 
Books and articles providing comparative study of Christianity and 
Confucianism abound.49 There is also much material providing comparative study of 
western philosophy and Daoism.50 However, little has been attempted thus far by 
way of comparative study of Christianity and Daoism,51 and most of what is 
available is not concerned with the problem of evil. I believe this is in part because 
theodicy has not been an important topic in Daoism, for the reason that Daoists 
generally accept evil as fate (ming) (Chapters 5:1, 6:2) and that Dao manifests both 
good and evil. Daoism emphasizes a cosmic harmony which is only possible if there 
is both the bright side (yang) and the shadow side (yin) (Chapters 5:2, 7:3).52 For 
                                                 
47 Peters, "Constructing a Theology of Evolution: Building on John Haught," 936. 
48 See footnote number 46. 
49 Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study (Tokyo ; New York: Kodansha 
International, 1977); John D. Young, Confucianism and Christianity: The First Encounter (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1983); Xinzhong Yao, Confucianism and Christianity: A 
Comparative Study of Jen and Agape (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 1996); Heup Young 
Kim, Wang Yang-Ming and Karl Barth: A Confucian-Christian Dialogue (Lanham, Md: University 
Press of America, 1996); Yanxia Zhao, Father and Son in Confucianism and Christianity: A 
Comparative Study of Xunzi and Paul (Brighton England: Sussex Academic Press, 2007); Robert C. 
Neville, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2000); Robert C. Neville, Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a 
Comparative Context (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2008). 
50 Kuang-Ming Wu, "Dream in Nietzsche and Chuang Tzu," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13, no. 4 
(1986): 371-82; G. E. R. Lloyd and Nathan Sivin, The Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in 
Early China and Greece (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Günter Wohlfart and Marty 
Heitz, "Heidegger and Laozi: Wu (Nothing) - on Chapter 11 of the Daodejing," Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2003): 39-59; G. E. R. Lloyd, Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections: 
Philosophical Perspectives on Greek and Chinese Science and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004); Alan Fox, "Process Ecology and the “Ideal” Dao," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32, 
no. 1 (2005): 47-57; Katrin Froese, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Daoist Thought: Crossing Paths in-
Between (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006); Geling Shang, Liberation as Affirmation: The Religiosity 
of Zhuangzi and Nietzsche (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006); Mario Wenning, "Kant and Daoism on 
Nothingness," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 4 (2011): 556-68. 
51 George D. Chryssides, "God and the Tao," Religious Studies 19, no. 01 (1983): 1-11; Hans Küng 
and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese Religions (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 159-93; Heup 
Young Kim, A Theology of Dao (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2017). 
52 Contrary to the old culture based on the fluid equilibrium (the harmony of yin and yang), modern 
Chinese culture after Mao Tse Tung has focused on ‘the modern scheme of history with its ideas of 
progress and linear, purpose-orientated time’ (93). Although the relatively recent liberalisation of the 
Chinese economy has brought rapid industrialisation to China, Moltmann suggests the need for a 
balance between equilibrium and progress: ‘The ancient Chinese way of thinking in dynamic 
harmonies full of tension is again of inestimable significance for the new paradigm of society brought 
into a balance with the nature of earth which enables it to survive and to this extent is the paradigm of 
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Daoism, good and evil are the sole preserve of intentional human action, rather than 
originating in Ultimate Reality (Chapters 5:2, 6:3). 
I will therefore identify evil in the Zhuangzi by an indirect method. I will find 
the opposites of what is regarded as the good to be pursued in the Zhuangzi, and 
then, I will compare them with equivalent objects, qualities, or states in Haught’s 
evolutionary theodicy. Although the opposite of good does not always mean bad in 
the Zhuangzi, the opposites can provide a clue to reconstructing the real meaning of 
evil for Zhuangzi, even if the text does not designate them using the word ‘evil’. My 
method, then, is to identify what is ‘evil’ in the Zhuangzi by looking for what could 
be called by the author as ‘an evil’. 
The similarities between Haught and Zhuangzi with regard to the problem of 
evil will be the point of departure for this study, and the differences between the two 
thinkers will supply ideas to be used in developing the evolutionary theodicy of 
Haught for constructing an integral, holistic theodicy.  
This thesis may be the first comparative study between evolutionary theodicy 
and Daoism. It will demonstrate the similarities and differences between 
evolutionary theodicy and Daoism regarding the problem of evil and develop the 
debate or dialogue between religion and science, including Daoism, serving as a 
catalyst for further study.  
 
(2) Methods of Study 
The Conversation between Religion and Science 
Ian Barbour classifies the relationship between religion and science into four types: 
Conflict, Independence, Dialogue and Integration.53 Barbour’s ‘integration’ model 
seems to be manifested in three forms in the conversation between evolutionary 
biology and theology. First, is ‘natural theology’, the idea that the existence of God 
                                                 
a post-industrial society’ (101). [See Moltmann, Creating a Just Future: The Politics of Peace and the 
Ethics of Creation in a Threatened World, 87-101.] 
53 ‘Conflict’ is the view that science is incompatible with any form of religion. ‘Independence’ is the 
theory that religion and science are two different fields and can be distinguished by the questions they 
ask, the domains to which they refer, and the methods they employ. ‘Dialogue’ is the view that 
religion and science can speak to and listen to each other. ‘Integration’ is discussed among those who 
seek a more systematic and extensive partnership between religion and science. [Ian G. Barbour, 
When Science Meets Religion (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2000), 7-38.] 
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as a hypothesis can be supported by the evidence of design in nature, and science has 
actually helped us to become aware it. Second, the ‘theology of nature’ is the idea 
that scientific theories can affect the reformulation of certain religious doctrines even 
though the main ideas of religion lie outside science. Third, ‘systematic synthesis’ is 
the idea that ‘both science and religion contribute to the development of an inclusive 
metaphysics, such as that of process philosophy’.54 
 John Haught similarly suggests four distinct ways in which science and religion 
can be related to each other: Conflict, Contrast, Contact and Confirmation. Conflict 
is ‘the conviction that science and religion are fundamentally irreconcilable’. 
Contrast is ‘the claim that there can be no genuine conflict since religion and science 
are each responding to radically different questions’. Contact is ‘an approach that 
looks for dialogue, interaction, and possible “consonance” between science and 
religion, and especially for ways in which science shapes religious and theological 
understanding’. Contact means that religion must not disregard new scientific 
developments because science and religion inevitably interact with each other. 
Confirmation is ‘a somewhat quieter, but extremely important perspective that 
highlights the ways in which, at a very deep level, religion supports and nourishes 
the entire scientific enterprise’.55 Confirmation implies that religion can pave the way 
for some scientific ideas and discoveries.  
According to Barbour, Haught’s first two categories, Conflict and Contrast, are 
identical with his own of Conflict and Independence. Haught’s third category, 
Contact, combines Barbour’s categories of Dialogue and Integration. Haught’s fourth 
category, Confirmation, is treated in the category of Dialogue by Barbour.56 In my 
opinion, the most important difference between the two scholars is their method of 
explanation. Barbour classified ‘most’ debates about science and religion into four 
types and analysed each category’s merits and demerits. On the other hand, Haught 
selected ‘useful’ conversations about religion and science, categorised them into four 
types, and explained them from the first-person point of view. Haught excludes less 
useful discourses in his types (e.g. creationism and concordism), and he tries to prove 
the usefulness of all four of his types for each topic. Haught prefers the categories of 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 27-28. 
55 Haught, Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation, 9. 
56 Barbour, 4. 
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Contact and Confirmation, but he also tries to show the importance of the categories 
called Conflict and Contrast. This is different from Barbour, who classifies scientific 
creationism as belonging to the category of Integration, while Haught calls scientific 
creationism and concordism ‘conflation’. Haught rules out conflation in his typology 
because he believes that conflation is an inadequate attempt to prevent conflicts by 
commingling science with belief inappropriately, and the fusion of science and 
religion obscures any real relationship between them.57  
In this thesis, my methodology concerning the relationship between religion and 
science will be similar to those underlying the categories or typologies of ‘Contact’ 
(Haught) and ‘Integration’ (Barbour). I will try to develop the theodicies of Haught 
and Zhuangzi in conjunction with evolutionary science. Like Haught’s category of 
‘Contact’, I will examine how science can help to shape the theories of Haught and 
Zhuangzi. As the category of ‘Integration’ by Barbour signifies, I will seek a more 
extensive partnership between science and the ideas of the two thinkers regarding the 
problem of evil. This perspective is sometimes called ‘theistic evolution’, but I will 
use the term ‘evolutionary theology’.58 When I discuss the problem of evil and the 
righteousness of God, I will use the term ‘evolutionary theodicy’.  
 
The Conversation between Christian Theology and Daoism 
In comparing religions, we must have in mind a method for doing so. Jonathan Smith 
is one representative scholar who studies methodology in regard to the comparative 
                                                 
57 Haught, Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation, 13-14. 
58 It is impossible to provide a coherent general categorisation of ‘evolutionary theology’, covering all 
scholars who undertake comparative study between evolutionary science and Christianity, because 
these scholars have very diverse opinions according to the degree to which they accept evolutionary 
science. I will discuss in detail in Chapter 2:1, ‘What are Evolution and Evolutionary Theology?’ 
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study of religions,59 and he has published widely in this field.60 He asks, ‘Is 
comparison an enterprise of magic or science?’61 He criticizes previous comparative 
work as more impressionistic than methodical and summarises the modes of 
comparison that have been utilized for the last 2,500 years into four types. First is the 
‘ethnographic’ approach, which is based on travellers’ impressions, so it depends on 
‘intuition, a chance association, or the knowledge one happens to have’.62 According 
to him, this comparison lacks the proper basis of comparisons and is not systematic. 
Second is the ‘encyclopaedic’ tradition, which compares data just because they 
cohabit within some category, providing no clues about the method of comparison. 
This approach consists of ‘contextless lists held together by mere surface 
association’,63 so that data are not compared or explained properly. Third is the 
‘morphological’ approach, which arranges individual items in a hierarchical way of 
increased complexity and organization, ignoring categories of historical and 
geographical context. This approach presupposes an a priori notion of economy in 
which there are few ‘original elements’ (the archetypes) from which complex 
systems are generated.64 Fourth is the ‘evolutionary’ approach, which is an 
                                                 
59 Braun and McCutcheon praise Smith as ‘one of the towering intellectual figures of his generation’ 
in the study of religion. ‘This’, they say, is ‘not only because of the impressive variety of data 
domains at his command and his ever startling theoretical thought concerning these data, but also 
because of his continued willingness to serve the academy as scholar, teacher, thoughtful leader in the 
proper role and place of education’. [Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon, eds., Introducing 
Religion: Essays in Honor of Jonathan Z. Smith (London ; Oakville: Equinox Pub., 2008), xv.] 
Moreover, two well-known books about comparative religious study reflect Smith’s influence. A 
Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age was titled in reference to Smith’s 
article, “In Comparison a Magic Dwells,” and another book about comparative study, composed by 
sixteen famous contributors was entitled, Introducing Religion: Essays in Honor of Jonathan Z. Smith, 
despite the fact that the content of the book is not related to Smith. 
60 Jonathan Z. Smith, Map Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions (Leiden: Brill, 1978); 
Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982); Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987); Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early 
Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); 
Jonathan Z. Smith, Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004). 
61 Jonathan Z. Smith, "In Comparison a Magic Dwells," in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative 
Religion in the Postmodern Age, ed. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2000), 26. 
62 Ibid., 27. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Smith acknowledges that Mircea Eliade left behind remarkable achievements in religious studies 
based on the morphological approach. However, Smith criticises the philosophical presuppositions of 
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unauthorized combination between the morphological approach and the new 
framework of the evolutionists. This approach allows comparativists to draw data 
(cultural materials) ignoring the given time and place, and locate them in a series 
from the simplest to the more complex. The simplest was assumed chronologically 
and logically prior.65  
 Based on these criticisms of previous methods, Smith suggests the following 
four moments of comparative work: description, comparison, redescription and 
rectification. ‘Description’ is a process that comprises the anthropological or 
historical dimensions of the study. ‘Comparison’ has to be undertaken both in terms 
of aspects and relations held to be significant, and with respect to some category, 
theory, question, or model of interest to comparativists. He claims that the goal of 
comparison is the ‘redescription of the exempla (each in light of the other) and a 
rectification of the academic categories in relation to which they have been 
imagined’.66 There is then a redescription of compared materials in the light of 
others. Rectification modifies previous academic categories based on redescription. 
Smith claims that ‘[P]rogress is made not so much by the uncovering of new facts or 
documents as by looking again with new perspectives on familiar materials’.67 
Therefore, matters of comparative methods are central to him, and four moments are 
needed in comparative work. Other scholars, such as William Paden,68 have 
considered similar methods to Smith’s. 
 While Smith’s study is classified as ‘comparative religion’, there is a prominent 
scholar in ‘comparative theology’, too: Francis Clooney.69 According to Clooney, 
                                                 
Eliade’s approach because they are based on the Romantic and Neoplatonic Idealism, and his 
approach is designed to exclude the historical. (ibid., 29.) 
65 Ibid., 28-29. 
66 Smith, "The "End" of Comparison: Redescription and Rectification," in A Magic Still Dwells: 
Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, 239. 
67 Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late 
Antiquity, viii. 
68 William E. Paden, "Elements of a New Comparativism," in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative 
Religion in the Postmodern Age, ed. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2000), 182-92. 
69 Francis Clooney and Robert C. Neville are eminent scholars in comparative theology. Neville 
focuses on Confucianism and Buddhism in his comparative study, and Clooney concentrates on 
Hinduism. While Neville is philosophical and reflective, Clooney is practical and participative. 
According to Clooney, Neville’s thought draw him toward ‘subtle distinctions perfected with an air of 
detachment’, but Clooney’s work moves toward ‘deeper engagement in stubborn particularities’. 
[Francis X. Clooney, Comparative Theology: Deep Learning across Religious Borders (Malden, 
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comparative religion emphasizes a neutral perspective with respect to what the 
comparison might imply religiously or where it might lead.70 On the other hand, 
comparative theology seeks explanations ‘which are rooted in a particular faith 
tradition but which, from that foundation, venture into learning from one or more 
other faith traditions’.71 Clooney puts stress on Christian identity, and also thinks 
Christianity should be open to other religious traditions. He calls his methodology 
‘including theology’, which means that he brings what he learns from other traditions 
into his reconsideration of Christian identity.72  
For performing a comparative study between Christian theology and Daoism, I 
will be mainly following the comparison theories of both Smith and Clooney because 
their methodologies are particularly helpful for my study. First of all, Smith’s 
emphasis on the importance of differences between religions in comparative study 
will guide me in finding the relevant differences between the evolutionary theodicy 
of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi and rethinking Haught’s ideas in 
the light of these differences. Second, Smith thinks that ‘x resembles y’ is logically 
incomplete, and recommends that propositions of comparison such as ‘x resembles y 
more than z with respect to …’ or ‘x resembles y more than w resembles z with 
respect to …’ are far more useful.73  
Now, my comparative work will not simply claim ‘the evolutionary theodicy of 
Haught is similar (or different) to the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi’. My 
comparison will be not dyadic but triadic: other Christian theodicies will be the third 
comparison group. I expect that the relationship between the evolutionary theodicy 
of Haught and other Christian theodicies both uncovers and better informs the 
dialogue between science and religion, and the relationship between the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi uncovers what genuine 
dialogue between Christianity and Daoism consists in. The topics for each section 
will be the criteria of the comparative work; for example, ‘Christian theologians have 
                                                 
Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 47. Neville, Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in 
a Comparative Context, 127-48.] 
70 Clooney, 9. 
71 Ibid., 10. 
72 Ibid., 16. 
73 Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late 
Antiquity, 51. 
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said the following about topic z. However, John Haught says this in harmony with 
evolutionary science (Religion and Science). Daoism in the Zhuangzi is more similar 
to or more different from the evolutionary theodicy of Haught than traditional 
Christian theodicies with respect to y about the topic z (Christianity and Daoism)’.  
As Clooney’s comparative theology connects traditional theological concerns 
with the actual study of another tradition,74 I will combine Zhuangzi’s ideas with the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught. My goal in this thesis is to supplement Christian 
theodicy with the ideas of Daoism as Clooney suggests, as the goal of his 
comparative theology.  
Based on Smith’s four steps of comparative work and Clooney’s comparative 
theology, I would like to define my own five steps of comparative study: description, 
comparison, generalisation, differentiation and supplementation.  
In the first step, ‘description’, I will describe the evolutionary theodicy of 
Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi separately according to each 
chapter’s topic. In the second step, ‘comparison’, I will try to find similarities 
between these two thinkers. In the third step, ‘generalisation’, I will generalise my 
ideas discussed in the second step. This step will reveal how the ideas of two thinkers 
of different times and cultures can be discussed together using the same terms. 
Generalised forms of theodicies by Haught and Zhuangzi will contribute to a broader 
conversation between Christianity and Daoism and between science and religion. In 
the fourth step, ‘differentiation’, I will explore the differences between Haught and 
Zhuangzi. In the fifth step, ‘supplementation’, I will explore how the Christian 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught can be developed further through the utilisation of 
the Daoist thought of Zhuangzi. It will be paramount not to present the similarities in 
a simplistic way or think that something I find is particular to a certain religion75 
throughout my steps ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’. By this I simply mean that 
for this study to be objective, personal prejudices must not be allowed to influence 
the analysis. It is imperative to remain open to learning from other religions76 
throughout the methodological step of ‘supplementation’, in that what we may 
sometimes take to be ‘unique’ to a certain religion – perhaps being that which drove 
                                                 
74 Clooney, 10. 
75 Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown, 6. 
76 Clooney, 16. 
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us to belief in the first place – may not actually be unique in the history of ideas and 
religions. Supplementation, when it operates correctly, leaves open the possibility of 
one religion or philosophy learning from another, clarifying or deepening its insights. 
My methodology is similar to Smith’s in the way that it puts the same premium 
on differences and similarities between religions. I agree with Smith’s argument that 
the end of comparison cannot be the act of comparison itself.77 Therefore, I will not 
cease my comparative work at the point of comparing the two thinkers, and I will try 
to generalise the ideas that are present. However, while Smith concentrates on 
redescribing compared materials in the light of other materials in the step of 
‘redescription’, I will focus on generalising and theorizing in the third step. 
Instead of stopping at the final step of ‘rectification’, I will develop this thesis 
by employing ‘differentiation’ and ‘supplementation’. This is because the purpose of 
this thesis is to develop Christian theodicy in the light of comparison with Daoism 
rather than to develop academic categories that are regarded as important in 
comparative religious study. Through comparison and generalisation, we will see 
how two different religious traditions can be compared. Differences between the two 
thinkers will be the key for supplementation. Through differentiation and 
supplementation, Christian theodicy will be developed from a wider viewpoint. My 
methodology therefore follows Smith’s comparative religion in the steps of 
‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ and follows Clooney’s comparative theology in 
the final step, ‘supplementation’. Because Clooney’s comparative theology aims to 
combine theological concerns with actual study of newly encountered traditions or 
religions,78 my final step can receive assistance from his methodology. I will use the 
strengths of the two thinkers, and this means developing my thesis with regard to 
both the analytic and practical, the objective and the subjective, and both the external 
and internal in religious life.  
In undertaking this comparative study between the evolutionary theodicy of 
Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi, I will divide my main chapters into 
three parts. In the first part, I will examine the evolutionary theology of Haught and 
the ideas constituting his theodicy (Chapters 2 and 3). In the second part, I will 
                                                 
77 Smith, "The "End" of Comparison: Redescription and Rectification," in A Magic Still Dwells: 
Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, 239. 
78 Clooney, 10. 
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expound the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi and his ideas on evil (Chapters 4 and 5). 
In the third part, I will compare the two thinkers (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). The topics 
that will be covered in the comparison will be the following: information and qi 
(vital energy), the grace of God and ziran (spontaneity), free will and wuwei (non-
action), the kenotic God and Dao’s omnipresence, the self-absenting of God and the 
hiddenness of Dao, the ‘dark side’ and yin (the shadow side), purpose or direction of 
evolution, and new creation and tianrenyitong (the unity of heaven and human 
being).  
Based on these comparisons, I will generalise the ideas of Haught and Zhuangzi 
on evil into seven different theodicies (the natural state defence, the free action 
defence, the suffering God defence, the hidden God defence, the harmony defence, 
the progress defence, and the final fulfilment defence). I will then supplement the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught with the Daoist ideas of Zhuangzi on the basis of 
their differences. In the conclusion of the thesis (Chapter 9), I will summarize my 
main ideas, explore the meaning and importance as well as the limitations of this 
study, and provide direction for future comparative study between science and 
religion and between Christianity and Daoism.  
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PART Ⅰ. THE EVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY OF JOHN 
HAUGHT 
 
To do comparative study between the evolutionary theology of John Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi concerning the problem of evil, we first need to know 
the two thinkers’ basic philosophical and theological doctrines and thoughts on evil – 
what it is, how it comes about, and how it can and should be experienced. Thus in 
Part I, which is composed of chapters two and three, the evolutionary theology of 
Haught will be discussed. In chapter two, I will expound Haught’s perspectives on 
evolutionary science and Christian theology, and in chapter three, I will give an 
exposition of the problem of evil and of theodicy in Haught. Part I serves to lay out 
the ideas of Haught for later comparative work with the Daoist thought of Zhuangzi 




Chapter 2  
Evolutionary Science and Christian Theology in Haught 
 
The influence of Darwinian evolutionary science is continuously growing. Many 
scholars in various fields, such as in the natural sciences, social sciences, philosophy, 
and linguistics, have accepted Darwinian evolutionary theory, with evolutionary 
theory informing their respective research areas. However, according to Haught, 
theologians still think and write almost as if Charles Darwin had never lived.79 I also 
suggest that contemporary religious ideas should consider a transition to the 
Darwinian world.  
Haught does not worry that an appropriate idea of God will be distorted or 
simply be made redundant by science because for him, the larger our sense of the 
universe is, the better sense we should have of the dimensions and grandeur of 
deity.80 For Haught, religious believers do not need to be afraid to learn from science 
about the universe. Similarly, Arthur Peacocke says, ‘Theology has been most 
creative and long-lasting when it has responded most positively to the challenges of 
its times’.81 I also think that scientific knowledge, especially Darwinian evolutionary 
theory, can enlarge our sense of God, and Haught aims to demonstrate this in his 
evolutionary theology. 
In this chapter, I will explain how Haught tries to harmonize evolutionary 
science with Christian theology. First of all, I will define the concepts of ‘evolution’ 
and ‘evolutionary theology’. Next, I will show how Haught keeps balances between 
the evolution of life and a creator God, between natural selection and divine 
providence, between the three notions of contingency, law and time and a 
transcendent personal God, between cosmic evolution and divine promise, and 
finally, between evolutionary science and ecotheology. I chose these categories 
because they clearly illuminate the most important aspects of Haught’s Christian 
theology with regard to evolutionary science for us. This chapter is not only an 
exposition of the main ideas of Haught about religion and science, but also a 
                                                 
79 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 2. 
80 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 37. 
81 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human, 7. 
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preliminary chapter and a basis upon which to examine the evolutionary theodicy of 
Haught in further detail in the next chapter.  
 
(1) What are ‘Evolution’ and ‘Evolutionary Theology’?  
The goal of this section is to fix the scope and provide brief definitions of the terms 
‘evolution’ and ‘evolutionary theology’ rather than to provide detailed exposition 
and analysis. 
Life on Earth seems to have developed throughout its history, expressed today in 
the familiar concept of evolution.82 In fact, the idea that all organisms are generated 
by natural methods from other forms is rooted in ancient times. For example, Plato 
toyed with such thoughts.  
Sinew, skin, and bone were interwoven at the ends of our fingers and toes. 
The mixture of these three was dried out, resulting in the formation of a 
single stuff, a piece of hard skin, the same in every case. Now these were 
auxiliary causes in its formation – the pre-eminent cause of its production 
was the purpose that took account of future generations: our creators 
understood that one day women and the whole realm of wild beasts would 
one day come to be from men [exandrōn gunaikes kai talla thēria 
genēsointo], and in particular knew that many of these offspring would 
need the use of nails and claws or hoofs for many purposes. This is why 
they took care to include nails formed in a rudimentary way in their design 
for humankind [anthrōpois], right at the start.83  
So we can see that evolutionary thought, in various pre-Darwinian forms, is a 
very old idea.84 Evolutionary ideas spread during the second half of the eighteenth 
and the first half of the nineteenth centuries into areas other than biology, including 
philosophy, linguistics, sociology and economics.85  
                                                 
82 Ernst Mayr, What Evolution Is (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 8. 
83 Timаеus, 76d5–e8. in Stella Sandford, Plato and Sex (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 
2010), 132. 
84 There is, in fact, also a famous discussion by St. Augustine which can be read as ‘evolutionary’, in 
his discussion of Genesis 1 in The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Augustine thought that God created the 
world with the capacity to develop of itself – a perspective that is harmonious with biological 
evolution. [Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Ancient Christian Writers, no. 41 (New York: 
Newman Press, 1982)] 
85 Mayr, 9. 
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Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829) was the first scholar to develop the specific 
idea that all of the different forms of life had been successively produced, from the 
simplest to the most complex, by natural causes operating over immense periods of 
time. He claimed that animals were induced to develop new habits when they were 
confronted with new environments, and acquired characteristics that were then 
passed on to the next generation.86 His idea, called the ‘Lamarckian’ explanation, is 
considered as the first inclusive theory of biological evolution, and the theory has 
seen a recovery in popularity largely because of new discoveries in epigenetics. 
Evolutionary theory today at least is largely Darwinian, but it has definite 
Lamarckian tendencies. 
Evolutionism became the subject of intense focus as a result of the publication of 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859. Darwin says in his book:  
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been 
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, 
whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of 
gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most 
wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.87  
Darwin presented evidence that species were not fixed or in static states without 
development, and explored many specific ideas to substantiate his theory of 
evolution by natural selection, establishing that all species have descended from 
common ancestors, time after time. Before Darwin, some scholars such as George-
Louis Leclerc de Buffon88 (1707–1788) and Jean Baptiste Lamarck89 proposed the 
notion of the evolution of species, but it was Darwin who systematized the theory of 
evolution by means of his mechanism of natural selection. When I use the concept of 
‘evolution’ in this thesis, then, I refer to Darwinian evolution, which features natural 
selection as one of its most important aspects. ‘Evolution’ in this thesis also refers to 
Neo-Darwinism, which informs all of the life sciences.  
                                                 
86 R. W. Burkhardt Jr., "Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829)," in Evolution: The First Four Billion 
Years, ed. Michael Ruse and Joseph Travis (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 672-
74. 
87 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, ed. Gillian Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[1859] 2008), 360. 
88 Histoire naturelle (1749–1788, 36 volumes) 
89 Philosophie zoologique (1809) 
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Darwin explained the idea of evolution by using phenomena and processes that 
could be observed in nature, and therefore did not need to rely on special creation or 
any supernatural forces. In On the Origin of Species, Darwin explains variation under 
domestication, variation under nature, struggle for existence, and natural selection. 
According to Darwin, the struggle for existence among all organic beings inevitably 
exists throughout the world, and natural selection almost unavoidably causes 
extensive extinction of less adaptable organisms and forms of life – adaptable, that is, 
to changes in predational and environmental pressures. Darwin also posited that 
natural selection therefore results in ‘Divergence of Character’ because ‘the more 
living beings can be supported on the same area the more they diverge in structure, 
habits, and constitution, of which we see proof by looking to the inhabitants of any 
small spot or to naturalised productions’.90 These constituent theses came to be taken 
together, resulting in the view that evolutionary biology cannot be compatible with 
Christianity for the following reasons. 
The first reason is that Darwin’s ideas on evolution provide a whole new story or 
account of creation which ostensibly seems to be in conflict with biblical accounts, 
such as the creation story in Genesis.91 Christians had hitherto regarded the world as 
the special creation of God, complete at the outset and very much like (if not the 
same) as how we find it today – an account which is in clear contrast to the 
Darwinian account of the gradual evolution of the world and its species, not based on 
perfect plan but rather on adaptability in survival. 
The second reason for the apparent opposition between science and religion that 
Darwin’s notion of natural selection – which proposes that the natural world is 
governed by accidental or contingent aspects of evolution and ruthless struggle – 
raises difficult questions about God’s role in creation. God’s traditional role of a 
morally perfect Father of all creatures Who neither desires nor intends their suffering 
or death came to be seen untenable given the immense and arbitrary suffering in the 
world.  
                                                 
90 Darwin, 7-8, 98. 
91 There are many attempts to harmonize modern science and the biblical creation stories. For 
example, many scholars interpret the ‘days’ mentioned in Genesis as metaphors for much longer 
episodes in time, such as geological periods. Some also suggest that the ‘six days’ are better thought 
of as God’s timescale, different from that of the earth’s. Finally, some also interpret the texts 
metaphorically or poetically rather than as a literal account of creation. (cf. Harris, The Nature of 
Creation: Examining the Bible and Science, Chapter 3 'Creation According to the Bible I: Genesis'.) 
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Third, Darwin’s theory of human descent from lower forms of life seems to 
question age-old beliefs in the uniqueness and distinctiveness of human beings in 
virtue of their being created in God’s image (Gen. 1:26). The traditional doctrine of 
the imago dei posits that human beings, while existing in the world, are of a different 
ontological plane to the other life forms on Earth in virtue of possessing a soul. A 
soul, which constitutes a rational substance for traditional 
Boethian/Aristotelian/Scholastic philosophy possesses free will and intelligence – 
properties which are by definition spiritual or immaterial and which therefore require 
a divine cause and cannot result from material causes or come about from gradual 
processes. Hence, in traditional scholastic philosophy, the human embryo possesses a 
soul (and the intelligence and free will inherent in it) from the outset, from the 
moment of conception, despite the fact that we know the human person’s intelligence 
and freedom of the will as capacities will develop as the child matures. The 
capacities of intelligence and freedom of the will, constituting the essential properties 
of the soul and being complete therefore demand a cause prior to and beyond 
terrestrial causes, given that terrestrial causes are always bound up (in scholastic 
terminology) in potency (potential) and act (realisation) deriving from material 
events.92 
The fourth reason for the apparent opposition between science and religion is 
that chance or accident in evolution seems to destroy the notion of divine providence 
and teleology in virtue of the sheer randomness and contingency of life and the 
fortunes of creatures attempting to survive in the world. 
Fifth, Darwinian evolution appears to rob the universe of purpose, and human 
life of any lasting significance for the principle reasons that human beings seem not 
being made in the image of God, not possessing a special place in God’s plan for 
creation, and no longer being assured of being held in the guiding, providential hands 
of God in the face of suffering. Human beings are apparently ‘thrown into’93 a 
fundamentally irrational world without reason other than the biological exigency of 
the survival of our species to merely survive and pass on our genes until our 
inevitable death. These views, emerging from a mechanistic view of the world 
devoid of rationality or any discrimination between creatures or individuals in their 
                                                 
92 Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1947), chap. 3. 
93 Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 218-20. 
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needs, desires and vulnerabilities – in other words, no ‘existential guardianship’ 
whatsoever – was the foundation of the philosophies of absurdism and existentialism, 
exemplified in the writings of Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger 
in the twentieth century. Combined with the view of Freud that humans were mostly 
driven by the unconscious desires to dominate and to procreate, this formed a rather 
monstrous picture of the human being – isolated in the world, subject to the 
primordial and impersonal forces of natural selection and the libido, and 
fundamentally selfish and animalistic.  
Finally, sixth, the origin of human beings posited by Darwinian evolution seems 
to conflict with the notion of original sin and the Fall. Put simply, if human greed, 
vindictiveness, violence, as well as the suffering caused by ‘natural force’ in the 
world is simply intrinsic to the nature of this reality, both necessary and inevitable, 
then the Christian narrative that those things were due to a pre-historic, voluntary 
decision by the first human being appeared not only outdated, but absurd. The 
implication for Christianity was this: that by removing the ontological wound 
inherited from Adam (and the collective guilt and tendency to commit evil due to it), 
the new Darwinian picture of the world apparently removed any need for a saviour 
and any need of spiritual redemption. 
Largely for these reasons, notable critics of Christianity since Darwin’s time 
have advocated the view that religion should not simply be tolerated but should be 
challenged using critical argumentation wherever its influence arises. The ‘New 
Atheism’ of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel 
Dennett is a relatively recent example of such ‘scientific naturalism’ and its central 
dogma is that ‘only nature, including humans and our creations, is real; that God 
does not exist; and that science alone can give us complete and reliable knowledge of 
reality’.94 According to what is called the ‘New Atheism’, which exemplifies 
‘scientism’ and combines it with an aggressive form of argumentation employing 
rhetorical devices including that of the appeal to ridicule, scientifically educated 
people have to deny belief in God, because God does not lie within the realm of 
evidence that science deal with. For the New Atheists, people who still believe in 
God in some form or other today are, in light of all the evidence against the 
hypothesis of God’s existence, less intelligent than atheists or agnostics.  
                                                 
94 Haught, God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens, x. 
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After Darwin, therefore, theologians had to answer the challenge posed by 
evolutionary theory. The Wilberforce–Huxley debate95 in 1860 is emblematic of the 
objections made by churchmen to Darwin’s theory at the time. John Thomas Scopes’ 
trial known as ‘Monkey Trial’ in 1925 is also widely regarded as the first conflict 
between Christian fundamentalism and Darwinism.96 In the modern world, some 
theologians such as Henry Morris and John Whitcomb remained unswayed by the 
evidence for evolution and by the implications that it is has for traditional Christian 
theism. Morris and Whitcomb deny evolution and claim that God created the earth 
and all terrestrial life during a relatively short period, between 5,700 and 10,000 
years ago. This idea is known as ‘young-earth creationism’ or ‘flood geology’. 
Relative to cosmological time scales used today, youth-earth creationists posit God’s 
recent special creation of all that is present in the physical universe in six twenty-
four-hour periods and a geologically significant flood at the time of Noah that buried 
most of the fossils.97  
In contrast, Haught not only accepts evolutionary theory but also tries to develop 
Christian theology with the help of evolutionary biology. He has written more than 
ten books concerning this issue, in particular, Responses to 101 Questions on God 
and Evolution (2001), Deeper than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in the Age of 
Evolution (2003), God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution (2008), Science and 
Religion: From Conflict to Conversation (2008), Making Sense of Evolution: 
Darwin, God, and the Drama of Life (2010), and Science and Faith: A New 
Introduction (2012). Haught proposes in his books that essential aspects of the 
biblical tradition can allow us to think about Ultimate Reality in a way that is not 
only religiously satisfying but also acknowledges the evolutionary nature and history 
of the world.  
Before giving specific answers to the issues surrounding science and religion, 
Haught divides theologians’ answers to Darwinism into three types: Opposition, 
                                                 
95 Thomas Henry Huxley and Bishop Samuel Wilberforce participated in an intense debated at the 
Oxford University Museum after the presentation of a paper by John William Draper on the 
intellectual development of Europe in relation to Darwin’s theory. 
96 Peter J. Bowler, "Christian Responses to Darwinism in the Late Nineteenth Century," in The 
Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity, ed. J. B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett (Chichester, 
West Sussex ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 37. 
97 Ronald L. Numbers, "Scientific Creationism and Intelligent Design," in The Cambridge Companion 
to Science and Religion, ed. Peter Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 128. 
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Separatism and Engagement.98 ‘Opposition’ claims that theology and neo-Darwinian 
science are mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable in explaining the world. Haught 
classifies scientific materialism (e.g. Richard Dawkins,99 Daniel Dennett100 and 
Steven Jay Gould101), creationism (e.g. Duane Gish102) and intelligent design as 
instances of Opposition. ‘Separatism’ claims that science is naturally limited to 
dealing with questions about physical causes of events, while theology is concerned 
with questions about the ultimate ‘meaning’ or purpose of things, so that there is no 
conflict between the two (e.g. Guy Murchei103). The final category of ‘Engagement’ 
brings Darwin’s ideas into theological frameworks, and places evolution at the very 
centre of theological reflections on the natural world. Haught classifies post-
Darwinian natural theology104 (e.g. John Polkinghorne105) and evolutionary theology 
as instances of Engagement. 
                                                 
98 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 27-47. This is different from Haught’s four 
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What, then, is meant by ‘evolutionary theology’? Niels Henrik Gregersen 
defines evolutionary theology as ‘forms of religious self-reflection that are 
significantly shaped by the resources of evolutionary biology’.106 Peter Bowler 
regards it as the pursuit of harmonizing creationism’s commitment to the argument 
from design with the evolutionist assertion that nature is governed by constant laws 
rather than discontinuous miracles.107 Most contemporary proponents of evolutionary 
theology prefer standard neo-Darwinian models of evolution including natural 
selection, the transmutation of species over time, and the statistics of variations of 
environments and genomes.108 Although the specific definitions of evolutionary 
theology may vary,109 they usually agree that evolutionary theology does not look for 
definitive traces of the divine in nature, such as design. According to Haught, 
evolutionary theology opposes creationism and intelligent design because such an 
idea is too static to grasp the dynamic and unpredictable (and for that reason perhaps 
disturbing) way in which the biblical God interacts with the world. Haught says 
about evolutionary theology: 
Instead of trying to prove God’s existence from nature, evolutionary 
theology seeks to show how our new awareness of cosmic and biological 
evolution can enhance and enrich traditional teachings about God and 
God’s way of acting in the world. In other words, rather than viewing 
evolution simply as a dangerous challenge that deserves an apologetic 
response, evolutionary theology discerns in evolution a most illuminating 
context for our thinking about God today.110  
Haught argues that evolutionary theology should consider all the difficulties that 
are evident in the post-Darwinian representation of nature.111 Haught’s theology of 
evolution is therefore an attempt to derive a holistic approach in comparing Darwin’s 
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main ideas and theses with those of Christianity, not simply an attempt to draw 
selectively from Darwinian evolutionary theory for theology’s sake. 
It should be noted that the term ‘evolutionary theology’ is not a unified term in 
the science–religion field; the theological response to evolutionary biology has often 
been called ‘theistic evolution’. Claude Stipe defines theistic evolution as the idea 
‘which accepts that evolution occurred as biologists describe it, but under the 
direction of God’.112 Robert John Russell defines theistic evolution more 
dynamically: ‘God creates the world ex nihilo with certain fundamental laws and 
natural constants, and God acts everywhere in time and space as continuous creator 
(creatio continua) in, with, and through the processes of nature’.113 Both Stipe and 
Russell’s definitions clearly show their acceptance of evolutionary biology as well as 
an affirmation of God’s creating the universe in some manner.  
Meanwhile, Mark Harris prefers the term ‘evolutionary theologies’ rather than 
‘theistic evolution’ because there are many such responses, and these debates 
(should, in principle) offer ways ‘to understand God in the light of evolution rather 
than the reverse’.114 Arthur McCalla names it a ‘theology of science’, and remarks 
that ‘the theology of science draws on the biblical understanding of God to explain 
why the physical world is as modern science shows it to be’ rather than looking for 
hints of God’s existence in the design of the physical world.115 Harris and McCalla 
define their terms by focusing on theology rather than evolution or science. Similarly, 
Haught seems to prefer to use the term a ‘theology of evolution’, and defines it as ‘a 
systematic set of reflections that tries to show how evolution, including those 
features that scientific sceptics consider to be incompatible with religious faith, 
illuminate the revolutionary image of God given to Christian faith’.116 His blueprint 
for a theology of evolution illuminates the revolutionary image of God that has been 
passed down to us.  
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Based on the definitions of many scholars, I will use ‘evolutionary theology’ 
when I refer to theological responses to Darwin’s evolutionary biology as a way of 
Engagement rather than Opposition or Separatism. This is because, as Harris 
properly states, my thesis is focused on theology rather than evolution or science, and 
the term is helpful to use in terms of theodicy. This means that when I discuss the 
problem of evil in evolutionary theology, I will use the term ‘evolutionary theodicy’. 
Continuing my definitions of ‘evolution’ and ‘evolutionary theology’, I will now 
examine Haught’s thoughts on evolutionary theology specifically.  
 
(2) The Evolution of Life and a Creator God 
Most scientists agree that the world is constituted of self-organizing systems. The 
arrangement of physical ‘stuff’ into atoms, molecules, planetary systems, stars, 
galaxies, cells, organisms, persons and societies spontaneously takes place in a way 
that seems to need no apparent external intervention. Some scientists unabashedly 
maintain that modern science has rendered the idea of creation by God completely 
superfluous. How can we reconcile the claim that God’s creative power is 
metaphysically necessary for anything to exist with a universe that exists, persists 
and functions on its own and that ultimately produces life, including humans 
possessing freedom, thereby also being the sole source of their actions? 
Haught answers that ‘the new scientific picture of a spontaneously self-
organizing universe actually provides Christian faith with the opportunity to renew 
and deepen its unique understanding of divine power’.117 For Haught, the greatest 
display of divine power is that which respectfully allows something other than God 
to come into being. Modern science helps us to see more clearly that divine creativity 
and the self-renunciation of divine love share an indivisible relation. Almost 
paradoxically, the divine power to create ex nihilo is based on the divine humility 
(Chapter 3:3), so we can think of creation as the ex nihilo product of divine 
omnipotence. 
Haught claims that humans possess souls but also that every other living being 
possesses a soul, in its own way. He explains this via the etymology of the word 
‘soul’. ‘Soul’ is the English translation of the Latin anima, from which the word 
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‘animal’ stems. Soul has always meant an ‘animating principle’, and so all living 
things must be ‘ensouled’ in some way.118 Haught therefore thinks that the 
emergence of the human soul would not be any exception to this animating process, 
but instead ‘a most intense exemplification of a general aspect of creation and 
evolution’.119 
If all living beings have souls in their own way, how can evolution be 
harmonized with the biblical claim that humans are made ‘in the image and likeness 
of God’? Haught believes that human beings’ bearing of the image and likeness of 
God provides for the possibility of human moral consciousness and discrimination 
generally, and our consequent capacities for making and faithfully keeping promises 
and for compassionate love. This is because humans are ‘the only species on earth 
endowed with freedom, responsibility, and the capacity to love selflessly’.120  
Haught also attempts a reconciliation by means of the interrelationships present 
in an organic world bearing the imprint of its Creator. God, however, is the most 
intimately related and relatable One to the world, as implied in the Trinity, a doctrine 
which gives relationship or substance metaphysical primacy.121 In the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity, God is revealed as Transcendent (Father), Incarnate (Son), 
and Immanent (Spirit), a conception of the divine which receives support from some 
evolutionary theologians. For example, Gloria Schaab argues, ‘if the triune God as 
Transcendent, Incarnate, and Immanent is understood in panentheistic terms, then no 
aspect of God is detached from the God–world relationship’.122 She understands that 
the being of the cosmos is integral to the Being of the Divine, and that all events in 
the cosmos are events in the life of God. Similarly, Arthur Peacocke says, ‘All that is 
created is embraced by the inner unity of the divine life of the Creator – 
Transcendent, Incarnate, and Immanent’.123 Schaab and Peacocke argue that 
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evolutionary theology effectively demonstrates the triune nature of God in and 
through the close relationship between God and creatures.124 
Based on this triune interpretation of the divine, I think that humans have the 
capacity for intimate relationship with all creation just as God does, and Haught 
shows his support for this view in his conception of evolutionary theology. 
According to Haught, the fact that all living beings have souls in their own way 
proves that there is an intimate relation between humans and non-human beings, and 
therefore that evolution supports the biblical idea of human beings having been 
created in God’s image and likeness.125 Quoting Philip Hefner’s term, ‘created co-
creators’, Haught says that God’s will is that we participate in the work of making 
things new in this unfinished universe.126 This enables humans to have a 
responsibility for all creatures, as well as the protection of the natural environment. 
Then, we may ask why God would allow evolution to bring about so many 
millions of kinds of living beings? Is the diversity of life indicative of the 
extravagance of divine creativity? Darwin’s theory of evolution helped to illuminate 
and explain the incredible diversity of organisms present on Earth.  
The evolutionary theology of Haught claims that divine creativity is always 
dissatisfied with the monotony of the status quo and the infinite God can never be 
fully represented by any one creature, or indeed, any one concept. God therefore 
continually creates a multiplicity of beings, ‘so that what is lacking in one thing as 
far as representing God’s infinite perfection is concerned can be supplied by 
something else, and that by yet something else, and so on’.127 For Haught, only an 
awareness of the indefinite diversity of beings can guide us to a profound sense of 
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the infinite. In the next section, I intend to show how Haught believes Darwin’s 
evolutionary theology can enrich our notions of divine creation and providence. 
 
(3) Natural Selection and Divine Providence 
What happens in and to individual members of a given species over the long periods 
of time involved in evolution? How do individuals change from generation to 
generation and what is responsible for these changes? According to evolutionary 
biology, individuals possessing any advantage over others would have a better 
chance in surviving and procreating and thereby preserving their kind. The 
preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of evolutionarily injurious 
variations Darwin called ‘natural selection’.128  
The theory of natural selection became the foundation of the modern 
interpretation of evolution, and Mayr explains that Darwin’s idea of natural selection 
is based on five observations.129 First, every population has such high fertility that its 
size would increase exponentially if not restrained. Second, the size of populations 
remains stable over time except for temporary fluctuations. Third, the resources 
available to every species are limited, from which the inference that there is fierce 
competition among the members of a species is made. Fourth, any two individuals of 
a population are not exactly the same, from which the inference that individuals are 
different from each other in their potentialities of survival is made. Fifth, any of the 
differences among the individuals are partly heritable, from which the inference that 
natural selection through many generations results in evolution over time is made. 
We can summarize these five into the notion of ‘the survival of the fittest’,130 and 
this is one of the main issues raised in the conversation between science and religion. 
The theory of natural selection has caused much controversy in Christianity. 
The theory of natural selection seems to have ruined the basis for trust in a 
providential God because natural selection’s pitiless disregard of vulnerable 
organisms makes us wonder whether God really cares for the weakest living beings 
in the universe. Recent theological perspectives that accept evolution must reconcile 
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the Creator’s providence with the harsh realities of a world conditioned by natural 
selection. Denis Edwards says, ‘I would want to argue that God is not to be 
understood as another factor operating alongside natural selection, or in addition to 
it, but is rather to be understood as acting through it’.131 For him, God acts in, with, 
and through natural processes, and continuously creates according to natural 
selection. Haught tries to reconcile the reality of such an evolving world with 
religious faith in divine providence in various ways.  
First of all, Haught distinguishes philosophical language from scientific 
language. He insists that it is not a strictly scientific but a philosophical claim to say 
that natural selection leaves no room at all for divine providence. In other words, it is 
a not only a belief about the nature of scientific knowledge, but it is also a claim 
about the nature of reality more generally, and a claim about the nature of knowledge 
– its necessary and sufficient conditions, rooted in the belief system known as 
‘scientism’. Scientism is not a product of scientific research, but an assumption that 
arises from individual and social preferences that are neither logically inferred from 
nor relevant to the professional practice of science.132 Therefore, for Haught, the 
claim that natural selection is in conflict with the providential view of the world is a 
kind of belief that groundlessly assumes that there is no possible deeper way of 
understanding the generation and continued existence of life than that of biological 
science. 
It should be noted that Haught approaches this issue by supposing a broader 
meaning of divine care. Providence is traditionally taken to be God’s sustenance, 
support or provision together with special divine acts. Haught thinks of this 
providence of God as humble, self-giving, promising love. For Haught, the Christian 
God does not overpower the world but wills that it ‘become itself’ as fully as 
possible. This unfolding is seen as an expression of the love of God. God fully 
endows the world with freedom in order for it to experiment with its possibilities. 
Haught understands that ‘the process of evolution is the story of the universe trying 
out various ways of becoming distinctively itself’.133 Therefore, divine providence is 
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manifested as loving self-restraint, that is, as a ‘letting be’ that permits the universe 
to come out as something other than God. 
When Haught builds his evolutionary theology, he refuses a defensive way such 
as divine design and proposes the active way of using evolutionary theory to 
construct his wider theological system. Haught does not think of God simply as a 
designer. According to him, evolutionary theory makes us think of God in a more 
biblical way than before. He says, ‘Evolutionary biology now provokes theology to 
set forth in sharper relief than ever the biblically-based image of God as the 
compassionate and promising One who gives the divine self unreservedly to the 
cosmos’.134 For him, evolutionary data are consonant with the image of God who is 
humble enough to permit something to emerge spontaneously. Therefore, 
evolutionary science never contradicts belief in God, whose compassionate 
providential care is such that the world emerges as sufficiently autonomous to make 
a partnership with God.135 
 Third, natural selection is consonant with the biblical God when we think of 
God as ‘the One who makes all things new’.136 Haught thinks of God as the source of 
‘novelty’– not just as the source of a humanly idealized order. Even the countless 
imperfect adaptations in natural selection can allow us to sense more explicitly that 
the whole world is still being created. Haught criticizes the idea of intelligent design 
because the notion of God as a designer is not in harmony with genuine novelty in 
the world, changes which are spontaneous and also self-sustaining. In other words, 
he understands God as the One who disturbs the status quo in order to cause 
something new. Haught says, ‘If God is the ultimate source of order, God is no less 
primordially the source of novelty that sometimes has to disrupt order so as to 
overcome triviality and monotony. The God of evolution is the inexhaustible 
wellspring of new forms of order’.137 In short, Darwin’s idea of natural selection 
actually allows us to retrieve afresh the biblical God who ‘makes all things new’ (Isa. 
43:19; Rev. 21:5), and therefore, the evolutionary theology of Haught reconciles both 
the evolutionary theory of Darwin and traditional Christian thought. 
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 Finally, nature is in some sense self-creative, but for Haught, this affirmation is 
not a denial of God’s creativity. The Spirit of God is hiddenly present in all instances 
of continuous creation, and is intimately involved in all that occurs in nature. He 
thinks that a creator who gives rise to a self-creating world is much more exalted 
than a creator who assertively produced everything directly and without involving 
creatures.138 In other words, a creator who calls a self-organizing world into 
existence appears much more deserving of our worship than a creator who insists on 
making everything directly and complete at the outset. Therefore, the self-creativity 
of evolution through natural selection does not diminish the role of divine creativity 
or providence.  
 
(4) Contingency, Law, Time and a Transcendent Personal God 
Although there are intense debates among biologists, especially concerning exactly 
how evolution takes place,139 most evolutionary biologists agree that three 
ingredients are enough for evolution of diverse living creatures. The first generic 
constituent of evolution is accidental, random, or ‘contingent’ occurrences. For 
example, these are the extremely improbable chemical coincidences demanded for 
the origin of life, the accidental genetic mutations that make possible diverse lives, 
and other unpredictable events in the natural world that form the course of evolution.  
The second component is the necessity implied in the ‘law’ of natural selection 
and in the inflexible rules of physics and chemistry that pertain throughout the 
cosmos. The law mercilessly throws out the weaker organisms, such that those with 
traits that inhibit their survival in a competitive environment, die and eventually 
become extinct, allowing only the strong to survive, reproduce and over time, 
remain.  
The third ingredient of biological evolution is a colossal span of ‘time’. 
Evolution requires vast epochs of time to bring to fruition various random 
combinations in what is an altogether un-directed affair. In order to produce 
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survivors and reproducers, evolution requires enormous temporal amplitude. Without 
an enormous expanse of time the many improbable outputs of evolution could never 
have been actualized.140 
Evolutionary biology seems to prove that evolution can be fully explained with 
reference to contingency, law and time, and there seems to be no room for a 
transcendent and personal God. Moreover, contingency and chance in evolution 
appear to contradict the nature of the traditional Christian God who creates and 
maintains the world ‘orderly’. Many events in evolution seem to occur purely by 
chance, making us suspect that nature is at least highly undirected and unplanned, 
without teleologies. Third, because most evolutionists share the presumption that the 
law of natural selection is blind and impersonal, there are severe questions about how 
to think of divine providence in such an uncaring world. Finally, the requirement of 
long periods of time for evolutionary processes makes us wonder why an infinitely 
intelligent Creator would waste time – billions of years – before bringing about 
living beings. Why did not God create everything at once and finish it? These kinds 
of questions arise when we try to understand contingency, law and time in evolution 
in relation to the Christian God. 
How can these difficulties be accepted in evolutionary theology? Haught 
endeavours to provide what sort of religious meaning he can make of the 
impersonality and cruelty of natural selection, and the fact that life seems to have 
appeared gradually over a period of around 3.8 billion years. 
In the evolutionary theology of Haught, these difficulties can be reconciled and 
understood in various ways. First of all, he suggests that there is a ‘hierarchy of 
explanations’, that is, to learn to read things on different levels. We are inclined to 
prefer an ‘either/or’ rather than a ‘both/and’ way of thinking about natural and divine 
creativity. We thus are forced to choose either natural evolution or divine creation in 
explaining the diversity of life. However, Haught suggests a hierarchy of 
explanations, and explains it analogically.141 To paraphrase, when someone is driving 
your car down the street, you ask, ‘Why is my car moving?’ The question could be 
answered at different levels, which differ in their appropriateness: the car is moving 
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because the wheels are turning: because internal combustion has set the pistons, 
drive-shaft and so forth in motion; because Jim is driving it; because Jim has to go to 
the shop. For Haught, just as all these explanations can coexist without contradicting 
one another, theology can claim that the ultimate explanation of evolution is God’s 
creativity without disturbing the integrity of the various sciences and the evidence 
they gather. In other words, the fact that the universe is unfolded by God in an 
extremely creative way does not revoke the genetic, chemical and evolutionary 
accounts of life.142 The Bible can provide us with profound religious truths without 
having to be scientifically accurate. If the Bible had been written using the standards 
of modern science, most people in the past might never have got anything out of it. 
Doubtless, its teachings would also lose much of their moral, spiritual and poetic 
significance. Therefore, according to Haught, sensing a ‘hierarchy of explanations’ 
will make us realize that we are not pushed into a narrow choice between exclusively 
theological and scientific explanations. 
Haught’s hierarchy of explanations is criticised by McCalla because it ‘requires 
assent to the metaphysical postulate of the deeper, religious level of explanation, 
thereby transgressing methodological naturalism’.143 McCalla points out that 
Haught’s harmonisation between science and religion demands either the 
presupposition or agreement that such a metaphysical level of explanation is an 
acceptable postulate. But such a position is also bound to biblically-based 
metaphysics, which would almost certainly regard God to be that Ultimate Reality 
which is the source and end of existing things, and thereby also the end or 
terminating point in explanation. Regardless of whether this position is a coherent or 
legitimate theological position, doubtless some scholars would decline Haught’s 
offer to accept it as a presupposition in theories concerning all reality, as in 
metaphysics, cosmology, and evolution.  
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I think that Haught’s hierarchy of explanations is persuasive as long as it 
enables us to provide theological explanations of the universe without conflict with 
scientific explanations of it. However, there is concern that it may unintentionally 
focus on the ‘Separatism’ model rather than ‘Engagement’ model mentioned earlier 
in virtue of the fact that he seems to posit that science and religion deal with separate 
problems and have qualitatively different modes of expression (Chapter 2:1).  
Haught also expresses other important ways in answering the difficulties caused 
by evolution. Haught tries to explore the deeper theological meaning in the features 
of contingent happenings, invariant laws and the vast stretches of time that make 
evolution even possible. Evolutionary science, according to Haught, does not explain 
why the universe is set up in the first place, why such a mixture of contingency, law 
and vast stretches of time allowing for evolutionary processes come about. Haught 
thinks that describing at full length why the universe is arranged in this way is the 
task of evolutionary theology. 
Haught brings both contingency and chance – essential factors of evolution – 
into his theology. For him, it is natural that there are strange and unpredictable events 
– including mutant forms of life – in natural history because our world is still 
unfinished and open to new creation. Without such unpredictable events, the universe 
would have become so strictly locked into a fixed order a long time ago that it would 
have remained lifeless and mindless. Therefore, such irregular events are not 
antithetical to a broad notion of a personal God. If we demand a perfectly ordered 
universe, for Haught, it implicitly means that the providence of God should take the 
form of ‘dictatorship’. Haught claims that we should not expect that evolution will be 
smooth and steady, because such monotony would manifest a world very different to 
what we see – a world alive and always surprising in its novelty, be it in present 
lifeforms or the development of lifeforms over time as we piece together the fossil 
record. Evolution suggests that divine providence sees much deeper, which enlarges 
our sense of God.144 
Can this sense of God in evolution be harmonized with the traditional Christian 
God who is transcendent and personal? In the evolutionary theology of Haught, the 
God who permits evolution is personal. Haught agrees with Steven Weinberg’s claim 
that a universe separated from the idea of a personal God would be inherently 
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‘pointless’ as well as ultimately devoid of religious depth.145 The reason Haught 
sticks to a personal God is that he thinks what he chooses to worship should at least 
be personal. For Haught, the notion of a personal God is transformative not only 
cosmically in the sense that the cosmos has a ‘meaning’ extrinsic to itself, but also 
personally, in the sense that, if there is a personal God who created the cosmos, then 
I am driven to seek out the ‘meaning’ of my life within that cosmos, and in relation 
to the character, intentions and plans of Ultimate Reality.  
This, of course, does not mean that Haught’s ideas of God exclude non-personal 
aspects of God. Haught tries to combine God’s personal and impersonal aspects in 
his notion of God as a ‘transcendent personal divine power’: ‘There is no reason why 
we cannot take the extravagantly sacramental self-expression of a transcendent 
personal divine power of renewal’.146 Haught regards cosmic evolution as the 
sacramental self-expression by which the reviving power of a personal God is 
manifested. Ann Michaud suggests that ‘expanding [Haught’s] articulations on the 
issue of a personal God would lend credence to Haught’s insistence that the entire 
cosmos must be considered in a Christian eschatological vision’,147 but I think that 
when Haught talks of a ‘personal’ God, he means a ‘relational’ God who is related to 
all creatures rather than a God who is only related to human persons, or solely human 
beings. I believe this alternative idea of a personal God contains much that is 
beneficial to our understanding of ecology, our relationship to other forms of life, 
and our place in and use of the planet.  
Moreover, while Haught emphasises the necessary novelty and spontaneity of 
the universe, he also claims that the regularity present in natural selection is 
fundamental to a universe open to the future. If there is not a certain amount of 
consistency in nature, everything would collapse again and again into utter disorder, 
rendering any future whatsoever impossible.  
Finally, the requirement of vast durations of time for evolutionary processes to 
operate is unsurprising because the finite world cannot fully adapt to its boundless 
origin and goal. In other words, the Infinite is necessarily other than its creation, the 
finite, and the finite by definition exists and lives in time or temporality. 
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Furthermore, the God of Haught does not decide all outcomes beforehand but allows 
the world to participate in shaping its own future. The immeasurable and 
extraordinary dissemblance between the finite and the infinite, Haught says, calls for 
a great drama of evolution across limitless eons of time.148 Similarly, Michael Dowd 
writes: ‘Evolutionary Christianity is an integral formulation of the Christian faith that 
honors biblical and traditional expressions, conservative and liberal, while 
enthusiastically embracing a deep-time worldview’.149 For him, evolutionary 
Christianity symbolises the entire history of the cosmos in God-glorifying, Christ-
edifying, scripture-honouring ways. 
In the evolutionary theology of Haught, time, essential to the evolutionary 
process, also makes important sense as the stage for God’s promise for the future. 
Time itself is a gift of the arriving future that biblical faith connects with the mystery 
of God. For Haught, Darwinian evolution requires plentiful expanses of time, but 
time must first be given as a gift.150  
In short, even though nature’s openness to accident may at first strike us as 
contrary to the notion of a creator-God, the law of natural selection as impersonal 
and as such contrary to a caring God, and the enormous time in evolution as 
apparently prodigiously wasteful, as we have examined so far, the three ingredients 
of evolution make very good sense to a theology that pictures God as humble, self-
giving and promising love in the evolutionary theology of Haught.  
 
(5) Cosmic Evolution and Divine Promise 
Nature can be seen as irregular and even deadly while also benign and nurturing. The 
natural world revealed by evolution can seem to be inherently malicious when taken 
alongside belief in the caring providence of God and the comfort that can be had 
from believing in God’s existence. Cosmic evolution contains the random and 
maladaptive aspects of the process as well as order. What can we make theologically 
                                                 
148 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 113. 
149 Michael Dowd, Thank God for Evolution: How the Marriage of Science and Religion Will 
Transform Your Life and Our World (New York: Viking, 2007), 75. 
150 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 62. 
 47 
of all the mutations and other accidents that bring about suffering and death in 
evolution?  
According to the creation stories of Genesis, creation is essentially good. 
However, after Darwin it has become hard for people to accept this literally. Haught, 
however, explains that nature’s ambiguity is consistent with the unfinished state of 
the universe, the process of being created. Haught thinks that nature is neither 
completely chaotic nor clearly ordered. Nature’s processes progress with ambiguity 
and promise. For him, even nature’s ambiguity is in harmony with its being a 
‘promise’, because ‘If everything at the moment were perfectly clear, completely 
ordered or mathematically certain, there would be no promise of a future’.151 Haught 
claims that without nature’s ambiguity there would be neither the boundless 
openness of the cosmos nor life itself.  
We can find God’s promise in the Bible. There is promise in ambiguity, and this 
is the message of Genesis. Trusting in a promise does suppose that chaos and 
confusion may not be final, because God will make all things new.  
See, I am doing a new thing! Now it springs up; do you not perceive it? I 
am making a way in the desert and streams in the wasteland (Isa. 43:19).  
He who was seated on the throne said, ‘I am making everything new!’ 
Then he said, ‘Write this down, for these words are trustworthy and true’ 
(Rev. 21:5).  
In the biblical context, God is revealed as the world’s future. In the Bible, God is 
a God of promise and creates and sustains the world continuously by opening up a 
future for the world. For Haught, it is the ‘coming of this Future’ that allows for the 
evolution of the world in the first place. God, the world’s Absolute Future (Karl 
Rahner’s term), is the ultimate explanation of evolution.152 Haught’s explanation 
removes George Murphy’s concern that:  
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The science–theology dialogue has often concentrated on matters closely 
related to the doctrine of creation. That is understandable, but it runs the 
danger of separating the dialogue from the message of salvation.153  
Haught’s theology interprets the history of biological evolution in light of hope, 
a vision of its future transformation. Evolutionary theology therefore proposes an 
enormous shift in our understanding of divine transcendence. Haught explains that 
God is not only ‘up above’, but also ‘up ahead’. Consideration of evolutionary 
processes helps theology recover a biblical sense of God as a giver of promises yet to 
be fulfilled. God comes into this world from the future and creates it anew from the 
future. In the evolutionary theology of Haught, God and God’s promise are regarded 
in terms of the ‘futurity’ of being, rather than in terms of an immobile and eternal 
presence hovering ‘up above’. For him, this kind of understanding of God is not so 
much a qualitative change as a radical retrieval of forgotten biblical insights about 
God.154  
Haught’s ideas about the eschatological future bear the influence of Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin.155 Teilhard understood Christ as the pinnacle of evolutionary 
progress, the ‘Omega Point’.156 For Teilhard, the evolutionary process is moving 
towards its consummation, Christ. He thought that God is the ultimate goal and 
source of the evolutionary processes in the world. It means that God focusses on the 
final promise, new creation. Teilhard’s central theses have been questioned by many 
scholars even of liberal and evolutionary theological leanings,157 but his basic 
understanding of evolution can be correlated to the divine promise of Haught, which 
Haught himself recognises in developing Teilhard’s theological insights (Chapter 
3:1).  
However, Schaab points out two risks in the notion of God’s coming from the 
future:  
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First, despite Haught’s statements to the contrary, it devalues the present 
and the past that provide the limits and potentialities on which evolution 
and emergence depend. Second, it locates divine creativity in a future that 
some would contend has dubious ontological status in an evolutionary 
paradigm.158  
I find Schaab’s critique of the notion of the arrival of God from the future is 
persuasive, and I will suggest a more detailed exposition of her critique and offer my 
own defence of it in chapter 3:3 (‘A Metaphysics of the Future’). R. J. Berry, 
meanwhile, also disputes Haught’s thesis, saying that creation should be understood 
as a gift rather than a promise: ‘The Promised Land with everything needed for its 
inhabitants was a gift…. Creation is a gift; it is separate from God, rooted in history, 
and complete’.159 However, Haught refutes Berry’s argument in saying that God’s 
promise is inseparable from God’s self-gift.160 I also think divine promise is one of 
the most significant gifts for all creatures that God gives.  
In short, Haught insists that the reconciliation of science with religion can best 
be accomplished with the understanding that nature offers great promise in its sacred 
depths.161 Since evolutionary theology is closely related to the issues of suffering or 
pain in creation, it must include in-depth discussion about future promise or an 
eschatological hope for the whole universe. He calls the cosmic vision for the 
promise of the fulfilment of an Absolute future a ‘metaphysics of the future’162 
(Chapter 3:3). The temporal and spatial unfolding of a self-organizing world 
unceasingly moves through a field of promise. In respect of both the Bible and 
evolution, evolution accompanies promise, permitting believers to renew their hope 
for a final fulfilment in a new creation every day. When nature itself is regarded as 
promise rather than simply as design, the evidence of evolutionary biology appears to 
be not only consonant with faith, but also adds new depth to it. However, to the 
extent that creation is ‘unfinished’ it will inevitably involve a shadow side, namely, 
pain and suffering. This idea is connected with the very controversial issue of 
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purpose or direction in evolution. So I will discuss these issues in detail in Chapter 
three.  
 
(6) Evolutionary Science and Ecotheology 
Pollution, climate change, ozone depletion, the poisoning of soil, air and water, and 
the loss of sources of freshwater threaten human and animal life. Environmental 
pollution has been discussed in various academic fields over the last five decades.  
Present within such discussions, theologians started to focus on the 
interrelationship of theology and nature, and such widespread theological reflection 
on the relationship that human beings have with the earth is often called ecotheology. 
Since Lynn White Jr.’s well-known article ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic 
Crisis’163 in 1967, ecotheology became an important field of theology. Although 
some scholars such as John Passmore164 and Gerald Barney165 argue that Christianity 
is incorrigibly anti-ecological, the Bible’s creation theology and its injunction of 
sincere stewardship, along with the incarnational vision which endows human beings 
with a sacredness as creatures of the earth, provide substantial resources for an 
ecotheology. 
Evolutionary theology likewise cannot escape the environmental issues that face 
us today because it is strongly linked with nature. Southgate claims that ‘Uniqueness 
is given by God to humans in order to enable them to participate in God’s saving 
purposes, not for their own status or for them to abuse’.166 He suggests an 
eschatological ethic of Christian care for all creation based on the kenosis of Jesus 
and Romans 8:19–22. 
According to Haught, Darwin’s idea invites theology to consider the fact that 
we live in an unfinished universe. Evolution implies that creation is still occurring, 
with as much ontological, religious and moral significance as at its beginning. 
Haught remarks, ‘An unfinished creation invites theology to extend our hope not just 
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to a heaven for humans hereafter, but ahead to a destiny that must somehow include 
the whole universe’.167 His understanding of evolution brings out the ecological 
implications of a new awareness of living in an interconnected world.  
 For Haught, an evolutionary perspective expands our sense of God by making 
us perceive that divine care and providence extends to the whole cosmos. Evolution 
implies that humans are linked to the whole universe in a long-term process of 
becoming. For him, ‘the fresh new sense of our “togetherness” with this cosmos 
provides our hope with a broad new horizon’.168 Haught understands that evolution 
gives to human life a stronger meaning than ever of participation in the ongoing 
creative process of God. He also refers to promise as ‘the culmination of the whole 
cosmic story, and not just of human history’.169 In other words, Haught is not 
concerned only with the eventual fulfilment or destiny of human souls, but with that 
of the whole of creation. 
Moreover, according to Haught, it is of special importance for ecotheology to 
take evolution seriously because stewardship in and of the world implies more than 
just caring for what has been present from the beginning. Stewardship means that 
‘we should nurture the process of creation so as to enable it to realize its inherent 
evolutionary potential for future unfolding’.170 Haught believes that the Creator of 
this universe has a vision for it that exceeds human powers of calculation. One of the 
concluding positions that he reaches is that human destruction of life systems in the 
world is a strangling of its future evolutionary promise, a strangling which is 
sacrilegious and sinful.  
Paul Helm criticises Haught’s idea of cosmic promise, even though he does 
accept that the New Testament leads us to anticipate a new heaven and a new earth, 
the home of righteousness based on 2 Peter 3:13: 
Yet it is illegitimate (in my view) to relocate the idea of divine promise, 
which (though it permeates biblical literature) has chiefly to do with God’s 
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covenant of grace with Abraham and what follows from this, to the 
cosmos as a whole.171  
Helm argues that there is no guarantee in Scripture for such an understanding of 
divine promise, nor any implication that entertaining the idea might be a profitable 
exercise. Again, however, Haught offers a rebuttal to Helm’s argument, quoting Col. 
1:17, ‘all things hold together’ in Christ. For Haught, God’s word in the Bible often 
takes on undertones of promise, thus, he concludes that God’s promise opens up the 
future to all of creation as well as to human beings.172 I think Haught’s view is more 
persuasive, based as it is not only on the Bible but also on contemporary theologies 
such as process theology and ecotheology.  
Maintaining that a major task of ecotheology is to ensure that looking toward the 
future ‘coming of God’ is a condition of ecological responsibility, Haught tries to 
connect evolutionary theology with ecology and eschatology. The benefits of this 
connection are as follows:  
First, such an interpretation helps restrain the strong human temptation to 
worship or divinize either particular aspects of the natural world or the 
cosmic whole. And second, putting nature into an eschatological and 
evolutionary perspective allows us to accept realistically its limitations 
without letting these lead us to despair.173  
Haught’s evolutionary theology effectively proves how evolutionary thought is 
related to ecology and eschatology.  
 
(7) Summary 
In this chapter, after defining what ‘evolution’ and ‘evolutionary theology’ are, I 
approached Haught’s evolutionary theology from several angles: the evolution of life 
and a creator God, natural selection and divine providence, contingency, law, time 
and a transcendent personal God, cosmic evolution and divine promise, and finally 
evolutionary science and ecotheology.  
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According to Haught, the claim that natural selection is in conflict with divine 
providence is indicative of an erroneous philosophical position known as ‘scientism’, 
and thus we should distinguish philosophical and theological language from 
scientific language. Divine providence is revealed as a ‘letting be’ that allows the 
universe to first come into existence and continue to be created in and through the 
actions and intentions other than those of God only. A Creator who made a self-
organizing world is regarded by Haught as much worthier of our worship than a 
Creator who creates everything directly and makes them absolutely complete at the 
outset. Concerning the issues of nature’s openness to accident, the law of natural 
selection and the enormous time involved in the process of the evolution of 
organisms in the world, Haught argues that they are closely connected to theological 
ideas that portray God as humble, self-giving and promising love. 
Haught also emphasizes divine promise in cosmic evolution. When nature itself 
is regarded as promise rather than as design, the evidence of evolutionary biology 
appears to add new depth to Christian faith as well as being compatible with it. 
Moreover, the evolutionary theology of Haught helps us to perceive that divine 
providence extends to the whole cosmos. It is important for ecotheology to take 
evolution seriously because stewardship in and of the universe on the part of 
creatures including human beings implies the ability of creatures to realise their 
inherent evolutionary potential in the future.  
 To sum up Haught’s theology of evolution, Darwin’s portrayal of the way the 
universe works is not contrary to Christian theology but rather invites us to think 
about God in a more meaningful and holistic way. For Haught, the God of evolution 
does not predetermine things in advance according to an eternal and immutable plan 
but shares with all creatures their own openness to an uncertain future. Haught says 
that ‘to avoid altogether the task of seeking out what the evolution of life means in 
terms of Christian faith is in my view a failure to embrace fully the doctrines of 
creation, incarnation and redemption’.174 We should note that this does not mean that 
evolutionary theology gives us the final word about life and the cosmos. Haught 
thinks that Darwin’s vision is only a small piece of a much wider and still not fully 
manifested set of truths about the cosmos. His argument is that theology should take 
into account the well-grounded discoveries of biology, astronomy, geology, 
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palaeontology or any other science in presenting an integral vision of the truth about 
this reality.175 Such a perspective will provide us with rich avenues for both scientific 
and religious exploration.  
In the next chapter, I will explore Haught’s evolutionary theology further by 
focusing on the problem of evil – Haught’s ‘evolutionary theodicy’. Haught’s 
evolutionary theology (Chapter 2) and his thoughts on evil (Chapter 3) will be 
readdressed in the light of Zhuangzi’s Daoist thought in the comparison part of the 
thesis (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
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Chapter 3 
The Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Haught 
 
In discussing the problem of evil and theodicy in Haught, it is necessary to define 
relevant terms first: evil, sin and suffering.  
St. Augustine (354–430) had thought that evil is simply the diminishing of the 
good to the point where nothing at all is left.176 For him, evil is the ‘absence of being’ 
or the ‘privation of being’. Augustine also understood the problem of evil through 
the doctrine of original sin: ‘Original sins are said to be the sins of others for the 
reason that people derive them from their parents. But not without cause are they also 
called ours, since, as the apostle says, “in that one all sinned” (Rom. 5:12)’.177 
Augustine’s doctrine of original sin has been both supported and criticised by many 
scholars throughout Christian history, with modern theories of evil often being in 
stark disagreement over where and when evil originates. 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) marked a milestone in theodicy in his 
claim that this is ‘the best of all possible worlds’,178 attempting a division and 
classification of evils metaphysically, physically and morally. For him, metaphysical 
evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin.179 
The concept of ‘theodicy’ originated with Leibniz. 
French Philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) said of the notion of original sin: 
[It is] Not that original sin is a gnostic concept; on the contrary, it is an 
anti-gnostic concept. But it belongs to the age of gnosis in the sense that it 
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tries to rationalize the Christian experience of radical evil in the same way 
as gnosis set up as “knowledge” its pseudo-philosophic interpretation of 
primordial dualism, of the fall of Sophia, and of every other entity prior to 
man.180  
Ricoeur refuses to begin with original sin in talking about evil, and explains that 
‘evil is supremely the crucial experience of the sacred’,181 that the threat of the 
dissolution of the bond between the human and the sacred makes people most 
intensely aware of the dependence that human beings have on the powers of the 
sacred. Ricoeur divides the symbol of evil into three: defilement, sin, and guilt. For 
him, the difference between defilement and sin is phenomenological rather than 
historical, and the category that controls the notion of sin is the category of ‘before’ 
God.182 It means that there is a prior Covenant which is significant for the 
development of the consciousness of sin, and a violation of such a Covenant comes 
to be known as sin. He goes on to explain the difference between sin and guilt: ‘Guilt 
designates the subjective moment in fault as sin is its ontological moment. Sin 
designates the real situation of man before God, whatever consciousness he may 
have of it.… Guilt is the awareness of this real situation, and if one may say so, the 
“for itself” of this kind of “in itself”’.183  
The contemporary theologian David Bentley Hart claims that theodicy is both 
impossible and contemptible, for the reason that if we could identify why God 
permitted suffering and death in the world – reproducing what would amount to a 
divine plan – then God would not be omniscient because we would be attaining the 
same heights of ultimate knowledge as Him, and He would not be kind of God that 
views evil as a monstrosity in the world because evil would be merely regarded as a 
necessary instrument in bringing about a greater good. The familiar theory of a 
‘greater good’, says Hart, is an abomination for those who suffer the worst kinds of 
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horrors, prolonged, intractable and utterly pointless insofar as they cannot be justified 
in terms of moral character-building.184 Hart writes: 
Ours is, after all, a religion of salvation. Our faith is in a God who has 
come to rescue his creation from the absurdity of sin, the emptiness and 
waste of death, the forces – whether calculating malevolence of imbecile 
chance – that shatter living souls; and so we are permitted to hate these 
things with a perfect hatred.185 
Bearing in mind the varying definitions of evil by scholars in and throughout the 
Christian tradition as described above,186 I will investigate the concept of evil, 
distinguishing between ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ instantiations. John Hick explains that 
natural evil is the evil that originates independently of human actions such as in 
disease, earthquakes, droughts and tornadoes, and moral evil is evil that human 
beings originate themselves, such as cruel, unjust and perverse thoughts and deeds.187 
Similarly, Layman classifies natural evil as ‘the suffering (and loss) due to non-
human causes’, and moral evil as ‘the wrongdoing for which humans are responsible 
and the suffering (and loss) that results from it’.188  
Some theologians, such as David Griffin, follow different classifications: moral 
evil is used only for malevolent intentions and natural evil is used to refer to all 
forms of suffering.189 In the latter classification, ‘sin’ is used as a synonym for moral 
evil, and natural evil means physical evil or the suffering which occurs within the 
realm of physical events, such bodily disease.190  
I will follow Hick’s classification of natural evil and moral evil even though this 
division is, admittedly, sometimes ambiguous when so-called ‘natural’ disasters arise 
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from humans’ wrong doing, such as flooding or landslides. Throughout this thesis, 
then, the term ‘natural’ will be used to refer to that ‘existing or present by nature’191 
and not as a result of human action. 
When I divide evil into natural evil and moral evil, there are important things to 
be considered. First, I do not believe that natural phenomena – such as earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, tornados, tidal waves, mudslides, avalanches, 
diseases, and birth defects – are evil in themselves. Layman defines natural evil as 
the suffering and loss due to non-human causes.192 When I use the term ‘natural evil’ 
in this thesis, it does not refer to natural disasters directly but rather suffering or pain 
caused by them.193  
Mark Harris questions whether the category of ‘natural evil’ is internally 
coherent. He understands that speaking of ‘natural evil’ is ‘to gather up the 
destructive and dangerous aspects of the natural world, label them with the 
theologically emotive category of evil, and pin the blame for them on God’.194 He 
finds an ambiguity here that ‘those very laws of nature which precipitate an 
unexpected earthquake killing thousands are the same laws which have provided 
stable, temperate and fertile landmasses for the flourishing of land creatures over 
millions of years’.195 For Harris, then, natural processes cannot be ‘evil’ as some 
malevolent, freely willed human actions are ‘evil’. Natural processes are, put simply, 
‘amoral’, and therefore natural evil is a category best avoided.196  
That said, the suffering that occurs as a result of natural processes is the root and 
crux of the problem of evil, and though this category ‘natural evil’ is, as has been 
shown, very much debatable, I will use the term, at least for now, to initiate the 
conversation between Haught and Zhuangzi for the purpose of building an integral 
theodicy. I will also employ the term when referring to natural phenomena (death, 
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disease, and natural disasters) in an East Asian religious context for purposes of 
continuity – this despite the fact that the writers in question (predominantly Zhuangzi 
and Laozi) would also not employ the term. 
In this chapter, I will elucidate the thoughts of the evolutionary theologian John 
Haught on the problem of evil and theodicy. For context, I will first outline how 
theodicy is related to the wider theology of Haught; second, I will expound how evil 
is regarded in his evolutionary theology; finally, I will explore the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught proper – how Haught aims to reconcile God’s existence with the 
existence of pain and suffering both moral and natural.  
 
(1) Christian Theodicies related to Haught 
Process Theodicy 
Process theology considers God and nature in the light of ideas developed mainly by 
Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) who emphasised that all the cosmos is in a 
process of becoming. John Cobb, David Griffin, Marjorie Suchocki and Whitehead 
are well-known representatives of this perspective. To approach the problem of evil 
from the perspective of process metaphysics is called ‘process theodicy’. According 
to this idea, God is the eventual source of both the order and the novelty in the 
cosmos. That the world is in the process of becoming means that God is persuasive 
rather than coercive because it means that God did not merely fix all of creation 
according to His own designs in the beginning. It also means that God is interested 
not so much in maintaining the present order as in the novelty of the evolutionary 
process.  
Process theodicy also tries to solve the problem of evil by acknowledging a 
restriction in divine power, or rather redefining omnipotence as it relates to 
immutability. Process theodicy regards random events in the cosmos as essential 
characteristics of the unfinished world. Without random events, the natural world 
would have been lifeless and mindless, and such a world would not be with the 
creation of a God who is always open to novel possibilities of becoming in the 
cosmos. Whitehead says: 
The wisdom of subjective aim prehends every actuality for what it can be 
in such a perfected system – its sufferings, its sorrows, its failures, its 
triumphs, its immediacies of joy – woven by rightness of feeling into the 
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harmony of the universal feeling, which is always immediate, always 
many, always one, always with novel advance, moving onward and never 
perishing.197  
Every moment in evolution converges into the divine experience in an 
intensifying aesthetic pattern. All the sufferings, sorrows, failures, and triumphs in 
evolution are endowed with ultimate meaning. Anything that happens in the world 
can lead to the final beauty that is brought into being in the compassionate embrace 
of God. Therefore, apparent chaos in the evolving world is not to be identified with 
evil because ‘harmony requires the due coordination of chaos, vagueness, 
narrowness, and width’.198 
Process theodicy also tries to solve the problem of evil by a restriction in divine 
power. Any suffering in creation is also experienced by God, and creation itself is 
seen as cooperation between God and all creatures. Whether this cooperation takes 
place is thus up to humanity. In other words, God cannot force humans to do God’s 
will, but can only influence them. God does not have, and never has had, a monopoly 
on power. God cannot prevent natural disasters, atrocities like the Holocaust, or 
human disease. Although God is responsible for evil because God has created the 
world having the potential not only of great good but also of great evil, God is not 
morally blameworthy because ‘God always intends the good and always shares the 
suffering of the creatures in a world in which beauty and tragedy are interwoven’.199  
Process theodicy seems to reject God’s sovereignty and omnipotence, but 
Haught argues that persuasive power is more powerful than coercion if power means 
‘the capacity to influence’.200 This is because God’s persuasive love can make a 
much more substantial, self-actualizing and autonomous world. 
Process theodicy is one of the most important determining ideas for the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught. Haught is convinced that process theology deals 
with the difficult problems of evolution more directly and efficiently than other 
theologies have, even though he does not accept all the ideas held by process 
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theologians.201 Haught also claims that process theodicy can be more consonant with 
the Christian image of God as suffering love when it integrates the insights of 
evolutionary science within itself.202 
 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin  
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) was a French Jesuit and palaeontologist who 
pursued the Christian meaning of evolution during his lifetime. The Human 
Phenomenon (1955) is his most important book and his essays were published after 
his death: The Future of Man (1959), Activation of Energy (1963), The Divine Milieu 
(1957) and Christianity and Evolution (2002).  
Teilhard’s main ideas are that there is a clear direction to the evolving universe, 
that this direction consists in increasing organized complexity, and that the ultimate 
goal of this advance is referred to as ‘Omega’, Omega being God. For Teilhard, 
creation is a process of gathering the manifold strands of universal evolution into a 
final future unity. Teilhard relates his understanding of evil in the following: 
A primary disorder cannot be justified in a world which is created fully 
formed: a culprit has to be found. But in a world which emerges gradually 
from matter there is no longer any need to assume a primordial mishap in 
order to explain the appearance of the multiple and its inevitable satellite, 
evil.203  
For Teilhard, evil is not an unexpected accident in the world. ‘[Evil] is an 
enemy, a shadow which God inevitably produces simply by the fact that he decides 
on creation. New being, launched into existence and not yet completely assimilated 
into unity, is a dangerous thing, bringing with it pain and oddity’.204 In other words, 
creating the world is no simple task, but an adventure and a risk to which God 
completely commits himself.  
Therefore, Teilhard’s theodicy can be summarized like this: evolution means 
that the creation of God is not finished. If creation is unfinished, then we cannot 
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expect a perfect universe at present. An evolving universe unavoidably has a dark 
side,205 but we can also anticipate the ‘Omega Point’, the revealed universal Christ, 
i.e. the Christ of evolution: the end of evolution and the summit of creation. 
Although Teilhard’s idea is criticized because of his focus on the good sides or 
aspects of evolution,206 his argument of evolutionary theodicy has had a great effect 
on Haught’s own theodicy. Haught emphasizes the direction of evolution and the 
importance of the future (I will explain these in detail in the following sections) and 
he does indeed have a high opinion of Teilhard, saying that Teilhard has emerged as 
the most important Christian thinker of the twentieth century and will permanently 
be a hero for those who believe that religion must get to grips with evolution.207 
 
Hans Jonas  
Haught is also influenced by the kenotic theology of Hans Jonas (1903–1993). Jonas 
was an eminent Jewish philosopher, and wrote a number of relevant books, 
including: The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God & the Beginnings of 
Christianity (1958), The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology 
(1966), The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological 
Age (1979), Mortality and Morality: A Search for Good after Auschwitz (1996).  
Jonas thinks that theology should accept a scientific vision of the cosmos, that 
is, a spatially enormous and temporally prolonged universe, necessary in order to 
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allow life and mind to bring about. According to Jonas, mind can experience itself in 
the diversity of its possibilities only in the inexhaustible supply of chance, in the 
boundless play of the finite, in the suffering arising from mortality, and in the 
surprises of the unplanned.  
At the same time, Jonas accepts that life and mind were intended by God, the 
primordial mind. God renounced himself in order to leave room for such an immense 
and protracted universe. Jonas writes that ‘the deity had to renounce His own power. 
Be that as it may, from then on things proceeded only in an immanent manner, with 
no further intervention of transcendence’.208 
Jonas highlights divine non-interference in the ongoing evolutionary process. 
He points out, ‘Only a universe colossal in space and time, in accordance with the 
rule of mere possibilities and with no intervention of divine power, offered any 
chance at all for mind’s coming to pass at any time or place whatsoever’.209 The 
reason why he emphasizes divine non-intervention is that he wants to make room for 
a notion of God that would be consistent with horrendous events in history such as 
the Holocaust. A God who is impotent to the extent of being unable to affect the 
process of natural or human history beyond the initial creation, Jonas thinks, cannot 
be blamed for the contingent evils in the world. Therefore, God for Jonas is the One 
who relinquishes all power at the minute of creation and is hereafter helpless 
concerning the evil uses of human free will, unable to intervene. For Jonas, God 
sympathizes with all that occurs in the world and is thereby given a particular 
identity of a suffering God, the kenotic God.  
Jonas’s theodicy is different from other evolutionary theologians, such as 
Peacocke, Haught and Harris in that he does not demand continuous interaction 
between God and the world during the process of evolution. I do not think that his 
conception of God actually serves to help those in the face of pain, however, for if 
God created the human beings with all our attendant sufferings but then as it were, 
relinquishes any power to influence what happens, then it seems that God is nothing 
other than a mad scientist who either cannot comprehend or does not care about the 
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consequences of his experiments – in this case, the creation of creatures with free 
will and consciousness, not only able to feel pain but experience it subjectively.  
Jonas’s theodicy has had an influence on the kenotic and ‘letting be’ ideas of 
Haught, but only up to a certain point. Although Haught emphasizes ongoing divine 
intervention in creatio continua, he acknowledges his kenotic theology is similar to 
Jonas’s idea of God and evolution.210 Jonas’s theodicy leads us to think differently 
about theodicy after the Holocaust. As Haught points out, Jonas’s theodicy seems to 
be attractive in justifying God in the face of evil, in virtue of the fact that God cannot 
be said to have ‘permitted’ or ‘allowed’ this particular horror to occur, but it cannot 
expound on how subjectivity emerges in the natural world at first.211 Moreover, 
Jonas’s theodicy makes it harder for us to identify or anticipate a Christian hope for 
the future. Without God’s continuous intervention, can creatures hope for future 
redemption? If God cannot influence the world or human lives in any way after its 
and their initial creation, how can we make sense of the eschatology so paramount in 
Christianity? This is the reason why Haught emphasizes the importance of the future 
in his theodicy (see below ‘A Metaphysics of the Future’).  
 
(2) Haught on Evil 
After having given a brief exposition of Christian theodicies related to Haught, I will 
now move to a theodicy specifically for a scientific age: evolutionary theodicy as 
developed by Haught. Haught raises insightful ideas in which to speak about the 
problem of evil in a scientific context while remaining steadfast to the Christian 
tradition.  
Before expounding the evolutionary theodicy of Haught, in this section, 
however, I will examine how Haught understands original sin – still one of the 
important elements of Christian doctrine – and what evil means in his evolutionary 
theology.  
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‘Original sin’, the Christian doctrine that people have inherited sin or a tendency 
toward sin from Adam, constitutes one of the principal challenges for Christians in 
harmonizing doctrine with evolutionary biology, especially in Western Christianity 
with its Augustinian heritage. What exactly original sin means has never been made 
perfectly clear. According to Augustine who coined the term ‘original sin’ (peccatum 
originale), it means a biologically-transmitted tendency to disordered desire and 
ignorance. Augustine says: 
For we all were in that one man, since we all were that one man [Adam], 
who fell into sin by the woman who was made from him before the sin. 
For not yet was the particular form created and distributed to us, in which 
we as individuals were to live, but already the seminal nature was there 
from which we were to be propagated; and this being vitiated by sin, and 
bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born 
of man in any other.212  
Modern evolutionary biologists do not accept that the first man appeared fully 
formed at the beginning, along the lines of a literalist reading of Genesis. However, 
Augustine’s notion of original sin was long taken for granted by Western Christianity 
as the actual condition of the human being, and some evangelical Christians still 
claim that if evolutionary theory is true, there could have been no ‘Fall’ of humanity, 
which is apparently required for the doctrine of original sin, and in virtue of this that 
there is no necessity for a Saviour to save humankind from sin. For example, George 
McCready Price claimed, ‘No Adam, no Fall; no Fall, no Atonement; no Atonement, 
no Savior’.213 In virtue of their philosophical and hermeneutical presuppositions, 
they deny evolution in order to preserve what they believe is core to Christian 
teaching.  
Recent scholars have interpreted original sin to mean the present, general state of 
human estrangement from God, from each other and from the natural world – not 
resulting from a particular act committed by Adam and inherited therefrom, as 
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Augustine held.214 Harris points out that the writers of the Bible did not strongly 
assert the historical Fall except in Romans 5, and considerable reliance on the Fall 
originated from the dominance of Augustinian thought in Western theology.215 
According to Southgate, evolutionary history does not start with the story of sin and 
the Fall of human beings, rather its history is that of millions of years in which the 
bright and shadow sides of creation coexist together216 – in moral consciousness, 
selfishness and generosity, malevolence and forgiveness. 
I think that it is barely possible to posit a historical Adam while accepting the 
main theses of evolutionary biology, without contradicting traditional Christian 
belief. It seems that something needs to give, if we are to reconcile modern scientific 
views of the world with the biblical view of the world (according to its most essential 
meanings, or spirit, if not to the literal letter). Evolutionary theologians, then, can 
only suggest the best plausible alternatives, choosing among different emphases in 
their interpretations of biblical narratives and the exigencies imposed upon thought 
by modern science.  
Haught tries to harmonize the idea of original sin and modern evolutionary 
biology. He first presupposes that fundamentalists’ interpretation of sin and 
redemption is immensely shallow. For Haught, evolutionary biology only contradicts 
a superficial biblical literalism, not the substance of Christian teaching concerning 
sin and redemption.  
Haught argues that evolutionary science cannot and should not be reconciled 
with a literal reading of the story of Adam and Eve.217 For him, Augustine’s literal 
interpretation of original sin, the genetic flaw inherited biologically (seminally), 
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misses deeper meanings intrinsic in biblical stories about our origin. He therefore 
tries to find underlying meanings rather than the superficial, and that deeper meaning 
for Haught is the turning away of human beings from God.  
First of all, Haught attempts to understand original sin from an ‘aesthetic-
evolutionary’ perspective. He explains, ‘Original sin consists of all the forces that 
lead us away from participation in this most essential and vitalizing pursuit 
(maximizing beauty)’.218 Note the dynamism in Haught’s definition. Based on his 
view, original sin does not denote actual disordered acts or intentional neglect; rather 
it implies the difficult situation that has been prevalent as a result of the humans’ 
callous disinterest in their creative mission in the world. Thus, Haught’s notion of 
original sin implies that we are conditioned by a whole history of evil as well as by 
what is life-affirming, simply on the ground of our being born into this changeable 
world.  
Moreover, Haught suggests that original sin is not the reverse side of an 
unfinished universe being created. For him, original sin is ‘the aggregation in human 
history and culture of all of the effects of our habitual refusal to take our appropriate 
place in the ongoing creation of the universe’.219 It is this sort of corruption by which 
humans are stained, not the defilement of an original cosmic perfection. Haught 
argues that there is the accumulated history of humans’ ‘Fall’, in a backward 
movement that is toward disunity, but past evolutionary achievement also provides a 
reason for having confidence that the forces of unity will be revealed to be victorious 
in the future. Evolution has brought about moral consciousness, civilisation, and 
religion that gives meaning in the cosmos where previously there was none. 
In short, according to Haught, there is no contradiction between evolution and 
what he considers to be a more realistic notion of original sin, ‘the complex of social 
and cultural pressures that channel our native impulses in destructive directions’.220 
His point is that an awareness of evolution may lead us to a deeper and more 
significant understanding of original sin than we had before, allowing us to avoid 
exclusivist dichotomies of fundamentalists on either side of the science and religion 
debate.  
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Haught’s idea about original sin leads us to understand the inner meaning of 
original sin without conflict with evolutionary science. More importantly, by saying 
that the ‘ideal’ world is not a past paradise to which some Christians seek to return 
but the new creation of the Absolute Future,221 not only does his idea not give up the 
necessity of future atonement and salvation, it also gives significance to present 
cosmic evolution. According to his argument, spiritual life can be shaped by 
expectation of what might be through the process of evolution, without being 
controlled by nostalgia for what has been lost.  
However, Haught’s idea can only explain original sin in terms of human beings’ 
own moral evil in act and thought, and cannot explain the existence and experience 
of natural evil and suffering (such as predation, starvation, and extinction) in the pre-
human world. Moreover, Haught does not connect original sin with evolution 
directly, focusing only on the inner meaning of original sin. In other words, he is not 
interested in the questions that evolutionary theologians have been trying to answer, 
such as when original sin materialised or where or how it originated.  
 
The Refusal to Participate in the Ongoing Creation  
In the evolutionary theology of Haught, God does not push the universe down a 
predetermined path or according to a certain trajectory, but compassionately 
persuades the world to shape itself toward ideal forms of order. However, the 
universe does not always respond fully to God’s persuasion, especially when it 
arrives at the human stage of its unfolding given the indeterminacy necessarily 
involved in freedom of the will. Therefore, the risk of evil remains and even becomes 
greater with the emergence of human freedom.222 If so, how does human freedom 
cause evil, and how can evil be specifically defined in a world in which evolution is 
intrinsic to its processes?  
Haught believes that sin or moral evil should be regarded as the consequence of 
the free submission on the part of human beings to the past and the past state of the 
world, whose ultimate unity has actually yet to be realised. In an unfinished universe, 
humans still exist as accomplices of evil and this complicity in evil is interpreted by 
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Haught as their systematic refusal to take part in the world’s continuous creation 
rather than as a cessation of primordial innocence. The creative process is one in 
which the naturally dispersed elements of an emerging cosmos are being drawn 
toward unity. Haught says: 
Our own sin, then, is at least in some measure that of spurning the 
invitation to participate in the holy adventure of the universe’s being 
drawn toward the future (the God-Omega) upon which it leans as its 
foundation. Here sin means our acquiescence in and fascination with the 
lure of the multiple. It is our resistance to the call of “being more,” our 
deliberate turning away from participation in what is still coming into 
being.223  
Haught’s understanding of evil respects the traditional emphasis on humans’ 
personal responsibility for evil. Moreover, based on process theology’s 
interpretation, Haught understands evil as anything that obstructs the world’s 
ongoing evolution as a world-in-the-making. This may include the obsession humans 
have with order (up to a certain point).  
Haught identifies two forms of evil in an evolving universe.224 The first is the 
evil of disorder. For example, this is the evil caused by suffering, war, famine and 
death. The second is the evil of monotony. This means sticking to trivial forms of 
order, refusing to accept new things even when it is reasonable to do so. Because the 
acceptance of novelty may interfere with a present sense of order, Haught suggests 
that people set up walls around their cultural and economic lives so as to rule out 
what is fresh and different. So, the way to avoid the evil of monotony is risking 
substantial change, the potential evil of chaos.  
Therefore, according to Haught, ‘Whatever else we may understand by “sin”, in 
an evolving universe it means our refusal to participate in the ongoing creation and 
renewal of the cosmos’.225 His understanding of sin suggests that some of the 
attitudes we considered holy at one time may now be revealed as abetting in 
monotony. He insists that reflecting on the notions of evil and sin in respect to 
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evolution helps us recover in a fresh way what the biblical prophets meant by justice 
and what Jesus meant by love.  
 
(3) The Evolutionary Theodicy of Haught  
According to evolutionary biologists, most of the species that evolution has 
produced, over ninety-nine percent, are now extinct. The extinction of species, with 
the necessary pain and suffering of creatures involved, seems to provide evidence 
against the goodness and wisdom of the Christian Creator God. Why has such 
suffering and waste existed throughout the millions of years of evolutionary 
processes? How can we understand all the suffering and loss lying under the surface 
of nature’s present order?  
 In this section, I will examine how Haught understands this specific 
manifestation of the problem of evil engendered by evolution. First, Haught mentions 
creation as ‘letting be’; second, he accepts that there is purpose or direction in 
evolution and refers to God’s suffering with all creatures as ‘divine kenosis’, and 
finally, he develops an argument concerning a ‘metaphysics of the future’, providing 
eschatological hope.  
 
Creation as ‘Letting Be’ 
According to Haught, if God is intimately related to the world, we should expect an 
aspect of randomness or indeterminacy in nature. The reason is that love typically 
operates not in a coercive but in a persuasive manner. Love refuses to impose itself 
upon the beloved (all creatures in this context), but instead allows the beloved to 
freely remain themselves.226 This evolutionary portrait of nature implies that God 
somehow intends the world, in like manner, to ‘become itself’.  
God’s creation as ‘letting be’ is understood by Haught as God taking the risk of 
allowing the cosmos to exist in relative liberty. The random variations or genetic 
mutations that compose the raw material of evolution are living proof of the world’s 
inherent freedom.  
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However, the ‘freedom’ of evolution leaves room for evil and suffering. Haught 
understands the problem of suffering in evolutionary processes to be illuminated by 
the love of God. According to Haught, God reveals his love to the whole world in the 
way that He creates and maintains the world as ‘letting be’. If God is truly love, then 
this love would persuade the cosmos to reach beyond itself toward new modes of 
being rather than compel it to do so. If God is love, then it is natural that there is 
chance and indeterminacy in the world, including the random mutations that offer the 
material for evolution’s wasteful processes.227 A demand for a perfectly ordered 
universe is also, Haught reckons, an indirect demand that God should exercise a 
coercive kind of power over creation. 
For Haught, the Christian God is the One who wishes to share creative life with 
all creatures. Such a God declines from the start any strict control over the process of 
creation, and regards all creatures as creative partners. Such a gracious self-denying 
love would be quite consistent with a world open to all the surprises in the process of 
evolution, and the suffering and struggle of life accompanying it. God cannot be 
anything other than a love that honours the freedom and spontaneity of the whole 
world. This implies there must be room for random events:  
As the divine Love gives itself to creation, the world’s independence and 
freedom do not decrease but intensify. And when humans emerge in this 
most fascinating story, evolution becomes endowed with an unprecedented 
freedom and consciousness. But this freedom brings with it a capacity for 
sin. Faith in God, however, entails faith in redemption. Evil, suffering and 
sin can be conquered by new creation.228  
For Haught, the divine love that allows all creation to ‘become itself’ gives 
unprecedented freedom to all creatures, and that freedom includes a capacity for sin. 
In other words, creatures bring about evil in the misuse of their freedom; evil does 
not emerge from God’s own will. If we understand evil and suffering based on this 
idea of Haught, we can conclude that the only sort of culpability that God has in the 
existence of evil is his endowing of such freedom to the whole of creation. Such 
freedom, even while it contains the possibility of the world falling into natural and 
moral evils, is an expression of God’s endless love. By analogy, we cannot claim that 
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the inventor of electricity is morally blameworthy for fires or electric shocks just 
because these sometimes occur as a result of the misapplication of the flow of 
electric charge. We cannot, for example, blame Benjamin Franklin for the death of 
Thomas Merton, who died of electric shock when an electric fan fell into his bath.229  
It often seems that Haught proposes an Open Theistic approach to divine 
knowledge, Open Theism affirming what is known by contemporary theologians to 
be the ‘great-making’ properties of omnipotence and omniscience, but redefining 
those terms for the purpose of acknowledging the radical unpredictability of human 
free will.230 God, for Haught, bears an analogical relationship to a kind of author that 
the writer George R. R. Martin calls a ‘gardener’, as opposed to that of the 
‘architect’. The writer who is an architect plans every point of the development of the 
story before actually writing the story, thereby giving very little role to improvisation 
other than in specific scenes. The gardener, on the other hand, only has a very 
opaque idea of the kind of story that he or she will write, ‘planting’ the seeds at the 
beginning, letting the story write itself thereafter, with the assistance of vague hints 
and intuitions of what should come.231 
For Haught, then, God is not morally blameworthy for the evil and suffering 
caused by the evolutionary processes for God must have endowed creation with 
freedom that is by definition unpredictable. God is divine love, and is a creator of the 
whole cosmos, itself possessing boundless freedom. 
We may question why natural selection – an important means of creation as 
‘letting be’ – works blindly, indiscriminately and impersonally. Haught also raises 
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the question of what life would be like today if evolution had preferred weak 
organisms rather than strong ones.232 If this had been the way evolution proceeded, 
life would have listlessly disappeared from the earth long ago, and humans surely 
would not exist. In other words, there are no better alternatives than the law of 
natural selection, i.e. the world is operated by the best possible principle (natural 
selection) even though it inevitably causes pain, suffering and death. 
Moreover, the laws of nature should be predictable in order that for nature not to 
collapse into utter caprice and chaos. Gravity is an important law of nature 
cosmologically, but it may be regarded as unfortunate for some people who happen 
to be falling from a dangerous height. Haught suggests that natural selection, then, is 
no more an obstacle to Christian theology than any other law of nature.233 Besides, 
Haught argues that, if God insisted on being in total control of things, the world 
would be a pallid and impoverished world. It would be devoid of all the drama, 
adventure, diversity, and intense beauty that evolution has actually produced. He 
says: 
A world of human design might have a listless harmony to it, and it might 
be a world devoid of pain and struggle, but it would have none of the 
novelty, contrast, danger, upheaval, and grandeur that evolution has 
brought about over billions of years.234  
A world devoid of pain and suffering is not all roses. For Haught, the grandeur 
and novelty of the cosmos is much more significant than pain and suffering, and is 
worth much more attention. We intuitively see the truth of this when considering the 
life of a moral exemplar who has undergone much pain. The focus is not so much on 
how much pain the person was able to endure, but rather the character that they were 
able to cultivate in spite of horrendous pain and suffering. As Haught says, ‘Since 
such [heroic] stories involve the narrative patterning of struggle, suffering, conflicts 
and contradictions into a complex unity, they stand out as one of the most obvious 
examples of beauty’.235 We must not isolate the pain and suffering that are intrinsic 
to evolution, but rather take them as necessary ingredients of the whole. Therefore, 
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we cannot assign blame to God for the pain and suffering involved in evolutionary 
processes in the theology of Haught. This idea seems to be similar to Leibniz’s idea 
of the best of all possible worlds, and Southgate’s ‘only way’ argument.236 However, 
people who are experiencing suffering may find little comfort in the explanation that 
this present state of the universe with all its pain and suffering, is a necessary 
constituent for its overall beauty or harmony. 
Haught’s idea about creation as ‘letting be’ may be possibly regarded as a sort of 
deism. The general idea that God refrains from direct intervention or direct 
providential ordering of the world in order for nature to be creative on its own course 
of evolution is seemingly identical to deistic notions of God and his relation to 
creation, a God who does not intervene with the functioning of the world but rather 
permits it to operate according to autonomous laws of nature.  
Haught, however, demonstrates that God is not like the unnecessary and remote 
‘first cause’ of deism because, for him, it is out of a personal eagerness to relate 
deeply to the world that God foregoes any direct presence to the world.237 
Paradoxically, for him, God’s withdrawal is not due to apathy but rather a most 
extreme form of involvement.238 Because God intends the evolving world to become 
more and more independent and to deepen its own sense of freedom, the ‘absent’ 
God is, contrary to appearances, united with the world by virtue of permitting it to 
achieve genuine autonomy.  
Haught sets out to defend himself from accusations of deism, saying ‘The divine 
Spirit is poured out into the world and is interior to the process of creation’.239 
However, it is my recommendation that we understand divine action and the 
providential ordering of the universe differently: evolution itself is the process of 
God’s continuous creation, the laws of nature being understood as channels whereby 
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God is always creating. This does not contradict the idea of creation as letting-be. 
This not only emphasizes God’s intervening in creation but is also consonant with 
evolutionary biology.  
With further regard to God’s relationship to the world, we can infer the 
relationship between God and creatures in Haught’s thought by calling to attention 
God’s will for creatures, purpose or direction in evolution and the divine kenosis, 
wherein God is present with the creatures, sharing their suffering. I will examine 
these themes in the following sections.  
 
Purpose or Direction in Evolution 
Another way that Haught approaches the problem of pain and suffering is to try to 
find purpose or direction in evolution. Haught believes that suffering may have a 
transformative quality, and says, ‘if we frame the whole of nature within the scheme 
of hope and promise of resurrection, Christian faith allows the evolutionary process 
to be redemptive as well’.240 This would mean that if we become accustomed to the 
conviction that pain and suffering can lead to something higher, then we will not be 
shaken by the Darwinian picture of life.  
Haught does attempt to explain why human beings are not able to entirely 
understand the ultimate purpose of the universe. Based on scientific ideas on the 
hierarchical structures of the laws of physics and chemistry, Haught suggests that 
creatures inhabiting lower levels do not always comprehend higher levels. He says, 
‘This principle insists that the higher comprehends the lower and dwells in it but is 
not capable of being grasped in a controlling way by the lower’.241 Each level can 
only control what lies below it. In other words, humans would not be able to easily 
identify divine purpose in the universe. Therefore, for Haught, even if purpose in the 
universe is not obvious for humans, it does not follow that the universe is 
purposeless. Does Haught’s epistemic position, that we cannot fully comprehend 
divine purpose in the universe answer Hart’s criticism of theodicies, that were we to 
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know for certain why and how God permits evil and suffering, God’s omniscience 
and omnibenevolence would be undermined? 
Even though we may affirm the existence of purpose or direction in the 
universe, we may question why God would want a world that is not completed and 
perfected immediately, and why the universe has to evolve in the uncompromising 
and dramatic way that evolutionary biology claims it does. Haught answers that it 
might be because God wants all creatures to take part in the divine joy of creating 
novelty that the cosmos is left unfinished and is to some degree self-creative.242 
Moreover, for Haught, an initially perfect design would almost certainly imply the 
end of evolution before it even began, and would imply the end of creaturely 
aspiration and hope, given that human actions are always performed for some 
intended potential end, that is, in principle not yet in existence but is attainable. Were 
there a perfect universe, there would arguably be nothing left to live for. In Haught’s 
words: ‘Perfectionism is a sure way to close off the future and prevent the world and 
our lives from ever becoming new’.243 The God of Haught’s theology encourages 
creatures to participate in the continuous creation of the universe.  
  
Divine Kenosis 
In stating his views on theodicy, Haught is first interested in how the sense of God 
‘as operative in actual religious awareness’ is consonant with recent scientific views. 
In other words, the discourse about God’s relation to the world must be closely 
related to the connotations of actual religious experience. This would imply seeking 
to understand the evolving world with regard to the outpouring of compassion and 
the corresponding meaning of world renewal associated with the ‘Christ-event’ – the 
crucified and risen Christ.244 Christians perceive the kenosis of God in the Christ-
event as Paul explains it: ‘who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard 
equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself (ἐκένωσεν), 
taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human 
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form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death – even death on 
a cross’ (Phil. 2:6–8).  
Some evolutionary theologians think of God as kenotic love when they examine 
the relationship between evolutionary science and theology. George Murphy says: 
In natural selection God is not understood as a deity who forces millions of 
generations through suffering and extinction without himself being 
affected by the process, but rather as a God who participates in the 
processes and shares in the suffering and death of the world. The price for 
the development of life is paid not only by God’s creatures but also by 
God himself.245  
Murphy applies the Christ-event to creation, and interprets suffering and death in 
nature in light of the kenosis of God. Southgate understands the notion of divine 
kenosis as both God’s permitting of processes that involve the co-existence or mutual 
arising of the unfit or weak and the fit or strong and God’s participation in the 
sufferings of the weak. Southgate also examines the notion of kenosis in the light of 
the Trinity: ‘The Father whose self-abandonment begets the Son, the Son whose self-
emptying gives glory to the Father, these in the power of the Spirit give rise to living 
selves’.246 
Similarly, Haught argues that Christian theology should inquire into how 
evolution might be reasonable when it takes place in a universe formed by God’s 
kenotic compassion, and tries to answer the problem of evil and suffering with 
respect to divine kenosis. Haught believes that ‘only the notion of God as self-
emptying love makes sense after Darwin’,247 and many scholars in science and 
religion have supported this view.248 This is the God who suffers along with all 
creatures and saves them by taking all of their evolutionary pain and triumph into the 
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continuous divine compassion. The struggle and pain in evolution are in consonance 
with a Christian interpretation of the world with regard to the cross of Christ; for 
Christians, all suffering in the world is transformed because of Christ. Evil is no 
longer meaningless and suffered alone, but redeemed and shared by Christ. Christ 
can be seen in those who suffer. 
Haught claims that this is not a God that evolutionary theology just created to 
accommodate Darwin. This is the empathetic God revealed in the Bible: the God of 
Israel who shared the pain of the oppressed in Egypt, the God who identifies with the 
crucified Jesus, and the God that Christian faith hoped in long before scholars 
discussed nature’s evolutionary birth pains.249  
The suffering of the innocent and the weak in evolution is indivisibly united 
with the divine eternity. For Haught, Christian theology cannot allow a deity who 
simply creates and then abandons the world. The same God who creates the world to 
evolve by its own means is also intimately engaged in and with the evolutionary 
process. He says, ‘God struggles along with all beings, participating in both their 
pain and enjoyment, ultimately redeeming the world by an infinite compassion – so 
that in the end nothing is ever completely forgotten or lost’.250 Darwin’s evolutionary 
ideas can lead Christian theology to a new sense of God, more in touch with the 
whole of creation than previous Christian ideas of God.  
In the evolutionary theodicy of Haught, the passion and resurrection of Jesus 
mean that God fully shares the pain and suffering of this world. Haught says, ‘The 
self-emptying God of religious faith does not stand aloof from evolution, but enters 
into it, taking all of its suffering and creativity into the divine life’.251 In other words, 
the suffering of living beings is not in vain – does not dissipate – in virtue of an 
isolation from God, but becomes an important part of God’s continuous work, which 
is, as we previously said, analogous to a novel which has not been meticulously 
planned beforehand, but which is being written even while the events in the story 
unfold. In virtue of the encompassing context of the infinite compassion of God, all 
the suffering of the world will be carried away and the redemption of whole creation 
will be finally accomplished. Therefore, for Haught, the real obstacle to reconciling 
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faith and evolution is not the pain and suffering in the world, but our failure to have 
acquainted ourselves fully with the astonishing image of a God who pursues the 
world’s freedom as the highest value and who shares in the world’s suffering.252  
According to Haught, a vulnerable love of God allows the world to experience 
its own internal power of self-creativity. In contrast, coercive power can never 
substantially and positively affect beings from within, only superficially affect them 
from without. God’s power is revealed most fully in His self-emptying 
empowerment, not in coercive power.253 Thus we can say that evolutionary science 
helps us to give up tyrannical images of God as a mere monarch, ordering His 
creation to perform according to His own whims.  
For Haught, God’s kenosis is the paradigmatic instance of relational power. 
Even though Berry claims that the extent of kenosis has limits, due to the obvious 
exhibition of Jesus’ authority over natural forces (winds and waves) in the 
Gospels,254 Haught refutes him, believing that this is a misconception of divine 
kenosis: ‘kenosis should be understood to mean that there are no limits to the 
outpouring of divine love, and love should never be associated theologically with 
weakness’.255 Haught’s view is that God, by his nature, does not intrude into the 
world in the manner of dictatorial power, and therefore that neither God’s kenosis 
nor his power, which can only be properly understood in reference to His love, is to 
be judged according to exhibitions of brute power (as with Christ controlling the Sea 
of Galilee). Again, for Haught, to talk of God’s power is to talk of ‘relational power’. 
This relational power is positive rather than negative, that is, indicative of 
immeasurable strength rather than indicative of impotence, and is clearly implied by 
the central Christian doctrines and narratives of, for example, finding freedom in 
slavery to God, and life in death. Kenosis, signified most clearly by God’s own 
positive self-giving of himself on the Cross, then, is not to be confused with 
weakness other than the heroic weakness intrinsic to selflessness and sacrifice. 
Haught is persuasive in arguing that God’s intimate relationship with the cosmos 
implies that He is also affected by everything occurring in the world.  
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Not everybody agrees over Haught’s conception of divine kenosis, however. 
First, the concept of kenosis in Philippians 2:7 was not, presumably, introduced in 
order to point out the Creator’s self-limitation to permit the rivers of blood inevitable 
in nature as ‘red in tooth and claw’, as Peters argues: 
Rather than identify kenosis with divine self-limiting to permit suffering 
and death, it would be better to say that in the incarnation God limits his 
eternity to enter into time, limits his infinity to become finite, limits his 
divine life to enter into creaturely death, limits self to ingress into the 
other. The theology of the cross points to a present God who is at one with 
our weakness, not to an absent omnipotent God.256 
According to Peters, ‘divine identification with the unfit’ is the key that unlocks 
the door to eternal life because God becomes one with the unfit – the weak, destitute 
and marginalised – on the cross. Celia Deane-Drummond also claims that the image 
of God should be that of a co-suffering creator who identifies with the victims of 
evolutionary processes rather than the process itself.257 However, Haught seems to 
connect the notion of kenosis with God’s allowing suffering and pain in creation 
even while He permits them in order for His creatures to achieve a deeper autonomy. 
As Peters and Deane-Drummond mentioned, divine kenosis is better understood, 
without contradicting Christian doctrine, when it is understood as divine participation 
in creatures’ suffering rather than God’s permission of suffering for the autonomous 
self-creation by those creatures. I do not think that Haught explicitly considers divine 
kenosis to be mere permission of suffering, for he argues for the existence of God 
who suffers with creatures as I expounded above. That said, Haught could make his 
position clearer so as not to risk identifying kenosis with mere permission of 
suffering in creation. 
Now, we should also consider another issue, which is that if God is in intimate 
relationship with creatures in virtue of divine kenosis, how does God build a 
relationship with the fittest, those who survive without much suffering in the natural 
world? If evolution is a theory and narrative of the fittest creatures surviving best and 
‘God’s creative Spirit is the ultimate explanation of evolution’,258 we may infer from 
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this that the fittest are the ones intended by God to maintain and perpetuate His 
creation in progression. How are the fittest and the God-who-was-crucified-and-
resurrected for the unfit related? If God is an ever-active creator in the process of 
evolution, his salvific designs should focus on the fittest that adapt themselves to the 
process rather than on the unfit. Many evolutionary theologians as well as Haught 
overlook this contradiction. The Christian God, of course, is a saviour for the whole 
world, and it is natural that the unfit have a place in God’s salvific mission. But then 
what does His crucifixion and resurrection mean for the fittest? If we primarily apply 
the Christ-event to only God’s suffering with and for the unfit, we may overlook 
matters about the salvation of the fittest.  
It is impossible that divine kenosis should clearly explain or resolve the problem 
of evil with reference to evolution. Like Hart, Murphy argues, ‘The only real 
Christian theodicy is the passion of Christ. This is not an explanation of evil but a 
claim that God suffers with the world from whatever evil takes place.… The world’s 
pains are God’s stigmata’.259 Haught also acknowledges that there is no easy 
theoretical solution to the problem of suffering, but he nonetheless hopes for final 
consolation: ‘[God] will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death 
or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away’ (Rev. 
21:4). This eschatological vision will be made manifest for the whole of creation and 
not just for humans. By regarding evolutionary suffering as God’s own suffering, 
Haught hopes for an eventual victory of love and life over pain and death, even 
though people initially cannot comprehend why suffering is so prevalent. 
 
A Metaphysics of the Future 
The metaphysics of ‘being’ in which Plato and Aristotle were interested was adopted 
in Christian theology, and it still shapes the intellectual setting of Western religious 
thought. However, due to the development of new evolutionary ideas from the 
eighteenth century onwards, the notion of ‘becoming’, of permanent or unceasing 
movement or change returned to the fore of Western intellectual life, after having 
had only brief hints of interest after Heraclitus. 
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In the evolutionary theology of Haught, the future is paramount. He claims that 
the novel possibilities that evolution has available to it derive from the imminent and 
immanent arrival of the future. The persistent coming of an unrehearsed future 
enables both the present and the past to open onto a path of transformation, the 
novelty that is manifested in evolution.260 Haught calls this a ‘metaphysics of the 
future’, and explains:  
A metaphysics of the future is rooted in the intuition, expressed 
primordially in the biblical experience of what is ‘really real’, that the 
abode of ultimate reality is not limited to the casual past nor to a fixed and 
timeless present ‘up above’. Rather, it is to be found most 
characteristically in the constantly arriving and renewing future.261 
Haught’s vision of the future can properly accommodate both the data of 
evolutionary biology and the claims of Christianity about how a promising God 
relates to the world.  
Obviously, Haught is not the only one who focuses his theology on the future. 
Teilhard de Chardin claims that only a God who is functionally and totally ‘Omega’ 
can satisfy us. For Teilhard, evolution occurs because the world is drawn into God, 
and God-Omega is the ultimate end of evolution (Chapter 3:1).  
Since Teilhard de Chardin, many theologians, such as Moltmann,262 Rahner,263 
Pannenberg264 and Peters,265 have emphasized the importance of the future in their 
respective theological systems. Moltmann expresses the significance of 
eschatological future in Christianity:  
Hence eschatology cannot really be only a part of Christian doctrine. 
Rather, the eschatological outlook is characteristic of all Christian 
proclamation, of every Christian existence and of the whole Church. There 
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is therefore only one real problem in Christian theology, which its own 
object forces upon it and which it in turn forces on mankind and on human 
thought: the problem of the future.266 
In the evolutionary theodicy of Haught, the past is gone and is irretrievable, and 
the present disappears before we can see it, slipping through our fingers as we try to 
grasp it. The future is always arriving with the possibility of new being. Haught 
believes that what has already been entrusted to the past is not itself enough to 
express the novelty of evolutionary events. So only in the future (or in reference to 
the future) can reach the eventual source from which new species of life originate.267 
For Haught, the future endows new meaning to a world which appears hopelessly 
lost and even unreasonable in the present arbitrariness of events and the prevalence 
of suffering. The hope for future redemption can be an answer to the problem of 
suffering and evil.  
But how do we know that cosmic processes ultimately lead to meaningful 
outcomes? Haught answers that we do not know because the ambiguity of an 
unfinished world remains. Because of the fact that we live in a still unfinished 
universe, we must always rely on trust rather than clear vision. Haught believes that 
there would be no room for doubt in God’s goodness or purposes in a finished or 
perfected world.268 We can walk by faith and not by sight because our status is as 
part of a world still in the process of being created.  
Therefore, theodicy after Darwin is best understood as new creation with 
eschatological hope. As Paul says in Romans 8, our hope is for liberation from 
suffering and the renewal of the whole cosmos, not just the salvation of human souls. 
In the evolutionary theodicy of Haught, the suffering and pain necessarily involved 
in evolutionary processes will disappear in the future as a result of the consummation 
of creation.  
I think that Haught’s idea on ‘a metaphysics of the future’ is a plausible 
approach to the problem of evil, but it is not free from criticism.  
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First, the theory of ‘a metaphysics of the future’ essentially consists in casting 
the dice on the uncertain future. We do not know the future in any degree of certainty 
whatsoever, but, in light of faith, must believe that the future is one in which we can 
hope. Haught’s view, then, also invites doubt about the future eschatologically, and it 
must be restated that the promised future compensation of pain and suffering in the 
world cannot reduce the present experience of such by humans here and now, despite 
conscious affirmation of Christian belief and doctrine. The problem of evil, whether 
on a subconscious or conscious level, remains. Haught’s view may be regarded as an 
uncritical natural optimism for a stronger doctrine of providence, as Alister McGrath 
argues.269 
Second, as Schaab mentioned,270 Haught’s theology may depreciate the present 
and the past that provide the potentialities on which evolution depends. Again, the 
pain and suffering that is experienced is invariably experienced by persons now. How 
can we say God is working in creation? To emphasize the imminent and immanent 
new creation too strongly may lead to the emptying of divine significance in this 
creation, for if God no longer plays a part in the development of the world or in 
human events, then why is God important for us now? In addition, if the emphasis is 
on the future to the extent that the future absorbs and transforms all that went before, 
can the so-called ‘past’ actually be significant at all? Indeed, it seems that Haught 
also views time as something of an incessant ‘push’ to the future, both 
metaphysically and phenomenologically. Can the past or present really be said to be 
real on this basis? 
Third, the evolutionary theology of Haught pursues the conversation between 
theology and science, but whether an eschatological future, called the new creation, 
can be explained or accommodated by evolutionary creation is unclear. To be 
persuasive, a conception of the new creation should not be qualitatively different to 
continuous creation in regard to divine intervention. If God intervenes ‘naturally’ in 
continuous creation (i.e. the evolutionary process), a supplementary explanation is 
needed for the new creation, one that accommodates the possibility that God seems 
to intervene ‘supernaturally’. 
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Finally, it seems that evolutionary theologians, in virtue of the fact that they put 
more weight on the eschatological future, downplay the objective atoning 
significance of the cross. And this seems to apply to Haught. So we are left with this 
question: How does the future salvation of all reality – and not just human beings in 
a state of sin – relate to the atonement of the cross? In Christianity, the Christ-event 
on the cross acquires objective importance as much as the future promise, or perhaps 
more, because the Incarnation, according to Christian belief, makes the future 
intelligible in the first place.271 Evolutionary theologians should therefore clarify the 
relationship between the atonement of the cross and the future salvation of the 
evolving universe at large.  
 
(4) Summary 
In this chapter, I provided an exposition of Haught’s thoughts on the problem of evil 
and his conception of theodicy in light of evolutionary theory. In the first section, I 
briefly summarized Christian theodicies related to Haught: process theodicy and the 
ideas of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Hans Jonas. In the second section, I 
expounded what evil is in the evolutionary theology of Haught. We saw that Haught 
understands original sin as humanity’s habitual refusal to take its appropriate place in 
the ongoing creation of the universe, and this understanding helps us to comprehend 
the inner meaning of original sin without conflict with evolutionary science. Haught 
divided evil into two forms: the evil of disorder (caused by suffering, war, famine 
and death) and the evil of monotony (refusing to accept new things).  
In the third section, I explored the evolutionary theodicy of Haught in its four 
aspects: creation as ‘letting be’, purpose or direction in evolution, divine kenosis and 
a metaphysics of the future. For Haught, the divine love that permits all creation to 
‘become itself’ gives unprecedented freedom to all creatures, and that freedom 
includes a capacity for evil. Haught also argues that God wants all creatures to 
participate in the divine joy of creating novelty, and this is why God would want a 
world that is not completed and perfected immediately. Moreover, for Haught, the 
passion and resurrection of Jesus mean that the self-emptying God fully participates 
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and shares the pain and suffering experienced in this world. Finally, Haught believes 
that theodicy after Darwin is best understood as new creation with eschatological 
hope, and calls this idea a ‘metaphysics of the future’.  
To sum up Haught’s evolutionary theodicy: Darwin’s idea of evolution leads 
Christian theology to penetrate more deeply into the fundamentals of the Christian 
faith. Haught thinks that the Christian faith already implies something like the 
Darwinian picture of life. Paradoxically, God’s creative power becomes known 
precisely in such a self-effacing relationship to His creatures. God’s creative power 
would become clear in such a self-effacing fashion. The idea of an almighty God 
who is untouched by the world’s suffering is hard to harmonize with Christology. 
Moreover, Haught’s vision of the future can accommodate both the data of 
evolutionary biology and the claims of Christianity, even though it does have the 
unresolved problems mentioned above. Therefore, for Haught, an evolutionary 
theological understanding of the problem of evil is the most plausible theodicy in a 
scientific age.  
 The most pressing issue for Haught’s theodicy is how understanding evil on the 
intellectual level (its causes and solutions) can be applied to the personal and 
emotional level, that, to the experience of pain and suffering. Not only Haught’s 
theodicy but many Christian theodicies still face the same problem. I hope to address 
this most serious concern by a thorough dialogue between Haught’s evolutionary 
theology and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi in the comparison part of the thesis 
(Chapters 6, 7 and 8).  
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PART Ⅱ. THE DAOIST PHILOSOPHY OF ZHUANGZI 
 
In Part Ⅰ, I explored the evolutionary theology of John Haught. I expounded how 
evolutionary science and Christian theology can be harmonized in Haught in chapter 
2, and the problem of evil and theodicy of Haught in chapter 3.  
Now we move to Part Ⅱ, the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi. I will examine 
Daoism and Zhuangzi’s philosophy in general in chapter 4, and Zhuangzi’s 
conception of evil in chapter 5. These two chapters will present information about 
the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi for the purpose of comparative study between the 
evolutionary theology of Haught and the Daoist philosophy in Zhuangzi in Part Ⅲ, 




Chapter 4  
Daoism and Zhuangzi’s Philosophy 
 
Daoism consists in a number of indefinable characteristics and diversities. The 
difficulty of defining the notion of ‘Dao’ is shown in the main Daoist text, the 
Daodejing, beginning with this passage: ‘The Dao that can be told of is not the 
eternal Dao’272 – to select only one translation of this enigmatic verse. In addition, 
‘Dao’ has been used in many religions in China in virtue of its many possible shades 
of meaning. Daoism not only has obscure beginnings, multiple scriptures and 
denominations, it is also mixed with other religions such as Confucianism and 
Buddhism in beliefs and practices. Thus we can agree with Herrlee Creel’s saying: ‘I 
shall not be so foolish as to try to propound a single, sovereign definition of what 
Taoism is’.273 Creel claims that Daoism is a conglomeration of doctrines rather than 
a school of thought. Joachim Gentz refers Daoism as ‘the most complex and 
indefinable of the great religious traditions in China’.274 
  Keeping in mind this basic understanding of Daoism as a religion or way of life, 
I will explore Daoism and Zhuangzi’s philosophy in this chapter. To begin with, I 
will examine in detail what Dao and Daoism are, and next, the Daoist philosophy of 
Zhuangzi, as the successor of Laozi in the development of early, ‘philosophical’ 
Daoism. Finally, I will try to compare the notions of Dao in Daoism and God in 
Christianity with specific regard to these topics: Ultimate Reality as the origin and 
provider of all beings, the transcendence of Dao and God, the omnipresence of Dao 
and God, the incomprehensibility of Dao and God, and the personal and impersonal 
characterisations of Dao and God. This chapter will provide the basic information 
about Daoism needed for comparative study between Daoism and Christianity.  
 
 
                                                 
272 Daodejing, chap. 1. (道可道非常道.) own translations when another translation is not cited. 
273 Herrlee Glessner Creel, What Is Taoism? And Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), 1. 
274 Joachim Gentz, Understanding Chinese Religions (Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 2013), 
70. 
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(1) What are ‘Dao’ and ‘Daoism’?  
Daoism is both a philosophical and religious tradition that originated in ancient 
China from around the 6th to the 4th century BCE. Daoism has influenced Chinese life 
and thought ever since, in conjunction with other faiths and philosophical systems: 
Confucianism, which also originated in China at the same period as Daoism, and 
Buddhism, which came to China from India around the second century CE. Daoism 
spread amongst East Asian countries such as Korea, Vietnam and Japan. While 
Daoism may not be a popular religion in East Asia today, it has had a strong 
influence on all aspects of society, from ethics, medicine, literature and martial 
arts.275 
Daoism has traditionally been divided into two discrete traditions: philosophical 
Daoism and religious Daoism. Daoism generally gives preference to obscurity and 
relates its teachings in parables and riddles. As a religion, Daoism is esoteric and 
many of its secrets are open only to the initiated.276 The root ideas of both traditions 
emerged from the yijing (易經), or the Book of Changes, which is approximately 
2,900 years old. The yijing is both a summary of ancient Chinese cosmology and a 
manual for rulers predicated upon its cosmology, presented in two principles 
essential to Daoism: the positive (yang) and negative (yin). 
It is upon this foundation that philosophical Daoism emerged. The first of the 
two foundational texts of philosophical Daoism is the Daodejing (The Book of the 
Way and its Power). Traditionally ascribed to Laozi, the origin of the Daodejing and 
the date of its compilation have been much disputed.277 As such, it is also often 
referred to simply as the Laozi.  
                                                 
275 Paula Hartz, Daoism, 3rd ed., World Religions (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2009), 8. 
276 Küng and Ching, 131. 
277 Among several versions of the Daodejing, the standard version that many scholars have used is 
‘Wang Bi Version’. In 1973, another version was excavated in Mawangdui, and this is similar to the 
standard version except for the different order of ‘Dao part’ and ‘De part’. In 1993, what is thought to 
be the earliest version was excavated in a tomb in Guodian. The volume of this version (around 2,000 
characters) is smaller than Wang Bi’s and it does not contain certain features of the latter, such as 
what some scholars regard as implicit criticisms of Confucianism subsequently added to the original. 
Nonetheless, for this thesis, I use the Wang Bi version. See: Robert G. Henricks, Lao-Tzu: Te-Tao 
Ching - a New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Ma-Wang-Tui Texts (New York: 
Ballantine, 1989); Robert G. Henricks, Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching: A Translation of the Startling New 
Documents Found at Guodian (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
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 A summary of Daoist cosmology and moral principles for the guidance of 
rulers, the Daodejing is composed of 81 short chapters (about 5,000 characters), and 
is a combination of poetry, philosophical ideas and mystical images, and focuses on 
the life of wuwei (non-action). It also explains the operating principle of the cosmos 
as that of Dao and the sage’s life as that of having Dao’s virtue.  
The Daodejing has greatly influenced East Asian countries. Wing-Tsit Chan 
explains the leverage of the text: ‘No one can hope to understand Chinese 
philosophy, religion, government, art, medicine – or even cooking – without a real 
appreciation of the profound philosophy taught in this little book’.278 I think that no 
other Chinese historical text of such small a size has influenced so much in East 
Asian countries. These days, the interest of the book is worldwide: it has been 
translated more than 300 different versions (more than 80 of them into English).279  
The other text is the Zhuangzi, presumably written in the fourth and third 
centuries BCE. It is composed of several essays which are written in anecdotes, 
parables, paradoxes and allegories. The ideas of the Zhuangzi are presented in a 
different style from those in the Daodejing, making much use of humour and 
focussing on unity with nature (wuwei-ziran). Arthur Waley referred to the Zhuangzi 
as ‘one of the most entertaining as well as one of the profoundest books in the 
world’.280  
In the Zhuangzi, only the Inner Chapters (內篇, chap. 1–7) are thought to be 
written by Zhuangzi himself, and the Outer Chapters (外篇, chap. 8–22) and the 
Mixed Chapters (雜篇, chap. 23–33) were presumably written by Zhuangzi’s 
disciples and followers. Because the authorship and date of compilation of the 
Zhuangzi are still debated, I follow the custom of referring to the work as the 
Zhuangzi rather than the author when I quote texts from the Outer and Mixed 
Chapters.  
Over the centuries, followers of Laozi and Zhuangzi developed Daoist ideas and 
practices, adopting them ritual and worship practices to form what is now known as 
‘religious’ Daoism. There were two prominent early Daoist movements: Taiping Dao 
                                                 
278 Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1969), 136. 
279 Gentz, 77-78. 
280 Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1939), 163. 
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(Dao of the Great Peace, 太平道) and Wudomi Dao (Dao of the Five Pecks of Rice, 
五斗米道). Taiping Dao was led Zhuang Jiao during 160s and 170s, and he led the 
Yellow Turban movement, a resistance movement of farmers against the 
government. Around the same time, Zhang Ling founded Wudomi Dao (also called 
Tianshi Dao, 天師道), and his followers donated five pecks of rice for their 
membership. Religious Daoists have characteristically pursued the achievement of 
‘immortality’ through inner self-cultivation, occupied with alchemical practices, qi 
(spirit), sexual practices, and also breathing techniques. 
Regardless of the differences between philosophical and religious Daoism, Dao 
is the key concept in both Daoist traditions. The term Dao was used in diverse 
philosophical schools in ancient China, including Confucianism, and was adopted in 
Chan and Zen Buddhism,281 but received its first systematic treatment in the 
Daodejing. According to the Daodejing, Dao is the One which is natural, 
spontaneous, nameless, indescribable and eternal. Whether Dao can be discussed at 
all is a question raised by the very first verse in the Daodejing, which, if we recall, 
was ‘The Dao that can be told of is not the eternal Dao’. This passage itself has been 
the focus of much debate in Chinese scholarship. Dao (道) means ‘way’, ‘path’, 
‘road’, ‘principle’, ‘flow’, ‘course’ or ‘doctrine’, as both a noun and a verb such that 
the characters 道可道 can be interpreted to mean ‘The Way that can be Way-ed’ 
(followed, as a method) and also ‘The Way that can be spoken of’ (named, 
defined).282 Together, 道可道非常道 seems to imply that the Dao is utterly 
indefinable and incomprehensible, and Laozi expresses this sentiment in another 
well-known verse: ‘He who knows does not speak, and he who speaks does not 
know’.283 
Yet the Daodejing was written and the philosophical schools multiplied. 
Whatever the experience of ultimate reality in any part of the world, and however 
inexpressible it may, we must be able to convey something of it. What follows is my 
attempt to outline the doctrine of Dao. 
                                                 
281 Chan and Zen (禪) Buddhism are schools of Mahayana Buddhism originated in China, combined 
with Daoism.  
282 Alan Watts, Tao: The Watercourse Way (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 38-39. 
283 Daodejing, chap. 56. (知者不言, 言者不知.) 
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First, Dao is the origin of all beings.284 Dao is the beginning of all changes in the 
world and the ultimate cause of them. Dao is present before the manifestation of all 
the things of the world, and there is no time that Dao did not or does not exist, and 
therefore the categories of existence and non-existence, strictly speaking, do not 
apply to it. Laozi explains the operation of Dao: 
Dao produces them [the myriad creatures]; virtue rears them; things shape 
them; circumstances perfect them. This is why the myriad creatures all 
revere Dao and honour Virtue. Dao is revered and Virtue honoured not 
because this is decreed, but because it is natural. And so Dao produces 
them and Virtue rears them; raises and nurtures them; settles and confirms 
them; nourishes and shelters them. To produce without possessing; to act 
with no expectation of reward; to lead without lording over; such is 
Enigmatic Virtue!285 
Laozi says that Dao produces, raises, and shapes all creatures. Similarly, in the 
Zhuangzi, Dao is the origin of all things: ‘Before Heaven and earth existed, Dao was 
there, firm from ancient times. It gave spirituality to the spirits and to God; it gave 
birth to Heaven and to earth’.286 Zhuangzi understands that Dao alone was present in 
the beginning, and created the whole universe, including spiritual beings. Due to 
Dao’s movement, all things are given birth to and are maintained in the world. 
Zhuangzi explains this: ‘It is Dao of heaven to keep moving and to allow no piling 
up – hence all things come to completion’.287 Dao thus is the beginning of the 
universe and the way by which all things pursue their route. In other words, Dao is 
the origin of existence in all possible modes. Dao is the starting point of all changes 
and the ultimate cause of human and non-human beings’ growth. 
Second, as mentioned earlier, Dao contains both the positive and negative 
aspects of reality. For Laozi, the nature of Dao is expressed in opposite poles: yin 
                                                 
284 Ibid., chap. 4. (萬物之宗) 
285 Ibid., chap. 51. (道生之, 德畜之, 物形之, 勢成之, 是以萬物莫不存道而貴德. 道之尊, 德之貴, 
夫莫之命而常自然. 故道生之, 德畜之, 長之育之, 亭之毒之, 養之覆之. 生而不有, 爲而不恃, 
長而不宰, 是謂元德.) Cited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Norden, Readings in Classical 
Chinese Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2005), 187. In virtue of the myriad 
interpretations of ‘Dao’ and the fact that ‘Dao’ or ‘Tao’ (as is still used in popular publications on 
Daoism from the earlier Wade-Giles translation system) has entered the English language, I do not, 
unlike Ivanhoe and Norden, translate Dao into ‘Way’. 
286 Zhuangzi, chap. 6. (未有天地, 自古以固存. 神鬼神帝, 生天生地.) Watson, 45.  
287 Ibid., chap. 13. (天道運而無所積. 故萬物成.) 
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(the shadow side) and yang (the bright side), being and non-being, something and 
nothing. Laozi says, ‘To have and to lack generate each other. Difficult and easy give 
form to each other. Long and short offset each other. High and low incline into each 
other. Note and rhythm harmonize with each other. Before and after follow each 
other’. 288 Zhuangzi similarly says, ‘For this reason, whether you point to a little stalk 
or a great pillar, a leper or the beautiful Xishi, things ribald and shady, or things 
grotesque and strange, Dao makes them all into one. Their dividedness is their 
completeness; their completeness is their impairment’.289 Dao is the interchange of 
yin and yang, good and bad, or something and nothing.  
Third, Dao has a circular movement, which is immanent in all creatures and the 
cosmos. Dao is the origin and final source of all things, that from which they come 
and that to which they return. Laozi says, ‘Turning back is the action of Dao. 
Weakness is the operation of Dao’.290 Dao is the origin of all beings and their natural 
habitat. Dao becomes the cause not only of the formation of all things but also the 
destruction and dissolution of all things. Destruction and dissolution are ways to 
become the unity of all things in Dao, so they do not contain a negative meaning but 
have positive directivity. Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, turning back is eventual 
movement of all things: ‘The principle of following one another in orderly 
succession, the property of moving in alternation, turning back when they have 
reached the limit, beginning again when they have ended – these are inherent in 
things’.291 The turning back of things at the limit of their development sustains the 
circular movement of created reality originated by Dao.  
Finally, Dao transcends space and time. Dao exists everywhere and at every 
time. According to the Daodejing, ‘There is a thing [Dao] confused yet perfect, 
which arose before Heaven and earth. Still and indistinct, it stands alone and 
unchanging. It goes everywhere yet is never at a loss’.292 For Laozi, Dao existed 
                                                 
288 Daodejing, chap. 2. (故有無相生, 難易相成, 長短相較, 高下相傾, 音聲相和, 前後相隨.) 
Ivanhoe and Norden, 163.  
289 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (故爲是擧莛與楹, 厲與西施, 恢恑憰怪, 道通爲一. 其分也, 成也. 其成也, 
毁也.) Watson, 11.  
290 Daodejing, chap. 40. (反者道之動, 弱者道之用.)  
291 Zhuangzi, chap. 25. (隨序之相理, 橋運之相使, 窮則反, 終則始, 此物之所有.) Watson, 224-225. 
292 Daodejing, chap. 25. (有物混成, 先天地生. 寂兮寥兮, 獨立不改, 行而不殆.) Ivanhoe and 
Norden, 174-175.  
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before the formation of the universe, and it exists without the limitations of space and 
time. According to the Zhuangzi, Dao exists in all things, even in urine and 
excrement,293 while invisible: ‘Dao has its reality and its signs but is without action 
or form. You can hand it down, but you cannot receive it; you can get it, but you 
cannot see it’.294 Dao operates everywhere and at all times ‘spontaneously’, ‘without 
(conscious) action’ (wuwei-ziran) – notions which I will develop in detail in the next 
section. However, let us say something briefly about the limitations of our 
metaphysical categories when applies to Dao. 
Western philosophy and theology usually applies the concepts of ‘dualism’ or 
‘monism’ to express the most general aspects of a school of thought or a religion. 
Whereas dualism is usually used to express the view that reality consists in two 
fundamentally opposing or qualitatively different forces or substances (matter and 
spirit, good and evil, wisdom and illusion), monism is used to express the view that 
whatever differences may be apparent in the world for us, these differences a merely 
apparent, and at bottom, reality is constituted by one entity, substance or force. 
Dualism is perhaps exemplified by Zoroastrianism, Gnostic Christianity, and more 
recently in the history of ideas, the philosophy of Descartes. Monism is exemplified 
by the Parmenidean notion of the immutable One, the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, 
and in the modern era, Spinoza and, later, Hegel. 
Given that Dao is the unifying principle at work in the manifestations of yin and 
yang, would we be correct to apply the Western philosophical term of monism to 
describe Daoism? Perhaps the most well-known saying of Laozi is that ‘The Dao 
which can be spoken of is not the true Dao’, suggesting that it is absolutely 
impossible to define or even conceive of Dao, given that Dao contains, underlies and 
transcends all reality – even words. As such, it cannot be captured in a thought, 
word, or concept. To illustrate this further, we note that to say something exists is to 
contrast existence with (at least possible) non-existence. In like manner, to say 
something is ‘one’ is also to contrast ‘one’ with ‘multiple’, or, philosophically ‘the 
many’. If Dao both contains and transcends these concepts, we surely cannot call it 
‘the One’, for Dao also includes, and is manifest in, ‘the many’. We cannot, 
therefore, describe Daoism as a monism according to such Western philosophical 
                                                 
293 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. (See Chapter 4:3 ‘The Omnipresence of Dao and God’.) 
294 Ibid., chap. 6. (夫道, 有情有信, 無爲無形. 可傳而不可受, 可得而不可見.) Watson, 45. 
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categories. And while yin and yang are opposites in appearance, because they are 
inseparable in any and all circumstances, they are in a conspiracy, in agreement, in 
unity. For this reason, and for the previous reason that Dao contains all concepts, we 
also cannot call Daoism a ‘Dualism’ either. 
However, despite all this, we can affirm that Daoism is closer to an ontological 
monism than an ontological dualism in virtue of the very fact that we refer to one 
principle, one force, one reality underlying all things. In order for Daoism to be 
intelligible for us in the Western philosophical tradition, then, we have to apply the 
term of monism, even if it is, strictly speaking, not accurate. 
 
(2) The Daoist Philosophy of Zhuangzi 
Wuwei (無爲, non-action) 
Wuwei and ziran are the major concepts in Daoism, and they are clearly revealed in 
the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Wuwei (無爲), literally ‘non-action’, ‘non-striving’, 
‘not doing’, ‘absence of doing’, ‘without doing’ or ‘effortless action’, is a central 
concept of Daoist philosophy. The simplest explanation is that wuwei means ‘acting 
spontaneously’. Sung-Peng Hsu interprets wuwei as ‘not-having wilful action’.295 
According to Gentz, wuwei is ‘a kind of action that does not force things against their 
nature’ and is a way to act in accordance with Dao.296 Wuwei does not mean literally 
inactivity but rather ‘taking no action that is contrary to Nature’.297 In other words, 
wuwei is letting nature take its own route, best illustrated in the difference between 
intuition and analysis, or intuitive knowledge and analytical knowledge: direct, 
wordless knowledge, and contrived, aggregative knowledge. 
Wuwei is the most important notion for the art of rulership in the Zhuangzi and 
the Daodejing. 
The Virtue of emperors and kings takes Heaven and earth as its ancestor, 
Dao and its Virtue as its master, inaction as its constant rule. With 
inaction, you may make the world work for you and have leisure to spare; 
                                                 
295 Sung-Peng Hsu, "Two Kinds of Changes in Laotzu's Thought," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4, 
no. 4 (1977): 333. 
296 Gentz, 79. 
297 Chan, 136. 
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with action, you will find yourself working for the world and never will it 
be enough. Therefore the men of old prized inaction.298 
This is why sages abide in the business of nonaction, and practice the 
teaching that is without words. They work with the myriad creatures and 
turn none away. They produce without possessing. They act with no 
expectation of reward. When their work is done, they do not linger. And, 
by not lingering, merit never deserts them.299  
According to the texts, wuwei is Dao’s constant rule and the world works for 
According to the texts, wuwei is Dao’s constant rule and the world ‘works’ for 
oneself, that is, becomes an extension of oneself for the performance of actions 
without strenuous effort, when one rests in non-action. Thus the sage deals with 
affairs without contrived action and teaches virtue without words.300 Logically 
speaking, it is impossible to manage affairs without action and to share doctrine 
without words. This paradox can be understood when we truly grasp the notion of 
wuwei. 
 In Daoism, wuwei does not mean to live in seclusion, and is defined as ‘do 
nothing’, ‘prefer stillness’, ‘engage in no activity’, and ‘be without desires’.301 Laozi 
says: 
The more taboos and prohibitions there are in the world, the poorer the 
people. The more sharp implements the people have, the more benighted 
the state. The more clever and skilful the people, the more strange and 
perverse things arise. The more clear the laws and edicts, the more thieves 
and robbers. And so sages say, ‘I do nothing and the people transform 
themselves; I prefer stillness and the people correct and regulate 
                                                 
298 Zhuangzi, chap. 13. (夫帝王之德, 以天地爲宗, 以道德爲主, 以無爲爲常. 無爲也, 
則用天下而有餘. 有爲也, 則爲天下用而不足. 故古之人貴夫無爲也.) Watson, 100.  
299 Daodejing, chap. 2. (是以聖人處無爲之事, 行不言之敎. 物作焉而不辭, 生而不有, 爲而不恃, 
功成而弗居. 夫唯弗居, 是以不去.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 164.  
300 This is very similar to St. Francis of Assisi’s exhortation: ‘Preach the Gospel. Use words [only] if 
necessary.’ 
301 Wuwei means not only non-action, but also practical tactics for action for Laozi. People who never 
dare to be ahead of the world can become leaders of the various offices: ‘I have three treasures that I 
hold on to and preserve: The first I call loving kindness; the second I call frugality; the third I call 
never daring to put oneself first in the world. The kind can be courageous. The frugal can be generous. 
Those who never dare to put themselves first in the world can become leaders of the various officials’ 
(Daodejing, chap. 67. Ivanhoe and Norden, 196-197). 
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themselves; I engage in no activity and the people prosper on their own; I 
am without desires and the people simplify their own lives’.302 
In other words, all things go well if human beings do not engage in calculated or 
contrived activity. ‘Preferring stillness’, ‘engaging in no activity’, and ‘being without 
desires’ allow one to ‘transform’ and ‘prosper’. Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, humans 
can know Dao, rest in Dao, and get to Dao, when they stay in wuwei: ‘Only when 
there is no pondering and no cogitation will you get to know Dao. Only when you 
have no surroundings and follow no practices will you find rest in Dao. Only when 
there is no path and no procedure can you get to Dao’.303 
In short, as the Zhuangzi states, wuwei is one of the principles of Dao: 
‘Emptiness, stillness, quietude and non-action are the root of the heaven and the earth 
and the principle of Dao and Virtue’.304 As such, wuwei is one of the virtues which 
every person – common or noble – must cultivate in order to become a sage or wise 
ruler. If people rest in non-action, all things will manage themselves,305 and things 
will go well.  
 
Ziran (自然, spontaneity) 
Ziran is another very important concept in the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi. Zi 
(自) literally means ‘from…’ or ‘self-…’, and ran (然) means ‘like this’.306 Ziran is 
generally understood as ‘spontaneity’, ‘nature’, ‘self-becoming’, or ‘being so of 
itself’, but each English translation, as with so many Chinese words, does not contain 
the exact meaning of ziran.307 
                                                 
302 Ibid., chap. 57. (天下多忌諱, 而民彌貧, 民多利器, 國家滋昏, 人多伎巧, 奇物滋起, 法令滋彰, 
盜賊多有. 故聖人云. 我無爲而民自化, 我好靜而民自正, 我無事而民自富, 我無欲而民自樸.) 
Ivanhoe and Norden, 191.  
303 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. (無思無慮始知道, 無處無服始安道, 無從無道始得道.) Watson, 176.  
304 Ibid., chap. 13. (夫虛靜恬淡寂漠無爲者, 天地之本, 而道德之至.) 
305 Ibid., chap. 11. (汝徒處無爲, 而物自化.)  
306 Qingjia Wang, "On Lao Zi's Concept of Zi Ran," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 24, no. 3 (1997): 
292. 
307 Qingjia Wang points out several problems of common English translations of ziran: ‘First, the 
translation of “ziran” as “nature” may misread it as a noun which refers to an entity rather than to a 
process of growing and becoming; second, the translation of “spontaneity” may miss the “active” 
meaning of the term “ziran”; third, “self-so-ing” or “self-becoming” may mislead our understanding 
of the term to fall into some egoistic trick, i.e., to make the naturalistic process “personalized”’. [ibid., 
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Both wuwei and ziran are important ideas in the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, 
and they are inseparable from one another, or mutually immanent: we can see that 
effortless action (wuwei) is also that which ‘of itself’ (ziran), and therefore it would 
be a mistake to reify the concepts as though they were ‘parts’ about which we speak 
of a certain relation. Rather, it is wiser to speak of instances of the two; that is, define 
by way of example.  
The best example of ziran is the operation of Dao. Dao creates, maintains and 
recreates all creatures of itself, with no teleology. 
No thing is either complete or impaired, but all are made into one again. 
Only the man of far-reaching vision knows how to make them into one. So 
he has no use [for categories] but relegates all to the constant. The constant 
is the useful; the useful is the passable; the passable is the successful; and 
with success, all is accomplished. He relies on this alone, relies on it and 
does not know he is doing so. This is called Dao.308 
 Dao operates of itself above human recognition, and being thoroughly constant, 
in itself, it is successful without effort or design. According to the Zhuangzi, the state 
of ziran, even though it seems to be a state of chaos from the perspective of a human 
being, is the state of perfect unity with Dao: 
The men of old dwelled in the midst of crudity and chaos; side by side 
with the rest of the world, they attained simplicity and silence there. At 
that time the yin and yang were harmonious and still; ghosts and spirits 
worked no mischief; the four seasons kept to their proper order; the ten 
thousand things knew no injury; and living creatures were free from 
premature death. Although men had knowledge, they did not use it. This 
was called the Perfect Unity. At this time, no one made a move to do 
anything, and there was unvarying spontaneity (ziran).309 
When humans do not get caught up in self-conscious over-thinking and 
machination, all beings will be harmonized with Dao, and this harmony is the state of 
                                                 
312.] I think that ‘spontaneously becoming’ is the best translation, but I will translate it into 
‘spontaneity’ or ‘being so of itself’.  
308 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (凡物無成與毁, 復通爲一. 唯達者知通爲一, 爲是不用而寓諸庸. 庸也者, 
用也. 用也者, 通也. 通也者, 得也. 適得而幾矣. 因是已. 已而不知其然, 謂之道.) Watson, 11.  
309 Ibid., chap. 16. (古之人, 在混芒之中, 與一世而得澹漠焉. 當是時也, 陰陽和靜, 鬼神不擾, 
四時得節萬物不傷, 群生不夭, 人雖有知, 無所用之, 此之謂至一. 當是時也, 莫之爲而常自然.) 
Watson, 122-123.  
 99 
the perfect unity. However, it perhaps need not be said that this unity in spontaneity 
cannot be achieved by conscious effort; much as one cannot relax if one is ‘forced’ 
or commanded to do so. If human beings do attempt to ‘force’ themselves into 
relaxation, their self-conscious, wilful actions will disrupt the constant state of 
harmony and this in turn disrupts the harmony in the world.  
He who holds to True Rightness does not lose the original form of his 
inborn nature. So for him, joined things are not webbed toes; things 
forking off are not superfluous fingers; the long is never too much; the 
short is never too little. The duck’s legs are short, but to stretch them out 
would worry him; the crane’s legs are long, but to cut them down would 
make him sad. What is long by nature needs no cutting off; what is short 
by nature needs no stretching. That would be no way to get rid of worry. I 
wonder, then, whether benevolence and righteousness are part of man’s 
true form. Those benevolent men – how much worrying they do!310 
 According to the Zhuangzi, the world that is made by the operation of yin and 
yang is perfect of itself because Dao does not discriminate among all things in terms 
of what is more ‘real’ (i.e. the distinction between nature and supernature, men and 
angels – that is, higher ontological statuses or ‘degrees of being’), and also does not 
distinguish between what classical Western philosophy would call degrees of 
‘perfection(s)’ or qualities: ‘The Great Dao is capable of embracing all things but not 
of discriminating among them’.311 Human benevolence and righteousness only 
brings worry or sorrow, for we become fixed upon an image or ideal of what we 
must, when that image bears no relation to the real world. We become concerned 
with ‘acting the part’ and worry about failing short of it – and, because we worry, we 
worry about worrying, ad infinitum. In the philosophy of the Zhuangzi, the unity or 
harmony between all beings is a key idea, and it is only possible when humans rest in 
wuwei-ziran.  
 The Zhuangzi shares the important ideas of wuwei-ziran with the Daodejing, but 
it is different in both style and content. Whereas the Daodejing, like similar manuals 
                                                 
310 Ibid., chap. 8. (彼至正者, 不失其性命之情. 故合者不爲騈, 而枝者不爲岐. 長者不爲有餘, 
短者不爲不足. 是故鳧脛雖短, 續之則憂. 鶴脛雖長, 斷之則悲. 故性長非所斷, 性短非所續, 
無所去憂也. 意仁義其非人情乎. 彼仁人何其多憂也!) Watson, 61.  
311 Ibid., chap. 33. 
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for the nobility,312 serves primarily as a metaphysical treatise whose broad principles 
are to be comprehended at the most general level and applied first to one’s attitude, 
the Zhuangzi focuses on how Dao and its principles are applied at the most practical 
level and is therefore a work for common people as well as the ruler.313 Moreover, 
The Zhuangzi emphasises Dao’s eternality and all-encompassing presence in cosmic 
and biological transformations, including the birth, life and death of human beings. 
According to P. Skogemann, Zhuangzi’s deep contact with the eternal ‘enables him 
to see the relativity of things and he loves to make fun of man’s prejudices and 
tendencies to judge everything from his own standpoint’.314 The relativity of things 
and suspension of judgment between right and wrong, of preferable and undesirable 
are significant and repeated themes in the Zhuangzi.315 
Concerning training methods to be a ‘true man’ (眞人) or a ‘sage’ (聖人), the 
highest state that Daoists pursue, zuowang (坐忘, siting in forgetfulness), wuhua 
(物化, the transformation of things) and xianjie (縣解, freeing of the bound) feature 
as significant phases in the Zhuangzi. I will expound the details of these phases 
necessary to be undergone in becoming a sage for Zhuangzi in Chapter 5. The 
important notions in the Zhuangzi of qi (氣, vital energy), yin-yang (the shadow and 
bright sides of Dao’s operation), the omnipresence and hiddenness of Dao, and the 
                                                 
312 For comparison, see the political manual by Han Fei (韓非, c.280–233 BCE), in which he applies 
Daoist principles at the broadest possible level for the benefit of the attitude of the ruler: ‘Though 
right and wrong swarm about him, the ruler does not argue with them. Be empty, still, inactive, for 
this is the true nature of the Way. Study, compare, and see what matches, for this will reveal how 
much has been accomplished. Compare with concrete results, check against empty assertions. Where 
the root and base of the affair are unshaken, there will be no error in movement or stillness’. [Burton 
Watson, Han Feizi: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 38.] 
313 Gentz, 79. 
314 P. Skogemann, "Chuang Tzu and the Butterfly Dream," Journal of Analytical Psychology 31, no. 1 
(1986): 75. 
315 For example, Zhuangzi argues: ‘Suppose you and I have had an argument. If you have beaten me 
instead of my beating you, then are you necessarily right, and am I necessarily wrong? If I have beaten 
you instead of your beating me, then am I necessarily right, and are you necessarily wrong? Is one of 
us right and the other wrong? Are both of us right, or are both of us wrong? If you and I don’t know 
the answer, then other people are bound to be even more in the dark. Whom shall we get to decide 
what is right? Shall we get someone who agrees with you to decide? But if he already agrees with you, 
how can he decide fairly? Shall we get someone who agrees with me? But if he already agrees with 
me, how can he decide? Shall we get someone who disagrees with both of us? But if he already 
disagrees with both of us, how can he decide? Shall we get someone who agrees with both of us? But 
if he already agrees with both of us, how can he decide? Obviously, then, neither you nor I nor anyone 
else can know the answer. Shall we wait for still another person?’ (chap. 2. Watson, 17.) 
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unity of heaven and human being(s) (天人一通, tianrenyitong) will be discussed in 
detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in comparison with Haught’s ideas.  
 
Zhuangzi and Natural Science 
It seems anachronistic to read the Zhuangzi through the lens of modern science 
because of the vast separation in time between Zhuangzi and the scientific (modern) 
era, and also because the Zhuangzi is of an entirely different genre, not being 
anything like a scientific text. We can nevertheless examine the Zhuangzi in the light 
of modern natural science for the following reasons.  
 First, both the Zhuangzi and natural science are interested in the essence of 
nature. Natural science is concerned with understanding natural phenomena in terms 
of their essence and causes, and this is not in fact different from the Zhuangzi. The 
Zhuangzi consists of vagaries and abstruse stories, but as Thomas Merton says, it is 
profound in its directness and its simplicity in that it seeks, ‘as does all the greatest 
philosophical thought, to go immediately to the heart of things’316 Although there are 
differences in methodology and approach between the Zhuangzi and natural 
science,317 their primary concern is the nature: the origin of the world and the 
operating principle of nature.  
Second, the Zhuangzi contains what we could call what is closest to the 
scientific knowledge of the time, including an emphasis on the operations of qi, even 
while this prescientific cosmology seems quite immature in comparison to modern 
science. The Zhuangzi has an understanding of the law(s) of nature.  
When wood rubs against wood, flames spring up. When metal remains by 
the side of fire, it melts and flows away. When the yin and yang go awry, 
then heaven and earth see astounding sights. Then we hear the crash and 
roll of thunder, and fire comes in the midst of rain and burns up the great 
pagoda tree.318 
                                                 
316 Thomas Merton, The Way of Chuang Tzu (New York: New Directions, 1969), 11. 
317 There is the very real difference concerning empiricism, i.e. natural science proceeds by a testable 
and revisable methodology, which is different to a more metaphysical philosophy like Daoism. 
318 Zhuangzi, chap. 26. (木與木相摩則然, 金與火相守則流. 陰陽錯行, 則天地大絯. 
於是乎有雷有霆, 水中有火, 乃焚大槐.) Watson, 227.  
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Not only does the Zhuangzi demonstrate understanding of natural phenomena, it 
also reveals proto-evolutionary thinking about the natural world: spontaneous 
generative change, for example, from microorganisms, to moss, to plantain … to 
leopards, to horses, and finally to humans.319 Considering the text’s time of 
compilation, this idea of ‘transmutation’ (or ‘evolution’ in modern scientific 
parlance) can indeed be evaluated from the perspective of modern science (Chapter 
6:1). 
 Finally, Daoist ideas formed the basis of the development of Chinese science. 
According to Joseph Needham, the contribution of Confucianism to science was 
almost naught, but Daoist speculations about nature ‘fully equalled pre-Aristotelian 
Greek thought [as in the West], and lie at the basis of all Chinese science’.320 
 In religious Daoism, the ultimate goal of Daoist discipline is to be a shenxian 
(神仙), one who achieves immortality. To this end, Daoist experimented with ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’ ‘alchemic’ practices and these led to the development of Chinese science.  
 For these reasons, it is worth looking at the Zhuangzi in the light of science. I 
will do this comparative work in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in conjunction with the ideas of 
John Haught.  
 
(3) Dao in Daoism and God in Christianity 
Does Dao have similar attributes to the Christian God? If the sages of non-Christian 
traditions have access to knowledge of Ultimate Reality through observation of the 
cosmos, the natural world and human history, we may find similar methods and 
perspectives among them. Concerning the relationship between Dao and the 
Christian God, Hans Küng understands that if Dao is everything and if it can be 
understood as ‘being in becoming’, Dao would eventually be identical with God in 
the differentiated way of the Western philosophical and theological tradition.321 
                                                 
319 Ibid., chap. 18. ‘Among the various species, there is a microorganism which propagates in water. It 
becomes moss on the water margin and it becomes plantain on the highlands.… The yangxi grass lives 
with the bamboo that no longer sprouts, which gives birth to an insect by the name of qingning, which 
in turn gives birth to the leopard, and which again in turn gives birth to the horse, which again in turn 
gives birth to the man’ (Wang Rongpei, 295). 
320 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China: History of Scientific Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1956), 1. 
321 Küng and Ching, 173. 
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In this section, I will briefly compare Dao of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi 
with the God of the Bible. Through this comparison, I will reveal that Dao and God 
may be said to have similar properties as well as markedly distinguishing properties. 
This comparison aims will provide the basis for my comparative study between the 
evolutionary theology of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi.  
 
The Origin and Provider of All Beings 
In the Bible, whether initial creation is out of nothing (ex nihilo) is debatable. 
According to Genesis, ‘In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Now 
the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the 
Spirit of God was hovering over the waters’ (Gen. 1:1–2). Whether the creation in 
Genesis is the creation out of nothing or out of pre-existent material is not clear, but 
many Church fathers posited the idea of creation out of nothing. The key point about 
which most theologians agree is that God is the origin of the natural world that we 
know and as such all creatures come from God.  
Dao in Daoism is the origin of the manifold world and all its creatures as well. 
Dao created all creatures out of non-being. Although the notion of non-being in 
Daoism does not exactly correspond with the notion of nothingness in Western 
thought, researching nothingness in connection with non-being is a good way to 
understand creation synthetically.  
The activity of Dao can be compared to God’s providence. The Psalmist says 
about God’s providence:  
These all look to you to give them their food at the proper time. When you 
give it to them, they gather it up; when you open your hand, they are 
satisfied with good things. When you hide your face, they are terrified; 
when you take away their breath, they die and return to the dust. When you 
send your Spirit, they are created, and you renew the face of the earth (Psa. 
104:27–30). 
According to the Psalmist, God feeds and raises all creatures; their life and death 
are ordained by God as the origin and sustainer of all beings. 
How is Dao’s activity revealed in Daoist metaphysics? Laozi says, ‘Dao 
produces them [the entities and creatures of the world]. [Dao] raises and nurtures 
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them, settles and confirms them and nourishes and shelters them’.322 Dao produces, 
rears, settles, confirms, nourish and shelters all creatures but does not restrict them. 
Dao produces them ‘without possessing’, acts ‘without expectation of reward’ and 
leads them ‘without lording over’.323 
Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, Dao is the origin of all things, including spiritual 
entities: ‘The bright and shining is born out of deep darkness; the ordered is born out 
of formlessness; pure spirit is born out of Dao. The body is born originally from this 
purity, and the ten thousand things give bodily form to one another through the 
process of birth’.324 
I believe that the conception of Dao as expressed by Laozi and Zhuangzi is 
something between the traditional notion of the Christian God who is providential in 
His activity and the God of deism. As with the Christian providential God, Dao is the 
origin and provider of all things. As with deism, Dao rears all beings without 
possessing or lording over them. The notion of Dao is therefore similar to the God of 
Christian process theology (Chapter 3:1).  
The Christian God is the creator of all beings in the world, and creativity is one 
of the major attributes of God. Whitehead expounds creativity in Western terms.  
Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in 
which the Aristotelian ‘matter’ is without a character of its own. It is that 
ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot 
be characterized, because all characters are more special than itself. But 
creativity is always found under conditions, and described as 
conditioned.325 
Whitehead understands that creativity is the universal of universals. It is that 
ultimate principle from which the many emerge and by which the many, in time, 
become the universe conjunctively.326  
                                                 
322 Daodejing, chap. 51. (故道生之, 德畜之, 長之育之, 亭之毒之, 養之覆之.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 
187.  
323 Ibid. 
324 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. (夫昭昭生於冥冥, 有倫生於無形, 精神生於道, 形本生於精, 
萬物以形相生.) Watson, 180.  
325 Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, 31. 
326 Ibid., 21. 
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In Daoism, creativity is also an important attribute of Dao. The creativity of Dao 
is revealed in the process in which Dao is diversified from unicity into multiplicity, 
yang and yin, and in turn, into particulars, that is, all objects, creatures, events, etc. 
Like the Creator in Christianity, the creativity of Dao is one of the important 
properties of Dao.  
 
The Transcendence of Dao and God 
‘Transcendence’ means to go beyond or to be beyond. In Christian theology, God is 
portrayed as possessing transcendent qualities and being transcendent in Himself 
‘insofar,’ as Taliaferro and Marty write, ‘God is not identical to (and is thus beyond) 
the cosmos’.327 Transcendence is an important quality of Ultimate Reality, or rather, 
its relationship to us. To discuss Dao and the Christian God, some consideration of 
the transcendence of Dao as understood by Laozi and Zhuangzi is necessary. Laozi 
says, ‘But talk about Dao – how insipid and without relish it is! Look for it and it 
cannot be seen; listen for it and it cannot be heard; but use it and it will never run 
dry!’328 Dao transcends sensual perception. Dao cannot be seen or heard, but it works 
or flows and never runs dry. Laozi puts stress on Dao’s transcendence over and 
above sensory experience: 
Looked for but not seen, its name is ‘minute’. Listened for but not heard, 
its name is ‘rarefied’. Grabbed for but not gotten, its name is ‘subtle’. 
These three cannot be perfectly explained, and so are confused and 
regarded as one. Its top is not clear or bright. Its bottom is not obscure or 
dark. Trailing off without end, it cannot be named. It turns to its home, 
back before there were things. This is called the formless form, the image 
of nothing. This is called the confused and indistinct. Greet it and you will 
not see its head; follow it and you will not see its tail. Hold fast to the way 
of old, in order to control what is here today. The ability to know the 
ancient beginnings, this is called the thread of Dao.329 
                                                 
327 Charles Taliaferro and Elsa J. Marty, eds., A Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion (New York: 
Continuum, 2010), 228. 
328 Daodejing, chap. 35. (道之出口, 淡乎其無味. 視之不足見, 聽之不足聞, 用之不足旣.) Ivanhoe 
and Norden, 180.  
329 Ibid., chap. 14. (視之不見, 名曰夷. 聽之不聞, 名曰希. 搏之不得, 名曰微. 此三者, 不可致詰. 
故混而爲一. 其上不曒, 其下不昧. 繩繩不可名. 復歸於無物. 是謂無狀之狀, 無物之象. 是謂惚恍. 
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As we can see in this passage, Dao cannot be defined in clear language and 
transcends the range of sensual cognition. Dao is ‘not seen (不見)’, ‘not heard 
(不聞)’, ‘not gotten (不得)’, and ‘cannot be named (不可名)’, and therefore, it is ‘the 
formless form (無狀之狀)’, ‘the image of nothing (無物之象)’, and ‘the confused 
and indistinct (惚恍)’.  
Similarly in the Zhuangzi, Dao is described as transcendent: ‘Dao has never 
known boundaries from the beginning’.330 Dao does not only not have boundaries but 
also is eternal: ‘Dao is without beginning or end, but all other things have their life 
and death’331 Dao in the Zhuangzi also transcends human sensory experience: ‘Dao 
cannot be heard; heard, it is not Dao. Dao cannot be seen; seen, it is not Dao. Dao 
cannot be described; described, it is not Dao’.332 
Transcendence is also essential in the presentation of God in the Bible. But we 
also see the doctrine of ‘immanence’333 just as clearly emphasised. St. Paul says: 
‘One God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all’ (Eph. 4:6). 
God is not only transcendent of all things but is also ‘omnipresent’ in all things. In 
addition, St. John says, ‘The one who comes from above is above all; the one who is 
from the earth belongs to the earth, and speaks as one from the earth. The one who 
comes from heaven is above all’ (John 3:31). The attribute of transcendence is shared 
by Dao and God, and it provides a clue for a deeper dialogue between Daoist thought 
and Christian theology. 
 
The Omnipresence of Dao and God 
Dao flows everywhere and cares for all creatures. Laozi says, ‘How expansive is the 
great Dao! Flowing to the left and to the right. The myriad creatures rely upon it for 
                                                 
迎之不見其首, 隨之不見其後. 執古之道, 以御今之有. 能知古始. 是謂道紀.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 
169.  
330 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (道未始有封.) 
331 Ibid., chap. 17. (道無終始, 物有死生.) 
332 Ibid., chap. 22. (道不可聞, 聞而非也. 道不可見, 見而非也. 道不可言, 言而非也.) Watson, 184. 
333 Immanence means ‘to inhabit’ from the Latin immanere. According to A Dictionary of Philosophy 
of Religion, ‘The immanence of God is God’s presence throughout the creation. Immanence is a 
feature of God’s omnipresence or ubiquity’. [Taliaferro and Marty, 120.] 
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life, and it turns none of them away’.334 Zhuangzi discusses the omnipresence of Dao 
with his disciple Dongguozi: 
Master Dongguo asked Zhuangzi, ‘This thing called Dao – where does it 
exist?’ Zhuangzi, said, ‘There’s no place it doesn’t exist’. ‘Come’, said 
Master Dongguo, ‘you must be more specific!’ ‘It is in the ant’. ‘As low a 
thing as that?’ ‘It is in the panic grass’. ‘But that’s lower still!’ ‘It is in the 
tiles and shards’. ‘How can it be so low?’ ‘It is in the piss and shit!’ Master 
Dongguo made no reply. Zhuangzi said, ‘Sir, your questions simply don’t 
get at the substance of the matter. When Inspector Huo asked the 
superintendent of the market how to test the fatness of a pig by pressing it 
with the foot, he was told that the lower down on the pig you press, the 
nearer you come to the truth. But you must not expect to find Dao in any 
particular place – there is no thing that escapes its presence! Such is the 
Perfect Way, and so too are the truly great words. “Complete”, 
“universal”, “all-inclusive” – these three are different words with the same 
meaning. All point to a single reality’.335 
Like in the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, the omnipresence of God is revealed in 
the Bible. Other than in Ephesians and the Gospel of John quoted above, we might 
also point to Jeremiah: ‘“Can anyone hide in secret places so that I cannot see him?” 
declares the LORD. “Do not I fill heaven and earth?” declares the LORD’ (Jer. 
23:24). The Christian God exists everywhere, so no one can hide from him. In short, 
omnipresence, one of the important properties of Ultimate Reality or its relationship 
to human beings, is found in both the Daoist Dao and the Christian God.  
 
The Indefinability of Dao and God 
When we discuss Ultimate Reality, we generally assume that it can be described with 
language, even if our attempts certainly fall short, and our words do not, and cannot, 
represent or recreate experience of the Absolute. Let us remember, however, how 
Laozi pictures the indefinability of Dao in the Daodejing: 
A Dao that can be told of is not a constant Dao. A name that can be named 
is not a constant name. Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven and earth; 
                                                 
334 Daodejing, chap. 34. (大道氾兮, 其可左右, 萬物恃之而生而不辭.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 179.  
335 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. (東郭子問於莊子曰, 所謂道惡乎在? 莊子曰, 無所不在. 東郭子曰, 
期而後可. 莊子曰, 在螻蟻. 曰, 何其下邪? 曰, 在稊稗. 曰, 何其愈下邪? 曰, 在瓦甓. 曰, 
何其愈甚邪? 曰, 在屎溺.… 汝唯莫必, 无乎逃物. 至道若是, 大言亦然. 周遍咸三者, 異名同實, 
其指一也.) Watson, 182.  
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named, it is the mother of the myriad creatures. And so, always eliminate 
desires in order to observe its mysteries; always have desires in order to 
observe its manifestations. These two come forth in unity but diverge in 
name. Their unity is known as an enigma. Within this enigma is yet a 
deeper enigma. The gate of all mysteries!336 
Similarly, Zhuangzi says, ‘The Great Dao is impossible to describe.… If Dao is 
manifest, it is not Dao’.337 This means that any name, definition, or positive 
knowledge of Dao is in fact illusory. Put simply, if we think we have it, we don’t. 
Robert Elliott Allinson regards Laozi and Zhuangzi as ‘contributors from Chinese 
philosophy that both discuss the transcendence of the limits of language’.338 Most 
ancient Chinese philosophical schools believed that the act of naming is necessary, 
and that names do correspond to realities in the world. However, Laozi and Zhuangzi 
reject this as it concerns Dao and certain aspects of life such as wuwei, de and ziran, 
precisely because concepts are static and Dao and the world are not. This is the 
revolutionary and distinct character of Daoism. 
Daoism conveys the reality of Dao apophatically, or by way of negation: what 
Dao is not. Dao is described negatively as nameless, effortless, formless, in other 
words, has no definition. The Daodejing and the Zhuangzi focus on what Dao is not, 
in order to explain what Dao is. For this reason, Daoist philosophy is generally 
regarded as a negative philosophy. Küng summarizes the negativism of Daoism and 
perhaps surprisingly, Christianity: 
What must also be kept in mind is that, for both Taoist and Christian 
thought, the innermost essence of the Tao, like that of God, remains hidden 
to human beings. Whoever thinks he or she can sneak inside the mystery 
of God to get a kind of inside view of God suffers from the greatest self-
                                                 
336 Daodejing, chap. 1. (道可道非常道, 名可名非常名. 無名天地之始, 有名萬物之母. 
故常無欲以觀其妙, 常有欲以觀其徼. 此兩者同, 出而異名. 同謂之玄. 玄之又玄, 衆妙之門.) 
Ivanhoe and Norden, 163.  
337 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (大道不稱.… 道昭而不道.) 
338 Robert Elliott Allinson, "Wittgenstein, Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu: The Art of Circumlocution," 
Asian Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2007): 98. In this article, Allinson claims that where Western philosophy 
ends with the limitations of language marks the point of departure for Eastern philosophy, comparing 
Wittgenstein’s reflections to the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s 
reflections end at the limitations of language: ‘[W]hereof one cannot speak thereof one must be 
silent’. [Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (Mineola, NY: 
Dover Publications, 1999), 27.] As we see in Laozi’s Daodejing, however, Daoist philosophy, begins 
with the limitations of language: ‘The Dao which can be spoken of is not the true Dao’. The common 
theme here is the limits of language and the necessity of transcending it in experience. 
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delusion. Whoever thinks he or she has comprehended God has already 
misapprehended him. Whoever thinks he or she has God in hand comes up 
empty-handed! His or her grasp extends literally into nothingness. On the 
basis of mystical theology and negative theology, Christians can therefore 
also understand completely why Taoists refuse all definitions, all naming 
of the Tao, whether positive or negative.339  
We need to keep in mind Küng’s suggestion. Specific definitions about Ultimate 
Reality are misleading. According to the Book of Isaiah, ‘“For my thoughts are not 
your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways”, declares the LORD. “As the heavens 
are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts 
than your thoughts”’ (Isa. 55:8–9). St. Paul also says, ‘Oh, the depth of the riches of 
the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths 
beyond tracing out! “Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his 
counsellor?”’ (Rom. 11:33–34).  
Apophatic or negative theology is theology that attempts to apprehend or 
comprehend God through negation or in terms of what may not be said about the 
perfect goodness that is God. Apophatic theology is an attempt to pursue unity with 
the Divine through seeking knowledge of what God is not, rather than by pursuing 
what God is. The method of via negativa of Thomas Aquinas stands as an exemplar 
of apophatic theology, and stands in contrast to cataphatic or positive theology, 
which deals in analogy and simile, describing what ultimate reality is like 
figuratively or by relation – for example that God is love is comprehensible by 
analogy with human love; that God is a father with qualities that we value is 
comprehensible by analogy with human fatherhood. Both methods seem similar or at 
least analogous to the ways employed in speaking of Dao in the writings of Laozi 
and Zhuangzi, as well as others. However, the differences in how Western and 
Chinese philosophers and theologians write are such that whereas Western thinkers 
tend to aim at conceptualisation and systematisation, Chinese philosophers tend to 
write in images or parables (especially as found in the Zhuangzi). Thus the two 
traditions constitute different conceptions of philosophy and theology altogether. 
Nevertheless, the two traditions share the view that ultimate reality can never be 
reconstructed conceptually by the human intellect. 
                                                 
339 Küng and Ching, 178. 
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The indefinability of Dao and God is of great importance for developing an 
integral theodicy, for the problem of evil arises out of the apparent logical conflict 
between evil, pain or suffering and pre-conceived notions of love and goodness – and 
therefrom, pre-conceived ideas about what God can and should do or permit and 
prevent. If, as the Bible says, God is Love ontologically, but we cannot give a 
positive conceptualisation of that Love in virtue of God’s indefinability, then we 
surely cannot make moral demands of God, claiming to know what ‘loving’ actions 
(love as a verb) are required of God as Love (love as a noun). In short, even if there 
is analogous relationship between the activities and properties that we see in the 
world and those of God, because of their infinitude in the Divine, it seems that we 
are in no position to make moral judgements upon God on the basis of the conditions 
that we perceive in the world.  
It is this line of thinking that leads theologians, writing in the tradition of Job, to 
argue that no amount of knowledge of human love or fatherhood can let us second-
guess the reasons as to why God allows for the horrendous suffering in the world. 
Even the famous and oft-employed ‘Good father analogy’ breaks down. The 
indescribability of ultimate reality, which is characteristic of Dao and God, provides 
an alternative way of doing theodicy, albeit in a passive and defensive way.  
 
The Personal and Impersonal Characterisations of Dao and God 
One of the important differences between Dao and God is that of personal and 
impersonal characterisations. The God of the Bible is clearly personal. Despite the 
problem of analogous relationships that we point out above, God is what we may call 
a ‘main character’ in the Bible, who affects the plot of the narrative and who has a 
stake in what occurs. In the Bible God exhibits many of the feelings that human 
beings exhibit: repentance (Gen. 6:6), jealousy (Exod. 34:14), anger (Isa. 57:17) and 
pleasure (Lev. 4.31). 
On the other hand, Dao is generally regarded as impersonal. Dao is considered 
as the principle or the way inherent in all things. Laozi says, ‘I do not know its name; 
I call it Dao. If forced to give it a name, I shall call it Great’.340 Because Dao is not 
                                                 
340 Daodejing, chap. 25. (吾不知其名. 字之曰道. 强爲之名曰大.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 175.  
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seen as personal, at least in the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, Dao is not the subject of 
worship: ‘The Great Dao does not admit of being praised’.341 
Although the Daoist Dao is generally regarded as impersonal and the Christian 
God is personal, we need to consider this further before jumping to conclusions for 
theodicy. What does it mean to say that ultimate reality is personal or impersonal, for 
Western philosophy? I think the reason why the Christian God is described as 
personal and in personal terms is to picture the relationship between God and 
creation, and indeed, God and creatures, that is so evident in the Bible. In other 
words, the term ‘personal God’ may be used for purposes of relating the notion that 
God created all things and is continuously related to them. However, in Eastern 
philosophy, the term ‘personal’ or ‘impersonal’ is not needed. The Daoist Dao itself 
is seen as impersonal, but its operation is poetically described in personal terms, for 
example as creating and caring for all things (‘of itself so’). In Eastern philosophy, 
the boundary between personal and impersonal is ambiguous, unimportant, and 
perhaps even meaningless. We see the same phenomenon in the ‘wisdom beyond 
wisdom’ of the Mahayana’s Heart Sutra, in which sunyata (emptiness or 
boundlessness) is at first glance highly impersonal, but which is in unity with karuna, 
of loving-compassion, manifest in the Bodhisattva.342 In Tibetan Buddhism, ultimate 
reality is sometimes referred to as the Mother. Dao in Daoism is similarly described 
as the Mother:  
There is a thing confused yet perfect, which arose before Heaven and 
earth. Still and indistinct, it stands alone and unchanging. It goes 
everywhere yet is never at a loss. One can regard it as the mother of 
Heaven and earth. I do not know its proper name; I have given it the style 
‘Dao’.343 
Dao, the One that existed before heaven and earth and operates everywhere, is 
called the Mother of the universe. Elsewhere, Laozi says, ‘The world had a 
                                                 
341 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. 
342 Kazuaki Tanahashi, The Heart Sutra: A Comprehensive Guide to the Classic of Mahayana 
Buddhism (Boston: Shambhala, 2014). 
343 Daodejing, chap. 25. (有物混成, 先天地生. 寂兮寥兮, 獨立不改, 行而不殆. 可以爲天下母. 
吾不知其名. 字之曰道.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 174-175.  
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beginning; this can be considered the mother of the world’.344 Dao’s operation of 
creation and care for creation is described as the presence of a mother.  
The traditional Christian God, on the other hand is pictured as the ‘personal’ 
‘Father’. This difference is quite obviously due to cultural differences between the 
West and the East. Nevertheless, the idea is similar: God and Dao are closely related 
to all things in the world. Therefore, the question of whether God and Dao are 
personal or impersonal does not constitute a problem in comparative study between 
Daoism and Christianity. In fact, some theologians have begun to regard God as 
‘impersonal’ in order to emphasize his universal features, rather than risk 
anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism brought about by an over-emphasis on 
characteristics or properties that God only possesses in analogical relationship to 
human beings. For example, claiming that ‘ground-of-being theism’ can effectively 
handle the problem of suffering in nature rather than ‘determinate-entity theism’ or 
‘process theism’, Wildman says:  
This God [as the ground of being] is not good in a humanly recognizable 
way, nor personal in character, yet when we assert God’s goodness despite 
its incongruity with our anthropocentric ways of thinking, our minds are 
led higher to larger patterns and wider virtues in which suffering is no 
longer merely an unwanted side effect of otherwise wondrous physical 
processes but a creative source in its own right.345 
This image of God as ground of being, as the One who transcends easy 
recognition and which is impersonal or apersonal, is in harmony with the image of 
Dao in Daoism as I mentioned above, especially when it concerns the problem of 
evil, which I will discuss in the following chapters.  
 
(4) Summary 
In this chapter, I explored Daoism and Zhuangzi’s development of Daoist philosophy 
in particular. To begin with, I examined what Dao and Daoism can be taken to be, 
and next, the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi. Daoism is both a philosophical and 
                                                 
344 Ibid., chap. 52. (天下有始, 以爲天下母.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 187.  
345 Wildman,  in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Evil in Nature, 
293. 
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religious tradition that originated in ancient China, and the Daodejing and the 
Zhuangzi are the two foundational texts of philosophical Daoism.  
In Daoism, Dao is the origin of all beings, containing both the positive and 
negative aspects of reality, having a circular movement immanent in all creatures and 
the cosmos, and transcending space and time. In the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi, 
wuwei (non-action), ziran (spontaneity), and the relativity of things are the major 
themes.  
In this chapter I also expounded how the Zhuangzi can be viewed from a 
scientific perspective: the Zhuangzi is interested in the essence of nature as is natural 
science, containing what is closest to the scientific knowledge of the time. We saw 
that Daoist ideas form the foundation of Chinese science. 
In the third section, I tried to compare Dao in Daoism to God in Christianity 
with regard to these topics: ultimate reality as the origin and provider of all beings, 
the transcendence of Dao and God, the omnipresence of Dao and God, the 
indefinability of Dao and God, and personal and impersonal characterisations of Dao 
and God. As I related, there are several similar properties in God and Dao, and these 
provide clues for meaningful dialogue between Christianity and Daoism. Based on 
these ideas, I will now explore the conception of evil found in the Zhuangzi in the 




Zhuangzi on Evil 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the conception of evil found in the Zhuangzi. To begin 
with, I will explore what the origin of evil is and how evil can be understood in East 
Asian religious philosophy in comparison to Christianity. In order to examine the 
problem of evil in the Zhuangzi, we first need to have an understanding of evil in 
East Asian religions more generally. I then will focus on the ideas of the Zhuangzi. In 
this I will first try to explain the Zhuangzi’s conception of evil and its origins, 
secondly to relate the Zhuangzi’s perception of evil as a phenomenon, and finally to 
relate how the Zhuangzi believes evil can be overcome.  
 
(1) East Asian Religions on Evil: Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism 
Confucianism, Daoism, and (Mahayana) Buddhism have been dominant religions in 
East Asian countries, especially, in China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam.346 For 
convenience I will call these three collectively as ‘East Asian Religions’ and their 
ideas ‘East Asian philosophy’ in this thesis. Because of their similarities and 
differences, the conceptions or understandings of evil in other East Asian religions 
help us to understand evil as found in the Zhuangzi, in turn allowing us to employ 
Zhuangzi’s thought for our larger aim in this thesis.347 
In examining evil in East Asian religions, there are some difficulties. It first 
needs to be said that what we call ‘the problem of evil’ is either non-existent or at 
most not a great threat in East Asian philosophy because of its understanding or 
conception of evil. For example, Laozi asks, ‘How much difference is there between 
                                                 
346 Confucianism and Daoism originated in China. Buddhism spread to China from India by the first 
century BCE, but was not recognised as a foreign religion because Chinese Buddhism shared much 
with Daoism, including doctrinal emphases on reincarnation and practical emphases on meditation as 
the primary means to attain liberation. Chinese Buddhism was therefore considered to be another 
Daoist sect in the first years of its introduction in China. [Gentz, 92-93; Robert H. Sharf, Coming to 
Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2002), 22.] 
347 As far as Daoism is concerned, I will focus on Laozi’s ideas of evil in this section. The Daoist 
philosophy of Zhuangzi on evil will be expounded in detail in the following section.  
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good and evil?’348 For Laozi, the differentiation between good and evil is 
metaphysically and logically meaningless because the ontology and experience of 
Ultimate Reality is expressed in an entirely different framework from the Western 
framework in which the problem of evil is posed. So I will instead use an indirect 
way to explore the problem of evil, i.e. the opposite of so-called ‘good’ in East Asian 
religions. Second, and to elaborate on what was said above, in contrast to traditional 
Christian belief which has held on to the infinite goodness and omnipotence of God, 
East Asian religions have different ideas about Ultimate Reality. In East Asian 
religions, omnipotence, omniscience and infinite goodness are not regarded as 
properties of Ultimate Reality. As we consider John Hick’s argument that ‘The 
problem of evil arises only for a religion which insists that the object of its worship is 
at once perfectly good and unlimitedly powerful’,349 what I have called the problem 
of evil in East Asian religions (that concerning what is considered by them as wrong 
or undesirable in life and how it should be dealt with), in which Ultimate Reality is 
not referred to as perfectly good or powerful should be discussed in a different 
manner to that of Western philosophy and theology. Third, there are various sects or 
divisions in Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. This means that there is not one 
unified system of thought in any one of the traditions, and their ideas depend on 
diverse interpretations of core texts by religious scholars or sects that do not place 
high value on historical dating or chronological recording of authorship as in the 
West. The main religious texts of the East Asian religions, such as the Analects, the 
Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, are generally thought to be compilations of writings of 
several authors or to have been edited by disciples or later scholars. It means that it is 
not easy to infer the original ideas of the founders of the religions. I will therefore 
focus on the texts rather than the alleged founding thinkers, and I will thus give 
attention to selecting the representative scholars and main themes and tenets in each 
religion. 
With these difficulties in mind, I will examine how evil can be understood in 
East Asian religious philosophy in this section, first exploring the origin of evil, 
second looking at how these religions have understood evil as a natural phenomenon 
– a key point which they share and which very clearly distinguishes them from 
                                                 
348 Daodejing, chap. 20. (善之與惡 相去若何?) 
349 Hick, 4. 
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Christianity. As far as the origin of evil is concerned, I will focus on ‘moral evil’ 
because ‘evil’ in East Asian philosophy mostly means moral evil. In the third part, I 
will explore and compare how East Asian religions counsel their followers in living 
with the reality of evil as experienced.  
 
The Origin of Evil 
In East Asian philosophy, the reality of evil is inextricable from its theory of human 
nature rather than that of a God or of supernatural beings.350 Especially in 
Confucianism the standard position on the origin of evil is that jen (仁, humanity) is 
thwarted or corrupted by selfishness.351 There are two traditions of Confucianism 
accounting for selfishness: Mencius (c.370–c.290 BCE) and Xunzi (c.300–c.230 
BCE). Mencius insists on the innate goodness of the individual.  
As for their essence, they can become good. This is what I mean by calling 
their natures good. As for their becoming not good, this is not the fault of 
their potential. Humans all have the heart of compassion. Humans all have 
the heart of disdain. Humans all have the heart of respect. Humans all have 
the heart of approval and disapproval.352 
For Mencius, the mind of pity, commiseration, shame, dislike, respectfulness, 
reverence, right and wrong is possessed by all human beings, and this means that 
human nature is inherently good. Bad moral character is caused by society’s 
influence, thus, in Mencius, ‘The way of learning is none other than seeking for the 
lost mind’.353 
Xunzi, by contrast, believes that human nature is originally bad, and the purpose 
of moral cultivation is to develop humans’ nature into a state of goodness. ‘Humans’ 
nature is evil, and their goodness is the result of their activity’.354 According to him, 
                                                 
350 Julia Ching, "The Problem of Evil and a Possible Dialogue between Christianity and Neo-
Confucianism," Contemporary Religions in Japan 9, no. 3 (1968): 164. 
351 Neville, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World, 102. 
352 Mencius, The Mencius, 6. A. 6. (乃若其情則可以爲善矣, 乃所謂善也. 若夫爲不善, 
非才之罪也. 惻隱之心 人皆有之, 羞惡之心 人皆有之, 恭敬之心 人皆有之, 是非之心 人皆有之.) 
Ivanhoe and Norden, 147. 
353 Ibid., 6. A. 11. (學問之道 無也, 求其放心而已矣.) 
354 Xunzi, Xunzi, chap. 23. (人之性惡, 其善者僞也.) 
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a human is born with a fondness for profit, and tends to towards conflict and evil. 
The principles of ritual (le, 禮) and music (yue, 樂) are ways by which human beings 
develop virtue and order, and humans’ conscious effort toward their cultivation is 
needed to overcome their evil nature.355 Whether selfishness comes from social 
influence or human nature, selfishness is considered the origin of evil in 
Confucianism.356 
As already indicated, in Daoism, discussing the origin of evil may be misguided. 
Laozi did not divide reality in terms of good and evil, and discussions of evils are 
denounced and avoided by both. Nevertheless, we can identify evils in Laozi by an 
indirect method. Even though Laozi did not differentiate evil from good dualistically, 
it is possible to infer the origin of evil in the core of their writings. We can find the 
opposites of the good that he pursued. Laozi emphasizes wuwei, and he rejects 
contrived or intentional action. For him, the notion of human will is of human origin 
and is unnatural, and intentional or deliberate actions create division, conflict and 
evil – evil being understood as disharmony. Laozi reveals the essence of wuwei 
understood as non-action: ‘Dao [of heaven] does not contend but is good at victory, 
does not speak but is good at responding, does not call but things come of their own 
accord, and is not anxious but is good at laying plans. Heaven’s net is vast. Its mesh 
is loose but misses nothing’.357 The life of non-action wins without fighting, 
responds without speaking, comes without calling, and plans good without anxiety. 
They are possible because heaven’s net is loose but misses nothing. In other words, 
the world untouched by human machinations and manipulation is its most perfect 
condition, and we should therefore leave the world, including human nature, as it is. 
If human beings perform actions intentionally, or rather over consciously, the world 
loses its natural state, and evil comes about. Laozi even recommends: ‘Cut off 
sageliness, abandon wisdom, and the people will benefit one-hundred-fold. Cut off 
benevolence, abandon righteousness, and the people will return to being filial and 
                                                 
355 Ibid., chap. 20. (禮樂之統, 管乎人心矣.) 
356 In neo-Confucianism, the origin of evil can be explained by the interaction between li (principle) 
and qi (vital energy). For Zhu Xi, the two Ethers (yin and yang) and the Five Elements (water, fire, 
wood, metal and earth) were perfect in the beginning but they lose their perfection because of being 
rolled and swished back and forth. This operation causes lack of harmony, or what may be called evil, 
in the world. (Zhu Xi, The Conversations, 4. 13.) 
357 Daodejing, chap. 73. (天之道, 不爭而善勝, 不言而善應, 不召而自來, 繟然而善謀. 天網恢恢, 
疏而不失.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 199.  
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kind’.358 For him, ‘sageliness’, ‘wisdom’, ‘benevolence’ and ‘righteousness’ are 
discarded because Daoism rejects any non-spontaneous actions. Laozi refuses all 
actions that bring about artificiality because artificial acts cause artificial division, 
saying:  
Everyone in the world knows that when the beautiful strives to be 
beautiful, it is repulsive. Everyone knows that when the good strives to be 
good, it is no good. And so, to have and to lack generate each other. 
Difficult and easy give form to each other. Long and short off-set each 
other. High and low incline into each other. Note and rhythm harmonize 
with each other. Before and after follow each other.359 
According to Laozi, all things in the world are relative and complement one 
another. There is no distinction originally. The notions of long and short, high and 
low, and before and after are derived from intentional comparison. Intentional or 
deliberate behaviour causes division, and these bring about evil as a result.  
In Buddhism, the origin of evil lies in ignorance (avidya), which means not 
knowing the true nature of the self.360 Evils are easily explained in Buddhistic 
metaphysics if we understand the word ‘karma’.  
Karma is a Sanskrit word from the root ‘kri’, which means to do or to make. So, 
karma literally means ‘doing’, ‘making’ or more widely, ‘action’. As Christmas 
Humphreys explains, ‘Karma is the law of moral retribution, whereby not only does 
every cause have an effect, but he who puts the cause in action suffers the effect’.361 
In other words, it means that life becomes what one does. In the Samyutta Nikaya, 
one of the most important of the Buddhist scriptures, karma is described thus: 
‘Whatever sort of seed is sown, that is the sort of fruit one reaps: the doer of good 
reaps good; the doer of evil reaps evil. By you, dear, has the seed been sown; thus 
you will experience the fruit’.362 Charles Keyes points out that karma is a ‘theory of 
                                                 
358 Ibid., chap. 19. (絶聖棄智, 民利百倍. 絶仁棄義, 民復孝慈.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 171.  
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360 Mysore Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), 75. 
361 Christmas Humphreys, Karma and Rebirth, New ed. (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994), 12. 
362 Saṃyutta Nikaya, Part1. c.11. v.903. in Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: 
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causation that supplies reasons for human fortune, good or bad, and that can at least 
in theory provide convincing explanations for human misfortune’.363 Understood in a 
popular manner, karma is often talked about in conjunction with the notion of 
reincarnation or rebirth, together constituting a sort of system of moral retribution for 
one’s own actions.  
However, this popular understanding is rejected by most scholars and senior 
practitioners of Mahayana and Tibetan Buddhism. It should be said that the Buddha 
repeatedly claims that the question of reincarnation is unprofitable because it leads in 
no way to the heart’s enlightenment.364 It should also be pointed out that the 
Mahayana understands karma in a cosmic or metaphysical fashion, which when 
taken with the Mahayana’s fundamental notion of sunyata or emptiness, is not to be 
understood in the same manner as the Theravada’s individualistic understanding of 
karma. Broadly speaking, for the Theravadists, karma is understood 
individualistically, such that the focus of spiritual practice is to purge oneself of 
negative karma through spiritual discipline; hence the Buddha is reported to have 
said ‘Be ye a light unto yourselves’. In contrast, the Mahayana understands karma 
supra-individualistically, because reality is of the nature of emptiness, or 
boundlessness. Actions are not events performed by isolated agents, but are 
performed by all, and affecting all; hence, the work of the bodhisattva is to liberate 
all from avidya and the cycle of birth and death (samsara), which is caused precisely 
by the ignor-ance (ignoring) of the identity between oneself and cosmos, foregoing 
nirvana for themselves until this goal is reached. From the above considerations, we 
can generally say that Buddhism locates the origin of evil in humans’ distorted 
perception of themselves and the world, and their consequently distorted behaviour, 
which causes suffering. 
 
The Perception of Evil  
In Confucianism, natural evil is accepted as fate or as the will of Heaven. People are 
encouraged to accept natural evil rather than ask the reason for it. The representative 
                                                 
363 Charles Keyes, "Merit-Transference in the Kammic Theory of Popular Teravada Buddhism," in 
Karma: An Anthropological Inquiry, ed. Charles Keyes and Valentine Daniel (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), 167. 
364 Humphreys, 51. 
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word is ming (命) or tianming (天命). Ming literally means fate or destiny, and 
tianming means Heaven’s fate which is pictured by Heaven’s moral decree, pure 
fatalism, or total agnosticism.365 Tianming can also mean Mandate of Heaven, decree 
of Ultimate Reality, personal destiny, and course of order. Because it can be 
explained diversely, what tianming is depends on one’s own philosophy. This is 
because, in the Analects, as Joachim Gentz writes, ‘there is hardly any thematic 
order, no unified teaching system and no coherent definition of the same term’.366 
Early Confucianists understood it to mean either the decree of Ultimate Reality or the 
rise and fall of the moral order. However, Neo-Confucianist Zhu Xi used tianming to 
mean the operation of nature that is endowed in things and allows them to be as they 
are.367 According to Wing-tsit Chan, tianming generally means fate or personal order 
of God in religion, but it is practically always understood as moral destiny or moral 
order in philosophy.368 For modern writers, ming is interpreted as fatalism, 
naturalism, theism, atheism, and both theism and naturalism.369  
Confucius (551–479 BCE) understands disease as ming rather than evil in the 
Analects (Lunyu).370 When Boniu fell ill, Confucius went to ask after his health. 
Grasping his hand through the window, Confucius sighs and says, ‘That we are going 
to lose him must be due to fate! How else could such a man be afflicted with such an 
illness? How else could such a man be afflicted with such an illness?’371 Zixia, a 
disciple of Confucius, says, ‘Life and death are governed by ming, wealth and 
honour are determined by Heaven (tian)’.372 Zixia understands that people cannot do 
anything about life and death and should accept them as fate. For Zixia, wealth and 
honour are settled by Heaven.  
                                                 
365 Ning Chen, "Confucius' View of Fate (Ming)," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 24, no. 3 (1997): 
324. 
366 Gentz, 54. 
367 Chu Hsi, Lunyu Chichu, 2. 4. (天命 卽天道之流行而賦於物者, 乃事物所以當然之故也.) 
368 Chan, 22. 
369 Chen,  323. 
370 The Analects is the collection of dialogues between Confucius and his contemporaries edited 
c.150–140 BCE. 
371 Confucius, Analects, 6. 10. (亡之, 命矣夫! 斯人也而有斯疾也! 斯人也而有斯疾也!) 
372 Ibid., 12. 5. (死生有命, 富貴在天.) 
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This understanding about life and death does not imply a total fatalism. In the 
Analects, we can see Confucius’ emphasis on life. When Zilu asked about death, 
Confucius answered, ‘You do not yet understand life – how could you possibly 
understand death?’373 The reason why Confucius did not want to speak about death 
was not because he did not understand it well, but because he thought that it was less 
important than life. Confucius thought that Zilu’s question was only remotely related 
to practical concerns, so he avoided answering directly. Edward Slingerland 
mentions that we clearly see Confucius’ practical orientation here: ‘[T]he aspiring 
gentleman [the exemplary person] is to focus his energy on virtuous conduct and 
concrete learning rather than empty speculation’.374 In this passage, we can learn 
much about Confucius’ humanism.  
Even if Confucius did not speak about death directly, we can perceive his ideas 
about death indirectly through other passages. For Confucius, death has always been 
with us.375 Death is neither evil nor special. Death is natural and is a part of tianming. 
Confucius understands that a person cannot become the exemplary person (君子) if 
he or she does not understand fate. ‘One who does not understand fate lacks the 
means to become the exemplary person. One who does not understand ritual lacks 
the means to take his place. One who does not understand words lacks the means to 
evaluate others’.376 The exemplary person is the one who knows fate and follow it.  
In Confucianism, natural evils arising from the earth’s movement (e.g. 
earthquake, tsunami and hurricane) are understood as ming, as are disease and death. 
Confucius does not directly speak about natural disasters. I would suggest that we 
understand Confucius’ thinking on disasters arising from the natural world in the 
context of his understanding of the role that Heaven plays in the natural world. When 
Confucius said that he would not speak, Zigong asked, ‘If the Master does not speak, 
then how would we your follows receive guidance from you?’ Confucius responded, 
‘What does Heaven ever say? Yet the four seasons are put in motion by it, and the 
                                                 
373 Ibid., 11. 12. (未知生, 焉知死?) 
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375 Confucius, 12. 7. (自古皆有死.) 
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myriad creatures receive their life from it. What does Heaven ever say?’377 Confucius 
understands that the four seasons and the myriad creatures move by Heaven – yet 
Heaven does not say anything even while it accomplishes many important things. 
This suggests that Confucius accepts all operations of Heaven naturally.  
Whether ming means blind fate or not is controversial. Guo Moruo and Fung 
Yu-ran think that Confucius played down the importance of spiritual beings in 
events, and his tian was not an anthropomorphic deity but a naturalistic force, so 
ming and tianming should be understood as blind fate.378  
In contrast, Hall and Ames disagree with the idea that ming is understood as 
impersonal and immutable fate. They suggest three cases in the Analects to support 
their opinion. The first one is that ‘Zigong will not accept his ming, and so engages 
in business speculation. His conjectures, though, are always on the mark’.379 The 
second is, ‘But must a complete person today be exactly like this? When seeing a 
chance for profit he thinks of what is right; when confronting danger, he is ready to 
take his ming into his own hands’.380 The final is the conversation between Zixia and 
Sima Niu about brotherless Sima Niu: ‘Life and death are governed by ming.… In 
this way, everyone within the Four Seas is his brother. How could the exemplary 
person be concerned about not having brothers?’381 Based on these passages, Hall 
and Ames claim that ming cannot be accepted as blind fate because a person without 
biological brothers can alter their condition by understanding what it means to have 
brothers, being able instead to have many fraternal brothers, such that what ‘fate’ is 
is in fact subject to changes in attitude.382 In other words, they reject Confucius’ 
acceptance that ming is blind fate.  
The opinion of Hall and Ames is comparatively new and while it may be 
persuasive, it is not above criticism. Above all, they use three passages to support 
their opinion, saying nothing about other passages, which cannot be interpreted in the 
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same manner. Moreover, Chen asserts that they have mixed changes in conception 
with changes in reality in their interpretation of 12:5, and explains this passage with 
the distinction of two realms between the transcendent and the human.383 
To settle the problem of the inconsistency in Confucius’ ming, I suggest that 
there were two different sorts of ming, and Confucius did not use this term with the 
same meaning every time. The two different meanings are ‘life’ and ‘fate’. Currently, 
ming is used with these meanings. According to Shanghai Jaiotong University Press’ 
Chinese Characters Dictionary, the first meaning of ming is life and the second is 
fate, lot, fortune or destiny.384 Other dictionaries show very similar results.385 Ming, 
in the Analects 11:19 and 14:12, means ‘life’, so Hall and Ames’ interpretation 
cannot stand. I believe that all examples of ming concerning natural evils in the text 
refer to fate. Therefore, the contention that ming does not mean fate aside, I will 
focus on the property of ming as fate. To understand ming clearly, we should 
comprehend tian and the relationship between ming and tian; whether tian means 
moral Heaven and personal deity – in which case, all passages in the Analects should 
be interpreted in light of the issue of theodicy – or amoral fate and impersonal force; 
depending upon whether ming means blind fate or teleological term of Heaven.  
In Daoism, Laozi seems to understand that death itself is not an evil. Laozi says, 
‘People model themselves on the earth. The earth models itself on Heaven. Heaven 
models itself on Dao. Dao models itself on what is natural (ziran)’.386 For him, 
people should eventually live according to what is natural, which means to comply 
with the order of nature. Dao models itself on the order of nature and death is a part 
of natural phenomena. Moreover, Laozi understands that all things were derived 
from Dao and are turning back to Dao. He says, ‘Turning back is the action of Dao. 
Weakness is the operation of Dao. All things in the world arise from being, and being 
arises from non-being’.387 Since all creatures come from non-being, death is to 
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follow the law of Dao. Laozi even says that ‘What helps life along is called 
“inauspicious”’.388 Laozi recommends accepting ming just as Confucius does. 
Attain extreme tenuousness; preserve quiet integrity. The myriad creatures 
are all in motion! I watch as they turn back. The teeming multitude of 
things, each returns home to its root; and returning to one’s root is called 
stillness. This is known as returning to one’s destiny [ming]; and returning 
to one’s destiny is known as constancy. To know constancy is called 
‘enlightenment’. Those who do not know constancy want only produce 
misfortune. To know constancy is to be accommodating. To be 
accommodating is to work for the good of all. To work for the good of all 
is to be a true king. To be a true king is to be Heavenly. To be Heavenly is 
to embody Dao. To embody Dao is to be long lived, and one will avoid 
danger to the end of one’s days.389 
Laozi understands that returning to one’s root is returning to fate, in accord with 
Dao, and is everlasting. Since he sees all things from the point of view of eternity, 
death is not evil. Confucius perceives death as fate, but Laozi understands it from a 
cosmic perspective. Even though Laozi does not talk about afterlife or Heaven as in 
Christianity, it could be argued that understanding death through the lens of eternity 
is similar to a Christian understanding of death.  
Laozi thinks that death is a part of Dao’s movement, not good or bad, but he 
does not put the same importance on life and death. His philosophy is focused on life 
rather than death. For him, Dao is the principle of life, and Dao helps people have 
long lives. Laozi repeatedly says, ‘Whatever is not in accordance with Dao will soon 
die (perish)’,390 in chapters 30 and 55 of the Daodejing. Since Dao is life-centred, 
death is inferior to life, metaphorically speaking. For instance, Laozi says, ‘When 
alive human beings are supple and weak; when dead they are stiff and strong.… The 
strong and the mighty reside down below; the soft and the supple reside on top’.391 
For Laozi, tenderness and weakness like life are superior because they come from a 
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lack of will, and strength and greatness like death are inferior because they come 
from assertive will.  
In Daoism, Laozi does not consider natural disasters as evil and in fact seems to 
regard evils caused by human agency and will as more important. In the Daodejing, 
Laozi says that natural disasters derive from nature and not from human action. ‘To 
be sparing with words is what comes naturally. And so, a blustery wind does not last 
all morning; a heavy downpour does not last all day. Who produces these? Heaven 
and earth!’.392 For Laozi, natural movements such as whirlwinds and rainstorms are 
the operations of Heaven and earth, i.e. the those of Dao, so they cannot be regarded 
as evil. Laozi thinks those who have virtue (德, power of Dao) are in a specific sense 
free from natural disasters. He says, ‘Those who are steeped in Virtue are like 
newborn children; poisonous creatures will not strike them; fierce beasts will not 
seize them; birds of prey will not snatch them away’.393 In another part of the 
Daodejing, Laozi says, ‘I have heard that those good at nurturing life, on land do not 
meet with rhinoceroses or tigers.… Rhinoceroses find no place to thrust their horns; 
tigers find no place to sink their claws’.394 Those who have virtue or are good at 
nurturing life are free from death in the sense that they no longer identify themselves 
as a self occupying the limited space of the physical body, but rather identify 
themselves with the cosmos or Dao. Through such harmony, it could be said that 
such a person does not ‘die’ as long as this is understood not to be the dissolution of 
the body (which is inescapable) but rather the dissolution of a body which is 
regarded as the beginning and end of the person. Evidenced by the fact that he does 
not regard natural disasters as evil but as natural processes, we can conclude that 
Laozi does not think that natural evil even exists. Laozi understands that evil in the 
strict, moral sense, derives from humans’ assertive will. 
Death in Buddhism is also not regarded as evil or punishment for wrong because 
it is required for karma’s operation. Death is just the causal and neutral mechanism 
of karma because if there is no death, there is neither karma nor rebirth. Moreover, 
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death is sometimes understood as the means to reach greater rewards in the next life, 
even though this understanding of death draws the counterargument that ultimate 
reward is to enter into nirvana by a release from the cycle of samsara (rebirth). 
Therefore, death is an indispensable part of maintaining rebirth, and also the 
possibility of attaining nirvana. In Buddhistic mechanisms, natural evils are easily 
explained, and bodily death and disease are not evils. 
In Buddhism, evil is of human origin, and humans suffer from their choices and 
use of their own free will. We should be clear on what this means. Buddhism would 
not claim that ‘natural disasters’ and evils such as bodily disease arise from a 
disrupture consequent upon misuse of human freedom. Rather, the term ‘evil’ is used 
in a qualified, perhaps metaphorical sense, not relating to physical events per se, but 
rather to a psychological state of ‘suffering about suffering’, or suffering over 
physical or mental pain, as we might worry about worrying. Karma should therefore 
be interpreted psychologically to mean the law of cause and effect pertaining to 
previous psychological states and attitudes that influence current and future 
psychological attitudes. Pain and suffering caused by natural phenomena such as 
earthquakes and rainstorms cannot be considered evils or detested as such because 
they are simply a part of the law of karma.  
A question about the law of karma is raised. How can we accept occasional 
accidents? Is there some reason that we may discover? Perhaps most directly: do 
people deserve all that happens to them? Humphreys explains that: ‘There must 
equally be unmerited happiness, for which in due course we must compensate with 
suffering, and that on balance the cosmic harmony, within and by the Law of karma, 
would be restored’.395 He thinks that ‘time’ is the key to the problem. It would be 
incredibly difficult, if we took a literalistic understanding of reincarnation, to 
comprehend the guidance of an incoming soul to a body and to a set of exact 
circumstances it deserves, that is, along karmic lines as they are manifest for each 
person. But even if karma is not taken on individualistic lines, it is nonetheless the 
law of the cosmos, and each of our actions influences the future for all human beings 
in some way or other, however undetectable at present. For Humphreys, all that does 
not apparently accord with the law of karma at present, therefore, would perhaps be 
the object of later payment of karmic debt.  
                                                 




I have tried to relate how evil is understood and integrated in human experience in 
East Asian philosophy. We found that while there are similarities, such as between 
the Confucian and Daoist notions of harmony and disharmony, there are also clear 
differences, even if only in emphasis; for example, whereas Buddhism would speak 
of ‘atonement’ for the ‘sin’ of avidya, Daoism would not. Here, I will briefly 
compare the above approaches to evil to that of classical, biblical Christian thought 
in order to reveal the broader, shared characteristics of East Asian philosophy.  
The biblical Christian tradition of natural evil is informed by biblical stories 
such as the Flood, or the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, where divine 
judgement is wrought through the natural world. That is, the whole natural world 
enacts God’s punishment for sin or disobedience of his will. On the other hand, there 
are exceptional cases in the Bible. In the Book of Job, Job suffers horrendously, 
despite the fact that he is ‘blameless and upright’ (Job 1:1). In addition, as Jesus’ 
disciples asked him, ‘Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born 
blind?’ Jesus answered. ‘Neither this man nor his parents sinned, but this happened 
so that the work of God might be displayed in his life’ (John 9:3). These kinds of 
natural evils cannot be explained by the punishment of God.  
For Buddhism, the theory of karma can explain the problem of natural evils not 
in terms of its origin but in terms of its acceptance, integration in human experience 
and its remedy for human consciousness. Christian thought by comparison has much 
difficulty, because of its literalistic interpretation of evil – evil not as a mental state 
of avidya and consequent suffering about suffering, but as a positive reality created 
by some agent, whether it be by human beings or God, or even by other supernatural 
beings like the Devil or unclean or evil spirits in the Bible.  
In Buddhism, evil, that is, psychological suffering arises from human behaviour 
– sin, or avidya. Natural evils may be seen as punishment for human sin in both 
Buddhism and biblical Christianity, but in vastly different ways. In the Bible, human 
sin is sometimes punished in this life by God, and in Buddhism, human sin is 
punished in the next life, even if it be the next stage in our psychological makeup or 
development, by the law of karma. That which a man soweth, he will reap. 
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That said, the theory of karma is not beyond criticism. Kaufman points out five 
problems with the law of karma: the memory problem, the proportionality problem, 
the infinite regress problem, the problem of explaining death, and the free will 
problem.396 Henry Wright claims that karma proposes no solution to evil, and what it 
amounts to is only a proposal for pessimism and surrender.397 I do not agree with 
Wright. The law of karma is only pessimistic if taken as something analogous to 
predestination, whereby even physical evil, pain or suffering is the result of karmic 
causal lines from an infinity of previous lives. In actual fact, the law of karma is 
optimistic from the point of view that the present life, or one’s present state of mind 
(including attitudes and conceptions about oneself and the world) completely decides 
what one experiences in the future, however distant. Buddhism claims that people 
can decide the quality of their next life, or perhaps state of consciousness, through 
their own effort. Therefore, I think the law of karma is something of an oxymoronic 
‘pessimistic optimism’.  
In many religions, as in philosophy, the tension between fatalism and 
‘libertarianism’ (absolute freedom of the will) is a live issue. The main reason is that 
scriptures can be interpreted in many ways because of different authors, times, and 
compilations of texts. In Confucianism, it is controversial whether supernatural force 
(tian, shangdi) means personal and moral agency or blind and impersonal fate. 
Again, in Buddhism, karma seems to be fatalistic because it encourages people to 
accept their present life. However, in the sense that people’s present life is the result 
of their previous life, people can decide their future life through their own will, and 
this supports libertarianism in Buddhism. Throughout Christian history, there has 
been a controversy over free will and predestination.398 St. Paul says, ‘For those God 
foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the likeness of his Son, that he 
might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those he predestined, he also 
called; those he called, he also justified; those he justified, he also glorified’ (Rom. 
8:29–30). However, the Psalmist says, ‘Surely you will reward each person 
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according to what he has done’ (Ps. 62:12), and there are other passages to support 
humans’ free will (Deut. 12:28; John 13:17, 2 Cor. 11:15; Jam. 1:25). Therefore, 
there has been tension between fatalism and libertarianism in both Christianity and 
East Asian philosophy, and this tension helps us to see several aspects of these 
religions.  
According to the Analects, natural evils are sometimes constitutive of 
punishment for human wrongdoing, and Confucius understands natural evils as 
events that occur merely part and parcel of what he calls ‘fate’. However, we cannot 
conclude this because, in Confucian texts earlier than the Analects, such as the 
Shangshu and the Shijing, natural evils are not described as a result of human 
behaviour sent down by heaven as punishment. Earlier, significant Confucian texts 
focus on moral evils, such that calamities, which are sent down by heaven, are 
always human-made – like invasion, rebellion and usurpation, rather than natural 
disasters.399 Laozi also insists on non-action and leading a life which follows Dao, or 
the Way of nature. However, differently from biblical Christianity and Buddhism, 
Confucianism and Daoism understand natural evils from a more natural and 
cosmological viewpoint: fate rather than punishment, and a present life rather than a 
future life.  
When it comes to understanding natural death, classical Christianity, 
Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism all take a neutral attitude. Death itself is not 
evil. In particular, death can be explained from the perspective of eternity in 
Christianity, Daoism and Buddhism. In other words, death does not mean the end but 
the beginning of the next life in these religions. The kingdom of heaven in 
Christianity, perpetuity of Dao in Daoism, and the next life through karma in 
Buddhism commonly imply that death is a rite of passage. Layman suggests a 
hypothesis to settle the problem of natural evil: ‘If any purposes that an almighty and 
perfectly good being has for its creatures have not been achieved prior to their death, 
then such purposes will be achieved – to the extent possible – after the death of the 
creatures’.400 He thinks that this hypothesis can provide an assurance that people who 
have died due to natural evils will have opportunities to reclaim the fulfilment once 
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denied them.401 His explanation is one way to understand natural death in 
Christianity and Buddhism which emphasize an afterlife in some manner.  
Dao, in Daoism, is the origin of creation and extinction. Laozi says, ‘Turning 
back is the action of Dao. Weakness is the operation of Dao. All things in the world 
arise from being, and being arises from non-being’.402 Although Laozi does not 
mention an afterlife directly, he understands death from a cyclical or eternal 
perspective. Therefore, natural death in Christianity, Buddhism, and Daoism, is 
understood from not just this world but also the next life, so death itself is not evil.  
Laozi says, ‘The myriad creatures are all in motion! I watch as they turn back. 
The teeming multitude of things, each returns home to its root; and returning to one’s 
root is called stillness. This is known as returning to one’s destiny [ming]’.403 For 
Laozi, returning to ming is being called to eternity and is in accord with Dao. The 
writer of the Book of Ecclesiastes similarly says, ‘The dust returns to the ground it 
came from, and the spirit returns to God who gave it’ (Eccl. 12:7). For the writer, all 
things return to their roots, so what has been will be again.  
I know that everything God does will endure forever; nothing can be added 
to it and nothing taken from it. God does it so that men will revere him. 
Whatever is has already been, and what will be has been before; and God 
will call the past to account (Eccl. 3:14–15).  
For Ecclesiastes, whatever is has already been, and what will be has been before, 
and therefore there is nothing new under the sun (Eccl. 1:9). In Buddhism, the law of 
karma pervades all reality, manifest in this case in that all things die and are born 
again repeatedly. Since all things are connected, there is nothing new under the sun 
in Buddhism. Laozi says, ‘Heaven is long lasting and earth endures’.404 For 
Ecclesiastes, the Buddhist tradition and Daoism, human life, and each of our lives, is 
only a phase of or episode in the life of the earth and earth, or the world, is itself 
eternal. 
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Laozi explains an ideal world free from natural evils as follows: 
I have heard that those good at nurturing life, on land do not meet with 
rhinoceroses or tigers, and in battle do not encounter armoured warriors. 
Rhinoceroses find no place to thrust their horns; tigers find no place to 
sink their claws; soldiers find no place to drive in their blades. Why is 
this? Because such people have no place for death.405  
Isaiah portrays paradise poetically:  
The wolf will live with the lamb, the leopard will lie down with the goat, 
the calf and the lion and the yearling together; and a little child will lead 
them. The cow will feed with the bear, their young will lie down together, 
and the lion will eat straw like the ox. The infant will play near the hole of 
the cobra, and the young child put his hand into the viper’s nest (Isa. 11:6-
8).  
St. John hears a loud voice from the throne saying, ‘There will be no more death 
or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away’ (Rev. 
21:4). The focus is a new heaven and a new earth following the end of the world. In 
contrast, for Buddhism, the end of death and suffering neither lies in a new or 
different world, objectively, nor a better life or rebirth in the future. Rather, the end 
of suffering and death is nirvana, awakening.406 What all three religions share here is 
the belief that in this ideal state, be it an ideal world or an ideal state of 
consciousness, there are no evils or suffering whatsoever. 
 
(2) Zhuangzi on Evil 
The Origin of Evil 
As I explained in the previous chapter, non-action (wuwei) and spontaneity (ziran) 
are core notions in Daoist thought. To forego wilful or self-conscious action, 
allowing oneself to follow or flow with the direction of nature without attempting to 
control events or other people’s actions is, for the Daoist, the ideal life, the life of 
wuwei-ziran. This life is required not only for the common people but also political 
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leaders.407 According to the Zhuangzi, ‘If the exemplary persons find they have no 
other choice than to direct and look after the world, then the best course for them is 
non-action. As long as there is non-action, people rest in the true form of their 
nature’.408  
Based on this philosophy of Zhuangzi, we can infer what his ideas on the origin 
of evil or suffering are. First, wilful action (breaking wuwei) causes evil. Because in 
Daoist thought the notions of ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ seem to be synonymous with 
‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ respectively, it follows that any action that breaks the 
natural harmony of things is wrong, and one does this by attempting to control life. 
There is an insightful story in the Zhuangzi concerning the attempt to control what is 
given by nature.  
The emperor of the South Sea was called Shu [Brief]; the emperor of the 
North Sea was called Hu [Sudden]; and the emperor of the central region 
was called Hundun [Chaos]. From time to time, Shu and Hu came together 
for a meeting in the territory of Hundun, and Hundun treated them very 
generously. Shu and Hu discussed how they could repay his kindness. ‘All 
men’, they said, ‘have seven openings so they can see, hear, eat, and 
breathe. But Hundun alone doesn’t have any. Let’s trying boring him 
some!’ Every day they bored another hole, and on the seventh day Hundun 
died.409 
In this last story of the Inner Chapters, Zhuangzi emphasizes the importance of a 
state without effortful or self-conscious action. Hundun died because of his friends’ 
‘favour’, demonstrating that good intentions certainly do not always entail good 
outcomes, and that our attempts to improve what is already given can in fact 
backfire, because we are acting against the principle of wuwei.410.  
Intriguingly, the word hundun (混沌) literally means ‘chaos’, which is also the 
state before creation as narrated in Genesis 1:2. The Christian God commenced the 
creation of the universe in this state of chaos at the very beginning, setting about to 
                                                 
407 We note that the Daodejing, like many Daoist texts, also functions as a manual for ruling. 
408 Zhuangzi, chap. 11. (故君子不得已而臨莅天下, 莫若無爲. 無爲也而後安其性命之情.) 
409 Ibid., chap. 7. (南海之帝爲儵, 北海之帝爲忽, 中央之帝爲混沌. 儵與忽, 時相與遇於混沌之地, 
混沌待之甚善. 儵與忽謀報混沌之德. 曰, 人皆有七竅, 以視聽食息, 此獨無有, 嘗試鑿之. 
日鑿一竅, 七日而混沌死.) Watson, 59.  
410 The English maxim of not ‘Gilding the lily’ and the Zen maxim of not ‘Putting legs on a snake’ 
express this sentiment of avoiding unnecessary change, improvement or adornment very well.  
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create order, but in the Zhuangzi, a pristine state of chaos is regarded as most 
desirable. While ‘chaos’ almost always has negative denotations and connotations in 
English, it has many more in Chinese, some good and bad, including ‘innocent’ and 
‘muddled’. Doing anything to this primordial first state in the cosmos and 
consciousness causes evil, according to Zhuangzi.  
While wuwei and ziran cannot be talked about independently of each other, we 
may identify slightly different emphases in either concept. While wuwei emphasises 
the attitude or state of ‘letting go’, literally meaning ‘not pushing’, the emphasis of 
ziran, being ‘self suchness’ is that of something acting of itself, and in itself, without 
extrinsic cause or necessity, which is how Daoism characterises nature as a whole 
(ziran also being the word to denote ‘nature’ in Mandarin). We might therefore look 
at how breaking ziran, the way of nature, is regarded by Zhuangzi, too. Zhuangzi 
argues the importance of following the order of nature with the famous sword of 
antiquity ‘Moye’.  
When a skilled smith is casting metal, if the metal should leap up and say, 
‘I insist on being made into a Moye!’ he would surely regard it as very 
inauspicious metal indeed. Now, having had the audacity to take on human 
form once, if I should say, ‘I don’t want to be anything but a man! Nothing 
but a man!’ the Creator would surely regard me as a most inauspicious sort 
of person. So now I think of heaven and earth as a great furnace, and the 
Creator as a skilled smith. Where could he send me that would not be all 
right? I will go off to sleep peacefully, and then with a start, I will wake 
up.411 
With the parable of the Moye, Zhuangzi accounts for the life of ziran. Heaven 
and earth are both compared to a great furnace and the Creator, Dao, to a skilled 
smith. All things in the world are in the process of being made by the Creator, being 
sustained and preserved in existence without any effort or control on their part. Thus, 
the most natural thing to do is to acknowledge this fact in our being, to feel and not 
merely know that our beginning, middle and end are all in the hands of the Ultimate, 
and not under our own control. If we do not feel this fact, we will not allow ourselves 
to flow with nature, through want of control (itself in virtue of being anxious about 
                                                 
411 Zhuangzi, chap. 6. (今大冶鑄金, 金踊躍曰, 我且必爲鏌鎁, 大冶必以爲不祥之金. 
今一犯人之形, 而曰人耳人耳, 夫造化者, 必以爲不祥之人. 今一以天地爲大鑪, 以造化爲大冶, 
惡乎往而不可哉! 成然寐, 籧然覺.) Watson, 48–49.  
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ourselves and our lives) and want to be something specially crafted like Moye – 
bringing about evil in the world.  
Third, for Daoism, all things arise mutually, are mutually dependent – this being 
known as xiangsheng (相生, being-born-together). The paradigmatic instance of this 
principle is yin-yang, of positive and negative aspects in all reality, extending to 
inside and outside, the singular and the plural, and even existence and nonexistence, 
meaning that it is, at bottom, impossible to isolate any object of the world as a self-
subsisting entity or fact. Daoism shares this perspective with Hinduism and 
Buddhism, according to which entities have no svabhava, or self-existence.412 
Dividing or discriminating between things – defining and positing them as objects of 
human consciousness to the exclusion of others – causes evil, according to Zhuangzi: 
Everything has its ‘that’, everything has its ‘this’. From the point of view 
of ‘that’, you cannot see it; but through understanding, you can know it. So 
I say, ‘that’ comes out of ‘this’, and ‘this’ depends on ‘that’ – which is to 
say that ‘this’ and ‘that’ give birth to each other. But where there is birth, 
there must be death; where there is death, there must be birth. Where there 
is acceptability, there must be unacceptability; where there is 
unacceptability, there must be acceptability. Where there is recognition of 
right, there must be recognition of wrong; where there is recognition of 
wrong, there must be recognition of right. Therefore, the sage does not 
proceed in such a way but illuminates all in the light of Heaven (Nature). 
He, too, recognizes a ‘this’ but a ‘this’ that is also ‘that’, a ‘that’ that is 
also ‘this’. His ‘that’ has both a right and a wrong in it; his ‘this’, too, has 
both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he still have a ‘this’ and 
‘that’? Or does he, in fact, no longer have a ‘this’ and ‘that’? A state in 
which ‘this’ and ‘that’ no longer find their opposites is called ‘the hinge of 
Dao (daoshu, 道樞)’.413 
According to Zhuangzi, distinctions between this and that, between death and 
birth, between acceptability and unacceptability, and between right and wrong, are 
meaningless, and are in fact, harmful. Dao operates without distinctions or divisions 
and following the Dao in wuwei-ziran is what Zhuangzi regards as the good life. That 
                                                 
412 Alan Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 63. 
413 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (物無非彼, 物無非是. 自彼則不見, 自是則知之. 故曰彼出於是, 是亦因彼. 
彼是方生之說也, 雖然, 方生方死, 方死方生. 方可方不可. 因是因非, 因非因是. 是以聖人不由, 
而照之於天, 亦因是也. 是亦彼也, 彼亦是也. 彼亦一是非, 此亦一是非. 果且有彼是乎哉? 
果且無彼是乎哉? 彼是莫得其偶, 謂之道樞.) Watson, 10.  
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Dao has no divisions and operates without divisions is made evident in the following 
passage.  
The ten thousand things are really one. We look on some as beautiful 
because they are rare or unearthly; we look on others as ugly because they 
are foul and rotten. But the foul and rotten may turn into the rare and 
unearthly, and the rare and unearthly may turn into the foul and rotten. So 
it is said, ‘You have only to comprehend the one breath that is the world’. 
The sage never ceases to value oneness.414 
For the Zhuangzi, beauty and ugliness are ultimately relative values – relative to 
a person, a time, and a place, always changing and only ‘true’, if that can ever be 
said, at this particular instance when one uses the word, and for the particular person 
using it. But in virtue of xiangsheng, they are also inevitably false values for 
someone else. Bearing in mind that Dao transcends even number or quantity and is, 
as such, beyond the singular and plural, I maintain that ‘yi (一)’ is better understood 
as something along the lines of ‘fundamental boundless’.415 Because all things are 
boundless, Zhuangzi believes that the only value to be held dear is that of 
boundlessness. Dividing between beauty and ugliness, right and wrong, and good 
and evil is the origin of evil (if we name it ‘evil’) in the philosophy of Zhuangzi.  
 
The Perception of Evil 
Zhuangzi said much about natural evil, including death, while Confucius and Laozi 
did not. The Zhuangzi connects the origin of death with Dao: ‘Dao is the origin of all 
things in the universe. Without Dao, everything will die; with Dao, everything will 
live’.416 For the Zhuangzi, life and death are a part of the operation of Dao. Zhuangzi 
also understands death as ming: ‘Life and death are fated – constant as the succession 
                                                 
414 Ibid., chap. 22. (故萬物一也, 是其所美者爲神奇. 其所惡者爲臭腐. 臭腐復化爲神奇, 
神奇復化爲臭腐. 故曰, 通天下一氣耳. 聖人故貴一.) Watson, 177.  
415 While Watson translates the character ‘一’ as ‘one’, this is in fact its simplest meaning, and at a 
deeper level, denotes fundamentally Daoist intimations of ‘focus’, ‘unity’ and ‘holistic’. Palmer 
translates it as ‘unity’. [Martin Palmer, The Book of Chuang Tzu (London: Penguin Books, [1996] 
2006), 188.] 
416 Zhuangzi, chap. 31. (道者, 萬物之所由也, 庶物失之者死, 得之者生.) 
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of dark and dawn, a matter of Heaven. There are some things that man can do 
nothing about – all are a matter of the nature of creatures’.417 
Since life and death are beyond the power of human beings, Zhuangzi believed 
that we ought to stop making valuations about death. When Zhuangzi’s wife died, 
Huizi saw that Zhuangzi was squatting on the ground, singing and beating time on a 
basin. Huizi said, ‘You lived with her, she brought up your children and grew old.… 
But pounding on a tub and singing – this is going too far, isn’t it?’ Zhuangzi said: 
You’re wrong. When she first died, do you think I didn’t grieve like 
anyone else? But I looked back to her beginning and the time before she 
was born. Not only the time before she was born, but the time before she 
had a body. Not only the time before she had a body, but the time before 
she had a spirit. In the midst of the jumble of wonder and mystery, a 
change took place and she had a spirit. Another change and she had a 
body. Another change and she was born. Now there’s been another change 
and she’s dead. It’s just like the progression of the four seasons: spring, 
summer, fall, winter. Now she’s going to lie down peacefully in a vast 
room. If I were to follow after her bawling and sobbing, it would show that 
I don’t understand anything about fate. So I stopped’.418 
Zhuangzi’s answer well illustrates the text’s view of life and death. In the 
Zhuangzi, death is a return to our roots; we become a part of nature as we always 
were, and this allows us to see now that we are indeed inseparable from nature, that 
we are nature, and to accept the operations of Dao and ming. Therefore, death itself 
is not evil, and even getting wildly upset over death is unnatural.  
The Zhuangzi also states:  
For example, hunger, thirst, cold and heat, and poverty and destitution – 
these all come from the operation of the heaven and the earth and from the 
movement of things. To escape from the afflictions by Heaven (tian) 
means to change with the operation of heaven and earth and with the 
movement of things.419  
                                                 
417 Ibid., chap. 6. (死生命也, 其有夜旦之常, 天也. 人之有所不得與, 皆物之情也.) Watson, 44.  
418 Ibid., chap. 18. (不然. 是其始死也, 我獨何能无槪然! 察其始 而本无生, 非徒无生也 而本无形, 
非徒无形也 而本无氣. 雜乎芒物之間, 變而有氣, 氣變而有形, 形變而有生, 今又變而之死, 
是相與爲春秋冬夏四時行也. 人且偃然寢於巨室, 而我噭噭然 隨而哭之, 自以爲不通乎命, 
故止也.) Watson, 140–141.  
419 Ibid., chap. 20. (飢渴寒暑, 窮桎不行, 天地之行也. 運物之泄也, 言與之偕逝之謂也.) 
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For the Zhuangzi, because pain and suffering such as hunger, thirst, cold and 
heat, are all caused by the operation of Dao (heaven and earth), trying to change 
them is to challenge the operation of Dao itself. 
Moreover, the problem of evil as both experienced and conceived is explained 
by the word ‘yin’ in Daoism. Yin literally means the ‘shadow side’ or ‘gloomy side’, 
and yin always and inextricably exists with yang, the positive – hence the notion of 
yinyang. Hsiao-Lan Hu and William Allen expound the interaction of yin and yang: 
‘Yin and yang stand for the two opposites that are contradicting each other and 
encroaching upon each other, and yet the two are also receding from each other and 
moving toward each other, supplementing each other, balancing each other, and also 
containing each other’.420 Yin and yang are bound up each other and they are in 
complementary relations.  
Laozi and Zhuangzi express their philosophy based on the harmony of yin and 
yang. Laozi says:  
To have and to lack generate each other. Difficult and easy give form to 
each other. Long and short off-set each other. High and low incline into 
each other. Note and rhythm harmonize with each other. Before and after 
follow each other.421  
All things in the world exist in a harmonizing relationship and supplement each 
other whether we can discern those relations for ourselves or not. Discrimination 
between having and lacking, between easy and difficult, between long and short, and 
between high and low is meaningless. Even differentiation between good and evil is 
insignificant and is actually harmful according to both Laozi and Zhuangzi.  
Dao in the Zhuangzi contains the bright side (yang) and the shadow side (yin), 
good and evil, something and nothing, and life and death. Yin and yang, which 
compose Dao, cannot exist independently. Suffering and death, which are 
manifestations of yin, cannot be excluded from the operations of Dao because yin 
and yang move interdependently. According to the Zhuangzi, ‘The sage harmonizes 
with both right and wrong and rests in Heaven the Equalizer. This is called “walking 
                                                 
420 Hsiao-Lan Hu and William Cully Allen, Taoism, Religions of the World (Philadelphia: Chelsea 
House, 2005), 31. 
421 Daodejing, chap. 2. (故有無相生, 難易相成, 長短相較, 高下相傾, 音聲相和, 前後相隨.) 
Ivanhoe and Norden, 163.  
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two roads (liangxing, 兩行)”’.422 Therefore, the shadow side of Dao, yin, is 
indispensable according to the philosophy of Zhuangzi.  
 
Overcoming of Evil 
The question of how evil can be overcome in Daoist philosophy is a difficult 
(perhaps even absurd) question, but I will try to answer this based on the teachings of 
the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi.  
In Laozi and Zhuangzi, the highest good is non-action. The most important way 
to overcome the problem of evil is to live by acceptance of the laws of nature. This 
ideal life consists in living without intentional action. Laozi portrays the life of sages: 
Those who would gain the world and do something with it, I see that they 
will fail. The world is a spiritual vessel and one cannot put it to use. Those 
who use it ruin it. Those who grab hold of it lose it. And so, sometimes 
things lead and sometimes they follow; sometimes they breathe gently and 
sometimes they pant; sometimes they are strong and sometimes they are 
weak; sometimes they fight and sometimes they fall; this is why sages cast 
off whatever is extreme, extravagant, or excessive.423 
Attempts to manipulate the world according to our image or ideas about how it 
should be will always fail. Whether it is the self-defeating attempt to force ourselves 
to be good, to right the world’s wrongs, to force oneself to bear any amount of 
physical or emotional pain without mental suffering, or to create a world without 
suffering, both Laozi and Zhuangzi teach that such efforts amount to disruption of 
the flow of Dao because we are getting in our own way. In the end, such attempts 
amount only to self-strangulation. When we give it up, when we let it go, and, as it 
were, let ourselves be carried by Dao, we no longer experience evil.  
In like manner, Laozi believes that when rulers attempt to control the lives of 
their subjects, that is, to rule overbearingly, their actions bring about evil in the 
world:  
                                                 
422 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (是以聖人和之以是非. 而休乎天釣. 是之謂兩行.) Watson, 11.  
423 Daodejing, chap. 29. (將欲取天下而爲之, 吾見其不得已. 天下神器, 不可爲也. 爲者敗之, 
執者失之. 故物或行或隨, 或歔或吹, 或强或羸, 或挫或隳. 是以聖人, 去甚去奢去泰.) Ivanhoe and 
Norden, 177.  
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The people are hungry because those above eat up too much in taxes; this 
is why the people are hungry. The people are difficult to govern because 
those above engage in action; this is why the people are difficult to govern. 
People look upon death lightly because those above are obsessed with their 
own lives; this is why the people look upon death lightly. Those who do 
not strive to live are more worthy than those who cherish life.424 
Laozi says that rulers have trouble ruling people because they engage in doing 
something other than letting the world and human nature be as they are. 
Endeavouring to live, or rather, endeavouring to force life to become what we 
imagine it should be so that we can be happy, is no more worthy than cherishing life 
– precisely because cherishing life brings about anxiety, attachment, and therefrom, 
the intention to control. For Laozi, the most extreme evil is war because it is an 
extreme example of an attempt to control people, events and the world, arising from 
anxiety and attachment. Laozi criticizes the waging of war: ‘One who serves a ruler 
with Dao will never take the world by force of arms. For such actions tend to come 
back in kind. Wherever an army resides, thorns and thistles grow. In the wake of a 
large campaign, bad harvests are sure to follow’.425 A war is a deliberate action for 
the sake of a king or nation’s desires for conquest.  
According to Chapter 53 of the Daodejing, the gap between rich and poor is a 
manifestation of radical deviance from Dao. All people have success and enjoy a 
share in nature’s bounty, but some people get more than their share through selfish, 
that is, controlling, behaviour:  
The court is resplendent, yet the fields are overgrown, and the granaries 
are empty. Yet some wear elegant clothes; fine swords dangle at their 
sides; they are stuffed with food and drink; and possess wealth in gross 
abundance. This is known as taking pride in robbery. Far is this from 
Dao!426  
                                                 
424 Ibid., chap. 75. (民之饑, 以其上食稅之多. 是以饑. 民之難治, 以其上之有爲. 是以難治. 
民之輕死, 以其上求生之厚. 是以輕死. 夫唯無以生爲者, 是賢於貴生.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 199–
200.  
425 Ibid., chap. 30. (以道佐人主者, 不以兵强天下. 其事好還, 師之所處, 荊棘生焉, 大軍之後, 
必有凶年.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 177.  
426 Ibid., chap. 53. (朝甚除, 田甚蕪, 倉甚虛. 服文綵, 帶利劍, 厭飮食, 財貨有餘, 是謂道夸, 
非道也哉.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 188.  
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According to Laozi, people who possess abundant wealth when others are 
starving to death are robbers. This is because this striving for accumulation of 
material wealth to the detriment of others is not the way of Dao.  
Similarly, for Zhuangzi, flowing with Dao is the way by which one overcomes 
evil. Zhuangzi believes that the yin and yang as instantiated in life and death is the 
pattern of Dao in our world.  
I received life because the time had come; I will lose it because the order 
of things passes on. Be content with this time and dwell in this order, and 
then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In ancient times this was called 
the ‘freeing of the bound (xianjie, 縣解)’.427 
If one dwells in this pattern of the world, of the pulse or rhythm of yin and yang, 
neither sorrow nor joy can restrain him or her, for we let go of holding onto the 
positive (yang) and, indeed, trying to help it be victorious over the yin. This is called 
xianjie (freeing of the bound), and therefore this is the state in which and by which 
evil, as defined in the Daoist tradition, is overcome.  
It should be noted at this point, however, that in the Zhuangzi, the overcoming of 
evil can be approached and explained in much more variety than the Daodejing. This 
includes, for example, religious training or meditative practice.  
I began explaining and kept at him [Buliang Yi] for three days, and after 
that he was able to put the world outside himself. When he had put the 
world outside himself, I kept at him for seven days more, and after that he 
was able to put things outside himself. When he had put things outside 
himself, I kept at him for nine days more, and after that he was able to put 
life outside himself. After he had put life outside himself, he was able to 
achieve the brightness of dawn, and when he had achieved the brightness 
of dawn, he could see his own aloneness. After he had managed to see his 
own aloneness, he could do away with past and present, and after he had 
done away with past and present, he was able to enter where there is no 
life and no death.428 
                                                 
427 Zhuangzi, chap. 6. (且夫得者時也, 失者順也. 安時而處順, 哀樂不能入也. 
此古之所謂‘縣解’也.) Watson, 48.  
428 Ibid. (告聖人之才, 亦易矣. 吾猶告而守之, 三日而候能外天下. 已外天下矣, 吾又守之, 
七日而後能外物. 已外物矣, 吾又守之, 九日而後能外生. 已外生矣, 而後能朝徹. 
朝徹而後能見獨. 見獨, 而後能無古今. 無古今而後能入於不死不生.) Watson, 46.  
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At the final step, one transcends time and space, and therefore there is no 
boundary between life and death. If there is no boundary between life and death, we 
can also say that it is meaningless to make a distinction between good and evil. The 
final step recalled by Zhuangzi is the step of transcending all boundaries, and this is 
the step by which evil is overcome. Both the process and the final step related by 
Zhuangzi can be expounded by the term zuowang (坐忘). Zhuangzi puts this into the 
mouth of Confucius himself.  
Yan Hui said, ‘I’m improving!’ Confucius said, ‘What do you mean by 
that?’ ‘I’ve forgotten benevolence and righteousness!’ ‘That’s good. But 
you still haven’t got it’. Another day, the two met again, and Yan Hui said, 
‘I’m improving!’ ‘What do you mean by that?’ ‘I’ve forgotten rites and 
music!’ ‘That’s good. But you still haven’t got it’. Another day, the two 
met again, and Yan Hui said, ‘I’m improving!’ ‘What do you mean by 
that?’ ‘I can sit down and forget everything (zuowang)!’ Confucius looked 
very startled and said, ‘What do you mean, sit down and forget 
everything?’ Yan Hui said, ‘I smash up my limbs and body, drive out 
perception and intellect, cast off form, do away with understanding, and 
make myself identical with the Great Thoroughfare. This is what I mean 
by sitting down and forgetting everything’. Confucius said, ‘If you’re 
identical with it, you must have no more likes! If you’ve been transformed, 
you must have no more constancy! So you really are a worthy man after 
all! With your permission, I’d like to become your follower’.429 
Even though Zhuangzi expounds zuowang through the mouth of Confucius, this 
passage regards benevolence, righteousness, rites and music that are regarded as 
positive and conducive to virtue in Confucianism as low levels of spiritual or 
meditative discipline. The ultimate step is the step of forgetting everything. This is 
the step that transcends feelings such as suffering and pain. Therefore, in the step of 
zuowang, the problem of evil is overcome.  
 
Comparison 
                                                 
429 Ibid. (顔回曰, 回益矣. 仲尼曰, 何謂也? 曰, 回忘仁義矣. 曰, 可矣, 猶未也. 他日復見曰, 
回益矣. 曰, 何謂也? 曰, 回忘禮樂矣. 曰, 可矣, 猶未也. 他日復見曰, 回益矣. 曰, 何謂也? 曰, 
回坐忘矣. 仲尼蹴然曰, 何謂坐忘? 顔回曰, 墮肢體, 黜聰明, 離形去知, 同於大通, 此謂坐忘. 
仲尼曰, 同則無好也, 化則無常也. 而果其賢乎! 丘也請從而後也.) Watson, 52–53.  
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Based on the understanding of evil in the Zhuangzi, I will briefly explore how 
Zhuangzi’s philosophy compares with that of Christianity, Confucianism and 
Buddhism when it comes to evil.  
First, concerning suffering or pain that comes about as a result of natural 
disasters and disease, can we hope for a better life? Of course, hope for a better life 
cannot reduce pain in this world, but it can empower us in overcoming suffering. 
Whether it is a different world, as in Christianity, or a change in consciousness as in 
Daoism, our experience of ourselves and reality in general changes. The Zhuangzi 
relates the ideal state that Daoists pursue: ‘So I will take leave of you, to enter the 
gate of the inexhaustible and wander in the limitless fields, to form a triad with the 
light of the sun and moon, to partake in the constancy of Heaven and earth’.430 
Similarly, Jesus relates that upon the arrival of the Kingdom of Heaven ‘the 
righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father’ (Matt. 13:43). Both 
for people who attain Dao in the Zhuangzi and for righteous people in the Bible, a 
transcendent future, free of the sufferings that we presently experienced, is promised.  
Second, concerning fear of death, it is important to rid oneself of the obsession 
with maintaining, preserving and extending life. The Zhuangzi states, ‘Death does 
not exist for the one who kills life, and life does not exist for the one who lives 
life’.431 It means that the one who obsesses over life will die, and the one who 
sacrifices life will live. Jesus similarly says, ‘For whoever wants to save his life will 
lose it, but whoever loses his life for me will save it’ (Luke 9:24). In Buddhism, the 
origin of human suffering is located in desire and attachment.432 In Christianity, 
Daoism, and Buddhism, desire for life precedes loss, and that is the starting point of 
suffering.  
Finally, and most importantly, when it comes to living a life free of evil and 
suffering, I would suggest ‘unity between the human being and Ultimate Reality’ or 
‘unity between the human being and the universe’ is a theme repeated throughout the 
religions. There is a familiar anecdote about Zhuangzi and a butterfly. 
                                                 
430 Ibid., chap. 11. (余將去女, 入无窮之門, 以遊無極之野. 吾與日月參光, 吾與天地爲常.) Watson, 
79.  
431 Ibid., chap. 6. (殺生者不死, 生生者不生.) 
432 Keown, 31. 
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I, by the name of Zhuangzi, once dreamed that I was a butterfly, a butterfly 
fluttering happily here and there. I was so pleased that I forgot that I was 
Zhuangzi. When I suddenly woke up, I was astonished to find that I was as 
a matter of fact Zhuangzi. Did Zhuangzi dream of the butterfly or did the 
butterfly dream of Zhuangzi? Between Zhuangzi and the butterfly there 
must be some distinctions. This is called ‘the transformation of things 
(wuhua)’.433 
Wuhua (物化) literally means ‘the transformation of things’ or ‘things 
transform’. I think this is the final stage that humans can reach in terms of one’s 
awareness of the interconnection of all things. In this stage, awareness of oneself 
disappears, and I and things, I and the universe become one. According to the 
Buddhist conception of the universe, the universe is divided into 31 levels. In level 
30, there emerges the notion of ‘nothingness’, and in level 31, abandoning even the 
thought of nothingness, ‘There arises the ineffable state of mind known as “neither 
perception nor non-perception”. This is the highest state in which anyone can be 
reborn’.434 This final state is similar to wuhua in the Zhuangzi.  
Wuhua can be seen to be analogically related to the Biblical notion of denying 
oneself. Jesus says, ‘If anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take 
up his cross and follow me’ (Matt. 16:24; Mark 8:34; Luke 9:23). Denying oneself is 
to surrender one’s desire and become one with Jesus. Paul describes this specifically: 
‘I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me. The 
life I live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave 
himself for me’ (Gal. 2:20). At this stage, then, there is no boundary between myself 
and Jesus. I maintain that this is the same state as wuhua in the Zhuangzi and as the 
31st stage in the Buddhist concept of the universe. It is at this stage that, since ‘I’ do 
not exist, I cannot feel pain or fear of death. If a typhoon hits me, it means that I and 
the typhoon have become one. Although this conception of natural evil and 
overcoming suffering over it seems to be metaphysical rather than referring to felt 
experience, it does in fact help Christians, Buddhists, and Daoists to focus on the 
final and ideal stage of their respective religions: ‘unity between human and Ultimate 
Reality’ or ‘unity between human and the universe’. 
                                                 
433 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (昔者 莊周夢爲胡蝶, 栩栩然胡蝶也, 自喩適志與! 不知周也. 俄然覺, 
則蘧蘧然周也. 不知周之夢爲胡蝶與, 胡蝶之夢爲周與? 周與胡蝶, 則必有分矣. 此之謂物化.) 
Wang Rongpei, Zhuangzi, 1999, 39-41.  
434 Keown, 34. 
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Chinese Neo-Confucian Philosopher, Zhang Zai (張載, 1020–1077), reveals 
what it means to live together harmoniously with all creatures in the world in 
‘Western Inscription (西銘)’. 
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small 
creature as I find an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills 
the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I 
consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all 
things are my companions. The great ruler (the emperor) is the eldest son 
of my parents (Heaven and Earth), and the great ministers are his stewards. 
Respect the aged – this is the way to treat them as elders should be treated. 
Show deep love toward the orphaned and the weak – this is the way to 
treat them as the young should be treated. The sage identifies his character 
with that of Heaven and Earth, and the worthy is the most outstanding 
man. Even those who are tired, infirm, crippled, or sick and those who 
have no brothers or children, wives or husbands, are all my brothers who 
are in distress and have no one to turn to.435 
According to Zhang Zai, heaven and earth are our parents. All people are our 
brothers and sisters, and all things are our companions. Thus we should treat the 
suffering and the weak with deep love. This means to live in harmony with all 
creatures. This also means the unity between humanity and the universe containing 
heaven and earth, and this unity is an important way to overcome evil.  
 
(3) Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to present the conception of evil found in the 
Zhuangzi. To begin with, I explored what the origin of evil is and how evil can be 
understood in East Asian religious philosophy in comparison to the understanding of 
evil in Christianity. To summarize, in Confucianism, selfishness is considered the 
origin of moral evil, although it is debatable whether selfishness arises out of social 
influence or is essential to human nature itself. In Daoism, intentional or deliberate 
behaviour causes division, and this brings about moral evil as a result. In Buddhism, 
the origin of evil is the distorted perception that human beings have of themselves 
and their consequently distorted behaviour causes suffering. Regarding natural evils 
arising from the earth’s movement (earthquakes), Confucianism accepts them as fate 
                                                 
435 Zhang Zai, “Western Inscription (西銘),” (Wing-Tsit Chan, 497). 
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(ming) or as the will of Heaven. Laozi does not think that natural evil exists, 
evidenced by the fact that he does not consider natural disasters as evil. In Buddhism, 
natural phenomena such as earthquakes and tsunamis cannot be considered as evils 
because these are simply a part of the law of karma, the law of cause and effect 
running throughout this reality in both the natural and moral realms. 
 I then focused on the ideas of Zhuangzi specifically regarding the origin of evil, 
the perception of evil, and the overcoming of evil. In the philosophy of Zhuangzi, 
moral evil is the disharmony brought about by controlling or self-conscious action. 
Controlling and self-conscious activity attempts to run against the direction or flow 
of Dao, for it breaks the principles of effortless action (wuwei), spontaneity (ziran), 
and oneness (daoshu). The Zhuangzi looks at evil as integral to the world, as the 
other side of the coin, or the trough of the wave, along with the positive force, which 
is yang. As such, the occurrence of evil, be it moral or natural, is brought under the 
notion of fate (ming) and harmony of yin and yang (liangxing). For the Zhuangzi, 
evil is overcome in following this flow of Dao. In the step of sitting in forgetfulness 
(zuowang), and in the step of transformation of things (wuhua), there is a cessation of 
distinctions, and with that both the experience and problem of evil will also cease. 
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PART Ⅲ. COMPARISON 
 
In order to carry out comparative work between the ideas of John Haught and 
Zhuangzi, I expounded the evolutionary theology of Haught in Part Ⅰ, and I explored 
the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi in Part Ⅱ by focusing on the problem of evil.  
Now we move to Part Ⅲ, the comparison between the evolutionary theodicy of 
Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi based on my methodology: 
description, comparison, generalisation, differentiation and supplementation. I will 
examine the comparison from the perspective of ‘evolution and natural/moral evil’ in 
chapter 6. To be specific, I will compare the ideas of Haught and Zhuangzi on the 
basis of the following topics because they display the most plausible theodicies 
between Christianity and Daoism: (1) information and qi with regard to evolution 
and the emergence of life, (2) the natural state defence, comprising a synthesis of the 
notions of the grace of God and ziran with respect to natural evil, and (3) the free 
action defence, comprising a synthesis of the notions of free will and wuwei as they 
pertain to moral evil.  
In chapter 7 I will examine my comparative work from a ‘continuous creation’ 
point of view on the basis of the following topics: (1) the suffering God defence, 
comprising a synthesis of the notions of the kenotic God and the omnipresence of 
Dao, (2) the hidden God defence, comprising a synthesis of the notions of the self-
absenting of God and the hiddenness of Dao as they pertain to the problem of 
responsibility for evil in the world, and (3) the harmony defence, a synthesis of the 
notions of the ‘dark side’ and the yin (shadow side), which Haught and Zhuangzi 
refer to as integral to cosmic harmony.  
In chapter 8 I will explore the comparison from the point of ‘new creation’. To 
put it concretely, I will do comparative work based on the following topics: (1) the 
progress defence, understood on the basis of purpose or direction of evolution and 
(2) the final fulfilment defence, a synthesis of the notions of new creation and 
tianrenyitong (the unity of heaven and human being).  
Throughout this comparative part of the thesis, I will try to develop plausible 
theodicies for both East and West in a scientific age. The aim of my thesis is to 
demonstrate that the evolutionary theodicy of Haught can provide a better 
understanding of the problem of evil through dialogue if it employs the ideas of the 
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Zhuangzi. I also expect that we can see in this thesis how Western evolutionary 





Evolution and Natural/Moral Evil 
 
In this chapter, I will expound the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist 
philosophy of Zhuangzi with regard to evolution and the problem of natural and 
moral evils. Information and qi with regard to evolution and the emergence of life, 
the grace of God and ziran with respect to natural evil (the natural state defence), and 
free will and wuwei (the free action defence) will be the topics of each section. With 
these topics, I will reveal the similarities and differences between the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught and Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi, and I will develop plausible 
theodicies in a scientific age.  
 
(1) Evolution and the Emergence of Life: Information and Qi (氣, vital 
energy)436 
Description 
Uncovering the process by which life emerges from inanimate matter has been a 
formidable challenge for Darwinians. Darwin speculated that ‘all the conditions for 
the first production of a living organism … [could be met] … in some warm little 
pond with all sorts of ammonia and phosphoric salts, light, heat, electricity, etc. 
present’.437 Most Evolutionists438 infer that the building blocks of self-replicating life 
began to coalesce by an improbable chain of accidents about 3.8 billion years ago.439 
                                                 
436 An abridged edition of this section will be published as a chapter in Issues in Science and 
Theology: Are We Special? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology, ed. Michael Fuller, Dirk 
Evers, Anne Runehov and Knut-Willy Sæ ther (ESSSAT & Springer, 2017). 
437 Darwin’s letter to his friend Joseph Hooker in 1871. [in Mayr, 44-45.] 
438 Not all evolutionists regard life as arising by ‘an improbable chain of accidents’. For example, 
Kauffman claims that life is not a result of accident and chance, but ‘a natural property of complex 
chemical systems’, arguing that ‘when the number of different kinds of molecules in a chemical soup 
passes a certain threshold, a self-sustaining network of reactions – an autocatalytic metabolism – will 
suddenly appear’. [Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-
Organization and Complexity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 47.] 
439 Mayr and Haught think that life was established on the earth about 3.8 billion years ago, and 
Conway Morris also believes that life began at least 3.5 billion years ago. Research into the origin of 
life is still very speculative, but advances are slowly being made. [Mayr, 43; Haught, Is Nature 
Enough? Meaning and Truth in the Age of Science, 57; Simon Conway Morris, "Evolution and the 
Inevitability of Intelligent Life," in The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, ed. Peter 
Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 155.]  
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This biological conjecture may seem completely hostile to the age-old Christian 
conviction that God is the origin of life as its creator. In Genesis 1, God is usually 
regarded as creating all kinds of living beings as well as the whole world in the what 
we may capitalise as the ‘Beginning’. However, Haught claims that there is no 
necessary conflict between these accounts of the generation of life. According to 
Haught, the Darwinian conception of origins does not diminish God’s providential 
role, ‘if the natural world is so extravagantly gifted that, at relevant moments in its 
unfolding, random events open the door abruptly to a creativity that gushes forth in 
astonishingly new and unpredictable ways’.440 Haught argues that the emergence of 
life can be portrayed not so much as something grafted on from outside as the sudden 
budding of a flower, embryonically present from the outset.  
How can these sudden changes, including the emergence of life, be understood 
without conflict between religion and science? It is useful at this point to bring in 
Haught’s idea of ‘hierarchy’, which he draws from the classical Greek tradition. 
Based on the Greek roots of the notion of hierarchy, Haught focuses on the idea that 
all things have their origin of being (arche) in the field of the sacred (hier). 
According to him, hierarchy is necessary if some phenomena like life and mind are 
to be regarded as more valuable than others. For him, hierarchical thinking means 
that lower levels of creation can be quietly informed by the higher, and it is essential 
here to state the fundamentally religious intuition that reality and human values have 
a sacred origin beyond what biology can perceive and/or describe.441 In other words, 
if religious and ethical realities do have an irreducible basis and permanent 
importance in our world, there is need of hierarchical thinking, given its ontological 
and epistemological explanatory power.  
To explain and justify such hierarchical thinking without conflict between 
science and theology, Haught focuses on the notion of ‘information’. Polkinghorne 
understands information as ‘the specification of dynamical patterns of behaviour and 
energy flow’,442 and proposes the concept of active information: ‘a dynamical 
pattern-forming propensity that operates in a holistic way on totalities rather than 
                                                 
440 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 23. 
441 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 78. 
442 Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 78. 
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separable on constituents’.443 Peacocke understands God’s interaction with the world 
in the light of a continuing process of input of information, whereby ‘God’s 
intentions and purposes are implemented in the shaping of particular events, or 
patterns of events, without any abrogation of the regularities discerned by the 
sciences in the natural order’.444 Although Polkinghorne and Peacocke acknowledge 
that the notion of ‘information’ is not yet fully defined445 and apparently abstract,446 
– Haught in fact thinks that ‘Information’s inaccessibility to empirical scrutiny or 
mechanical analysis makes it seem “mystical”’447 – their speculations about 
information nonetheless shed light on how God may work in the world and 
contribute to our knowledge about how God relates to all creatures without any 
conflict with science.  
Haught suggests that God’s powerful but scientifically undetectable influence 
on the world can be compared with the way ‘information’ is seen in semiotics.448 To 
paraphrase, then, as you read a book, you are looking at blotches of black ink fixed 
onto a white page. If you do not know how to read, all you see would be 
unintelligible black marks, missing the informational content embedded within it. 
But if you are literate, the informational content of the marks is apparent. We can 
see, Haught argues, that information emerges suddenly – which cannot be explained 
with ink and paper alone. 
Allow me to recapitulate and reinforce Haught’s argument. Let us imagine the 
English sentence ‘Zhuangzi walking in woods’ written on a sheet of paper. 
According to the logic of Haught’s argument, the meaning of the sentence cannot be 
explained by the physical constituents of the state of affairs – the ink and paper; 
                                                 
443 Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 83. Polkinghorne 
expounds the possible consequences of active information: ‘(i) Holistic laws of nature which facilitate 
the coming-to-be of certain kinds of complexity…. (ii) There might here be a glimmer (no more) of 
how one might begin to conceive of the relationship between mind (intention – like pattern forming) 
and brain (physical activity – like energetic exchange). (iii) Theology is offered the possibility of 
beginning to understand its discourse of God’s special providential action, often expressed in terms of 
the Spirit’s guiding creation, in terms of a divine interaction within the world through active 
information’. [Polkinghorne, Faith, Science and Understanding, 166.] 
444 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human, 295. 
445 Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 78. 
446 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human, 296. 
447 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 81. 
448 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 94; Haught, God after Darwin: A 
Theology of Evolution, 78-81. 
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rather, they are instances of ‘information’, which is a higher-order reality. Now, we 
know that ‘Zhuangzi walking in woods’ is an incomplete sentence, but we cannot 
know that from the ink and paper alone; we know it is incomplete because we know 
the grammatical or syntactic rules of the English language, and we see that lacking 
the requisite words, there is a semantic error in the sentence. The rules of the 
language themselves seem to be of an order higher than that of the physical markings 
on the page. There is obviously more to say here, and philosophers will be able to see 
its relationship to the phenomenon of ‘intentionality’ – that of ‘aboutness’ – but I 
hope this is sufficient to illustrate Haught’s idea of information. 
Haught intends his analogy to shed some light on how God can create life 
without violating the laws of physics and chemistry. He claims that evolutionary 
biology and biochemistry cannot detect what we might call any ‘deeper 
informational’ level that might be present in the universe with an ultimate (or 
immanent) origin providing that meaning. The emergence of life and conscious 
beings can be actualized without their informational content ever showing up at the 
level of physical or chemical analysis. Their emergence does not require the violation 
of scientific laws as the inscribing of information in a book does not violate the 
chemistry of ink and paper.449 
In Daoism, Dao is the origin of all creatures, the beginning of all changes and 
the ultimate cause of all changes. Dao is without beginning or end, and there is no 
time that Dao did not or does not exist.450 According to the Zhuangzi, Dao alone 
existed in the beginning, and all creatures are produced by Dao out of non-being, 
including spiritual beings (Chapter 4:1).  
To understand Dao’s creation, we first need to know about the Daoist notion of 
qi. Qi (氣) literally means the breath of life, and it signifies physical energy, vital 
energy or the essence of life.451 According to the Zhuangzi, ‘Everything in the world 
stems from the one qi’.452 Qi has a primordial role in the origin of the world and its 
many entities. The life and death of human beings are also determined by the 
                                                 
449 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 94. 
450 Zhuangzi, chap. 17. 
451 Hartz, 140. 
452 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. (通天下一氣耳.) 
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operation of qi: ‘The birth of a man is the convergence of qi, which in turn forms life. 
The dispersion of qi causes death’.453 
How is Zhuangzi’s idea of qi connected with the idea of information in Haught? 
In the following parts, I will examine what similarities and differences between the 
two are, and how the idea of qi can supplement the idea of information. 
 
Comparison and Generalisation 
Haught’s idea of information and the idea of qi in the Zhuangzi have several 
similarities concerning their conception of the emergence of life. First of all, the 
creative work of information and the creative work of qi can be in harmony with the 
distinctiveness of human beings because of what we may call ‘gradational creation’. 
For Haught, information has the capacity to bring about hierarchical ‘discontinuity’ 
among various levels of creation in terms of complexity of entities, living and 
inanimate.454 Haught understands ‘information’ in a broad and general sense: ‘the 
overall ordering of entities – atoms, molecules, cells, genes, etc. – into intelligible 
forms or arrangements’.455 According to him, although it is neither energetic nor 
massive, information is quietly stationed in nature, and it powerfully orders 
subordinate natural elements into hierarchically distinguished fields. In short, 
Haught’s informational conception of life allows that life emerged from the 
evolutionary process and, at the same time, that life holds a more sacred position 
than inanimate matter in their being specially created by God with purposes, which is 
consonant with the traditional Christian narrative of human beings occupying a 
special place in the cosmos, in virtue of their possessing the image of God, itself 
traditionally regarded as consisting in self-knowledge and free will – integral aspects 
of consciousness.  
Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, the emergence and subsequent stages of the 
development of life are portrayed in gradational terms:  
There was no life originally. Not only was there no life, but there was also 
no shape (body) originally. No shape; only qi. In the middle of the chaos, a 
                                                 
453 Ibid. (人之生, 氣之聚也. 聚則爲生, 散則爲死.)  
454 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 26. 
455 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 74. 
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change took place and qi appeared. Qi itself changed and shape appeared. 
Shape changed and life appeared.456 
According to the Zhuangzi, some mysterious change457 brought about the 
emergence of qi, and qi in turn generated inanimate matter, and next, animate life. 
This evolutionary process involved in the operations of information and qi can 
accommodate and engender distinctiveness of the higher levels of creation such as 
that of human beings (the level of consciousness) because those higher levels contain 
the information of lower levels, despite not being reducible to them. In short, this 
gradational understanding of evolution can serve to explain and preserve the 
uniqueness of human life and consciousness. 
Second, the gradational process in which information and qi are involved can 
also be in balance with evolutionary science. As we saw for Haught, information 
operates in the universe without in any way violating lower-level laws of physics and 
chemistry. It means that information does not interfere with ordinary physical 
regularities but instead utilizes them for its ordering work.458  
Haught suggests that information can structure the universe, and endow it with 
hierarchically distinguished features in a non-invasive manner. In other words, 
information enables and operates all of this without interrupting the successive 
continuum of basic elements at atomic and subatomic levels from a scientific 
perspective. Based on this informational understanding of life, Haught thinks that 
God could be regarded as ‘the ultimate source of the novel informational patterns’459 
available to evolution.  
Similarly, the process for the emergence of humans in the Zhuangzi bears rough 
resemblances to evolutionary processes posited in biology.  
Among the various species, there is a microorganism which propagates in 
water. It becomes moss on the water margin and it becomes plantain on the 
highlands.… The yangxi grass lives with the bamboo that no longer 
sprouts, which gives birth to an insect by the name of qingning, which in 
                                                 
456 Zhuangzi, chap. 18. (而本無生. 非徒无形也, 而本无氣. 雜乎芒物之間, 變而有氣, 氣變而有形, 
形變而有生.) 
457 Big Bang can also be regarded as ‘some mysterious change’ even though it is more accurately 
described as a cosmological evolutionary model.  
458 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 75. 
459 Ibid., 77. 
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turn gives birth to the leopard, and which again in turn gives birth to the 
horse, which again in turn gives birth to the man.460 
Considering that the Zhuangzi was written in the fourth and third centuries BCE, 
this transmutation or proto-evolutionary thinking that we find here is worth being 
evaluated. Although, as Roel Steckx states, this transmutation does not seem to be 
the expression of a teleological striving for biological fulfilment but rather the 
essential process of generation itself,461 we need to concentrate on the fact that here 
the Zhuangzi expounds a conception of the transmutation of life in the animal world 
from microorganisms to moss, from plantain to creatures that have fully-fledged 
powers of locomotion such as leopards and horses, finally arriving at creatures with 
consciousness – to humans.  
That the Zhuangzi provides a conception of gradational creation is significant for 
us because on the basis of previous considerations, the idea of gradational evolution 
as found in Haught does not conflict with the central ideas of evolutionary biology, 
and now we can see that this is also the case with the Zhuangzi, revealing affinity 
between the two. 
Finally, information and qi operate undetectably. For Haught, the operation of 
information is hidden, and it weaves the world, as it were, silently. 
Information subtly weaves the world into patterns, then gathers these into 
still more comprehensive wholes, and always slips silently out of our 
grasp. It hides itself, even while performing its integrative and hierarchical 
chores. We murder it whenever we dissect it.462 
It should be observed that as information works imperceptibly at all levels of 
evolution, for the Zhuangzi, Dao’s operation cannot be articulated in any clearly 
defined way. According to the Zhuangzi, ‘The Great Dao exceeds description.… If 
Dao is clearly manifested, it is not Dao’.463 As information cannot be dissected, so 
                                                 
460 Zhuangzi, chap. 18. (種有幾, 得水則爲繼, 得水土之際 … 羊奚比乎不箰, 久竹生靑寧. 靑寧生
程, 程生馬, 馬生人.) Wang Rongpei, 295. We might note that the author of the Zhuangzi would, of 
course, not have used the Chinese equivalent of ‘microorganism’ given its modern origin. Ji (幾) 
originally refers to a creature so small as to be invisible to the naked eye, but this is rather clumsy in 
modern English and the tendency nowadays is in fact to use the word ‘microorganism’ to refer to the 
phenomenon. Rongpei’s translation of 幾 is apt for this reason.  
461 Roel Sterckx, The Animal and the Daemon in Early China (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2002), 168. 
462 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 81. 
463 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (大道不稱.… 道昭而不道.)  
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Dao cannot be detected or analysed physically or conceptually. Nevertheless, Dao’s 
operation in the world can be explained or at least conveyed by reference to the 
operations of qi. If, for Haught, information is the medium of the emergence of life, 
qi is the medium of it in the Zhuangzi. Because both information and qi operate in 
the world without detection, their activity can make connections between species but 
also provide for the distinctiveness of higher levels of reality. Why? Because if the 
operations of information and qi were clear, we would be able to easily map the 
development of species. In other words, there would be nothing mysterious about the 
emergence either of life or consciousness, and we could not have argued for 
distinctive higher levels, for there would be no essential difference between species. 
Based on this comparison between the operations of information and qi, we can 
generalise these two ideas about the emergence of life as ‘abrupt but continuous 
change from the previous level’. The media of the change(s) for both philosophies 
are information and qi respectively. This generalisation of the ideas of information 
and qi helps us to understand that life emerged from the evolutionary process at work 
at all levels and, at the same time, that living things enjoy a special position in 
contrast to inanimate matter or lower level species. This idea also helps us to 
understand the problem of evil. We can begin to comprehend that the things which 
we may call ‘natural evil’ (such as earthquakes, cancer, and death generally) emerge 
from the operation of information or qi during the process of evolution, just as the 
emergence of life and human beings as a specific lifeform did. In this case, the 
emergence of natural evil is not to be regarded as being in contrast to God’s good 
creation because God is not the first cause of natural evil. Moral evil, or what is 
commonly called ‘sin’ is of course yet to be addressed, and we shall look at the 
insights of Haught and the Zhuangzi pertaining to sin in Section 3 of this chapter.  
 
Differentiation and Supplementation 
Haught’s explanation of the emergence of life via information operating throughout 
evolutionary levels allows for the endowment of animate life and human life in 
particular with the sacredness that Christianity demands, without conflict with 
evolutionary science, but I want to further supplement Haught’s ideas about 
information, based on the differences between those ideas and Zhuangzi’s notion of 
qi. 
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As I explained above, the Zhuangzi reveals one conception of evolution from 
microorganisms to human beings. However, we need to focus on the following part 
concerning what occurs after the emergence of human beings in the book: ‘The man, 
in his turn, reverts to the microorganism. Everything in the world comes out of a 
microorganism and goes back to it’.464 The idea of evolution in the Zhuangzi seems 
to be a very early precursor to that of modern science, but for it, evolution is not 
linear but cyclical. In other words, human life is not, as it is sometimes construed in 
popular theological interpretations of evolution, the final or ‘highest’ stage of 
evolution, and human life reverts back to the form of a microorganism. Although the 
evolutionary process seems to have levels (or rather, phases) of development of 
complexity, all things return to the form of microorganisms. Let us clarify this 
thought. In the Zhuangzi, evolution comprises levels, phases or elements manifest by 
the operation of qi, and these levels do not mean or exhibit hierarchy typically 
pictured vertically – unlike in Haught. In this cyclical structure, whatever we might 
(arbitrarily) regard as ‘final’ phase of evolutionary development returns to the first.  
Haught’s idea of information grants a unique and theologically desired special 
status to human life. However, if his conception of evolution is linear, we may 
suppose that there will be a further stage in the development of life over and above 
that of human beings, even though Haught might not have considered or even 
conceived of this possibility in his idea of information. Indeed, theories abound 
concerning the hypothesis of a higher level of life beyond that of human beings, such 
as the emergence of what we might call super-conscious or supra-conscious beings. I 
do believe that the continuous operation of information may generate something of a 
higher order than individualised consciousness as manifest in human beings. This 
may also mean that human beings are not special as such because the lifeform that is 
the human being would be regarded as just another stage or level in the linear 
development of life in general. In contrast, it seems that in the Daoist cyclical 
structure as exhibited in the Zhuangzi, postulating a ‘higher’ stage in the 
development of life than human beings is meaningless. If we interpret Haught’s 
hierarchical understanding of life and evolution – utilising information – in light of 
the idea of qi in the Zhuangzi, therefore, the uniqueness of human beings in the 
evolving world will be revealed more fully. 
                                                 
464 Ibid., chap. 18. (人又反入於機. 萬物皆出於機, 皆入於機.) Wang Rongpei, 295. 
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Second, if we over emphasize the distinctiveness of humans based on Haught’s 
hierarchical understanding of the emergence of conscious life, we may be susceptible 
to overestimating ourselves, or committing speciesism – valuing this human lifeform 
to the detriment of others. I believe that we need to listen to the Zhuangzi: ‘But I 
[Zhuangzi] have never, for this reason, prided myself on it. I take my place with 
heaven and earth and receive breath [qi] from the yin and yang. I sit here between 
heaven and earth as a little stone or a little tree sits on a huge mountain’.465 Because 
humans received qi from the yin and yang (the negative and positive principles of 
Dao’s operation), the fact that humans share much with other creatures and entities in 
the world – most obviously their basic constituents – cannot be overlooked. 
I claim, then, that the fundamental Daoist idea of harmony with nature in the 
Zhuangzi can supplement and develop Haught’s idea of information for the following 
reasons. I suggest we can understand that information originated from one root and is 
itself immanent in all creatures in the world. This understanding leads us to 
ecotheology, for the human species is endowed with a higher level of information by 
means of the process of evolution which God oversees, and this uniqueness – 
together with what is shared with other creatures – entails the special responsibility 
to care for other species in the world. 
Finally, the difference between information and qi outlined offers us a source of 
inspiration in approaching the problem of evil that so pervades theology and 
religious life generally. As I explored above, for Haught and the Zhuangzi, 
information and qi appeared in virtue of the creative power of God and Dao 
respectively. Because of the great differences in the properties of the Christian 
conception of God and those of Dao, there are in fact marked differences between 
information and qi. Dao’s operation is revealed in the operation of both yin and yang. 
As the Zhuangzi says, ‘I received qi from the yin and yang’.466 If we consider the 
moral tragedies caused by human beings, up and down human history, it seems that 
the higher level of information467 that made humans special brings about both the 
capacity for moral goodness and the capacity for moral evil. From the Daoist 
                                                 
465 Ibid., chap. 17. (而吾未嘗以此自多者, 自以比形於天地, 而受氣於陰陽. 吾在天地之間, 猶小石
小木之在大山也.) Watson, 127. 
466 Ibid. (而受氣於陰陽.) 
467 Haught accepts the notion of levels of information because hierarchy is both essential and intrinsic 
to reality ‘if something is to be considered more valuable and more real than others’. [Haught, God 
after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 78.] 
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perspective, we need to take into account the negative or shadow side of information, 
if we are to adopt the term.  
If we accept that information involves both positive and negative principles – as 
with qi – we can say that the higher the level of information a species attains, the 
deeper or wider their capacity for both good and evil behaviour. Humans are special 
because they are endowed with a higher level of information. Being human is to have 
the capacity for moral action – good and evil. God allows us the freedom to choose 
as part of the ongoing evolution of the universe. Therefore, if we accept both the 
positive and negative sides of informational work, the problem of evil as manifest in 
such phenomena as animal pain468 (predation) or human crime will be transformed 
and made more amenable to an integral theodicy. 
In this section, I aimed to develop the evolutionary theology of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi as they pertain to the emergence of life. Both 
information in Haught and qi in the Zhuangzi provide for the distinctiveness of life in 
balance with evolutionary science because of ‘gradational creation’, the concept of 
which we have given considerable space to explore. Based on this similarity, I 
generalised gradational creation as the ‘abrupt but continuous change from the 
previous level’. This generalisation of the similar ideas of information and qi leads us 
to understand that living beings arise from and in virtue of the evolutionary process 
and that they simultaneously hold a special position in contrast to inanimate objects.  
However, I described how the understanding of information or qi is different 
between the two thinkers, and these differences can supplement the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught. First, Haught’s conception of evolution seems to be linear, but it 
is cyclical in the Zhuangzi. If Haught’s idea of information contains the cyclical 
structure of evolution, the uniqueness of human beings in the evolving world will be 
revealed more fully. Second, Haught’s hierarchical understanding of the emergence 
of humans may actually become a source of arrogance for humans to overestimate 
their place in their cosmos. If we can understand that information originated from 
one root and is itself immanent in all creatures in the world like the operation of qi in 
the Zhuangzi, Haught’s idea may provide a guiding light that eventually leads us to 
the very modern notion of ecotheology. Finally, Dao’s operation is revealed in the 
                                                 
468 Concerning animal pain as a major problem to be addressed in modern theodicy, see Michael J. 
Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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operation of both yin and yang. If we accept that information involves both positive 
and negative principles as qi does, then the evolutionary theology of Haught can be 
extended to various fields including animal pain and human crime. We begin to see 
the foundations of a new theodicy.  
 
(2) The Natural State Defence: The Grace of God and Ziran (自然, spontaneity) 
Description 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection is one of the most important theories that 
involves the notion of evolution. Darwin called ‘(the) preservation of favourable 
variations and the rejection of injurious variations’469 ‘natural selection’. The 
principle of natural selection is that ‘each slight variation, if useful, is preserved’.470  
The theory of natural selection seems to present several problems to traditional 
Christian theology (Chapter 2:3). The first problem is the relationship between God’s 
creation and natural selection. William Murry points out: 
The theory of evolution by natural selection has important implications for 
theology and religious belief. At the most obvious level it undermines a 
literal interpretation of the Genesis account of creation. At the next level it 
throws doubt on the notion of divine purpose in creation, since natural 
selection maintains that the only purposes of organisms are to survive and 
reproduce. And finally, it questions whether a divine creator is necessary at 
all.471  
To reiterate what was said in previous chapters, it looks as if there is some 
difficulty in harmonizing natural selection and traditional Christian theology, 
primarily because of the Christian view that organisms – especially human beings – 
possess intrinsic value.472 ‘Cosmic pessimists’ – among whom Haught lists Carl 
Sagan, E. O. Wilson and Stephen Jay Gould – believe that ‘the universe, the earth, 
life and human consciousness originate accidentally out of a process of 
                                                 
469 Darwin, 63. 
470 Ibid., 50. 
471 William R. Murry, "Natural Faith: How Darwinian Evolution Has Transformed Liberal Religion," 
UU World Spring (2009): 27. 
472 Genesis seems quite clear on the idea that created beings, as creation itself, have an intrinsic 
dignity in being designed and created by God, hence God calls creation ‘good’ (see Genesis 1:4, 10, 
12, 18, 21, 25, 31). 
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unintelligible, random events worked over by an impersonal process known as 
natural selection’.473 How can natural selection, seen as a conglomeration of 
unintelligible and random events, be connected with God’s continuous creation? 
Evolutionary theologians often approach natural selection in terms of God’s 
continuous creative work. In evolutionary theology, God’s creation is not complete at 
the moment of its coming into being, but in fact continues every day and every 
moment. Natural selection is usually seen by many scholars as one of the most 
important ways that God’s continuous creation can be revealed. Denis Edwards says, 
‘I would want to argue that God is not to be understood as another factor operating 
alongside natural selection, or in addition to it, but is rather to be understood as 
acting through it’.474 For him, God acts in, with, and through natural processes. For 
evolutionary theologians, God continuously creates according to natural selection, 
which means God’s continuous creation is compatible with evolutionary biology.  
The second problem is the pain, suffering and death generated by natural 
selection. If God participates in continuous creation through natural selection, is God 
responsible for this natural evil? Gloria Schaab understands that ‘Pain, suffering, and 
death appear to be necessary conditions both for the survival of life and for the 
transition of life to novel and emergent forms’475 in the evolutionary process. 
Peacocke also says, ‘Pain and suffering are present in biological evolution as a 
necessary condition for survival of the individual’.476 In other words, dying and 
predation are inevitable for new forms and patterns to emerge. Robert Russell says, 
‘Natural evil itself is a necessary consequence of the evolutionary processes which 
even God could not eliminate’.477 He calls this idea ‘cosmic theodicy’, which means 
‘God created our universe ex nihilo with the specific laws of physics and constants of 
nature which make Darwinian evolution possible’.478 For evolutionary theologians, 
                                                 
473 Haught, The Promise of Nature: Ecology and Cosmic Purpose, 17. 
474 Edwards, 52. 
475 Schaab, "The Creative Suffering of the Triune God: An Evolutionary Panentheistic Paradigm," 
292. 
476 Peacocke, "The Cost of New Life," in The Work of Love, 31-32. 
477 Russell, "Recent Theological Interpretations of Evolution," 178. 
478 Ibid., 179. 
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natural evil is inevitable. It comes as a feature of the processes of nature necessary to 
maintain the world. 
Within the broader context of creatio continua, Haught understands natural 
selection as the grace of God. He says, ‘If there is any truth to the central religious 
intuition that God loves the world with an unbounded love, then God’s “grace” must 
also mean “letting the world be itself”’.479 God’s grace has the character of ‘letting it 
be’, and God influences the world in a persuasive way rather than in a coercive way 
– that is, dialectically rather than by command. Because genuine love is by definition 
and necessity not coercive, continuous creation through natural selection is an 
expression of God’s love. Ruth Page similarly argues that ‘Divine self-limitation, 
then, is not a withdrawal of God, not even a withdrawal as a prelude to a return. It 
has more to do with how God relates to what is not-God’.480 For Page, divine 
freedom cannot be separate from divine love, and both divine freedom and love form 
and maintain God’s relationship with all the creatures. 
My belief is that Haught’s understanding of natural selection in no way 
contradicts either the traditional Christian image of God as One who revealed his 
boundless love on the cross or evolutionary biology whose evidential support cannot 
be denied. However, we also need to pay attention to Moltmann’s argument about 
evolution: ‘What has to be called eschatological is the movement of redemption, 
which runs counter to evolution. If we want to put it in temporal terms: this is a 
movement which runs from the future to the past, not from the past to the future’.481 
For Moltmann, evolution itself needs to be redeemed, and Christ is the redeemer of 
evolution. This understanding contradicts Teilhard’s idea of God as the ultimate goal 
of evolutionary process (Chapter 3:1) and it is also different from Haught’s idea that 
an evolutionary process taken to be natural selection is the most perfect expression of 
God’s boundless love. 
Haught attempts to reconcile the pain and suffering that result from natural 
selection and God’s love which the Christian must affirm: ‘The long creative 
struggle of the universe to arrive at life, consciousness, and culture is consonant with 
our faith’s conviction that real love never forces any state of affairs but always 
                                                 
479 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 43. 
480 Ruth Page, God and the Web of Creation (London: SCM Press, 1996), 52. 
481 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, 303. 
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allows for freedom, risk, adventure – and also suffering – on the part of the 
beloved’.482 Haught claims that the gracious, self-denying love of God is consistent 
with a world open to all the events in the physical dynamism of evolution. Therefore, 
Haught’s idea about natural selection can be seen to reduce God’s responsibility for 
natural evil without contradicting either science or Christian theology. 
In Daoism, natural selection is compatible with ziran. Zi literally means 
‘from…’ or ‘self-…’, and ran means ‘like this’, so Ziran is generally understood as 
‘spontaneity’, ‘nature’, ‘self-becoming’, or ‘being so of itself’ (Chapter 4:2). I think 
that the reason ziran is interpreted as both nature (noun) and self-becoming (gerund) 
is rooted in the Daoist understanding of nature. For Daoists, ‘nature’ is ‘becoming 
itself’ ‘spontaneously’. In other words, all things in the cosmos exist spontaneously 
(ziran), and they are becoming themselves (ziran). The best example of ziran is the 
operation of Dao. Dao not only created all creatures but also maintains them. Dao 
maintains and recreates all creatures spontaneously. According to the Daodejing, 
‘People model themselves on the earth. The earth models itself on Heaven. Heaven 
models itself on Dao. Dao models itself what is natural (ziran)’.483 For Laozi, people 
have to ultimately live according to what is natural, which means to comply with 
Dao. Spontaneity is the way that Dao works, and we cannot speak of Dao as having 
designs or as contriving in its operations. The Daodejing repeatedly says in chapters 
10 and 51 that ‘Dao produces without possession of things; it acts without relying on 
their ability; it leads without mastering’.484 In other words, Dao continuously creates 
and leads all creatures, but it does not rule them.  
In Daoism, natural evil is unimportant. According to Sung-peng Hsu, a modern 
interpreter of Laozi, there are no natural sufferings in Laozi’s view. Hsu says, ‘There 
cannot be any physical or mental pains in the universe where the assertive will is not 
operative. It means that all the sufferings in the world are supposedly man-made’.485 
Hsu does not mean that all natural phenomena, such as whirlwinds and earthquakes 
result in some way from human action. Such natural phenomena are not evils in the 
philosophy of Laozi. Laozi even accepts physical pain or anxieties as valuable, 
                                                 
482 Haught, Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation, 62-63. 
483 Daodejing, chap. 25. (人法地, 地法天, 天法道, 道法自然.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 175.  
484 Ibid., chap. 10, 51. (生而不有, 爲而不恃, 長而不宰.) 
485 Sung-peng Hsu, "Lao Tzu's Conception of Evil," Philosophy East and West 26, no. 3 (1976): 307. 
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saying: ‘What does it mean to revere calamity as you revere your own body? I can 
suffer calamity only because I have a body. When I no longer have a body, what 
calamity could I possibly have?’486 For Laozi, physical pain or anxieties are 
reasonable because we are embodied humans. Therefore, in Laozi, the pain and 
suffering that are part and parcel of the continuous creation of the cosmos are not 
themselves evils precisely because they are necessary aspects of the work of Dao, 
bringing the world into being naturally, or spontaneously. 
In the Zhuangzi, there are a number of sayings about natural evil, in contrast to 
the relatively few of the Daodejing (Chapter 5:2). The Zhuangzi connects the origin 
of death to Dao: ‘Dao is the origin of all things in the universe. Without Dao, 
everything will die; with Dao, everything will live’.487 In the Zhuangzi, life and death 
are both integral parts of the operation of Dao. The Zhuangzi’s understanding of life 
and death becomes clear as we read a conversation between Qin Shi and Laozi’s 
disciples in the book.  
When Laozi died, Qin Shi went to mourn for him, but after giving three 
cries, he left the room. ‘Weren’t you a friend of the Master?’ asked Laozi’s 
disciples. ‘Yes’. ‘And you think it’s all right to mourn him this way?’ ‘Yes’, 
said Qin Shi. ‘At first I took him for a real man, but now I know he wasn’t. 
A little while ago, when I went in to mourn, I found old men weeping for 
him as though they were weeping for a son, and young men weeping for 
him as though they were weeping for a mother. To have gathered a group 
like that, he must have done something to make them talk about him, though 
he didn’t ask them to talk or make them weep for him, though he didn’t ask 
them to weep. This is to hide from Heaven, turn your back on the true state 
of affairs, and forget what you were born with. In the old days, this was 
called the crime of hiding from Heaven. Your master happened to come 
because it was his time, and he happened to leave because things follow 
along. If you are content with the time and willing to follow along, then 
grief and joy have no way to enter. In the old days, this was called being 
freed from the bonds of God’.488 
                                                 
486 Daodejing, chap. 13. (何謂貴大患若身? 吾所以有大患者, 爲吾有身. 及吾無身, 吾有何患?) 
Ivanhoe and Norden, 168. 
487 Zhuangzi, chap. 31. (道者, 萬物之所由也, 庶物失之者死, 得之者生.) 
488 Ibid., chap. 3. (老聃死, 秦失弔之, 三號而出. 弟子曰, 非夫子之友邪? 曰, 然. 然則弔焉若此, 
可乎? 曰, 然. 始也吾以爲至人也, 而今非也. 向吾入而弔焉, 有老者哭之, 如哭其子. 少者哭之, 
如哭其母. 彼其所以會之, 必有不蘄言而言. 不蘄哭而哭者. 是遁天倍情, 忘其所受, 
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Through the mouth of Qin Shi, Zhuangzi emphasizes the virtue of a life adapted 
to the changes of nature and time. This life is the life beyond grief and joy. I maintain 
that on reflection, we can see that in the Zhuangzi, the pain, suffering and death 
caused by what we would today call natural selection is understood as the rule of 
nature. If a person understands this, then ‘grief and joy have no way to enter’. In 
short, Dao creates all creatures continuously and maintains them according to this 
rule. This rule is characterized by ziran. Because all natural evils arise out of the 
spontaneous work of Dao, they are not challenges that must be overcome for the 
Zhuangzi.  
 
Comparison and Generalisation 
Evolution through natural selection bears a greater similarity to Haught’s and the 
Zhuangzi’s ideas of creation than it does to the traditional Christian understanding of 
creation. In contrast to traditional Christian theism, which places an emphasis on the 
transcendence, or otherness of God, Haught and the Zhuangzi, while affirming divine 
transcendence, place more emphasis on divine immanence. This makes it easier to 
perceive the hidden workings of Ultimate Reality, given that we are less likely to be 
looking for external ‘signs’. The grace of God in Haught and the spontaneity of Dao 
for the Zhuangzi are both very different from divine command and direct 
intervention. For Haught and the Zhuangzi, God and Dao maintain and create all 
creatures continuously. This maintenance is partly described or explained as natural 
selection in evolutionary science, as the grace of God (letting the world be itself) in 
Haught, and as spontaneity (being so of itself) in the Zhuangzi.  
On the basis of this similarity, both the thought of Haught and that of the 
Zhuangzi can be utilised in order to express a theodicy accounting for natural evil 
caused by natural selection. In the evolutionary theology of Haught, God’s 
continuing creation is based on creation as ‘letting be’. Continuous creation would be 
less the consequence of God’s eternal ‘plan’ than of God’s humble and loving 
‘letting be’.489 Haught understands ‘Love by its very nature cannot compel, and so 
any God whose very essence is love should not be expected to overwhelm the world 
                                                 
古者謂之遁天之刑. 適來, 夫子時也, 適去, 夫子順也. 安時而處順, 哀樂不能入也, 
古者謂是帝之懸解.) Watson, 20–21.  
489 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 120. 
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either with a coercively directive “power” or an annihilating “presence”’.490 He 
thinks that his idea would be consonant with the Christian experience of God, ‘If 
God is essentially self-giving love, and if love in turn entails “letting the other 
be”’.491 If God permits natural selection as an expression of boundless grace and 
love, and if natural evil is inevitable during natural selection, then, we cannot blame 
God as the One orchestrating natural evil.  
Similarly, the Zhuangzi understands natural evil caused by natural selection as 
natural phenomena. Through an anecdote about Zhuangzi’s wife’s death, we can see 
how Zhuangzi accepts both life and death as two ends of the same spectrum.  
When she first died, do you think I didn’t grieve like anyone else? But I 
looked back to her beginning and the time before she was born. Not only the 
time before she was born, but the time before she had a body. Not only the 
time before she had a body, but the time before she had a spirit. In the midst 
of the jumble of wonder and mystery, a change took place and she had a 
spirit. Another change and she had a body. Another change and she was 
born. Now there’s been another change and she’s dead. It’s just like the 
progression of the four seasons: spring, summer, fall, winter’.492 
In this anecdote, Zhuangzi accepts human life and death in the same manner as 
the changing of the four seasons. Just as the progression of the four seasons is 
natural, life and death are also natural. And both are inevitable. Although Zhuangzi 
grieved like anyone else when his wife first died, he became free from sorrow after 
thinking of the principle of life and death.  
If we accept natural selection as the grace of God (letting the world be itself) 
like in Haught or spontaneity (being so of itself) like in the Zhuangzi, the problem of 
evil caused by natural selection is less of a challenge to the traditional attributes of 
God and Dao, and the explanation can exempt God and Dao of responsibility with 
regard to natural evil.  
                                                 
490 Ibid. 
491 John F. Haught, "Evolution, Tragedy, and Hope," in Science and Theology: The New Consonance, 
ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 234. 
492 Zhuangzi, chap. 18. (是其始死也, 我獨何能无槪然! 察其始, 而本无生. 非徒无生也, 而本无形. 
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是相與爲春秋冬夏四時行也.) Watson, 140–141. 
 166 
Here, I believe that we can generalise the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and 
the Daoist philosophy in the Zhuangzi regarding natural evil as the ‘natural state 
defence’. The ‘natural state defence’ means that the idea of natural selection in 
evolutionary biology can be harmonized with Haught’s idea of grace and the 
Zhuangzi’s idea of spontaneity. This idea is similar to Polkinghorne’s ‘free-process 
defence’, that ‘all of created nature is allowed to be itself according to its kind, just 
as human beings are allowed to be according to our kind’.493 According to this 
argument, for example, genes may mutate and cause cancer during multiplication and 
their overall process of evolution. For Polkinghorne, God permits the physical world 
to become itself in that ‘independence which is Love’s gift of freedom to the one 
beloved’.494 If Polkinghorne’s free-process defence focuses on each kind’s ‘self-
becoming’, my natural state defence emphasizes that those kinds of becoming are 
‘natural’ states of affairs. To embrace Daoist philosophy, I think that the term 
‘natural (ziran)’ is preferable to ‘free’ because the latter may connote or imply wilful 
action.  
In short, as implied by the natural state defence, God for Haught and Dao in the 
Zhuangzi both create the world continuously, not ruling from without, but letting the 
world be itself. In Haught and the Zhuangzi, because God and Dao give boundless 
freedom to all creatures, natural evil derived from natural selection is a part of the 
natural process, and therefore, natural evil is not a big conundrum to be overcome in 
either thinker.  
 
Differentiation and Supplementation 
One of the important differences between the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and 
the Daoist philosophy of the Zhuangzi regarding natural evil is the way one should 
address pain and suffering. Both thinkers understand natural evil as a feature of 
natural processes, and therefore, natural evil as less of a challenge. Nevertheless, 
creatures still experience actual pain and suffering from this natural process, and this 
is an escapable fact that has to be dealt with by a holistic theodicy.  
                                                 
493 Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion, 143; Polkinghorne, 
"Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker," in God and the Scientist: Exploring the Work of John 
Polkinghorne, 9. 
494 Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God's Interaction with the World, 77. 
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One solution of many theologians is to defer an explanation to an eschatological 
future. Evolutionary theologians such as Denis Edwards, Colin Gunton, Jürgen 
Moltmann, Ted Peters, John Polkinghorne and Robert Russell connect creatures’ 
pain and suffering to an eschatological vision. Gunton says, ‘Creation is a project. As 
created, it is perfect, because it is God’s project. But it is not perfect in the sense of 
being complete. It has somewhere to go’.495 Russell says, ‘[Jesus’] Resurrection 
signals the beginning of the transformation of the universe into the New Creation, 
our eschatological hope’.496 Like these theologians, Haught tries to understand that 
pain and suffering can lead to something higher and can frame the whole of nature 
within the scheme of the hope of the resurrection, of new life.497 He argues that the 
most effective way to conquer evil is to trust in the future and the ultimate value of 
our lives within this universe. Haught says, ‘[O]nly a passionate conviction that the 
whole cosmic journey is leading somewhere important will adequately energize our 
ethical lives to work toward the good’.498 It should be said here that these 
explanations may mean a great deal to creatures like us who suffer, but these 
concepts are based on a far-off and unidentified future. This is treated in more detail 
in Chapter 8, ‘New Creation and the Theodicy of the Metaphysical Future’. 
On the other hand, the redemption of present pain and suffering is not delayed 
to the future in Daoism. Daoists accept pain and suffering as ming. As I explained in 
Chapter 5:1 in detail, ming literally means fate or destiny. For Laozi, returning to 
each one’s root is returning to ming, and the returning of all things to ming is itself 
eternal. Laozi says: 
Attain extreme tenuousness; preserve quiet integrity. The myriad creatures 
are all in motion! I watch as they turn back. The teeming multitude of 
things, each returns home to its root; and returning to one’s root is called 
stillness. This is known as returning to one’s destiny [ming]; and returning 
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to one’s destiny is called ‘enlightenment’. … To embody Dao is to be long 
lived, and one will avoid danger to the end of one’s days.499  
Laozi understands that returning to each one’s root is returning to ming. For 
Laozi, death is to return to human origins, to become a part of nature as we always 
were, and to accept the operation of Dao and ming.  
Zhuangzi also understands natural evil as ming. Zhuangzi says ‘Life, death, 
preservation, loss, failure, success, poverty, riches, worthiness, unworthiness, 
slander, fame, hunger, thirst, cold, heat – these are the alternations of the world, the 
workings of fate [ming]’.500 Natural evils are caused by the alternations of the world 
and are the workings of ming, so people have no power to control them as such. He 
says, ‘Life and death are ming just like the eternal succession of day and night – a 
natural course of events. Humans do not have the power to control it: this is true of 
everything in the world’.501 Because people cannot control natural evil, they should 
be content with it, and that is the way of becoming a man of virtue. As Zhuangzi 
states, ‘To know what you can’t do anything about and to be content with it as you 
would with fate [ming] – only a man of virtue can do that’.502 
In short, for the Zhuangzi, pain and suffering are beyond humanity’s control, so 
humans must accept them as ming. Even though ziran and ming connote the opposite 
meaning, both are good terms to understand natural evil or pain and suffering in 
Daoism. Ziran is connected to Dao because Dao is, as it were, the principle of all 
other principles in the world. Ming is related to Heaven (tian) because ming is to 
follow the order of Heaven. I propose to use ziran to understand natural evil, and 
ming to accept practical pain and suffering that occur in virtue of natural evil. 
The eschatological vision of Haught may offer meaning for and in present pain 
and suffering, but it suggests that the present is only important in the light of the 
future. In other words, present pain and suffering cannot be addressed satisfactorily 
in the here and now in which we suffer. On the other hand, Zhuangzi tries to 
understand present pain and suffering as ming. Even though this idea of ming, or fate, 
                                                 
499 Daodejing, chap. 16. (致虛極, 守靜篤. 萬物竝作, 吾觀 其復. 夫物芸芸, 各復歸其根. 歸根曰靜, 
是謂復命, 復命曰常 … 道乃久.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 170.  
500 Zhuangzi, chap. 5. (死生存亡, 窮達貧富, 賢與不肖, 毁譽飢渴寒暑, 是事之變, 命之行也.) 
Watson, 39.  
501 Ibid., chap. 6. (死生命也, 其有夜旦之常, 天也. 人之有所不得與, 皆物之情也.) 
502 Ibid., chap. 5. (知不可奈何, 而安之若命, 唯有德者能之.) Watson, 36.  
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sounds like pessimism, it has actually been a practical way for Daoists to overcome 
pain and suffering in the present, as experienced.  
Christian parallels to ming may be found in the familiar phrases ‘God’s will’ or 
‘God’s mandate’. How can the concept of ming supplement evolutionary theodicy? 
In Christian theodicy, accepting God’s will is often one of the central themes, as 
implied by the biblical book of Job,503 but theologians have tried to find more 
specific reasons to prove the righteousness of God, that is, to vindicate God’s 
goodness despite the evil and suffering experienced by so many in the world. When 
Christian theologians accept pain and suffering as God’s will, they inquire further 
about the nature of God’s will. Zhuangzi, on the other hand, does not seem to need to 
ask when or whether something is Heaven’s will, but he accepts fate as a given, or 
brute fact without need of further investigation or justification. For example, 
Zhuangzi says, ‘Heaven covers all without partiality; earth bears up all without 
partiality – heaven and earth surely wouldn’t single me out to make me poor. I try to 
discover who is doing it, but I can’t get the answer. Still, here I am – at the very 
extreme. It must be ming’,504 and also says, ‘I was born on the dry land and felt safe 
on the dry land – that was what I was used to. I grew up with the water and felt safe 
in the water – that was my nature. I don’t know why I do what I do – that’s ming’.505  
These approaches to grace and fate respectively are rooted in the difference in 
the understandings of Ultimate Reality of Christianity and Daoism. I suggest that the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught needs focus to help Christians accept pain and 
suffering in the present, rather than encouraging them to focus on finding the 
                                                 
503 The book of Job (38–42) approaches the problem of evil and suffering with an emphasis on the 
extremely limited understanding that we human beings can possess about God’s work and plan for 
creation. As Edwards expounds one of three points to comprehend nature’s cruelty in light of 
Christian revelation, we do not know about what the God of Job 38–42 thinks with respect to our 
place in the cosmos and what the outcome of His work of creation and the new creation will be. 
Because of our limited perspective and the necessarily parochial character of our knowledge, we 
cannot see the full picture of God’s intentions and plan. [Edwards, 36-37.] The human being, as only 
one creature in the vastness of the cosmos, despite its privileged place as the image of God, cannot 
fully understand the Creator’s will. A similar sentiment is expressed bys the writer of Ecclesiastes: 
‘He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set eternity in the hearts of men; yet they 
cannot fathom what God has done from beginning to end’ (Eccl. 3:11). 
504 Zhuangzi, chap. 6. (天無私覆, 地無私載. 天地豈私貧我哉? 求其爲之者而不得也. 然而至此極
者, 命也夫!) Watson, 54.  
505 Ibid., chap. 19. (吾生於陵而安於陵, 故也. 長於水而安於水, 性也. 不知吾所以然而然, 命也.) 
Watson, 152.  
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meaning of pain and suffering in the future.506 I also suggest that the relationship 
between ziran (being so of itself) and ming (Heaven’s will) in the Zhuangzi will help 
us to revisit and re-imagine the relationship between natural selection (the process of 
nature) and God’s will in Christianity.  
Let us go deeper in our analysis of the Daoist worldview as expounded in the 
Zhuangzi. In Daoism, the terms of good and evil are used in a ‘descriptive’ sense 
rather than in an ‘evaluative’ sense as in Christianity.507 In classical Daoist 
philosophy, good and evil are terms to describe things or phenomena rather than to 
evaluate them. Because it does not speak of valuation, there is no cognitive 
preference between good and evil, although we must understand that the Zhuangzi 
deals in exaggeration as we see in its literary style and of the manner in which it 
relates stories. According to the Zhuangzi, deciding upon a good action to be 
performed because it is good morally or has the sanction of society is regarded as a 
wilful or contrived action, which is contrary to spontaneity. The Zhuangzi says: 
The boundary between things is actually the boundary between specific 
things. A boundary without a boundary means that no boundary is an 
absolute boundary. People talk about fullness and emptiness, and decline 
and decay. Dao makes things full or empty, but it is not full or empty. Dao 
makes things on the decline and decay, but it is not on the decline and 
decay.508 
For the Zhuangzi, there is no absolute boundary. Because there is no absolute 
boundary between good and evil, the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are relative words that 
describe phenomena, and are not evaluative words, pointing to an objective, supra-
conscious moral reality. It even claims that ‘To be without partisanship is already a 
                                                 
506 Wildman’s ground-of-being theism can assist the understanding of pain and suffering in the present 
as ming: ‘To acknowledge the ground of our being in these terms is to accept suffering as our fate and 
the fate of all creatures, and also to do what we will with these circumstances, whether that means 
sitting idly by or launching into the world with banners waving and guns blazing’. [Wildman,  in 
Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Evil in Nature, 294.] 
507 The utterances, ‘This grape is sweet’ or ‘This grape is large and blue’, are two possible examples 
of the descriptive sense. Obviously, the utterance, ‘This is a good grape’ is one instance of the 
evaluative sense. For more information and debates about descriptive/evaluative senses of words see: 
W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), chap. 5 and 6; R. 
M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). 
508 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. (而物有際者, 所謂物際者也. 不際之際, 際之不際者也. 謂盈虛衰殺, 彼爲
盈虛非盈虛, 彼爲衰殺非衰殺.) Wang Rongpei, 375.  
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kind of partisanship’.509 This is analogous to the concept of wuwei in that one cannot 
try to be spontaneous, or act without acting. For Daoism, people should at the very 
least refrain from engaging in wilful actions on the basis of a moral or social 
evaluation. People should stop performing wilful actions that accompany evaluation. 
Laozi suggests that people should discard ‘humanity (jen, 仁)’ and ‘righteousness (li, 
義)’510 (the highest values in Confucianism), because they have an evaluative sense 
and contribute to contrived action. There is a famous dialogue conveyed by Zhuangzi 
between himself and Confucius in the Zhuangzi itself, in which Zhuangzi accuses 
Confucius of manifesting egocentricity in his very attempt to dispel it through a 
consciousness and wilful effort to be loving and generous.511 
If judgment about good and evil is suspended, we cannot, strictly speaking, ask 
‘why’ present evils come about, for such a question betrays normative bias and 
evaluative preferences based on an underlying notion of purpose and direction of 
nature as it pertains to my own self. Therefore, if evolutionary theodicy pays 
attention to the descriptive senses of good and evil, the term ‘natural evil’ itself may 
be discarded. This understanding is indirectly connected with the ‘dark side’ in 
evolutionary theodicy, and I will discuss this view in detail in Chapter 7:3.  
In this section, I tried to develop the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi focusing on natural evil. In Haught and the Zhuangzi, 
God and Dao created and are creating all creatures continuously according to the 
processes of nature without direct intervention. Based on the same understanding, I 
generalised it as the ‘natural state defence’. The defence consists in the claim that 
natural evil derived from natural selection is a necessary aspect of the endowment of 
                                                 
509 Ibid., chap. 13. (無私焉乃私也.) Watson, 104.  
510 Daodejing, chap. 19. (絶聖棄智, 民利百倍. 絶仁棄義, 民復孝慈.) 
511 Zhuangzi, chap. 13. ‘Lao Dan said, “May I ask your definition of benevolence and righteousness?” 
Confucius said, “To be glad and joyful in mind, to embrace universal love and be without partisanship 
– this is the true form of benevolence and righteousness”. Lao Dan said, “Hmm – close – except for 
the last part. ‘Universal love’ – that’s a rather nebulous ideal, isn’t it? And to be without partisanship 
is already a kind of partisanship. Do you want to keep the world from losing its simplicity? Heaven 
and earth hold fast to their constant ways, the sun and moon to their brightness, the stars and planets to 
their ranks, the birds and beasts to their flocks, the trees and shrubs to their stands. You have only to 
go along with Virtue in your actions, to follow Dao in your journey, and already you will be there. 
Why these flags of benevolence and righteousness so bravely upraised, as though you were beating a 
drum and searching for a lost child? Ah, you will bring confusion to the nature of man!”’ (Watson, 
104).  
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boundless freedom to all creatures on the part of Dao and God in both philosophies. 
Natural evil, therefore, no longer presents itself as ubiquitous. 
I expounded the differences between Haught and Zhuangzi when it comes to 
their approach to actual pain and suffering. First, Haught understands that pain and 
suffering can lead to something higher and can frame all creation within the scheme 
of the hope for new creation. On the other hand, the redemption of present pain and 
suffering is not deferred to the future in the Zhuangzi, accepting pain and suffering as 
fate (ming). Second, in the Zhuangzi, good and evil are used in a ‘descriptive’ sense 
rather than in an ‘evaluative’ sense as in Christianity, and thus judgment about good 
and evil is suspended in the Zhuangzi. These differences can, indeed, supplement the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught: the Zhuangzi’s ideas here can be used to modify 
Haught’s thinking to render it able to accept pain and suffering in the present and for 
the present. Next, the evolutionary theodicy of Haught can instead focus on the 
descriptive sense when discussing good and evil when supplemented with the 
alternative perspective that the Zhuangzi provides.  
 
(3) The Free Action Defence: Free Will and Wuwei (無爲, non-action) 
Description 
Moral evil generally refers to humans’ wrongdoing or bad behaviour and the pain 
and suffering that come from it. Traditional Christian theologians have explained 
moral evil as the distortion of the free will that God gave human beings in the 
beginning. This, Richard Swinburne relates, is based on the idea that ‘He [God] 
cannot give us very serious free will, i.e. the free will to choose between good and 
wrong, without the natural possibility (unprevented by God) that we will do 
wrong’.512  
The reason that is traditionally given in Christianity as to why people choose to 
do wrong is closely related to Adam and ‘original sin’. St. Paul says, ‘Therefore, just 
as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way 
death came to all men, because all sinned’ (Rom. 5:12). Mark Harris claims that 
Augustine misunderstood this text that Adam’s sin passed down from generation to 
                                                 
512 Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
133. 
 173 
generation based on a faulty Latin translation,513 and this misinterpretation has been 
handed down to us as the doctrine of ‘original sin’. Nevertheless, causal connection 
between present human death and Adam’s original violation of the Law of God still 
remains a live issue of debate.  
The existence of the historical Adam and the hereditary transmission of original 
sin seem to fly in the face of evolutionary science. Conservatives and traditionalists 
such as Stephen Lloyd,514 Henri Blocher,515 J. H. Morrison,516 and C. J. Collins517 
require the historical Adam, but many evolutionary theologians such as John 
Walton,518 Patricia Williams,519 and Mark Harris520 refer to Adam as an ‘archetype’ 
or a ‘symbol’. Actually, except for Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15, the Bible is 
largely indifferent to the historical Adam.  
Still, even according to some evolutionary theologians, human free will is 
inclined to immoral behaviour because of the doctrine of the Fall. In other words, 
human nature prefers what is evil to what is good because of an inherited corruption 
of the will manifested in a tendency to sin. Other evolutionary theologians 
understand the doctrine of original sin in relation to entropy. Because entropy draws 
all things into a state of dilapidation and deterioration, it seems to correlate to 
original sin, given that in the Bible, God is the great unifying force whereas evil, sin, 
or the diabolical is the great dividing force (διάβολος comes from the Late Greek 
diaballein, which means to ‘throw across’ or ‘cast apart’, from dia- ‘across, through’ 
and ballein ‘to throw’). David Bradnick claims, ‘Both describe the “fallen” state of 
creation, the unceasing tug of a “mysterious power” towards despair, and the 
                                                 
513 Harris, The Nature of Creation: Examining the Bible and Science, 140. 
514 Stephen Lloyd, "Christian Theology and Neo-Darwinism Are Incompatible: An Argument from 
the Resurrection," in Debating Darwin. Two Debates: Is Darwinism True and Does It Matter?, ed. 
Graeme Finlay et al. (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), 5. 
515 Henri Blocher, "The Theology of the Fall and the Origins of Evil," in Darwin, Creation and the 
Fall: Theological Challenges, ed. R. J. Berry and Thomas A. Noble (Nottingham: Apollos, 2009). 
516 J. H. Morrison, "Physical Indeterminacy and Human Free Will," Expository times  (1934). 
517 C. John Collins, Did Adam and Eve Really Exist? Who They Were and Why You Should Care 
(Nottingham: IVP, 2011), 130. 
518 John H. Walton, "Human Origins and the Bible," Zygon 47, no. 4 (2012): 880. 
519 Patricia A. Williams, Doing without Adam and Eve: Sociobiology and Original Sin (Minneapolis, 
Minn.: Fortress Press, 2001). 
520 Harris, The Nature of Creation: Examining the Bible and Science, 142. 
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inability of creation to pull itself out of this destructive grip’.521 In evolutionary 
theology, creatures incline towards degeneration, and therefore, human action which 
utilises free will does not tend to produce morally good outcomes in the world 
overall. 
As I explained in Chapter 3:2 ‘Haught on Evil’, Haught thinks that evolutionary 
science is irreconcilable with a literal reading of the traditional story of Adam and 
Eve. He instead focuses on the inner meaning of the story, and understands it as 
humans’ turning away from God in virtue of their free will. For Haught, the notion of 
original sin is still relevant for reminding us not only of our estrangement from our 
Origin, but also of our incapacity to save ourselves from this state of a natural 
tendency to sin.522 The story helps us to realize that only God can rescue us, and so 
the need for a saviour is in no way diminished in Haught’s evolutionary theology. In 
Haught’s evolutionary theodicy, moral evil comes from humans’ turning away from 
God, and it is the human refusal to take an appropriate place in the ongoing creation 
of the universe in a scientific sense (Chapter 3:2). Thus, this explanation is not in 
conflict with either traditional Christian doctrine or evolutionary science.  
For Daoist philosophy, discussing the origin of evil is misguided. Daoists do not 
distinguish between good and evil, and act of naming things or persons as evil is 
denounced by them (Chapter 5:1). We can, however, identify moral evil in Daoism 
by an indirect method of locating the opposite of the so-called ‘good’ or ‘virtue’ that 
Daoists pursue. Wuwei is an important concept for understanding moral evil in 
Daoism. Wuwei means ‘non-action’, ‘non-striving’, ‘not doing’, ‘absence of doing’, 
‘acting spontaneously’, or ‘flowing with the moment’ (Chapter 4:2). In other words, 
wuwei means letting nature take its own course. As Laozi says, ‘This is why sages 
abide in the business of nonaction, and practice the teaching that is without 
words’.523 It does not mean doing nothing and saying nothing, but means doing all 
things according to the course of nature. Laozi also says, ‘Those who would gain the 
world and do something with it, I see that they will fail. For the world is a spiritual 
vessel and one cannot put it to use. Those who use it ruin it. Those who grab hold of 
                                                 
521 Bradnick,  74. 
522 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 81. 
523 Daodejing, chap. 2. (是以聖人處無爲之事, 行不言之敎.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 164.  
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it lose it’.524 We can see here that Laozi regards wilful or self-conscious action as at 
least counter-productive, and at worst, calamitous in virtue of the fact that it will 
likely eventually bring about not only failure, but also ruin or loss.  
Similarly, wuwei is one of the most important values of life in the Zhuangzi: ‘If 
you rest in non-action, things will transform themselves’.525 Without wilful or 
conscious action, the world goes on unimpeded. The same applies to the running of a 
country: ‘The sovereign of dark antiquity ruled the world through inaction, through 
Heavenly Virtue and nothing more’.526 According to the Zhuangzi, discrimination, 
wisdom and desire did not exist in the age of perfect virtue. What did exist, however, 
was a tabula rasa as far as human beings are concerned, an uncarved simplicity:  
In this age of Perfect Virtue, men live the same as birds and beasts, group 
themselves side by side with the ten thousand things. Who then knows 
anything about [the exemplary person] or [the nasty person]? Dull and 
unwitting, men have no wisdom; thus their Virtue does not depart from 
them. Dull and unwitting, they have no desire; this is called uncarved 
simplicity. In uncarved simplicity, the people attain their true nature.527 
In the philosophy of the Zhuangzi, wilful actions break the natural harmony that 
is normally present in the world. If the harmony of the world is thus violated, Dao 
and Virtue (de) will disappear. The Zhuangzi even says, ‘Grief and joy are 
perversions of Virtue; pleasure and anger are violations of Dao; like and hate are 
offenses against Virtue’.528 Thus we can infer from the Zhuangzi that wilful actions 
on the part of human beings are unnatural and they are the origin of moral evil.  
 
Comparison and Generalisation 
Human free will in the evolutionary theology of Haught and wuwei in the Zhuangzi 
have some similarities in explaining moral evil.  
                                                 
524 Ibid., chap. 29. (將欲取天下而爲之, 吾見其不得已. 天下神器, 不可爲也. 爲者敗之, 執者失之.) 
Ivanhoe and Norden, 177.  
525 Zhuangzi, chap. 11. (汝徒處無爲, 而物自化.)  
526 Ibid., chap. 12. (玄古之君天下, 無爲也, 天德而已矣.) Watson, 84. 
527 Ibid., chap. 9. (夫至德之世, 同與禽獸居, 族與萬物竝, 惡乎知君子小人哉! 同乎無知, 
其德不離. 同乎無欲, 是謂素樸. 素樸而民性得矣.) Watson, 66.  
528 Ibid., chap. 15. (悲樂者德之邪. 喜怒者道之過. 好惡者德之失.) 
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First, both free will and non-action attribute the blame for moral evil to human 
action. For Haught, moral evil comes from human free will regardless of how we 
might understand or apply the doctrine of original sin. Recall that Haught believes 
that sin or moral evil should be regarded as the consequence of the voluntary 
submission on the part of human beings to the past state of the world, rejecting 
participation in the ongoing creation of the world (Chapter 3:2). In the Zhuangzi, 
moral evil originates from unnatural or wilful human action. As such, Zhuangzi 
recommends that we should not allow ourselves not to be gripped by fleeting 
emotions or feelings: 
Joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, 
wilfulness, candor, insolence – music from empty holes, mushrooms 
springing up in dampness, day and night replacing each other before us, and 
no one knows where they sprout from. Let it be! Let it be! [It is enough that] 
morning and evening we have them, and they are the means by which we 
live. Without them, we would not exist; without us, they would have 
nothing to take hold of.529 
The phrase ‘Let it be’ sums up the notion of wuwei quite well. That wilful 
action causes evil is clearly revealed in the last story of the Inner Chapters about 
Hundun (chaos) and his friends. In the story, when Hundun’s friends bored seven 
holes into him in their kindness, Hundun died (Chapter 5:2). We can see here that 
wilful actions, even if borne from good intentions, can bring about calamity. To put it 
as Zhuangzi would, how much better to leave nature well alone!  
Second, both free will and wuwei are best defined as capacities for spontaneous 
action, though wuwei is also used a verb (to do something without conscious effort, 
such as breathing) and an adjective describing action. Both capacities of free will and 
wuwei can work well when they are not distorted. Both are one of the best gifts of 
human nature, and humans can cultivate a bond with God or Dao through free will or 
non-action. In the evolutionary theodicy of Haught, humans’ turning away from God 
distorts human free will, that is, refusing the novelty of creation corrupts the freedom 
of the will. 
                                                 
529 Ibid., chap. 2. (喜怒哀樂, 慮嘆變慹, 姚佚啓態. 樂出虛, 蒸成菌. 日夜相代乎前, 而莫知其所萌. 
已乎已乎! 旦暮得此, 其所由以生乎! 非彼無我, 非我無所取.) Watson, 8. 
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In the Zhuangzi, non-action does not mean ‘doing nothing’ but ‘following one’s 
nature’. Admittedly, here we cannot avoid a logical contradiction, but the non-action 
of Heaven and earth creates and maintain all things in the world.  
The inaction (wuwei) of Heaven is its purity, the inaction of earth is its 
peace. So the two inactions combine, and all things are transformed and 
brought to birth. Wonderfully, mysteriously, there is no place they come out 
of. Mysteriously, wonderfully, they have no sign. Each thing minds its 
business, and all grow up out of inaction.530 
All things emerge from non-action, as a poet must first rest in quiet 
contemplation to be able to be inspired for the writing of verses. For the Zhuangzi, it 
is not possible for evil to result from non-action. Evils arise from human wilful 
action, and human action is perverted when humans will, or decide upon doing 
something, intentionally. Therefore, without distortion, free will and wuwei for 
Haught and Zhuangzi respectively are good in virtue of retaining their naturalness, as 
capacities for spontaneous action.  
Traditional Christian theodicy explains moral evil and attempts to reconcile 
God’s existence with it on the basis of the ‘free will defence’. The free will defence 
usually claims that moral evil emanates from the action emanating from the free will 
of human beings. For example, John Hick says, ‘It seems to me that once you ask 
God to intervene to prevent some specific evil you are in principle asking [God] to 
rescind our human freedom and responsibility’.531 Evolutionary theologians, 
including Haught, do not seem to be much different from traditional Christian 
theologians in explaining moral evil, even though they usually do not understand the 
historical Fall literally, unlike some traditional theologians. 
Based on the similarities between the ideas of Haught and Zhuangzi about 
moral evil, I would like to generalise them as the ‘free action defence’. The ‘free 
action defence’ comprises the explanation that moral evil arises from humans’ 
distorted free will in the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and from the violation of 
non-action in the Zhuangzi. Therefore, in both Haught and Zhuangzi, evil can be 
                                                 
530 Ibid., chap. 18. (天無爲以之淸, 地無爲以之寧. 故兩無爲相合, 萬物皆化生. 芒乎芴乎, 
而無從出乎! 芴乎芒乎, 而無有象乎! 萬物職職, 皆從無爲殖.) Watson, 140. 
531 John Hick, "An Irenaean Theodicy," in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Stephen 
T. Davis (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark Ltd., 1981), 70. 
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located not in God or Dao, but in the free action of human beings. As such, the 
problem of moral evil can be expounded without laying the blame on God and Dao.  
Here it is absolutely crucial to distinguish between responsibility and 
blameworthiness. In creating and sustaining the world, including and especially 
human beings who are capable of doing evil, God, we can see, is in fact responsible 
for evil. God is the origin of the possibility for evil to come into existence in the 
world through human action, because of His creating human beings. That said, is 
God blameworthy? To be blameworthy is to be morally culpable, that is, to be guilty 
of malicious intent. To borrow from the ‘good father analogy’ in theology, just as a 
father does not intend his child to undergo the inevitable suffering that occurs in life, 
we might say that God in this case does not create human beings with the intention 
that they do evil and create suffering in the world. God, as it were, does not have 
malicious intent.  
 
Differentiation and Supplementation 
Free will in the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and wuwei in the Zhuangzi do have 
some differences.  
First, free will in Haught can bring about moral evil when it is distorted. 
Regardless of our acceptance that human free will is affected by original sin, it is 
absolutely obvious that not all free action does bring about evil. There are many 
decisions that we can make regarding the good and the morally wrong, and we 
generally presuppose that those decisions are free decisions. 
In contrast, all human action emanating from the free will, that is, self-conscious 
action, causes moral evil in the Zhuangzi. Because all intentional actions bring about 
evil, humans should rest in and rely on non-action (wuwei). That humans rest in non-
action does not mean that all things remain undone, or that nothing happens at all. 
According to the Zhuangzi, ‘All things in the world grow up out of non-action. So, as 
the saying is, the Heaven and the earth do nothing, and there is nothing that is not 
done’.532 
                                                 
532 Zhuangzi, chap. 18. (萬物職職, 皆從無爲殖. 故曰, 天地無爲也, 而無不爲也.)  
 179 
Second and more importantly, the understanding of human nature is different in 
the two thinkers. Haught does not accept a literal meaning of original sin, but he 
accepts its underlying meaning of humans’ audacious disregard for their creative 
mission in the world. Haught claims that there is the accumulated history of the ‘Fall’ 
of human beings in a backward movement toward disunity from their distorted free 
will (Chapter 3:2). For him, human nature tends towards refusing to join in God’s 
continuous creation.  
In contrast to this, in Daoism, human nature tends toward good and spontaneous 
action always brings about good behaviour. Wuwei generally means not to wilfully or 
consciously act, or act upon pre-conceived intentions that might be used to 
retroactively justify actions. Wuwei, therefore is genuinely spontaneous or effortless 
action. Hans Küng explains the importance of non-action:  
It is only when the human person, in ‘emptiness’ and freed of passions and 
desires, allows the Tao to rule his or her life; only when he or she lets 
himself or herself be filled by the Tao and quietly abides in purposeless 
action or ‘doing nothing’ (wuwei) – only then will he or she attain unity 
with the Tao.533  
Küng regards non-action as the way (or non-way) to unify oneself (or be 
unified) with Dao, but a certain paradox should be pointed out, which is the notion of 
attainment by non-action. By ‘attain’, Küng certainly does not mean ‘consciously 
achieve’, but rather enter into a new mode of consciousness. In Christianity, it is 
impossible for people to become one with God solely by their free will or effort 
alone. Theosis or deification is only possible with the help of God’s grace. This 
difference comes from different understandings of human nature between 
Christianity and Daoism.  
These differences between Haught and Zhuangzi can provide valuable insights 
into the evolutionary theodicy of Haught. Based on the Daoist philosophy of 
Zhuangzi concerning human nature, we can raise these questions: why was human 
nature created to be inclined to moral evil in Christianity? Why do only humans, 
among all creatures, violate the rules of nature and create evil?  
                                                 
533 Küng and Ching, 171. 
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The Daoist conception of human nature could lead theologians to conclude that 
human free will can itself be a part of the ‘very good’ (Gen.1:31) creation of God, 
and that therefore we cannot regard any particular action emerging from the use of 
free will as unnatural or evil, analogous to the fact that animals are neither morally 
upright nor morally deviant for their particular diets. The ‘very good’ creation that 
Genesis speaks of is, in virtue of God’s omnibenevolence and omniscience, good in 
the sense of suitability or aptness, as a design or tool is apt for the intended purpose 
or plan. It is also good in the moral sense because God, as the Good, cannot be, do or 
conceive anything that is the privation of the good. Therefore, to use scholastic 
language, creation is imbued with the ‘transcendental’ of the good, leading, as it 
were to its source, the Good itself – God. Creation, just like its source, then, is 
perfect, but we should not understand perfection here as ‘complete’.534  
If the evolutionary theodicy of Haught concentrates on God’s good creation 
more than humans’ tendency to sin, human free will may not be the origin of moral 
evil and it may have a meaning similar to spontaneous action (non-action) in the 
Zhuangzi. It is present as a self-developing process in the cosmos, just as a tree 
grows a branch. In other words, it is incorrect to label humans’ selfishness and 
aggression as ‘sin’, since these arise from their evolutionary heritage, and as such 
were created that way. Looking further ahead, the term ‘moral evil’ itself may, from 
this perspective, be discarded. Surely, though – and no doubt the reader will have 
formulated this objection already – grotesque and deeply disturbing moral evils such 
as rape and child abuse on the level of particular actions and the Holocaust on the 
level of events somehow defy this ‘levelling out’ of moral categories, somehow 
reach out to us as unacceptable occurrences. No doubt the worst sorts of moral evils 
need further discussion.  
In this section, I examined the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist 
philosophy of Zhuangzi with respect to moral evil. Moral evil emerges from the 
distorted free will of human beings in the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and from 
the violation of non-action (wuwei) in the Zhuangzi. Moreover, both free will in 
Haught and non-action in the Zhuangzi are good capacities when they are not 
                                                 
534 We can think of many examples in which incompleteness is essential to the perfection of a thing in 
art and relationships. There is a sense that an incomplete knowledge about a person, or the mysterious 
ending of a novel that keeps people thinking, can be that which makes something valuable or 
memorable.  
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distorted by a turning away from novelty or self-conscious contriving. I generalised 
these similar ideas as the ‘free action defence’, which claims that moral evil can be 
identified and explained without attributing responsibility for it to God and Dao in 
both philosophies respectively.  
However, I claimed that the understanding of moral evil is different in both 
Haught and Zhuangzi, and these differences can supplement the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught. First, free will in Haught can bring about moral evil when it is 
distorted, but freedom of the will manifest in self-conscious action brings about 
moral evil in the Zhuangzi. Second, in the evolutionary theology of Haught, human 
nature inclines to what is evil rather than what is good because of human’s inherited 
corrupt tendency to sin, but in the Zhuangzi, spontaneous action always brings about 
good behaviour. If the evolutionary theodicy of Haught can focus more on God’s 
good creation than humans’ tendency to sin, human free will will no longer be 
thought of as the origin of moral evil and instead be thought of as something similar 
to the capacity of spontaneous action (non-action) in the Zhuangzi. If this happens, 




Continuous Creation and the Theodicy of Harmony 
 
Along with creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing), creatio continua (continuous 
creation) is an important term in Christian theology. If creatio ex nihilo reveals 
God’s transcendence with respect to the world, creatio continua expresses God’s 
immanence in the world in an actively creative sense.535 The notion of continuous 
creation is not a prominent theme either the Bible or traditional Christian theology. 
Some notable theologians, such as Aquinas and Schleiermacher, understood 
continuous creation as God’s supporting and preserving the world. However, when 
evolutionary biology found new forms of organisms that were previously not known 
to not exist, the term ‘continuous creation’ started to be frequently used in the 
conversation between theology and science. Peacocke emphasises this: ‘Any notion 
of God as Creator must now take into account, that God is continuously creating, 
continuously giving existence to, what is new; that God is semper Creator; that the 
world is a creatio continua’.536 Haught understands that an instantaneously complete 
creation would be ‘a frozen universe, one without a future and one incapable of 
supporting life’,537 and claims that temporal duration is an intrinsic aspect of creation 
that originates life.  
Even though evolutionary theologians offer very different interpretations of 
creatio continua, many of them understand God’s continuous creation as compatible 
with evolution and that natural selection is an important way of interpreting 
continuous creation. As David Fergusson explains, ‘[T]he apparently free movement 
of natural forms is consonant with a God who is present and active within the 
creative process, in a manner analogous to God’s same involvement with human 
history’.538 Developments in evolutionary science can help theologians to understand 
God’s continuous creation more fully. Haught thinks that evolutionary biology is a 
great gift for us to understand and develop the idea of continuous creation more 
fully: ‘[O]ne of the great gifts of post-Darwinian thought is that it makes the notion 
                                                 
535 Harris, The Nature of Creation: Examining the Bible and Science, 114. 
536 Peacocke, "The Cost of New Life," in The Work of Love, 23. 
537 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 51. 
538 Fergusson, "Darwin and Providence," in Theology after Darwin, 81. 
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of ongoing creation much more immediate and understandable than at any other time 
in the history of Christianity’.539 
In this chapter, I will expound the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi with regard to continuous creation. The kenotic God 
and Dao’s omnipresence (the suffering God defence), the self-absenting of God and 
the hiddenness of Dao (the hidden God defence), and the ‘dark side’ (Haught) and 
yin (Zhuangzi) (together enabling the construction of what I will call the harmony 
defence), will be topics of each section. With these topics, I will reveal the 
relationship between the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist philosophy 
of Zhuangzi, and I will endeavour to develop plausible theodicies in a scientific age.  
 
(1) The Suffering God Defence: The Kenotic God and Dao’s Omnipresence 
Description 
As I expounded in Chapter 3:3, ‘Divine Kenosis’, the kenosis of God signifies the 
self-emptying of God through the ‘Christ-event’. For some evolutionary theologians, 
the notion of a kenotic God is a good way to understand the relationship between 
God and creatures in evolution. Peacocke, for example, argues that ‘God suffers in, 
with, and under the creative process of the world’.540 Peacocke understands that God 
suffers from the natural evils of the world together with human beings even as He 
intends to lead humans, and all creation, to a greater good.  
 Similarly, Haught says, ‘God struggles along with all beings, participating in 
both their pain and enjoyment, ultimately redeeming the world by an infinite 
compassion – so that in the end nothing is ever completely forgotten or lost’.541 For 
Haught, the passion and resurrection of Jesus imply that God fully shares the pain 
and suffering of the world. He understands that the kenotic God enters into the 
process of evolution taking all of its suffering into the divine life. 
 This aspect of kenosis of God can be compared to the omnipresence of Dao in 
the philosophy of Zhuangzi. In the Zhuangzi, Dao exists everywhere and all creatures 
rely on it for life (Chapter 4:3). In the conversation between Zhuangzi and 
                                                 
539 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 52. 
540 Peacocke, "The Cost of New Life," in The Work of Love, 37. 
541 Haught, Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation, 69. 
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Dongguozi, Zhuangzi gives some examples to enlighten his disciple about the 
omnipresence of Dao.542 As the dialogue relates, Dao exists in the ants, in the 
barnyard grass, in tiles and bricks, and even in the excrement. This conversation 
shows Dao’s manifest property of omnipresence well. The Daodejing also states that 
Dao exists everywhere: ‘How expansive is the great Dao! Flowing to the left and to 
the right. The myriad creatures rely upon it for life, and it turns none of them 
away’.543 In Daoism, Dao is so expansive, and it flows everywhere.  
 
Comparison and Generalisation 
The kenotic God and the omnipresent Dao are similar in the following ways. First, 
the kenotic God and the omnipresent Dao are immanent in all creatures and care for 
them. Because God suffers in creatures and with creatures, the meaning of divine 
kenosis implies divine immanence. This view is often identified with ‘panentheism’, 
or even ‘pantheism’, (the latter being a more familiar idea) but as I will now show, 
Haught’s evolutionary theodicy implies the former and not the latter. 
‘Panentheism’ is the belief that everything is in God but ontologically distinct 
from God.544 The belief that all creatures exist in God is different from ‘pantheism’, 
pantheism being the belief that the world is essentially identical with God, or that all 
things possess the same divine status. Panentheism seems to be accepted by a greater 
number of theologians than pantheism today, and passages from early and medieval 
Christianity that are consonant with a belief in panentheism can be found with 
relative ease.545 For instance, according to the apocryphal Gospel of Thomas, Chapter 
77, Jesus says, ‘Saw wood into pieces, and I am there. Lift a stone, and you can find 
                                                 
542 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. 
543 Daodejing, chap. 34. (大道氾兮, 其可左右, 萬物恃之而生而不辭.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 179.  
544 Joseph A. Bracken, "Contributions from Philosophical Theology and Metaphysics," in The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 350. 
545 The psalmist says, ‘Where can I go from your Spirit? Where can I flee from your presence? If I go 
up to the heavens, you are there; if I make my bed in the depths, you are there. If I rise on the wings of 
the dawn, if I settle on the far side of the sea, even there your hand will guide me, your right hand will 
hold me fast’ (139:7–10). The psalmist understands that God is in the heavens and in the depths of the 
earth. Because God exists everywhere and all creatures are in God, the psalmist confesses, ‘Where can 
I flee from your presence?’  
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me there’. Thomas Aquinas similarly argues that ‘God is in all things as the cause of 
the being of all things’.546 
Schaab contends that panentheism best exemplifies God’s creative relationship 
to the world in a manner that is at least conceptually consistent with modern 
evolutionary theories, and she conceives ‘this panentheistic relationship in 
Trinitarian terms that lead to a triune distinction in the One God as personally 
Transcendent, personally Incarnate, and personally Immanent in relation to the 
cosmos’.547 Jeffrey Pugh also understands that all particles, even quarks, interact 
with God when he writes: ‘Every quark, every particle, every aspect of matter and 
energy is connected to God’s desire and hope for the world’.548 
For Haught, panentheism implies that ‘God’s mode of being is wide, deep, and 
compassionate enough to embrace all creation – including the undeserved suffering 
of nonhuman life which Darwin himself found so excessive’.549 He believes that 
panentheism, meaning divine immanence, is completely consistent with the 
affirmation of divine transcendence.  
In the Zhuangzi, Dao is the origin of all creatures, and all creatures can exist 
because of Dao. Zhuangzi asks, ‘How can Dao leave and not exist?’550 Laozi 
similarly says about Dao’s role: ‘Dao produces them (all things) and de (virtue) rears 
them; Raises and nurtures them; Settles and confirms them; Nourishes and shelters 
them’.551 According to Laozi, Dao produces, raises, nurtures, settles, confirms, and 
shelters all creatures.  
Because the kenotic God and the omnipresent Dao exist in all creatures and 
support them, we can say that God and Dao in both philosophies are intimately 
involved in and with creatures’ lives, including the pain and suffering that they 
endure.  
                                                 
546 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 8, 1, ad. 1. 
547 Schaab, "The Creative Suffering of the Triune God: An Evolutionary Panentheistic Paradigm," 
291. 
548 Jeffrey C. Pugh, Entertaining the Triune Mystery: God, Science, and the Space Between 
(Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003), 53. 
549 John F. Haught, "The Suffering of God," Commonweal 138, no. 11 (2011): 15. 
550 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (道惡乎往而不存?)  
551 Daodejing, chap. 51. (故道生之, 德畜之, 長之育之, 亭之毒之, 養之覆之.) 
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Second, the kenotic God and the omnipresent Dao both establish a bi-directional 
relationship with creatures, rather than a merely one-directional relationship. It 
means God and Dao are both intimately involved in and with creatures. In 
evolutionary theology, God influences creatures and is also influenced by creatures. 
Schaab claims that her model of divine interaction in terms of whole-part influence is 
inspired by that of Peacocke.552 In her model, ‘[T]he system-as-a-whole influences 
its constituent parts and, conversely, the constituent parts influence the system-as-a-
whole’.553 The movement of influence in this model is bi-directional, and this 
comprises both the ‘top-down’ aspect and the ‘bottom-up’ aspects of a model of 
interaction that we are searching for. This model emphasizes both the creativity and 
receptivity of God. For Haught, God’s kenosis is the condition of dialogical 
intimacy. God suffers along with creation and takes all of the evolutionary travail of 
the world into the divine compassion.554  
Similarly, Dao in Daoism encompasses both the nature of creativity and the 
nature of receptivity. Laozi says, ‘Dao produced the One. The One produced two. 
Two produced three. Three produced all creatures’,555 and also says, ‘Turning back is 
the action of Dao. Weakness is the operation of Dao’.556 In the Zhuangzi, ‘Dao does 
not falter before the huge, is not forgetful of the tiny; therefore the ten thousand 
things are complete in it. Vast and ample, there is nothing it does not receive. Deep 
and profound, how can it be fathomed?’557 In Daoism, all creatures came from Dao, 
and Dao is the origin of all things. At the same time, the return to the opposite of 
creation – dissolution – is also moving with the principle of Dao. The regression that 
is also manifest in the movement of Dao can also be regarded as receptivity in the 
analogical sense of being receptive to new things, new beings coming into existence 
                                                 
552 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human, 53-
61. 
553 Schaab, "The Creative Suffering of the Triune God: An Evolutionary Panentheistic Paradigm," 
296. 
554 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 124. 
555 Daodejing, chap. 42. (道生一, 一生二, 二生三, 三生萬物.) 
556 Ibid., chap. 40. (反者道之動, 弱者道之用.) 
557 Zhuangzi, chap. 13. (夫道, 於大不終, 於小不遺. 故萬物備, 廣廣乎其無不容也, 
淵乎其不可測也.) Watson, 105-106.  
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– new beginnings. In other words, because Dao is metaphysically ultimate, there is 
nothing it does not receive, give, or contain. 
In the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi, 
the relationship between the Creator and creatures is not one-directional but bi-
directional. The bi-directional model draws the Creator closer to creatures, meaning 
that the Creator shares all things with creatures, including pain and suffering.  
Third, the kenotic God of Haught and the omnipresent Dao in the Zhuangzi are 
self-humbling rather than omnipotent. The traditional Christian God rules all 
creatures, as it were, from without and in a top-down fashion. For instance, the 
Psalmist confesses, ‘Your kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and your dominion 
endures through all generations’ (Psa.145:13), and ‘The Lord reigns forever, your 
God, O Zion, for all generations’ (Psa.146:10). God commands Adam and Eve, ‘Be 
fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the 
sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground’ 
(Gen.1:28). In traditional Christianity, there is a hierarchy among creatures, and God 
reigns over all creatures and human beings rule other living creatures. However, the 
evolutionary theology of Haught reveals the self-effacing, self-limiting and 
empathetic qualities of God. The kenotic God does not rule those creatures in the 
manner of a monarch, and God exposes His Own Self as self-humbling. Similarly, 
Dao does not rule creatures. According to the Zhuangzi:  
Dao gave birth to Heaven and to earth. It exists beyond the great ultimate, 
but does not regard itself as high; it exists beneath the nadir, but does not 
regard itself as deep. It existed before Heaven and earth, but does not regard 
itself as long ago; it is earlier than time immemorial, but does not regard 
itself as old.558  
Dao is the source of the creation and preservation of all creatures, but does not 
rule and interfere with them. Dao is higher, deeper, longer and older than any thing 
in the universe, including the universe itself, and cannot be considered to be like any 
created thing, or indeed any item or category of thought, because Dao embraces all 
extremes and subsists as the ground of all that is and can ever be, including the very 
thoughts and concepts we think. 
                                                 
558 Ibid., chap. 6. (生天生地. 在太極之上而不爲高, 在六極之下而不爲深. 先天地生而不爲久, 
長於上古而不爲老.)  
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As neither God in Haught nor Dao in the Zhuangzi govern creatures 
monarchically and do not try to change creatures artificially from without, the 
implication is that God and Dao do not have direct responsibility for the problem of 
evil for either philosophy. 
In the philosophies of Haught and Zhuangzi respectively, God and Dao cannot 
be divided from creatures in the life they live, and they therefore share all the pain 
and suffering that creatures experience. From this perspective, then, we cannot ask 
the suffering God and the inextricably immanent Dao to take responsibility for evil. 
Let us call these cumulative arguments, then, the ‘suffering God defence’. The 
‘suffering God defence’ means that God cannot be accused of evils in the world 
because God participates in the pain and suffering of all creatures. The kenotic God 
is closely related to all the lives and processes of creatures just as the omnipresent 
Dao is.559  
 
Differentiation and Supplementation 
The kenotic God and the omnipresent Dao are different in the following ways. First, 
while the kenotic God is personal, the omnipresent Dao is non-personal. When 
Haught says that God is ‘personal’, he means that God pays attention to what goes on 
in the world, and that ‘God must have the capacity to form deep relationships, to 
care, to love, to make and keep promises’.560 Based on this understanding of 
‘personal’, the kenotic God is often spoken of in personal terms, possessing emotions 
like or analogous to human beings, feeling the pain and suffering in all creatures. For 
Haught, the opening up a new future for all creatures is most indicative of personal 
care. God is the world’s future, and this theological picture does not contradict 
                                                 
559 It should also be said here that the distinction between responsibility and blameworthiness helps 
those who suffer here and now. Perhaps it is not enough for a theodicy to merely offer speculations 
about a promised future that will render present sufferings small, or even of a theory of divine reality 
that means God suffers with us because He is immanent. For I can cause and be responsible for evil 
and suffering but still suffer because of it, as does an alcoholic, for example – and this recognition 
helps no one in their suffering. However, could the same be said for a theodicy that offers a view of 
God as not only suffering with but also morally blameless? We might begin to see God as He who 
does indeed love us as a Father. 
560 Haught, Science and Faith: A New Introduction, 30. 
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science if we understand that science has shown the universe to be a still unfinished 
drama, or better, event.561 
In contrast, the omnipresent Dao operates as an impersonal principle in all 
creation and all creatures. According to the Zhuangzi:  
It is Dao of heaven to keep moving and to allow no piling up [stasis] – 
hence the ten thousand things come to completion. It is Dao of the emperor 
to keep moving and to allow no piling up – hence the whole world repairs to 
his court. It is Dao of the sage to keep moving and to allow no piling up – 
hence all within the seas bow to him.562  
All creatures have their own Dao as the principle of existence, and it is 
expressed in the Zhuangzi texts as ‘Dao of Heaven’, ‘Dao of the emperor’ or ‘Dao of 
the sage’. In contrast, the kenotic God is the same personal One who exists in all 
creatures.  
This difference can supplement the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and point 
towards a new chapter in evolutionary theology. Can we understand that the God 
existing in all creatures has different properties manifested in each creature, just as 
the Zhuangzi says of Dao? The question here is simply whether we can claim that 
God works differently in each creature while retaining His ontological unity. Can we 
say that the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob (Exod. 3:6; 
3:15, 16; 4:5; Matt. 22:32, Mark 12:26; Luke 20:37; Acts 3:13; 7:32) are the same 
God, but have a different relation to each human person? In other words, all events in 
the world can be understood as the events that occur in terms of the relation between 
God and each creature. For example, earthquakes and tsunami are phenomena which 
manifest that ‘God-in-the-earth’ is related to the earth. Suffering and death are also 
phenomena which manifest that ‘God-in-each-creature’ is related to each creature 
and their life cycles. The crucial point is this: that there is then no absolute standard 
of evil, i.e. the problem of evil should only be said to be manifest in each particular 
God–creature case, each having a limited range, as opposed to a universal problem of 
evil and suffering that could be answered by tools found within one religious 
tradition alone. Looking further ahead, we may say that evils in our view may not be 
                                                 
561 Ibid., 33. 
562 Zhuangzi, chap. 13. (天道運而無所積. 故萬物成. 帝道運而無所積. 故天下歸. 聖道運而無所積. 
故海內服.) Watson, 98.  
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evils from the perspective of the relation between God and each creature. This 
understanding based on the Daoist ideas presented in the Zhuangzi helps the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught to be able to approach the problem of evil from 
various angles. 
Second, the kenotic God seems like a God who is affected by creatures in so far 
as God suffers with creatures. If God suffers from evils along with human beings, 
God seems to be subjected by the same order of creation which He Himself has 
made, which, as noted earlier, is a view which is unpopular with traditional 
theologians. Because evolutionary theodicy focuses on the harmony between 
evolutionary science and Christian theology,563 however, it tends to understand God 
as One who is indeed affected by His own creations and by the principles underlying 
creation generally, such as life and death and physical laws. 
The omnipresent Dao is the independent One in the sense that it is the 
immutable ground of Being, but like the God of Haught, it is also closely related to 
creatures. Dao is transcendent as well as immanent (Chapter 4:3). According to the 
Zhuangzi, ‘Dao has never known boundaries from the beginning’.564 As stated 
previously, Dao also cannot be defined and named in relation to creatures. Zhuangzi 
says, ‘The Great Dao is impossible to describe.… If Dao is manifest, it is not 
Dao’.565 Dao exists in all creatures, but Dao transcends them at the same time, and 
unlike the God of Haught, is impersonal, or rather, supra-personal. Dao in the 
Zhuangzi also goes beyond form and voice: ‘When you try to look at Dao, it has no 
form. When you try to listen to Dao, it has no voice’.566 Laozi similarly says about 
the transcendent property of Dao: ‘But talk about Dao – how insipid and without 
relish it is! Look for it and it cannot be seen; listen for it and it cannot be heard; but 
                                                 
563 This idea of God presented in evolutionary theology can indeed be harmonized with the traditional 
Christian God who is immutable, omnipotent, and impassible. Schaab tries to harmonize the two kinds 
of understanding of God, emphasizing the creative suffering of the triune (transcendent, incarnate and 
immanent) God. Her understanding of God comprises ‘both temporal and atemporal, both free and 
freely self-restrained, both subject to and subject beyond the vagaries of the created order’. [Schaab, 
"The Creative Suffering of the Triune God: An Evolutionary Panentheistic Paradigm," 298-99.] 
564 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (道未始有封.) 
565 Ibid. (大道不稱.… 道昭而不道.)  
566 Ibid., chap. 22. (視之無形. 聽之無聲.) 
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use it and it will never run dry!’567 Dao is transcendent, so it cannot be seen or heard, 
but is also immanent, so that it is bottomless and never exhausted.  
This fundamental idea of the undivided relationship between the transcendence 
and immanence of Dao allows for a better understanding of the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught. We see that it is possible to emphasize both the transcendence 
and immanence of God in evolutionary theology. In his book The Nature of 
Creation, Mark Harris explores their harmony in expounding God’s creation. He 
claims that both creatio ex nihilo and creatio continua describe God’s creative work, 
the former as transcendent, and the latter as immanent. According to him, ‘the two 
categories complement each other, describing how God is both present in creation 
and transcendent with respect to it’.568 If evolutionary theodicy can accept the 
transcendence and immanence of God at the same time, the kenotic God can be 
understood as the One who will redeem the suffering and pain of creatures in a 
‘transcendent’ way in the future, as well as the One who suffers in solidarity with 
creatures in an ‘immanent’ way now. 
In this section, I tried to develop the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi with regard to the immanence and care of God and 
Dao respectively. The kenotic God and the omnipresent Dao interact with creatures 
and they are pictured as self-humbling and passible. Moreover, both the kenotic God 
and the omnipresent Dao establish a bi-directional relationship with creatures rather 
than a merely one-directional relationship. Based on this understanding, I generalised 
it as the ‘suffering God defence’. The ‘suffering God defence’ means that God 
cannot be deemed blameworthy for evils in the world because God takes part in the 
pain and suffering of all creatures. The same can be said of the omnipresent Dao. 
However, I examined the differences between the two thinkers here. First, while 
the kenotic God is personal, the omnipresent Dao is non-personal. Second, the 
kenotic God seems like a God who is affected by creatures, but the omnipresent Dao 
cannot be defined or named in relation to creatures, and as impersonal, Dao’s being 
in unaffected by creatures. These differences can supplement the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught in the following ways. First, if we understand that God, as He 
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exists in all creatures, has different properties in each creature as with the non-
personal Dao, there is no absolute standard of evil. In other words, the problem of 
evil is only applicable to the limited range of each God–creature case. Second, if 
evolutionary theodicy can accept the transcendence and immanence of God as with 
Dao, the kenotic God can be understood as the One who will redeem the suffering 
and pain of creatures in a new creation which transcends all that has gone before, and 
at the same time, suffers with creatures in the present in virtue of divine immanence. 
 
(2) The Hidden God Defence: The Self-Absenting of God and the Hiddenness of 
Dao 
Description 
David Hume says that Epicurus’ old questions about God and the problem of evil are 
yet unanswered: ‘Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he 
able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence 
then is evil?’569 As we can see in the classic formulation of the problem of evil by 
Epicurus and Hume, both the omnipotence and omnibenevolence of God seem to be 
incompatible because it would seem that an all-powerful and all-good God would by 
necessity create a world without suffering, precisely because that suffering is 
unnecessary, as God could conceive of states of affairs and want to manifest them for 
his creatures, were He to create them freely and without their prior consent. Thomas 
Aquinas formulates the problem thus: 
It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, 
the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word ‘God’ means that He 
is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil 
discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.570 
 If we frame the problem like this, it first seems that the problem of evil can only 
be settled if we are able to give up one of the two properties of God. 
In evolutionary theology, God is sometimes pictured as self-absenting. 
Evolutionary theologians, such as John Polkinghorne, John Haught, Keith Ward, 
Gloria Schaab, and Denis Edwards, see God as stepping back from the creative 
                                                 
569 Dorothy Coleman, ed. Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Other Writings 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 74. 
570 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 2, 3, arg. 1. 
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process, essentially letting the creatures create themselves. According to 
Polkinghorne, divine providence will not be rendered identifiable to us by scientific 
experiments but it may be discernible through eyes of faith, such that ‘God is indeed 
a deus absconditus, a hidden deity’.571 This idea is equivalent to a self-limitation on 
God’s part, i.e. that God limits his omnipotence and activity in the world out of love. 
Evolutionary theologians insist upon the self-limitation of God in order that creatures 
might unfold their potentialities in continuous creation.572  
Haught regards God’s self-limitation as highly characteristic of God’s love. It 
means that ‘This love might take the form of a self-withdrawal, precisely as the 
condition for allowing the world to emerge on its own so as to attain the possible 
status of being capable of a deep relationship with God’.573 God’s love, as it were, 
prevents God from forcefully imposing the divine presence upon the world. This is 
analogous to the case of a loving relationship, in the sense that a genuine relationship 
is one of mutual discovery, and a sharing-and-creating with between two people who 
are irreducibly other, even while they love one another. Just as one who really loves 
does not attempt to shape another into their own image, God refrains from such, out 
of love.  
Let us recall that if we understand God as ‘letting the world be itself’, the 
problem of evil can be settled because evil and suffering are necessary constituents 
of a world always evolving, and can only evolve if God refrains from controlling it 
from without. We saw that in light of Haught’s evolutionary theology, we cannot 
blame God for evil.  
While Haught settles Epicurus’ question by way of repressing the traditional 
concept of ‘divine omnipotence’ (that being unlimited power, or a limitlessly 
efficacious will) even while he argues that divine self-limitation is the most powerful 
expression of love, Zhuangzi deals with the question in the manner of denying even 
‘divine benevolence’. The philosophy of Zhuangzi, unlike traditional Christian 
theodicy based on the goodness of God, does not set Dao’s goodness forth as a 
                                                 
571 Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 84. 
572 Some scholars, such as Peacocke (2001: 37), see God as working intimately within the 
evolutionary process, and see God as acting fully in the world through evolution. In contrast, Haught 
focuses on God’s self-withdrawal from the creative process and understands this withdrawal from the 
perspective of God’s true love (Chapter 6:2).  
573 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 43. 
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premise. For Zhuangzi, the distinction between good and evil is meaningless. We see 
that saintliness ends up in either the pursuit of impossible ideals or in hypocrisy, that 
being ‘good’ or ‘holy’ actually causes just as much harm in the world as being ‘not 
good enough’. Zhuangzi says, ‘Great Benevolence is not benevolent. Great integrity 
is not humble’.574 Laozi similarly emphasizes the importance of harmony attained 
without conscious striving:  
Heaven and earth are not benevolent. They treat the myriad creatures as 
straw dogs. Sages are not benevolent. They treat the people as straw dogs. Is 
not the space between heaven and earth like a bellows? Empty yet 
inexhaustible! Work it and more will come forth. An excess of speech will 
lead to exhaustion. It is better to hold on to the mean.575  
For Laozi, holding to the middle way, i.e. harmony, is more important than 
being benevolent, such that neither ‘heaven and earth’ or even sages can be called 
benevolent. The expression ‘heaven and earth’ is a different expression for Dao.576 
Thus, in my view, Dao cannot be regarded as morally benevolent in Daoist 
philosophy.577  
Dao is also described as weak or humble rather than powerful or self-assertive. 
Zhuangzi says, ‘If Dao is manifest, it is not Dao’.578 Dao’s operation as well as Dao’s 
property cannot be described as clear or evident because Dao works namelessly and 
in wuwei. According to the Zhuangzi, ‘All things are different in principle, but Dao 
does not show partiality among them, and thus they are nameless. Because they are 
nameless, they rest in non-action, and because they rest in non-action, there is 
                                                 
574 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (大仁不仁. 大廉不嗛.) Watson, 14.  
575 Daodejing, chap. 5. (天地不仁, 以萬物爲芻狗. 聖人不仁, 以百姓爲芻狗. 天地之間. 
其猶槖籥乎. 虛而不屈, 動而愈出. 多言數窮, 不如守中.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 165. This chapter 
does not exist in the earlier version of the Daodejing, excavated in 1993. About four versions of the 
Daodejing, see Chapter 4:1, ‘What is Daoism?’. 
576 According to Moeller, the term ‘heaven and earth’ is frequently used synonymously with ‘Heaven’. 
[Hans-Georg Moeller, The Philosophy of the Daodejing (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 47.] Chang claims that Heaven represents the highest divinity. [Chung-Yuan Chang, Creativity 
and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art and Poetry (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 59.] 
577 Jen (benevolence) is the basic spirit of inner morals and social norms in Confucianism. The 
sentence, ‘Heaven and earth are not benevolent.’, critiques Confucius’ thought represented by the 
concept of jen. Laozi attacks the artificiality of Confucianism. 
578 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (道昭而不道.)  
 195 
nothing they cannot accomplish’.579 Laozi says, ‘Weakness is the operation of 
Dao’.580 As Dao works by non-action, Dao is the paradigmatic example of humility.  
 
Comparison and Generalisation 
Understanding God as self-absenting deity and Dao as non-benevolent and weak are 
similar ways to exempt Ultimate Reality of responsibility for evil. First, the 
evolutionary theology of Haught and the Daoist idea of Zhuangzi can settle 
Epicurus’ questions about the omnipotence and benevolence of Ultimate Reality. In 
the Bible and traditional Christian theology, God’s omnipotence and benevolence are 
essential properties that cannot be easily abandoned, and therefore the problem of 
evil arises. However, the evolutionary theology of Haught and the Daoist philosophy 
of Zhuangzi, with similar ways of dealing with the problem, can supply a possible 
solution.  
For Haught, God does not reveal His Self as divine omnipotence. Instead, God’s 
self-limitation for the purpose of empowering creatures’ self-creativity reveals God’s 
nature as Love and absolves God concerning the existence of evil. As Schaab 
similarly says, ‘If, in God’s nature as Love, God created both the cosmos and 
humanity as free and autonomous, then God, in God’s nature as Love, has chosen not 
to exercise coercive power over the cosmos and its creatures’.581 If we accept that 
God may sometimes exercise self-letting love rather than omnipotent power, the 
problem of evil can be less of a challenge because God allows the processes of nature 
to follow their course, and when it comes to human beings, the exercise of free will – 
itself necessary for any good to be done by us.582 
Daoism also can overcome the problem of evil as set out by Epicurus by 
returning to the amoral nature of Dao. For Zhuangzi, moral goodness is not an 
essential property of Dao. In the Zhuangzi, great benevolence does not make itself 
                                                 
579 Ibid., chap. 25. (萬物殊理, 道不私, 故無名. 無名故無爲, 無爲衛無不爲.) 
580 Daodejing, chap. 40. (弱者道之用.) 
581 Schaab, "The Creative Suffering of the Triune God: An Evolutionary Panentheistic Paradigm," 
294. 
582 Haught’s idea about the ‘self-absenting of God’ may be regarded as a kind of deism. Paradoxically, 
for him, God’s withdrawal is not due to apathy or disinterest toward the creatures He has created but 
rather a most extreme form of involvement. See Chapter 3:3 for details. 
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known as benevolent, rather, the benevolent person is self-effacing. If benevolence 
has either itself or another object of utility (be it favour or praise) as its guiding 
motivation, it is not authentic.583 Therefore, as in the evolutionary theodicy of 
Haught, Daoism does not suffer from the philosophical constrains which make 
Epicurus’ questions so problematic.  
Second, for both thinkers, God and Dao are working secretly in the world and 
are thus called hidden. The reason that God seems to be self-limiting in evolutionary 
theology is that God is regarded as working in a hidden fashion, self-absenting and 
not directly intervening in the world. Thus, God’s work is inconspicuous. The 
‘hiddenness of God’ has been an important attribute of God in the Bible and 
Christian history. In the Bible, God sometimes purposefully hides his face because 
people disobey His will (Deut. 31:17–18, 32:20; Isa. 1:15; Jer. 33:5; Mic. 3:4). 
However, Job (Job 13:23–24) and the psalmist do not know why God hides his face 
from them. The psalmist desperately cries ‘Why do you hide yourself in times of 
trouble?’ several times (10:1, 13:1, 27:9, 44:24, 69:17, 88:14, 89:46, 102:2, 143:7). 
Isaiah understands the hiddenness of God as a divine attribute: ‘Truly you are a God 
who hides himself, O God and Saviour of Israel’ (Isa. 45:15). Martin Luther’s 
theology of the cross emphasizes deus absconditus (the hidden God). For Luther, as 
Alister McGrath explains, ‘God’s strength is revealed under apparent weakness, and 
God’s wisdom under apparent folly’.584  
While the Bible exhibits God’s hiddenness and theologians have often 
acknowledged the hiddenness of God to be the source of the difficulty in identifying 
and acknowledging God’s work in the world, God’s omnipotence receives more 
emphasis in traditional Christianity to safeguard the fundamental doctrines of God as 
a metaphysically necessary creator and sustainer, even though we cannot always join 
the dots and arrive at that necessary being philosophically. Nevertheless, for Haught, 
God’s hiddenness is more important than His omnipotence because Haught regards 
God’s self-effacing love as that which makes possible creatures’ self-development. 
He says, ‘Indeed, an infinite love must in some sense “absent” or “restrain itself” 
precisely in order to give the world the “space” in which to become something 
                                                 
583 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. 
584 Alister E. McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough, 
2nd ed. (Malden, Mass. ; West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 220. 
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distinct from the creative love that constitutes it as “other”’.585 Therefore, the 
‘hiddenness of God’ is an important concept in explaining God’s work without 
contradicting the discoveries in evolutionary science.  
Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, Dao subsists and things are made manifest in 
concealment and in non-action. Paradoxically, all things are made manifest even 
while Dao rests in wuwei. The existence and activity of Dao is anything but 
evident.586 Like the God of Haught, Dao manifests itself in non-action and 
formlessness – granted language here becomes unavoidably paradoxical. Dao can be 
transmitted, or known and ‘seen’ by intuition and by the heart, but is beyond our 
vision and our analytical intellect, which utilises concepts based on what is 
experienced.587 Dao’s operation is hidden, but it is the ontological ground of all 
creatures in the Zhuangzi: ‘All things in the world find sustenance in Dao, which is 
never exhausted. This is the real Dao’.588 Again, in the Daodejing, ‘Dao does nothing 
yet nothing is left undone. Should barons and kings be able to preserve it, the myriad 
creatures will transform themselves’.589 Laozi accepts that all things come from 
Dao’s action, saying ‘yet there is nothing left undone’. According to yet another 
expression of Laozi, ‘Dao is hidden and without name. Only Dao is good at 
providing and completing’.590 
Here, I claimed that the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist 
philosophy of Zhuangzi can exculpate Ultimate Reality of responsibility for evil, as I 
claimed earlier, by challenging the historical Christian understanding of God. The 
divine attributes of omnipotence and benevolence have never been abandoned in 
Christian history. However, for Haught, God is pictured as self-letting and humble in 
his relationship to creatures in virtue of the fact that He purposefully hides His face 
                                                 
585 John F. Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
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586 Laozi writes, ‘When the worst scholars hear about Dao, they laugh at it! If they did not laugh at it, 
it would not really be Dao’ (Daodejing, chap. 41. Ivanhoe and Norden, 182-183). Laozi’s point is that 
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587 Zhuangzi, chap. 6. 
588 Ibid., chap. 22. (萬物皆往資焉而不匱, 此其道與.)  
589 Daodejing, chap. 37. (道常無爲而無不爲. 侯王若能守之, 萬物將自化.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 
180.  
590 Ibid., chap. 41. (道隱無名, 夫唯道, 善貸且成.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 183.  
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from creatures, to show his great love. In the Zhuangzi, Dao is described as hidden, 
nameless and weak because Dao takes care of all creatures secretly, and non-action 
and spontaneity are the ways of Dao’s operation. Therefore, we can generalise the 
implications of both views here as the ‘hidden God defence’. This ‘hidden God 
defence’ understands the nature of Ultimate Reality as self-absenting and essentially 
humble, which contributes to a cumulative solution to the problem of evil. 
It should be said the idea of a ‘hidden God’ does not mean that God works 
inefficiently or ineffectively. Rather, it signifies the most effective way God works 
for creatures. Haught claims: 
[I]t is the ‘self-withdrawal’ of any forceful divine presence, and the 
paradoxical hiddenness of God’s power in a self-effacing persuasive love, 
that allows creation to come about and to unfold freely and indeterminately 
in evolution. It is in God’s self-emptying humility that the fullest 
effectiveness resides.591 
The hidden God allows all creatures to unfold freely in the process of evolution. 
Although we cannot see or feel God’s work directly in evolution, God does His work 
in the most effective way possible. Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, Wuwei is the surest 
way to care for the world: ‘If the exemplary persons find they have no other choice 
than to look after the world, then the best course for them not direction of action but 
rather direction in non-action. As long as non-action abides, people rest in the true 
form of their nature’.592 Moreover, non-action is the key to achieve perfect action: 
‘Perfect speech is absence of speech, and perfect action is absence of action’.593 
In short, the ‘hidden God defence’ is a good way to approach the problem of evil 
as classically stated without denying God’s work in the world. Because God works in 
the world in a self-effacing way with as Dao, we cannot impose the responsibility for 
evil on God as if He were the direct cause.  
 
Differentiation and Supplementation 
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592 Zhuangzi, chap. 11. (故君子不得已而臨莅天下, 莫若無爲. 無爲也而後安其性命之情.) 
593 Ibid., chap. 22. (至言去言, 至爲去爲.)  
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For the ‘hidden God defence’, God sometimes reveals His creating work in 
unexpected ways, which is what is usually referred to as ‘chance’ in the cosmos. 
Chance in continuous creation is an important part of both evolutionary theology and 
Daoism. In the evolutionary theology of Haught, the claim that God’s self-effacing 
and humble qualities imply an answer to the problem of evil is reinforced by cosmic 
uncertainty. The emergence and evolution of life in evolutionary biology seem to be 
intrinsically unpredictable and the neo-Darwinian synthesis of genetics and 
molecular biology describes the history of the evolution of life as an extremely 
unpredictable process. How can this ‘chance’ or ‘cosmic uncertainty’ be harmonized 
with God’s continuous creation? 
Chaos theorist Joseph Ford says, ‘God plays dice with the universe. But they’re 
loaded dice. And the main objective of physics now is to find out by what rules were 
they loaded and how can we use them for our own ends’.594 Ford accepts that there 
are chance occurrences in God’s creation, but for him, chance events are not totally 
random because they have certain rules, about which God alone knows. Thomas 
Tracy expounds two possible ways to connect the unpredictability of the 
development of the cosmos to God’s active creation of it. The first is that God does 
play dice with the universe. However, for Tracy, the theological integrity of the 
doctrine of divine providence will depend on the claim that ‘God designs the dice’, 
and that God builds into the world a ‘restricted range of potential pathways for 
life’.595 The second possible way to connect the unpredictability of the development 
of the cosmos with God’s active creation is to posit that ‘God acts as primary cause 
giving being to an entity with one or more properties that bear a probabilistic, rather 
than deterministic, relation to antecedent secondary causes’.596 This means that God 
uses chance as a means to give shape to the world’s continuous creation. Similarly, 
for Elizabeth Johnson, God uses chance to ensure variety, novelty, resilience, and 
freedom in the universe. She says, ‘Chance is not an alternative to law, but the very 
means whereby law is creative. The two are strongly interrelated and the universe 
evolves through their interplay’.597 If we accept that God works with chance, then 
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unpredictable events can be thought of as a mode of divine creativity. Tracy’s two 
options concerning God’s relation to chance and Johnson’s ideas about chance help 
us to understand that chance events in evolution do not contradict Christian theology 
concerning divine providence, although the boundary between chance and law seems 
to be somewhat ambiguous.  
Haught tries to understand chance occurrences in evolution as doors to the ever-
novel future: ‘The very same events that appear purely random or absurd when 
viewed only in terms of a scientific method oriented toward the fixed causal past can 
be understood theologically as openings to the incoming of an indefinitely renewing 
future in this presently unfinished and perishable cosmos’.598 According to Haught, 
without the occurrence of contingent events, the laws of physics and of natural 
selection would freeze the universe into an everlasting sameness, or predictability 
that would be closed to the novelty of a genuine future. Haught does not regard 
contingency as a mere mask for a hidden necessity not yet completely understood. 
For him, contingent events are an essential part of the cosmos open to evolutionary 
novelty and to the future (new creation), breaking out of subordination to habitual 
routine.599 In the evolutionary theology of Haught, therefore, divine sovereignty and 
the chance involved in evolution do not compete.  
In the Zhuangzi, even though there are few stories about unpredictable incidents, 
this particular story is noteworthy:  
To hide a boat in a ravine and to hide a fishing-net in a swamp can be said to 
be safe enough. But ‘at night a strong person’ might come and carry them 
off on his back while the owner who is fast asleep knows nothing about it. 
To hide something small in something large is reasonable enough, but there 
is always the possibility of losing it. Hide the world in the world and the 
world will never be lost – this is the eternal truth.600 
‘At night a strong person (夜半有力者)’ signifies the hidden power to be able to 
do something unexpected. Trying to hide something is foolish and meaningless. The 
phrase ‘hide the world in the world’ means not to try to hide anything because trying 
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to change something in the world with our will inevitably turns out to be a 
meaningless endeavour in the larger scheme of Mother Nature. In other words, the 
world is at bottom unpredictable and this unpredictability, an aspect of Dao’s wuwei 
and nature of ziran, is the strong but hidden power, which human beings ought to 
keep in mind when considering their lives. According to the other part of the 
Zhuangzi, everything in the world changes on its own: ‘The life of things is a gallop, 
a headlong dash – with every movement they alter, with every moment they shift. 
What should you do and what should you not do? Everything will change of itself, 
that is certain’.601 The change of nature is fast and unpredictable, and it is out of 
human control. In short, Zhuangzi accepts indeterminism and chance in the cosmos, 
but he understands that chance is only a feature of Dao.  
This understanding of Zhuangzi can supplement Haught’s idea of chance. That 
the transcendent Creator operates in the cosmos through chance occurrences 
(including those involved in quantum indeterminacy) is abhorrent to traditional 
theologians because chance – in other words, randomness of events – seems to break 
the definitive rules of nature that the Creator has instituted in His creating nature, 
such as constancy or regularity. And yet, scientific developments force us to 
acknowledge indeterminacy in the universe, both at the microscopic (quantum) and 
macroscopic (organic) levels. For this reason, some evolutionary theologians attempt 
to retrospectively identify God’s plan or purpose in an apparently unpredictable 
world (Chapter 8:1). If there still exists a divine plan or purpose in what is still an 
apparently unpredictable world, God’s existence and Divine Providence can be 
compatible with the apparently unpredictable processes of biological evolution on 
Earth.  
In the case of Haught, although he understands chance in terms of God’s great 
love, his idea starts from the premise of a better future, i.e. new creation. I would like 
to suggest that we think about chance as somehow under the control of God, 
analogous to the operation of Dao in the Zhuangzi, manifest in the orderly creation of 
ziran, which is no less spontaneous or unpredictable. For Ultimate Reality itself, 
chance cannot be chance strictly speaking but a normal ordered and ordering process 
with metaphysical intelligibility. If we accept that there is no such thing as 
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indeterminacy from the perspective of the divine as in the Zhuangzi, demonstrating 
God’s work or manifestations of God’s work in what we perceive as an unpredictable 
world becomes easier. 
Another difference in the approach to divine hiddenness in Haught and 
Zhuangzi is the divergence of properties of God and Dao respectively. God in 
Haught is explained as self-limiting and humble, and Dao is regarded as non-
benevolent and weak. The reason why evil is a severe problem in Christian theology 
is that God is assumed to be benevolent. According to the Zhuangzi on the other 
hand, Dao is not constrained by any category, such as categories of good and bad, of 
beauty and ugly, and of right and wrong. Dao even goes beyond the boundary 
between being and nonbeing: ‘Dao cannot be considered as being, nor can it be 
considered as nonbeing’.602 This understanding of Dao forces us rethink whether we 
can actually ask God to account for evil. 
Based on this difference, we can ask the question: is it possible for us to 
understand that the Christian God transcends human categorisation? I do not think 
that the notion of God being ‘personal’ only refers to the crude belief that ‘God feels 
emotions like human being’, for the reason that God may feel emotion in a different 
way from humans or have different standards of judgement for good and bad. The 
Christian tradition has often reflected upon the possibility that, while God must have 
some analogical relation to our moral categories of goodness and love, such that we 
can call God ‘Love’ or a kind of ‘Father’, God’s standards of judgement may be very 
different from those of human beings, as illustrated in the book of Job.603  
If we could accept that God’s standards of judgement for good and bad may be 
different from those of humans, it is possible, metaphysically and epistemologically 
speaking, that evil, from our perspective, could be regarded as goodness from God’s 
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perspective. Moreover, if we could accept that God exists on an ontological level 
beyond the ephemeral feelings of human beings like Dao, the problem of evil will 
not be a severe problem for evolutionary theodicy.  
In this section, I examined the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist 
philosophy of Zhuangzi with respect to the problem of whom or what it is that 
responsibility for evil in the world lies with. For Haught, God is pictured as self-
absenting and humble in relation to creatures, and in the Zhuangzi, Dao is described 
as hidden, nameless and weak. Based on these similarities, I generalised them as the 
‘hidden God defence’. The ‘hidden God defence’ understands the nature of God as 
self-absenting or humble, who lets the world be while immanent and participating in 
it, such that we cannot assign blameworthiness for evil on God. 
However, I argued that the conceptions of ‘chance’ in evolution and of the 
properties of God and Dao are different in the two thinkers. Haught believes that 
contingent events are an essential aspect of a cosmos open to evolutionary novelty, 
but in the Zhuangzi, chance is only one aspect of Dao’s operation. Moreover, 
different from the Christian God, Dao goes beyond any category, such as categories 
of good and bad, of beauty and ugly, of right and wrong, even being and nonbeing 
and analogical or cataphatic categories of ‘Love’ or ‘Father’. Dao bears no analogical 
relation to human beings in terms of morality or psychology – as emphasised earlier, 
Dao is not benevolent. These differences can supplement the evolutionary theodicy 
of Haught. First, if we accept that there is no chance from the perspective of the 
divine as in the Zhuangzi, demonstrating God’s work in what we perceive as an 
unpredictable world becomes easier. Second, if we could accept that God’s standards 
of judgement between good and bad may be different from those of human beings or 
that God exists an ontological level beyond the ephemeral feelings of human beings 
like Dao, the problem of evil does not present itself as a pressing problem for 
evolutionary theodicy.  
 
(3) The Harmony Defence: The Dark Side and Yin (陰, the shadow side) 
Description 
In the process of evolution, creatures can sometimes help each other to survive 
without any conscious intention of doing so. For example, an animal may maintain 
the right population levels of its prey, in turn preserving a delicate ecological 
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equilibrium that benefits a wider range of animals in the area. A well-known case is 
the re-introduction of wolves at Yellowstone National Park in the United States.604 
The re-introduction of wolves has decreased the population of elks, allowing for 
recovery of aspen, willow and vegetation, in turn leading to a recovery in beaver 
numbers. Given the recovery of the aspen and willow at Yellowstone, beavers now 
have a reliable food source, and in their return they create dams which in turn help 
create stores of water for the willow – home to many birds. In this fascinating case, 
we see the natural process of transaction without intention of profit or gain in the 
animal and vegetable worlds. 
At the same time, the transactional process at work in nature obviously creates 
incredible amounts of suffering and death (the elk had to be eaten by wolves for what 
we see at Yellowstone today to come about). Creatures, including human beings, of 
course, suffer from what is sometimes prolonged and excruciating pain and suffering 
in the evolutionary processes at work. Michael Ruse explains the human dilemma in 
the process of evolution: ‘We are made in the image of God, so we are naturally 
good. But we are fallen – this is now part of our nature – and so we are also bad. An 
uneasy hotchpotch of selfishness and altruism’.605  
Here, we can raise the following questions: First, can pain and suffering which 
arise from evolution really be explained by and reduced to the natural process of 
nature (natural evil) or human free will (moral evil) as I wrote above? Second, is it 
possible to create the world in a less costly and painful way? That is, was it, or could 
it be, metaphysically possible for God to create this kind of world with just this 
amount of good but less evil and suffering? The second question implies a third, 
however, given we are looking for an ideal world: is this world the best of all 
possible worlds after all? What makes us think it might be? 
It might strike one as obvious that in considering whether such an ideal world 
could be or could have been created by God, whatever that world is, it cannot be 
perfect in the sense of having no suffering whatsoever. I believe it strikes most 
people as self-evident that there must be some suffering alongside comfort and ease, 
and therefore some evil alongside the good. We can readily think of many examples 
                                                 
604 https://www.yellowstonepark.com/things-to-do/wolf-reintroduction-changes-ecosystem, accessed 
22/10/17. 
605 Ruse,  in The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, 234. 
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in which what is good is only possible in virtue of, and perhaps in spite of, the 
contrary force, event or moral value of the good. 
The ‘dark side’ is neither a commonly used nor well-defined term in 
evolutionary theology, unlike yin (the shadow side) in Daoism. Practically everybody 
is familiar with the symbol of the yin-yang, but not everybody, perhaps especially 
Christians, are familiar with notion of a ‘dark side’ inherent in God’s creation. Some 
evolutionary theologians often use the term ‘shadow side’ to mean a negative aspect 
to things that breaks in during the process of evolution. It means that suffering and 
pain are inevitable by-products of God’s continuous creation. Nicola Hoggard 
Creegan calls it the ‘dark side’, which allows for the possibility of there being evil 
forces at work in the world, pointing to the parable of the wheat and the tares (Matt. 
13:24–30).606 Celia Deane-Drummond uses Bulgakov’s term ‘shadow sophia’ to 
characterize nature’s vulnerability to chaos and nonbeing (that is, traditionally 
speaking, the ‘privation’ of being).607 Sophia is both the wisdom of the incarnating 
Christ and the wisdom of creation, and this wisdom works through and comes to 
fruition in evolutionary history, also manifesting a necessary dark side to things. 
Each term has slightly different points of emphasis, but all are terms to express 
arguments helping us to approach the difficult problem of providing an adequate 
evolutionary theodicy. I will henceforth use the term ‘dark side’, which is also used 
by many evolutionary theologians, including John Haught. The dark side is an 
attempt to incorporate the moral ambiguities in evolution without accusing God of 
evil. 
How do evolutionary theologians defend the righteousness of God as it pertains 
to the existence of the dark side of creation? First, some evolutionary theologians 
accept the dark side as ‘unnecessary, but inevitable’ for all other creatures in God’s 
continuous creation. This argument focuses on the moral imperative to seek 
amelioration. Teilhard de Chardin says, ‘God cannot create without evil appearing as 
a shadow’.608 For him, the dark side is woven into God’s continuous creation, just as 
necessary as the messy underside of a beautifully knitted piece of fabric. 
                                                 
606 Nicola Hoggard, "Evolution and Evil," Stimulus: The New Zealand Journal of Christian Thought 
& Practice 17, no. 4 (2009): 20. 
607 Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom, 185-91. 
608 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Christianity and Evolution, trans. René Hague (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 134. 
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Polkinghorne understands the created world as a ‘package deal’, meaning that the 
bright side of the emergence of new lives is necessarily intertwined with the shadow 
side of extinction and malformation.609 Southgate claims that the violence, pain and 
suffering in evolutionary processes are necessary by-products of the way God brings 
about the amazing world in which we live.610 What amounts to an ‘only way’ 
argument – that this is the only way our world could have come into being – implies 
that the processes that lead to the refinement of creatures’ characteristics are the 
same processes that lead to the suffering and extinction of creatures, and thus cannot 
be regarded as either desire nor undesirable. 
Second, some evolutionary theologians posit that God puts constraints on 
manifesting His power for creaturely freedom. Peacocke points out that ‘there are 
inherent constraints on how even an omnipotent Creator could bring about the 
existence of a law-like creation that is to be a cosmos not a chaos’.611 Inherent 
constraints mean the self-limitation of God for a better world. For Peacocke, God 
suffers in, with, and under the process of continuous creation, and the process of 
creation is immensely costly to God. According to this theodicy, God is the suffering 
redeemer who suffers-with, rather than the benevolent yet aloof architect.  
Third, some evolutionary theologians have an overtly Christian theological 
focus, emphasising the cross of Christ and the eschatological future. Although 
creatures live in a state of ambiguity while this future remains in potentiality, the 
temporariness of the ambiguity will be clear, as well as the fact that pain and 
suffering will disappear in the eschatological future, if we believe in the promises of 
the Christian faith. Holmes Rolston claims that ‘The abundant life that Jesus 
exemplifies and offers to his disciples is that of a sacrificial suffering through to 
something higher.… The cruciform creation is, in the end, deiform, godly, just 
because of this element of struggle, not in spite of it. There is a great divine “yes” 
hidden behind and within every “no” of crushing nature’.612  
                                                 
609 Polkinghorne, "Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker," in God and the Scientist: Exploring the Work 
of John Polkinghorne, 9. 
610 Southgate, "God's Creation Wild and Violent, and Our Care for Other Animals," 252. 
611 Peacocke, "The Cost of New Life," in The Work of Love, 37. 
612 Rolston, "Naturalizing and Systematizing Evil," in Is Nature Ever Evil? Religion, Science, and 
Value, 84. 
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Here, briefly, are three ways to understand the dark side of evolution: the first 
was ‘unnecessary, but inevitable’, the second, ‘the self-limitation of God’ in terms of 
the present, and the third, ‘the eschatological future’, understood in terms of the 
future. The evolutionary theodicy of Haught comes near to the third type. Haught 
claims that the idea of an originally completed creation is unthinkable in the evolving 
world because such a world would be a world without internal self-coherence, 
freedom, life, or a future, for all these presuppose the possibility of change. Based on 
the idea of an unfinished universe, Haught expounds the problem of evil: 
If the universe is still unfinished, we cannot demand that it should here and 
now possess the status of finished perfection. And if the universe is not 
perfect, then this can mean only that it is now imperfect. Moreover, if ours 
is an imperfect world, the appearance of evil is not inconceivable. Evil and 
suffering could be thought of as the dark side of the world’s ongoing 
creation.613 
Haught understands evil and suffering as the dark side of the evolving world, 
without claiming that suffering is therefore morally tolerable. If we understand evil 
and suffering as the dark side of the world’s ongoing creation in an imperfect 
universe, God can be absolved from the problem of evil.  
The dark side of the evolving universe is explained by the word ‘yin’ (陰) in 
Daoism. Yin literally means the ‘shadow side’ or ‘gloomy side’, and yin cannot exist 
without yang. Paula Hartz explains yin and yang, ‘Yin is passive; yang is active. Yin 
is cool; yang is warm. Yin is night; yang is day. Yin is female; yang is male’.614 In 
fact, while in the West the two are most often referred to a yin ‘and’ yang, in ancient 
and traditional Chinese philosophy and literature, they are referred to as one: yin-
yang, which underlines for us their inseparability. The doctrine of yin-yang is an 
important component in relating Daoism to the Christian notion of continuous 
creation because the world was created and is maintained by the interaction of yin 
‘and’ yang.  
According to the Zhuangzi, all things in the world come from the harmony 
present in yin-yang: ‘Perfect Yin is stern and frigid; Perfect Yang is bright and 
glittering. The sternness and frigidity come forth from heaven; the brightness and 
                                                 
613 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 41. 
614 Hartz, 15. 
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glitter emerge from the earth; the two mingle, penetrate, come together, harmonize, 
and all things are born therefrom’.615 In the philosophy of Zhuangzi, the best possible 
world is the best precisely because of the harmonization of yin-yang. Both the 
shadow side (yin) and the bright side (yang) play an important role in maintaining all 
things in the evolving world. Thus, the shadow side, containing pain and suffering, 
does not present a big challenge in the Zhuangzi. 
 
Comparison and Generalisation 
The dark side in the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the shadow side in the 
Zhuangzi are similar in the following views.  
First, both maintain something at least analogous to a monistic view of Ultimate 
Reality in explaining the problem of evil.616 The problem of evil can be classified 
within dualistic or monistic frameworks. In a dualistic paradigm of the divine, such 
as Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism, good and evil exist in absolute conflict with 
each other and human beings and the world are affected by the movements of these 
two Realities which preside over good and evil respectively. Good–evil dualism may 
settle the problem of evil easily, because within this model, it is the evil force or 
entity that is responsible for evil. However, this dualistic interpretation617 does not 
adequately represent the worldview of traditional Christian theology because Satan is 
never presented as having equal rank with God. The Bible’s general perspective is 
that God is the only one who supervises every creature’s life and death, and 
happiness and misery. Satan or the Devil, is of course, a creature of God, and only 
continues to exist because of God’s sanction.  
The monistic view on the problem of evil asserts that evil is not an independent 
substance such as a god or entity who subsists as the source of immoral action, but 
rather a privation or absence of being. According to Augustine, ‘Everything that 
                                                 
615 Zhuangzi, chap. 21. (至陰肅肅, 至陽赫赫. 肅肅出乎天, 赫赫發乎地. 兩者交通成和.) Watson 
169.  
616 Recall that we acknowledged that the term ‘monism’ was not absolutely accurate when applied to 
Daoism but was the closest approximation possible in rendering Daoism intelligible for a Western 
audience. See Chapter 4:1 ‘What are Dao and Daoism?’ 
617 The ‘dualism’ I refer to here means ‘metaphysical dualism (God/Satan)’ or ‘cosmic dualism 
(good/evil), and not ‘theological dualism (God/humanity, creator/creation)’. Christianity is certainly 
classically dualistic in its fundamental/ontological distinctions between supernature and nature, nature 
and grace, matter and spirit, the necessary (God) and the contingent (the material world), etc. 
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exists is good, then; and so evil, the source of which I was seeking, cannot be a 
substance, because if it were, it would be good’.618 This perspective has been 
supported by the Church Fathers, the Reformers, Gottfried Leibniz, Karl Barth, and 
other many theologians.  
The ‘dark side’ in the evolutionary theodicy of Haught retains this monistic 
perspective of traditional Christian theology, and at the same time it explains the 
problem of evil effectively. The dark side does not result from the activity of Satan 
but is rather a negative aspect or an inevitable by-product of God’s continuous 
creation. Similarly, the ‘shadow side’ in the Zhuangzi is not an activity of an evil 
force but one of the two aspects of Dao’s movement. Therefore, both Haught and the 
Zhuangzi understand the problem of evil in what we may (very) tentatively refer to 
as monotheistic perspective, rather than in dualistic or polytheistic perspectives, 
which easily settle the problem of evil but which are not theologically acceptable for 
us.  
Second, the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of 
Zhuangzi both explain that the present world, with its shadow side, is the best 
possible world. As Rolston says, ‘A world without blood would be poorer, but a 
world without bloodshed would be poorer too, both less rich in biodiversity and less 
divine’.619 Bloodshed and death in the world actually contributes to the rich 
biodiversity that has evolved over millennia and has enabled the evolution of a more 
beautiful, ‘divine’ world, rather than a torpid and static world which would exist if 
there were no death. In other words, the present evolutionary system may be the best 
possible system for such a world as ours, and befitting of God’s self-letting love. 
Haught claims that ‘We should not think of God as ever having existed in any other 
way than as humble, self-giving, empowering, promising, redemptive love’.620 For 
Haught, the dark side that is revealed by God’s self-limitation is inevitable, and 
furthermore, it is necessary for God to show his endless love for creatures, in virtue 
of his omnibenevolence. 
                                                 
618
 Augustine, Confessions, 7. 12. 18. 
619 Rolston, "Naturalizing and Systematizing Evil," in Is Nature Ever Evil? Religion, Science, and 
Value, 85. 
620 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 125. 
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Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, the shadow side is necessary for the world. In fact, it 
is the disharmony of yin and yang, the attempt to make one victorious over the other 
or one last longer than the other, that brings about evil and suffering:  
If humans are extremely joyful, they lean toward yang. If humans are 
extremely angry, they lean toward yin. If both yin and yang are in disorder, 
the harmony of the four seasons will break, and the harmony of heat and 
cold will fail, and then, this will harm humans’ bodies. It will make 
humans lose the sense of joy and anger, to be of no fixed abode, not to 
think properly, and not to take the golden mean.621 
In the philosophy of Zhuangzi, the harmony of yin and yang is certainly 
preferable to only yang existing – something we ordinarily seem to want, as the 
Zhuangzi implies. Both extreme joy and extreme anger ruin the order in the universe, 
for the universe provides a natural balancing of the two in some way and at some 
time, unbeknown to human beings. For the Zhuangzi, then, humans should abide in 
the harmony between yin and yang that is guaranteed when we rest in wuwei. This 
idea is also exposed in the Daodejing: ‘And so, sometimes things lead and 
sometimes they follow; sometimes they breathe gently and sometimes they pant; 
sometimes they are strong and sometimes they are weak; sometimes they fight and 
sometimes they fall’.622 These kinds of differences are critical factors in creating 
harmony. Therefore, even though the world may not appear to us as the ‘best’ world 
in virtue of ubiquitous pain and suffering, we can say that it is the best ‘possible’ 
world for both Haught and Zhuangzi.  
In short, the dark side and the shadow side are accepted by each thinker from 
the perspective of inevitability or the necessary harmony of the world. Based on this 
similarity, for the purpose of crafting an integral theodicy, I generalise this as the 
‘harmony defence’. The ‘harmony defence’ consists in the claim that for the present 
world to be the best world actualisable by God, a fundamental harmony is necessary, 
and the dark side is an inevitable or necessary part in bringing about harmony in the 
universe and for creatures in their individual lives. Again, yin and yang are equally 
important and necessary in Daoism, but it is important to add here that what we may 
call an instance of either may not actually be an instance of one of them in virtue of 
                                                 
621 Zhuangzi, chap. 11. (人大喜邪, 毗於陽. 大怒邪, 毗於陰. 陰陽竝毗, 四時不至, 寒暑之和不成, 
其反傷人之形乎. 使人喜怒失位, 居處無常, 思慮不自得, 中道不成章.)  
622 Daodejing, chap. 29. (故物或行或隨, 或歔或吹, 或强或羸, 或挫或隳.) Ivanhoe and Norden, 177.  
 211 
our limited knowledge and circumstances as individuals. According to the Zhuangzi, 
‘The boundary between things is actually the boundary between specific things. A 
boundary without a boundary means that no boundary is an absolute boundary. 
People talk about fullness and emptiness, and decline and decay. Dao makes things 
full or empty, but it is not full or empty. Dao makes things decline and decay, but it 
is not itself decline and decay’.623 Zhuangzi denies the absolute boundary between 
things. The boundary of good and evil is, in an absolute sense for him, meaningless. 
In other words, the world is harmony itself. The ‘harmony defence’ addresses the 
problem of evil by utilising the dark side and the shadow side in both Haught and 
Zhuangzi.  
 
Differentiation and Supplementation 
The dark side in the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the shadow side in the 
Zhuangzi are, however, different in the following ways. The dark side and the 
shadow side are accepted in different ways in the two philosophies. In Haught, the 
dark side is inevitable for the best possible world, but it has a negative meaning. The 
dark side is the unavoidable, uncomfortable or painful aspect of things as they 
appear to us, and it will disappear in the eschatological future.  
In contrast, in the Zhuangzi, the shadow side is an important aspect of Dao in 
itself and its operations, but I emphasise that we are not to call this ‘evil’. Whereas 
the traditional Christian God is always understood as being perfectly good, without 
the dark side, Dao would not be, and this statement clearly extends beyond a mere 
statement concerning the appearance of a negative side of the things made manifest 
by the operations of Ultimate Reality. Dao operates when the bright side and the 
shadow side come together in harmony. The shadow side does not have a negative 
meaning and it is not evil. According to the Zhuangzi, yin and yang are mutually 
complementary.  
There are left and right, there are summary and detail, there are division 
and discrimination, and there are emulation and competition and 
contention…. Therefore, where there is division, there is not division; 
where there is discrimination, there is not discrimination. What does this 
                                                 
623 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. (而物有際者, 所謂物際者也. 不際之際, 際之不際者也. 謂盈虛衰殺, 
彼爲盈虛非盈虛, 彼爲衰殺非衰殺.) Wang Rongpei, 375. 
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mean? The sage embraces all things, but ordinary people discriminate 
among them to show off. As the proverb goes, where there is 
discrimination, there is something unseen [unenlightened].624 
In the Zhuangzi, division or discrimination, whether metaphysical or 
epistemological is strongly rejected. If there is no shadow side, there is no bright 
side. Yin and yang are the two manifest aspects of Dao’s operation.625 Yin is a 
necessary element in Daoism.  
Another difference between the ideas of Haught and Zhuangzi is how they 
understand the dark or shadow side in overcoming the problem of evil. Haught 
believes that nature will inevitably bear a dark side in so far as it is not yet 
completely created. For him, the natural world is pregnant with promise, ‘allowing us 
daily to renew our hope for a final fulfilment in a new creation’.626 In other words, 
what is a dark side to things for us will not remain as such in the new creation, the 
eschatological future. 
In contrast, the shadow side is an extremely important element in Daoism, and it 
is an inextricable element in the world and its processes. Concerning the origin of 
creation, the Zhuangzi answers: ‘Yin and yang balance against each other, revere 
each other, and regulate each other. The four seasons rotate each other, give birth to 
each other, and kill each other. Desire and dislike rise and fall in succession. The 
pairing of halves between male and female operate properly’.627 Yin is deeply 
involved in the existence of all things – from the creation of all beings, to the end of 
them. Thus, the shadow side is not something to be overcome in the future, but 
something which exists eternally.  
                                                 
624 Ibid., chap. 2. (有左有右, 有倫有義, 有分有辯, 有競有爭…. 故分也者, 有不分也. 辯也者, 
有不辯也. 曰. 何也? 聖人懷之, 衆人辯之以相示也. 故曰辯也者, 有不見也.)  
625 Laozi also expounds the complementarity between yin and yang several times in the Daodejing: 
‘Those who are crooked will be perfected. Those who are bent will be straight. Those who are empty 
will be full. Those who are worn will be renewed. Those who have little will gain. Those who have 
plenty will be confounded (chap. 22)’; ‘The heavy is the root of the light. The still rules over the 
agitated (chap. 26)’; ‘What you intend to shrink, you first must stretch. What you intend to weaken, 
you first must strengthen. What you intend to abandon, you first must make flourish. What you intend 
to steal from, you first must provide for. This is called subtle enlightenment (chap. 36)’. 
626 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 80. 
627 Zhuangzi, chap. 25. (少知曰. 四方之內, 六合之裏, 萬物之所生惡起? 大公調曰. 陰陽相照, 
相蓋相治. 四時相代, 相生相殺. 欲惡去就, 於是橋起. 雌雄片合, 於是庸有.)  
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Based on these differences, I would like to supplement the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught with the ideas of Zhuangzi. However, let us recall the traditional 
Christian picture of the relationship between evil and creation as creation moves 
toward the future. In traditional Christian theology, the relationship between good 
and evil is considered exclusive. In Christianity, good and evil are thought of as 
opposites. According to the Bible, on the last day, at the dawn of the new creation, 
the kingdom of God will bring about the triumph of the good and the elimination of 
evil. St. John writes: ‘He [God] will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no 
more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed 
away’ (Rev. 21:4).628 Again, some evolutionary theologians understand the dark side 
as ‘unnecessary, but inevitable’ in God’s continuous creation. But it is important to 
understand that for Haught, as in traditional Christian theology, the dark side is an 
intrinsic part of the universe, but also temporary. In this regard, Haught’s 
evolutionary theology stands in continuity with traditional Christian theism, but it is 
in stark contrast to Daoism, for which we cannot make a separation in yinyang. 
Neither yin nor yang are separable from another and neither are temporary. They 
must always be present in any world whatsoever. 
For Haught, if God is love, this love would persuade rather than command in 
order for creatures to reach new modes of being, and as a result there should be many 
instances of indeterminacy in the world as creatures utilise their freedom and choose 
to adhere or to turn away from the divine will.629 This indeterminacy contains the 
possibility for evil and suffering, but the ‘problem of evil’ will be answered for 
human beings and all creatures by the promise and manifestation of new creation. Do 
we have to understand the problem of evil from a future time (new creation) like 
Haught and many theologians? The idea of yin can give an insight in this.  
In the Zhuangzi, all creatures arise from the interplay of yin and yang. Good and 
evil are also related to each other in this way. As yin-yang is indispensable to 
continuous creation, good and evil are also indispensable from the cosmological 
dimension of things. On the contrary, evolutionary theodicy accepts the dark side as 
                                                 
628 Isaiah similarly says, ‘Then will the eyes of the blind be opened and the ears of the deaf unstopped. 
Then will the lame leap like a deer, and the mute tongue shout for joy. Water will gush forth in the 
wilderness and streams in the desert. […] and the ransomed of the Lord will return. They will enter 
Zion with singing; everlasting joy will crown their heads. Gladness and joy will overtake them, and 
sorrow and sighing will flee away’ (Isa. 35:5–6, 10). 
629
 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 127. 
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inevitable as far as the experience of creatures goes. We would certainly think that it 
would be best if the dark side did not exist because we, like other creatures, prefer 
comfort and peace, but as we know, the shadow side is inevitable during continuous 
creation, for it makes life cycles, progress of any sort and even existence possible. 
I think that if the dark side is inevitable in an evolving world, evolutionary 
theology accepts it as absolutely necessary, even while it is temporary. As the 
harmony of yin-yang constitutes the necessary ingredient for a balanced world in the 
Zhuangzi, the dark side may reveal the highest good of God’s creation when it is 
understood in terms of being necessary for an immanent harmony in creation.  
Moreover, as in Haught, if we focus on God’s ‘letting-be’ of creation out of 
love, then unexpected, random events in the world that bring about pain and 
suffering may afford testimony of God’s continuous love. We may take this 
perspective on the basis of St. Paul’s words (Rom. 5:20),630 where it is said that 
where pain and suffering increase, God’s self-emptying love increases all the more. 
We can see, then, that the dark side may actually be regarded positively rather than 
merely negatively – positively for the reason that it is proof of the freedom of 
creation and creatures, the guarantee that creation is not fatalistically ordered and 
commanded in its progression by God. Here, we must remember that the shadow side 
in the Zhuangzi can only be accepted positively when it is harmonized with the 
bright side. Likewise, the dark side in Haught can also be accepted positively when it 
can be harmonized with the good effects caused by God’s self-emptying love.  
In this section, I strived to develop the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi as they pertain to cosmic harmony. The dark side in 
Haught and the shadow side in Zhuangzi are accepted by each thinker respectively 
because of the inevitability of pain and suffering and the necessity of cosmic 
harmony. Based on this similarity, I generalised it as the ‘harmony defence’. The 
‘harmony defence’ implies that the present world is one of fundamental harmony, 
and the dark side is an inevitable or necessary aspect of things, giving rise to 
harmony in the world, enabling this world to be actualisable.  
However, I described how the understanding of the dark side or shadow side is 
different in either thinker. In Haught, the dark side has a negative meaning for human 
                                                 
630 ‘The law was added so that the trespass might increase. But where sin increased, grace increased 
all the more’ (Rom. 5:20). 
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beings and creatures as we perceive the suffering in the world, but which is no less 
inevitable in our experience for the purpose of actualising the best possible world 
until it disappears in the eschatological future. In contrast, in the Zhuangzi, the 
shadow side is not something to be overcome in the future, but something which 
exists eternally as an important element of Dao. This difference can supplement the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught: if we could accept that the dark side may allow for 
what is good in God’s creation (be it love, friendship or justice), as the harmony of 
yin-yang allows for what is good in the Zhuangzi, evolutionary theology can accept 




New Creation and the Theodicy of the Metaphysical Future 
 
There are several questions which arise when we reflect on ‘evolution’: why chance 
does not annihilate the possibility of the order that we see in evolutionary processes, 
why nature is ordered and yet open to disorder, and why natural selection can be 
explained by scientific laws and yet also be open to the theological explanation of an 
indeterminate, continuously created, new creation. For Haught, a metaphysics of the 
deterministic past or of an eternal present does not answer these questions. Haught is 
convinced that only within the framework of a theological metaphysics of the future 
will these kinds of questions concerning evolution be compatible with Darwinian 
science.631 In the evolutionary theology of Haught, a metaphysics of the future is the 
central idea that settles the underlying tension between theology and science that is 
so often posited as a pressing issue for us today. Haught’s point of view on theodicy 
is also focused on hope in the future rather than present suffering. For Haught, the 
suffering that is presently and necessarily undergone in evolutionary processes is not 
a severe theological problem as long as it promises something better or higher in the 
future.632 
In this chapter I will therefore develop Haught’s conception of the ‘future’ in 
relation to the notion of the completion of creation (as promised in Christianity) 
before comparing it to the cyclical notion of time in relation to cosmic completion in 
the Zhuangzi. In the first section, I will focus on purpose or direction in evolution in 
order to argue for what I will call the ‘progress defence’. In the second section, I will 
discuss new creation and the Daoist notion of tianrenyitong (the unity of heaven and 
human being) to build what I will call the ‘future reward defence’. Based on these 
two defences in conjunction with the previous five I have posited, I hope to offer an 
integral theodicy in a scientific age.  
 
                                                 
631 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 103-04. 
632 Rolston similarly claims that ‘The question is not whether the world is, or ever was, a happy place. 
Rather, the question is whether it is a place of significant suffering through to something higher. 
[Holmes Rolston Ⅲ, Science and Religion: A Critical Survey (PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 
2006), 142.] 
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(1) The Progress Defence: Purpose/Direction of Evolution 
Description 
Whether there is a divinely ordained direction or purpose in natural processes for 
Haught and Zhuangzi is debatable. Darwin acknowledged progress in evolution in 
the first edition of On the Origin of Species,633 but he changed his mind in the later 
edition and most of his followers deny such a global direction or universal progress 
in nature (this is not to deny relative progress, relative to the evolutionary advantages 
of certain creatures).634 How can we know that there is purpose or direction in 
evolution? Most evolutionary biologists deny teleology in nature. American 
evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould argues that no preordained purpose 
informs the history of life,635 and many scientists, such as Ernst Mayr,636 Steven 
Weinberg,637 Sandra Faber,638 Marc Davis639 and William Provine640 deny that the 
universe has a purpose. Peter Bowler, historian of biology, claims that Christians 
have traditionally presumed that history is not progressive. According to him, 
because humans have fallen from an initial state through original sin, the divine 
purpose that was primordially present in creation has been negated by humanity’s 
intentional separation from God.641  
However, some evolutionary theologians argue that teleology, or more exactly 
an intentional progress in nature, is still important in order to maintain a coherent 
notion of divine providence for creatures, and they accept such purpose for creatures 
in their own ways. For example, Peters and Hewlett say, ‘God provides a purpose for 
                                                 
633 ‘As natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental 
endowments will tend to progress towards perfection’. Darwin, 360. 
634 It is very difficult to define absolute progress in evolution, since there is no fixed point of reference 
that creatures are either evolving away from or towards. 
635 Gould, 41. 
636 Ernst Mayr, "Evolution," Scientific American 239, no. 3 (1978): 50. 
637 Steven Weinberg, The First Three Minutes: A Modern View of the Origin of the Universe (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977), 144. 
638 Alan P. Lightman and Roberta Brawer, Origins: The Lives and Worlds of Modern Cosmologists 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 340. 
639 Ibid., 358. 
640 William B. Provine, "Evolution and the Foundation of Ethics," in Science, Technology and Social 
Progress, ed. Steven L. Goldman (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1989), 261. 
641 Peter J. Bowler, Monkey Trials and Gorilla Sermons: Evolution and Christianity from Darwin to 
Intelligent Design (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 27-28. 
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nature but not within nature’.642 They explain this with analogy to human purpose; 
when a person builds a chair with a tree, the chair did not exist in the tree but became 
a chair because of the design of the person with a purpose. Although evolutionary 
biologists cannot discern divine purpose within nature, theologians expect that God 
has a purpose for nature. Thus, for these theologians, we must distinguish between a 
general teleology or end of God’s creating human beings and other creatures, and 
self-assigned teleologies of human beings with the free will to direct their own lives. 
That said, Haught proposes to understand ‘purpose’ as the ‘orientation of a 
process toward the realization of a value’ rather than as ‘heading straight toward a 
goal fixed from all eternity’,643 in other words, distinguishing between object and 
direction. For him, the term ‘purpose’ cannot be discussed apart from the concept of 
value because nothing but orientation toward value makes a movement purposeful. 
Thus Haught regards purpose as ‘the defining quality of any process aiming toward 
the realization of value’.644 Applying this distinction, then, we note that, according to 
the Big Bang model, the universe was a homogenous sea of radiation at the 
beginning, but now we see a wealth of plants, animals, humans and cultures on earth. 
There has been a gradual increase in organized complexity and in conscious 
awareness, and eventually the universe’s evolution has produced intellect, or 
conscious mind. The existence of intelligent organisms shows that something of 
importance has been progressing in the universe. Haught therefore emphasises the 
fact that great complexity and beauty have appeared in this universe, and argues that 
these show that the universe has a purpose or direction. But I think that it is not clear 
whether increased complexity implies progression or teleology.  
It is not easy to explore what Zhuangzi may and may not think about purpose or 
direction in evolutionary processes because the Zhuangzi does not discuss the matter 
directly, so we need to infer Zhuangzi’s idea of purpose from what he says about the 
features of the natural world.  
According to the Zhuangzi, there are indeed beauties, regularities and principles 
in the natural world: ‘Heaven and earth have their great beauties but do not speak of 
                                                 
642 Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett, Can You Believe in God and Evolution? A Guide for the 
Perplexed (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006), 120. 
643 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 109-11. 
644 John F. Haught, Nature and Purpose (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980), 70. 
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them; the four seasons have their clear-marked regularity but do not discuss it; the 
ten thousand things have their principles of growth but do not expound them’.645 In 
the Zhuangzi, the natural world is characterised by beauty rather than cruelty, and by 
evident regularities rather than chaotic or random events.  
Moreover, the recognition that the world is changing continuously is revealed in 
the Zhuangzi even if it does not imply the notion of evolution. All things change on 
their own: ‘The life of things is a gallop, a headlong dash – with every movement 
they alter, with every moment they shift. What should you do and what should you 
not do? Everything will change of itself, that is certain’.646 Everything in the world is 
moving and changing constantly, and these movements themselves operate with 
certain rules. One of the most obvious movements on earth for us is the changing of 
the four seasons.  
When the breath of spring comes forth, the hundred grasses begin to grow, 
and later, when autumn visits them, their ten thousand fruits swell and 
ripen. Yet how could spring and autumn do other than they do? – Dao of 
Heaven has already set them in motion.647 
The Zhuangzi states that Dao has already set all things in motion. The movement 
of the earth and the changing of the seasons are rooted in the movement of Dao, and 
so this particular series of movements cannot be regarded as merely ‘random’ or 
‘chance’ events.  
 
Comparison and Generalisation 
Whether or not direction or purpose exists in the process of evolution is important for 
evolutionary theologians because this is a decisive point of contact between 
evolutionary biology and theology. If God is a Creator, we can expect that God has 
designs or has a purpose for his creation, based on Biblical teachings.648 Christian 
theology has a basic notion of providence, and so there is an expectation that, if God 
                                                 
645 Zhuangzi, chap. 22. (天地有大美而不言, 四時有明法而不議, 萬物有成理而不說.) Watson, 178.  
646 Ibid., chap. 17. (物之生也, 若驟若馳, 無動而不變, 無時而不移. 何爲乎, 何不爲乎, 
夫固將自化.) Watson, 132. 
647 Ibid., chap. 23. (夫春氣發而百草生, 正得秋而萬寶成. 夫春與秋, 豈無得而然哉? 天道已行矣.) 
Watson, 188. 
648 See Genesis 1 and Romans 8.  
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is the creator through evolution, then evolution must in some sense be providential 
too, rather than violent toward creatures and wasteful in terms of time and life. 
However, examining or inferring evidence of a divine ‘plan’ through the operations 
of nature actually encumbers effective conversation between Christian theology and 
evolutionary science because evolutionary theorists have been successful in 
demonstrating that it is immensely difficult to harmonize scientific narratives with 
the Christian notion(s) of a divine design or plan. It would seem, according to such 
theorists, that the ‘law of the jungle’, which implies immense suffering and pain of 
weaker or ill-adapted creatures, as well as nature’s apparent inefficiency as it relates 
to the amount of time and suffering in evolutionary history it has taken for nature to 
manifest the human form, is incompatible with the notion of divine providence or 
design – especially by a loving, omnipotent God.  
Such cases, however, mean that, for Haught, there is no point or purpose to the 
universe. Haught argues that ‘Purpose is a much wider notion than plan or design, 
and it can live much more comfortably with chance, disorder, and the abyss of 
cosmic time than can the all too simple notion of design’.649 
Haught understands ‘purpose’ minimally as that which is ‘oriented toward a 
goal or toward a value’ or ‘at least vaguely directional lines’.650 In this sense, Haught 
claims that there is direction or purpose to evolution, but it does not mean ‘heading 
straight toward a goal fixed from all eternity’ but ‘a gradual rise in organized 
complexity, in sentience, and eventually in conscious awareness’.651  
This kind of understanding of purpose does not conflict with evolutionary 
science because the evolution of life works to increase levels of complexity overall, 
with the exception of the great extinctions, including what is referred to as the 
Holocene or Anthropocene extinction today, even while both human and artificial 
intelligence become more advanced and complicated – suggesting the emergence of 
new forms of life concurrent with the eradication of many others. Haught 
furthermore connects purpose or direction to the notion of beauty: ‘In an even 
broader sense there has been an ongoing cosmic trend toward complexity, and 
                                                 
649 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 114. 
650 Haught, Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation, 164-65. 
651 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 109-10. 
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toward more and more intense versions of ordered novelty – that is, toward 
beauty’.652  
Haught understands that ‘putting things this way allows us to affirm cosmic 
purpose without having to deny the realities of evolutionary struggle, innocent 
suffering and moral evil’.653 Although there is suffering and struggle in the evolving 
world, they are not unbearable evils if the world is approaching more ordered novelty 
or beauty. 
 Similarly, in the Zhuangzi, the natural world moves toward increasing harmony 
and beauty if harmony and beauty are not encumbered by self-conscious human 
actions which inevitably distort the order of the cosmos. We cannot say that the 
world has an externally given special purpose in Daoism, but it is possible to say that 
the world is always moving toward harmony and beauty in and through the operation 
of yin and yang. 
Based on this rather general similarity between the two systems, I will formally 
generalise the idea of purpose between Haught and the Zhuangzi as what I will 
henceforth call the ‘progress defence’. Both Haught and the Zhuangzi understand 
that there is direction in the natural world as long as that direction means reaching 
toward ‘beauty’. If we can accept that the natural world moves for the sake of 
reaching a better state, that is, a better world, beautiful and free from of pain and 
suffering, the problem of evil and suffering in its present state can be seen to be a far 
less severe issue because we can live in the well-founded hope for a better future. 
 
Differentiation and Supplementation 
According to our methodology, it is beneficial for us to also highlight the differences 
between Haught and Zhuangzi in their understanding of purpose or direction in the 
process of evolution. Most of all, in the Zhuangzi, changes or movements of nature 
are not by any means ‘intentional’ or ‘purposive’ movements of Dao even if those 
movements do culminate in metaphysical beauty. We can see how the movement of 
heaven and earth do not require external direction or purpose in the Zhuangzi:  
                                                 
652 Ibid., 110. 
653 Haught, Deeper Than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in the Age of Evolution, 40. 
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Does heaven turn? Does the earth sit still? Do sun and moon compete for a 
place to shine? Who masterminds all this? Who pulls the strings? Who, 
resting inactive himself, gives the push that makes it go this way? I 
wonder, is there some mechanism that works it and won’t let it stop? I 
wonder if it just rolls and turns and can’t bring itself to a halt? Do the 
clouds make the rain, or does the rain make the clouds? Who puffs them 
up, who showers them down like this? Who, resting inactive himself, stirs 
up all this lascivious joy? The winds rise in the north, blowing now west, 
now east, whirling up to wander on high. Whose breaths and exhalations 
are they? Who, resting inactive himself, huffs and puffs them about like 
this?654 
In this passage, ‘resting inactive (無事)’ is repeated three times. Again, it means 
that all operations of heaven and earth are not intentionally governed by Ultimate 
Reality but are the natural process of Dao, operating in and of themselves (ziran). It 
also means that the system operates ‘inactively’ (wuwei). All things in the world 
grow up out of non-action: 
The inaction of Heaven is its purity, the inaction of earth is its peace. So 
the two inactions combine, and all things are transformed and brought to 
birth. Wonderfully, mysteriously, there is no place they come out of. 
Mysteriously, wonderfully, they have no sign. Each thing minds its 
business, and all grow up out of inaction.655 
In the Zhuangzi, the world moves with non-action, and thus direction or purpose 
is not presented as an important subject for discussion. Dao does its work 
spontaneously, and notions of direction or purpose cannot be assessed in Daoism 
because Dao’s action has no purpose. Joachim Gentz characterises Dao as ‘an eternal 
creative force or principle that is the unintentional generative source of all things, 
including heaven and earth’.656 In his understanding, Dao is an ‘unintentional’ 
generative source having nothing to do with direction or purpose. It does not mean 
                                                 
654 Zhuangzi, chap. 14. (天其運乎? 地其處乎? 日月其爭於所乎? 孰主張是? 孰維綱是? 
孰居無事而推行是? 意者其有機緘而不得已邪? 意者其運轉而不能自止邪? 雲者爲雨乎? 
雨者爲雲乎? 孰隆施是? 孰居無事淫樂而勸是? 風起北方, 一西一東, 在上彷徨, 孰噓吸是? 
孰居無事而披拂是? 敢問何故?) Watson, 108.  
655 Ibid., chap. 18. (天無爲以之淸, 地無爲以之寧. 故兩無爲相合, 萬物皆化生. 芒乎芴乎, 
而無從出乎! 芴乎芒乎, 而無有象乎! 萬物職職, 皆從無爲殖.) Watson, 140. 
656 Gentz, Understanding Chinese Religions, 78. 
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that the process of continuous creation is characterized by randomness, which some 
evolutionists argue based on the random mutation alongside natural selection.  
Now, because Dao creates all creatures ‘spontaneously’ (ziran), there are indeed 
no goals to be attained in Dao’s creation of anything. Moreover, because all creatures 
‘become themselves’ (another meaning of ziran) in and with Dao’s operation, there 
is no randomness in Daoism. On the one hand, Dao does not lead all creatures into 
the process of ‘red in tooth and claw’ as if with the design of weeding out the weaker 
species and cultivating stronger species, and on the other hand, to reiterate, Dao does 
not lead them to any special cosmic end or goal.  
For the Zhuangzi, continuous and spontaneous creation of Dao can produce 
order without direction, which the central concept of wuwei conveys. The Zhuangzi 
says, ‘Heaven does not give birth, yet ten thousand things are transformed; earth does 
not sustain, yet ten thousand things are nourished’.657 The Zhuangzi also says that 
‘To act through non-action is called Heaven’.658 Even though Dao creates all things 
spontaneously, the world has its own order: ‘Spring and summer precede, and 
autumn and winter follow – such is the sequence of the four seasons.… If you speak 
of Dao and not of its sequence, then it is not Dao’.659 
The theological debate about direction or purpose in the process of evolution, 
which is important in evolutionary theodicy, is premised upon the notion that God 
has an intimate relationship with all creatures. Surely, many evolutionary 
theologians, including Haught, exclude God’s direct intervention in natural selection 
in trying to harmonize God’s existence and creation of the natural order with 
evolutionary science. At the same time, what can still properly be called God’s 
purpose for all creatures is not abandoned easily. Haught’s conviction, which is also 
my conviction, is that discussion of God’s purpose for all creatures ought to be 
harmonized with natural selection that seems to deny progress in nature. In the 
evolutionary theology of Haught, there is purpose and direction towards better states 
of the world and the cosmos in and through evolution, but it does not exhibit flawless 
                                                 
657 Zhuangzi, chap. 13. (天不産而萬物化, 地不長而萬物育.) Watson, 100.  
658 Ibid., chap. 12. (無爲爲之之謂天.) 
659 Ibid., chap. 13. (春夏先秋冬後, 四時之序也.… 語道而非其序者, 非其道也.) Watson, 101-102.  
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‘design’; rather, it is validated by its carrying the promise that the cosmos finds its 
fundamental ‘purpose’.  
In contrast, harmonizing a divinely-ordained teleology with the observable 
processes of nature is less a problem for Daoism in virtue of the benefits of the 
Daoist way of thinking. I believe that evolutionary theodicy does not need to be tied 
to purpose or direction in the natural world and the theses of Bowler and Ted Peters 
make for a good case as to why. Bowler insists that Darwinism has no built-in trend, 
and that it is ‘an open-ended, haphazard, and largely unpredictable model of 
progress’.660 He argues that the Christian tradition assumes that history is not 
progressive because of original sin.661 Peters also accepts that teleology is no longer 
persuasive and recommends that ‘theologians affirm a divine purpose for nature’662 
not ‘within nature itself’. For him, a divine purpose for nature is not located in a 
built-in telos but located in the will of God, and this goal is the new creation.663 
Receiving and utilizing these transformative ideas from Zhuangzi, Bowler and 
Peters, I want to supplement the evolutionary theodicy of Haught for this new era of 
inter-religious and inter-disciplinary collaboration. Overall, Haught’s works suggest 
a good understanding of purpose without conflict between Christian theology and 
evolutionary biology. However, I think that evolutionary theology does not need to 
retain the notion of a purpose of nature that involves a trajectory toward a better 
state.  
Although many Christians would respond that there must be divine purpose in 
the evolution of human beings in virtue of the fact that we are made in the ‘image of 
God’, which itself implies teleology, the very notions of ‘purpose’ and ‘progress’ are 
only conceivable within a framework that presupposes the linearity, or linear 
progression, of time. God’s divine purpose for nature and humans may not have such 
a direction if we accept not only that God exists beyond time and space, but also that 
the notion of the linearity of time as we experience it is also false. Just as direction 
does not have an important meaning in Daoism, which holds a cyclical understanding 
                                                 
660 Bowler, Monkey Trials and Gorilla Sermons: Evolution and Christianity from Darwin to 
Intelligent Design, 223. 
661 Ibid., 27. 
662 Peters, "Constructing a Theology of Evolution: Building on John Haught," 929. 
663 Ibid. 
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of time, the purpose of God who exists beyond time does not need to be revealed in 
the progression of time.  
According to Haught’s understanding of purpose, the natural world should 
become ‘better’ – that is, freed from pain and suffering – as time goes by, or at or by 
a certain time in the future (though we cannot predict this). However, if we accept 
that God does have a purpose or direction for nature in Himself beyond space and 
time, we can still claim that God is closely related to creatures and their pain and 
suffering, regardless of the future of the world as it is observed by us. Concerning 
purpose, the evolutionary theology of Haught can be supplemented by the ideas of 
purpose (or rather, lack thereof) in the Zhuangzi for a more integral response to the 
problem of evil and suffering.  
In this section, I tried to develop the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi in the light of purpose or direction of evolution. 
Haught accepts direction or purpose in evolution, but it does not mean ‘heading 
straight toward a goal fixed from all eternity’. Rather, it means ‘a gradual rise in 
organized complexity’. In the Zhuangzi, the natural world moves toward increasing 
harmony and beauty through the operation of yin-yang if uninterrupted by self-
conscious human actions. Based on these similar ideas, I generalised them as the 
‘progress defence’. The ‘progress defence’ implies that there is direction in the 
natural world as long as that direction means progression towards ‘beauty’ in both 
Haught and the Zhuangzi, thereby giving us hope a better future and a partial solution 
to the problem of evil.  
It was quite clear, however, that the notions of purpose or direction in Haught 
and Zhuangzi are not identical. The differences can be used to supplement the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught. To be specific, in the Zhuangzi, changes or 
movements of nature are not ‘intentional’ movements of Dao even if those 
movements culminate in a richer beauty of the cosmos. Moreover, ‘direction’ (a 
notion which implies or includes the linear progression of time) does not have an 
important meaning in Daoism because Daoism holds a cyclical understanding of time 
and Dao subsists beyond time in an eternal present. Therefore, if evolutionary 
theology accepts that God does have a purpose or direction for nature in Himself, 
beyond space and time, it can still argue that God is closely related to the world, the 
lives and destinies of its creatures, including all their suffering and pain, regardless of 
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the ‘future’ or new creation of the world, which Haught regards as important for 
redemption of pain and suffering.  
 
(2) The Final Fulfilment Defence: New Creation and Tianrenyitong (天人一通, 
the unity of heaven and human being)  
Description 
As I expounded in Chapter 3:3 in detail, a ‘metaphysics of the future’ is one of the 
most important ideas in the evolutionary theodicy of Haught. In a metaphysics of the 
future, God draws the universe toward future fulfilment:  
Evolution, to put it as directly as I can, seems to require a divine source of 
being that resides not in a timeless present located somewhere ‘up above’, 
but in the future, essentially ‘up ahead’, as the goal of a world still in the 
making. The term ‘God’ in this revised metaphysics must once again mean 
for us, as it did for many of our biblical forbears, the transcendent future 
horizon that draws an entire universe, and not just human history, toward 
an unfathomable fulfilment yet to be realized.664 
Haught understands that God exists ‘up ahead’ rather than ‘up above’, or to put it 
differently, he focuses on the journey toward the future rather than juxtaposing God’s 
design to present or past states of the world. To experience the ontological power of 
the future, Haught argues, we should dwell in a specific narrative or history, wherein 
the future unexpectedly invades the present and leads the world to formerly 
undreamed potentials. 
According to Haught, if we only pay attention to an ever-expanding cosmic past, 
we can never discover intelligibility in the world. Haught claims that ‘[A] 
metaphysics of the future not only allows scope for the hopes of religion but also 
provides an open-ended and realistic framework for the ongoing adventure of 
scientific discovery’.665 For him, a metaphysics of the future helps us to make better 
sense of evolutionary science than does a completely mechanistic framework 
constructed in terms of causal sequences and which impedes the novel creation of the 
evolutionary process.  
                                                 
664 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 91. 
665 Ibid., 101. 
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Haught’s metaphysics of the future is closely connected to the Christian notion of 
‘new creation’ because his expectation of the future completion of all creation can 
only be realised in the eschatological future. For Haught, authentic faith affirms that 
‘God’s initial creation (creatio originalis) continues even now (creatio continua) and 
will be brought to fulfilment in the future (creatio nova)’.666 In the evolutionary 
theology of Haught, eschatology is the extension into the future of a basic Christian 
faith that God is still creating the world.  
The reason why a metaphysics of the future is important in Haught’s theology is 
that it provides a clue to the more comprehensive answer to the problem of evil that 
we have alluded to. If we accept that the universe is still unfinished and it is in a 
process of progression directed to the future, we cannot expect that it should appear 
to possess finished perfection at this time. For Haught, if the universe is imperfect (at 
least for now), the appearance of evil and suffering is not inconceivable because it 
can be regarded as the dark side of the world’s continuous creation.667 The problem 
of evil will be totally settled in the eschatological future, i.e. new creation in 
Haught’s evolutionary theology.  
The expectation of an ultimate cosmic future is difficult to find in the Zhuangzi, 
because the Zhuangzi’s understanding of time is different to that of Haught. In the 
Zhuangzi, all differentiations are rejected. For example, the sun at noon is the sun 
setting, and a thing born is a thing dying.668 Time is no exception: ‘I set off for Yue 
today and came there yesterday’.669 This seems to be illogical because it is 
impossible to arrive yesterday after leaving today. Burton Watson understands that 
these paradoxes express the relativity of space and time.670 Clear distinctions 
between the past, present and future are foreign to classical philosophical Daoism as 
present in the Zhuangzi. The Daoist position regarding such differentiations between 
periods of time, and indeed causes and effects is very apparent in the text: 
                                                 
666 Ibid., 156. 
667 Ibid., 41. 
668 Zhuangzi, chap. 33. 
669 Ibid. (今日適越而昔來.) Watson, 297.  
670 Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Zhuangzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 
297. 
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There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There 
is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is 
being. There is nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. 
There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. 
Suddenly there is being and nonbeing. But between this being and 
nonbeing, I don’t really know which is being and which is nonbeing.671 
According to Zhuangzi, if there is a ‘beginning’, there is before ‘the beginning’, 
and also a ‘before’ ‘the before the beginning’, and this has infinite retroactivity. In 
other words, tracing a beginning to its origin is meaningless because that beginning 
can never be identified.  
For Zhuangzi, there is also no way to distinguish between being and nonbeing. 
This is first of all because Daoism sees the phenomenal world as much more of a 
Heraclitean flux than a stratum of static Aristotelian essences. Heraclitus famously 
posited that reality consists of an ever-changing flux or flow, extending not only to 
our subjective experience but also to the very qualities or properties of things, such 
that we can never identify an object at all – destroying, like Zhuangzi, the 
foundations of philosophy and thought itself by refuting the first principles of logic 
(the laws of identity, non-contradiction and sufficient reason).672 
 Zhuangzi stands diametrically opposed to such realism and the theory of the 
‘correspondence’ between mind and objects that we find in classical philosophy from 
the Socratics onward. For Zhuangzi as for Heraclitus in ancient Greece, it is 
impossible to distinguish between an object or event’s beginning or end and between 
their boundaries and ‘inner essence’. The Zhuangzi relates this perspective very 
clearly with regard to the relativity of ascriptions of ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ to 
statements of fact, given that almost everything can be disputed philosophically or 
linguistically as to its truth or meaning at the most basic level – illustrated and 
perhaps made most explicit in modern time by Heidegger’s ‘philosophical 
                                                 
671 Zhuangzi, chap. 2. (有始也者, 有未始有始也者, 有未始有夫未始有始也者. 有有也者, 
有無也者, 有未始有無也者, 有未始有夫未始有無也者. 俄而有無矣, 
而未知有無之果孰有孰無也.) Watson, 12-13. 
672 This is in stark contrast to the philosophy of Aristotle, who posits a basic ‘realism’ in which objects 
stand in existence independent of the human mind but which nevertheless are identifiable in their 
essences and properties through intentional analysis. For Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition 
leading all the way to high medieval Christianity, concepts are the tool by which the mind makes 
intelligible basic sense data, corresponding to given objects. [Gay Watson, A Philosophy of 
Emptiness, 63.] 
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hermeneutics’ which questions the very notions of ‘being’ and all other such 
fundamental terms that we ordinarily employ in philosophy and theology.673  
The famous story that Zhuangzi became a butterfly in his dream and became 
confused as to whether he became a butterfly or a butterfly became Zhuangzi 
(Chapter 5:2 ‘Zhuangzi on Evil’) is a good illustration of the recognition of the 
impossibility of defining objects running throughout the book. The deeper point, 
however, is that for the Zhuangzi, the ‘truth’ of the matter is actually beside the 
point, because of the limits of language in ascribing truth to events and reality to 
objects in a binary fashion, despite the demands of everyday life. 
However, this does not mean that Daoists do not have a conception of change or 
movement or indeed the ‘flow’ of time. At that time when the clock did not exist, the 
change of four seasons was the primary means by which human beings and Daoists 
in particular measured time, in virtue of the fact that they lived in an agrarian society. 
Thus in the Zhuangzi: ‘Heaven at least has its fixed times of spring and fall, winter 
and summer, daybreak and dusk’,674 and ‘It’s just like the progression of the four 
seasons: spring, summer, fall, winter’.675 
In the Zhuangzi, the state of the transcendence of time and space is that which we 
might call enlightenment, or ‘sagehood’ (the sage being known as shengren). If the 
new creation is the point at which all imperfection in the world is transformed in 
perfection in Haught, becoming a sage in the Zhuangzi means to overcome evil and 
suffering in the world, transforming oneself. This is illustrative of the fundamental 
difference present in Christian theology and Chinese Daoist philosophy concerning 
what we may call ‘liberation’ or ‘salvation’: for Christianity, salvation is only 
achievable in and through divine agape, the giving of oneself over to God’s love, 
which transforms the universe. In contrast, for Daoism and Buddhism, salvation 
consists in achieving a certain ‘liberative’ knowledge (gnosis) about the nature (or 
lack thereof) of oneself and the universe.676 We also find, corresponding to the 
                                                 
673 Gay Watson, 76-79.  
674 Zhuangzi, chap. 32. (天猶有春秋冬夏旦暮之期.) Watson, 283. 
675 Ibid., chap. 18. (是相與爲春秋冬夏四時行也.) Watson, 141. 
676 Aloysius Pieris, "Christianity and Buddhism in Core-to-Core Dialogue," CrossCurrents 37, no. 1 
(1987): 47-48. 
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Christian and Daoist pictures of cosmic unity, two terms: heping (和平, universal 
peace) and pinghe (平和, inner peace). 
Becoming a sage in the Zhuangzi means to live in a state of unity with heaven.  
And what do you mean by saying, ‘man and Heaven are one’? Confucius 
[Zhuangzi] said, ‘Man exists because of Heaven, and Heaven, too, exists 
because of Heaven. But man cannot cause Heaven to exist; this is because 
of [the limitations of] his inborn nature. The sage, calm and placid, 
embodies change and so comes to his end.677 
It should be noted that in Chinese, ‘heaven’ can mean anything from ‘sky’, 
heaven in a sense of a spiritual realm, and also ‘universe’ in the sense of that which 
is indifferent to individual human actions. Therefore, the phrase ‘humans and heaven 
are one’ also means that ‘humans and the whole universe are one’. To repeat, 
contradictory to classical Western understandings of discrete essences, in Daoist 
philosophy, all things in the world come from the same origin, and they are one.  
In this world, the ten thousand things come together in One; and if you can 
find that One and become identical with it, then your four limbs and 
hundred joints will become dust and sweepings; life and death, beginning 
and end, will be mere day and night, and nothing whatever can confound 
you.678 
The Daoist sage teaches that if humans realize that all things come together in 
one, any change on earth cannot, in fact, disturb them. Pain, suffering and death are 
not to be regarded as a problem that should be solved because they are also parts of 
the one. My life, if I am a Daoist, does not consist in the 70 or 80 years between the 
commencement of consciousness manifest in this particular organism that I am and 
the degeneration back into what is unconsciousness, namely, the earth, for again, I 
am that of which and from out of which consciousness both comes and goes. In other 
words, I am Dao, and Dao contains and transcends both consciousness and 
unconsciousness. 
                                                 
677 Zhuangzi, chap. 20. (何謂人與天一邪? 尼曰. 有人, 天也. 有天, 亦天也. 人之不能有天, 性也. 
聖人晏然體逝而終矣.) Watson, 164.  
678 Ibid., chap. 21. (夫天下也者, 萬物之所一也. 得其所一而同焉, 則四肢百體將爲塵垢, 
而死生終始將爲晝夜而莫之能滑.) Watson, 170.  
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For achieving unity with the rest of nature and with heaven, zuowang is one of 
the most important methods for the Daoist. As I expounded in Chapter 5:2, the term 
zuowang (‘siting in forgetfulness’) is an important method in overcoming the 
experience of overwhelming evil or suffering. Zhuangzi expounds zuowang through 
the mouth of Yan Hui: ‘I smash up my limbs and body, drive out perception and 
intellect, cast off form, do away with understanding, and make myself identical with 
the Great Thoroughfare. This is what I mean by sitting down and forgetting 
everything’.679 The ultimate state in Daoist training is that of forgetting everything, 
i.e. the transcendent state of the cessation of arbitrary distinctions between things and 
events, between the cosmos and myself, between happiness and suffering and 
between comfort and pain. The problem of evil is overcome in the step of zuowang. 
What comes about is not merely happiness, but peace; pinghe. 
 
Comparison and Generalisation 
There are several similarities between Haught and Zhuangzi in understanding the 
problem of evil from the perspective of new creation. I identify three. 
First, for both Haught and the Zhuangzi time is understood or experienced qua 
subjectivity. The subjective experience of time – its ‘duration’ – is more important 
than the objectivity of time – ‘clock time’ – as Henri Bergson famously argued. Both 
Zhuangzi and Haught focus on the experience of time rather than an ‘objective’ 
nature of time.  
The time of God in the Bible is sometimes pictured in a relative sense. For 
example, the Psalmist says, ‘For a thousand years in your sight are like a day that has 
just gone by, or like a watch in the night’ (90:4), and Peter similarly says, ‘With the 
Lord a day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day’ (2 Peter 3:8). 
From the perspective of God who is regarded as the One who is transcendent of time 
and space, the quantitative difference between a day and a thousand years is 
meaningless. Moltmann claims that the linear time implied by evolution will drop 
away for the revelation of the eternality of the new creation: ‘Eschatological future is 
to be understood diachronically: it is simultaneous to all the times, and in being so it 
                                                 
679 Ibid., chap. 6. (墮肢體, 黜聰明, 離形去知, 同於大通, 此謂坐忘.) Watson, 53.  
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represents eternity for all things’.680 Haught similarly gives priority to the future 
rather than the past and the present because ‘without the consistent and faithful 
coming of the future there would be no pushing of the present into the past, and 
consequently no temporal sequence of moments in which evolution could occur’.681 
For Zhuangzi, the passage of time is comprehended by a change of season, and 
the length of time depends on the perception of each being relatively. Zhuangzi says: 
South of Chu there is a caterpillar that counts five hundred years as one 
spring and five hundred years as one autumn. Long, long ago there was a 
great rose of Sharon that counted eight thousand years as one spring and 
eight thousand years as one autumn.682 
It is common sense that one spring or one autumn cannot exceed a year, but these 
are, of course, human conventions and need not map onto the universe as a whole 
(for example, a year on Jupiter is different to a year on Earth) or indeed lifeforms 
whose experience of time, or duration, is different to ours. We can metaphorically 
understand that the year of a dog is much ‘shorter’ than that of a human, but a year 
for a human is much shorter than that of a blue whale, despite the fact that 
‘objectively’, a year is the same for all creatures globally. We can notice that 
Zhuangzi also understands time relatively, and for him, anyone who is bound to the 
absoluteness of time as quantified by human beings cannot arrive at complete 
knowledge: ‘The reason why a summer insect cannot understand ice is that it is 
bound to a single season’.683 In short, time is the essential topic that runs throughout 
both Haught and Zhuangzi and they understand time analogously. 
The second similarity between Haught and Zhuangzi, which we have already 
implied, is the provision of salvation or liberation (or at least the possibility of such 
for all creatures, and not just human beings). For Haught, new creation means the 
fulfilment of creation, void of any pain and suffering of all creatures (Chapter 2:6). 
Similarly in the Zhuangzi, human beings and nature cannot be distinguished in this 
                                                 
680 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, 303. 
681 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 112. 
682 Zhuangzi, chap. 1. (楚之南有冥靈者, 以五百歲爲春, 五百歲爲秋. 上古有大椿者, 
以八千歲爲春, 八千歲爲秋.) Watson, 2.  
683 Ibid., chap. 17. (夏蟲不可以語於氷者, 篤於時也.)  
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regard: ‘Heaven and earth were born with me, and the all things are one with me’684 
The understanding that humans and heaven (or nature) are one is an oft-repeated and 
thus important theme in the Zhuangzi.  
Finally and most importantly, the unity between human beings and Ultimate 
Reality is significant in both new creation (Haught) and the stage of sagehood 
(Zhuangzi). In the Bible, the unification between human beings and God often 
appears as the core teaching. For example, Jesus says, ‘I am the vine; you are the 
branches. If a man remains in me and I in him, he will bear much fruit; apart from 
me you can do nothing (John 15:5)’, and Paul says, ‘I have been crucified with Christ 
and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me. The life I live in the body, I live by faith 
in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me’ (Gal. 2:20). The doctrine 
of ‘incarnation’ also means that God became human to save the world. Just as God 
clothed himself with a human body and entered into human history, humans will 
clothe themselves with a divine body in the time of new creation: ‘Listen, I tell you a 
mystery: We will not all sleep, but we will all be changed – in a flash, in the 
twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, the dead will be 
raised imperishable, and we will be changed’ (1 Cor. 15:51–52). These teachings 
confirm and deepen the doctrine of the imago dei that humans are made in the image 
of God. 
Although Haught does not seem to speak directly about the unification of 
humans and God in this new creation, his expectation of a final fulfilment of all 
creation – a world without pain and suffering – is essential for the state of all 
creatures to be transformed, that is, essential for his evolutionary theology to have 
apologetic value, and for a theodicy based on his wider evolutionary theology to 
come to a point of culmination relevant for those posing the problem of evil here and 
now. The rule of survival of the fittest will disappear at that time, and the wolf will 
live with the lamb (Isa. 11:6; 65:25). I believe that this kind of world without pain, 
suffering and death may only be possible when all creatures are endowed with fully 
divine properties, as we hear about in the Biblical stories of a new heaven and a new 
earth, and the notion of a ‘resurrection body’.685 I think that a world free of the dark 
                                                 
684 Ibid., chap. 2. (天地與我竝生, 而萬物與我爲一.)  
685 According to Deane-Drummond, the newness of the new creation implies that ‘the new time, space 
and matter will be radically transformed, entering perhaps new dimensions of reality’. This infers that 
humanity is not a dominator but a server of creational community, and that the redeeming work of 
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side we have been speaking of is possible for Haught when he presupposes that God 
and all creatures unify in one, when the divine properties afforded to human beings 
reach their perfection. 
Similarly, the unity between human beings and heaven (Dao) or the unity 
between humans and the universe is a theme repeated throughout the Zhuangzi 
(recall the story of Zhuangzi and butterfly illustrating wuhua, the seamlessness of 
human reality and cosmic or natural reality). Wuhua (物化) literally means ‘the 
transformation of things’ or ‘things transform’. In the state of wuhua, humans can 
reach an awareness of the interconnection of all things: I and the universe become 
one in the state of wuhua. To become one with the universe or Ultimate Reality, 
humans should forget all conventional knowledge afforded by language and practical 
concerns – the breaking up of the world between subject and object, thing and event. 
The Zhuangzi argues, ‘Forget things, forget Heaven, and be called a forgetter of self. 
The man who has forgotten self may be said to have entered Heaven’.686 This is the 
same principle that we can see in the Bible: ‘If anyone would come after me, he must 
deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me’ (Matt. 16:24; Mark 8:32; 
Luke 9:23). Forgetting or denying oneself is a prior condition for someone to unify 
with Ultimate Reality or the entirety of nature.  
Based on these similarities concerning the experience of time and the possibility 
of a redemptive cosmic unification achieved either through agape or gnosis, I want 
to generalise the ideas of Haught and Zhuangzi for what I will call the ‘final 
fulfilment defence’. For Haught, ‘Eschatology seeks to arouse complete trust in the 
God who makes promises, who is faithful to these promises, whose “reign” will 
bring about a “new creation,” and who comes to meet us out of an always surprising 
and ultimately fulfilling future’.687 Haught’s theological vision of nature as promise 
helps us to face up to the suffering and pain inevitable in evolution. Haught says, 
‘Eschatology and hope are broad-minded enough to acknowledge the ugliness and 
unresolved cruelty in any present state of evolution without requiring that we accept 
these conditions as final’.688 We can and do expect a final fulfilment in virtue of a 
                                                 
Christ connects with all creatures, not just for humanity. [Deane-Drummond, Wonder and Wisdom: 
Conversations in Science, Spirituality, and Theology, 131-32.] 
686 Zhuangzi, chap. 12. (忘乎物, 忘乎天, 其名爲忘己, 忘己之人, 是之謂入於天.) Watson, 89. 
687 Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 156. 
688 Ibid., 166. 
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promise, rather than merely stagnate in present conditions. For Haught, ‘Evil, 
suffering and sin can be conquered by new creation’.689 In the Zhuangzi, through 
Daoist training (zuowang, wuhua) people can arrive at final fulfilment, i.e. the state 
of forgetting everything and unifying with heaven (nature). In this state of the unity 
of the human and the cosmic, discussing good and evil or placing values on events 
based on mere feeling is meaningless because this state is a state of consciousness 
beyond discrimination, beyond the susceptibility of being caught by feelings and 
their colouring of the world. Therefore, the final fulfilment defence helps us to 
endure nature’s inherent limitations that bring about inner suffering and the 
conscious formulation of the problem of evil.  
 
Differentiation and Supplementation 
Based on our methodology, I will highlight the differences between Haught and 
Zhuangzi in their understanding of a future or at least possible liberation, salvation or 
redemption and supplement Haught’s ideas based on those differences.  
First, in discussing the final fulfilment of creation Haught focuses on the notion 
of ‘time’ and Zhuangzi focuses on that of ‘fulfilment’. For Haught, a final fulfilment 
will be accomplished in and by the coming eschatological ‘future’. In contrast, in the 
Zhuangzi, a final fulfilment is possible in the near future or even now, attainable by 
the withdrawal into Dao, and not in the end of the world. Zhuangzi says:  
Your master happened to come because it was his time, and he happened 
to leave because things follow along. If you are content with the time and 
willing to follow along, then grief and joy have no way to enter.690 
What Zhuangzi aims to point out here is that, contrary to the notion that ‘all 
things happen for a reason’ – the principle of sufficient reason – that is taken for 
granted in everyday language, events in life need not happen for a cause, and 
certainly have no overarching narrative or chain of causes or preceding events. It is 
by acknowledging this flowing nature of events – we might even say the ‘floating’ 
nature of the world and things that happen in it – that inner peace (pinghe) is 
                                                 
689 Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution, 128. 
690 Zhuangzi, chap. 3. (安時而處順, 哀樂不能入也.) Watson, 21.  
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possible. People also do not need to wait for the future to overcome pain and 
suffering.  
Focusing on the ‘future’ redemption such as in Haught leaves us vulnerable to 
the charge that a future completion or fulfilment of creation is only persuasive for 
people who have the clear conviction of that coming future, and therefore not for 
those undergoing present sufferings without such a conviction. I recommend that if 
Haught’s idea of a metaphysics of the future focuses on ‘fulfilment’ rather than 
‘future’ and it is continuously reinterpreted in the ‘present’ perspective, it will be 
more persuasive. In other words, we can instead come to understand that the final 
fulfilment of creation is already happening, it is already here and now, and we are on 
the way as we travel in the present toward the future. 
Second, the agent that overcomes evil and suffering is different in Haught and 
Zhuangzi. Haught confirms that all pain and suffering will be eliminated by God in 
the time of the new creation, bringing universal peace from a top-down ordering. In 
contrast, the problem of evil in the Zhuangzi is overcome by human beings for 
themselves through training for sagehood and for pinghe. If we believe the final 
fulfilment will be brought about only by God, we are apt to think that the 
responsibility that humans have in the problem of evil in terms of their committing 
moral evil may be weakened to the extent that God becomes solely culpable. If 
humans have a role in bringing about a final redemption, attaining liberation or 
entering into salvation, we will become more truly responsible for unity and peace 
among ourselves and between human beings and the cosmos in a larger scope.  
Finally, Haught and Zhuangzi have different ideas of time. Haught’s idea of a 
metaphysics of the future is premised upon a linear understanding of time. Creation 
is the process of the fulfilment of creation (new creation) leading from an initial 
creation. For Haught, then, this new creation is the peak of God’s creation. 
In contrast, the Zhuangzi demonstrates a conviction in the cyclical nature of time:  
All things in the world have different origins, and they succeed one 
another in different forms. Their beginning and end are elements of a 
constant gyration, and people cannot know its order.691  
                                                 
691 Ibid., chap. 27. (萬物皆種也, 以不同形相禪. 始卒若環, 莫得其倫.)  
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In such an endless cycle, discussing beginning and end are illogical: ‘There is no 
past and no present, no beginning and no end’.692 In the Zhuangzi, each entity exists 
in the cycle that birth (beginning) and death (end) constitute together as its two 
aspects. There is, as it were, a constant gyration between beginnings and endings, life 
and death, and the whole universe containing the earth is no exception. The 
beginning and end of the universe should be understood as the process of eternal 
cycle or gyration. Because end means new beginning in the Zhuangzi, there is no 
idea of a future redemption, that is, the harmonization of the human and the cosmic 
in and by an event that takes places beyond the present.  
Although Haught’s idea of new creation implies the linear understanding of time, 
we can see the cyclical understanding of time in Ecclesiastes:  
Generations come and generations go, but the earth remains forever. The 
sun rises and the sun sets, and hurries back to where it rises. The wind 
blows to the south and turns to the north; round and round it goes, ever 
returning on its course. All streams flow into the sea, yet the sea is never 
full. To the place the streams come from, there they return again (Eccl. 
1:4–7). 
Ecclesiastes describes the movement of the earth as the endlessly repetitive cycle 
of time and seasons. Based upon this cyclical and essentially recycling understanding 
of the world, William Brown claims that ‘Ecclesiastes offers much that resonates 
with science’.693 Although the theory of natural selection through cycles of endless 
competition seems to imply an ultimate futility of life, Mark Harris does argue that 
‘the author of Ecclesiastes acknowledged the same sense of futility thousands of 
years before, but concluded that it made religion and the confession of God, who is 
above everything, all the more important (Eccl. 12:13)’.694  
While Ecclesiastes first emphasises the futility of life, it goes on to posit an 
intrinsic felicitousness or aptness of everything that occurs – in other words, a proper 
time of things as they happen: 
                                                 
692 Ibid., chap. 22. (無古無今, 無始無終.) Watson, 186.  
693 William P. Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation: The Bible, Science, and the Ecology of Wonder 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 186. 
694 Harris, The Nature of Creation: Examining the Bible and Science, 67. 
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There is a time for everything, and a season for every activity under 
heaven: a time to be born and a time to die, a time to plant and a time to 
uproot, a time to kill and a time to heal, a time to tear down and a time to 
build, a time to weep and a time to laugh, a time to mourn and a time to 
dance, a time to scatter stones and a time to gather them, a time to embrace 
and a time to refrain, a time to search and a time to give up, a time to keep 
and a time to throw away, a time to tear and a time to mend, a time to be 
silent and a time to speak, a time to love and a time to hate, a time for war 
and a time for peace (Eccl. 3:1–8). 
This poem has attracted much attention from scholars, poets and ordinary people 
reading the Old Testament.695 My interest in this poem is that its structure, forming 
in the manner of a dialectic, with first a thesis and then an antithesis, is very similar 
to the method of description based on the harmony of yin and yang found in Daoist 
texts.696 Employing this poetic pattern, Ecclesiastes says that there is the proper time 
for everything. Living at the time of kairos697, then, can also be said to be living in an 
eternal present in Daoism. In the cyclical perspective of time, the cyclic past and 
future are less important, and only the present has significance and meaning. If we 
accept that God exists beyond time, every moment from God’s perspective may be 
regarded as the eternal present.  
With this help of cyclical understanding of time or change from the Zhuangzi and 
Ecclesiastes, we can rethink what we mean by the ‘time’ of the new creation which is 
so important in Haught’s thought. Although the final redemption at the new creation 
is often regarded for many evolutionary theologians as an important answer that 
cannot be given up when facing the problem of evil,698 we can understand the notion 
                                                 
695 Although Martin Luther interpreted this poem to be suggestive of God’s control of all the events 
constitutive of human life around 1532, some modern scholars, poets and lyricists understand it in the 
manner of John Cassian (360–432) to be suggestive of the freedom that human beings have to choose 
their moment of action or decision. For detailed discussion, see Eric S. Christianson, Ecclesiastes 
through the Centuries (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 164-73. 
696 For example, according to the Daodejing Chapter 22, ‘Those who are crooked will be perfected. 
Those who are bent will be straight. Those who are empty will be full. Those who are worn will be 
renewed. Those who have little will gain. Those who have plenty will be confounded’. We can also 
see this pattern in the Daodejing Chapters 2, 14, 26, 27, 29, 33, 36, 38, 40, 41, 45, 47, 77 and 81.  
697 Kairos (καιρός) means ‘a propitious moment for decision or action’. [Angus Stevenson, ed. Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 954.] 
698 Not all evolutionary theologians argue future-oriented theodicy as I expounded three types of 
theodicies in Chapter 7:3. For example, confer these: Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism 
and the Problem of Animal Suffering; Robin Attfield, Creation, Evolution and Meaning (Hants, UK: 
Ashgate, 2006). 
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of a new creation differently through a new metaphorical conception of time. In this 
alternative, cyclical understanding of time, the end also means the start. New creation 
may not mean totally ‘new’ but the fruit of something we (or our ancestors) 
experienced or we are experiencing now. In other words, we can now understand that 
new creation has ‘always already’699 begun and is ‘always already’ headed toward its 
completion. If we can recognise that the new creation is the commencement of a new 
revolution in this cyclical cosmic movement, rather than a severance from the past, 
we can give more importance to the present, as well as the past in its becoming the 
present for us. 
In this section, I explored the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist 
philosophy of Zhuangzi in the light of the notion of new creation. Haught and the 
Zhuangzi do not understand time chronologically, and the passage of time is 
understood qua subjectivity. There is also shared conviction in the possibility of the 
salvation or liberation of all creatures, not just human beings. Based on these 
similarities, I formulated what I called the ‘final fulfilment defence’, meaning that 
we can hope for a final fulfilment that resolves the problem of evil in virtue of a 
promise (Haught) or through Daoist training (zuowang, wuhua) in the Zhuangzi. 
However, I examined the differences between Haught and Zhuangzi in their 
understanding of this final fulfilment, and these differences can be used to 
supplement the evolutionary theodicy of Haught. First, regarding the ‘final 
fulfilment’, Haught focuses on the notion of ‘time’ and Zhuangzi focuses on that of 
‘fulfilment’. If Haught’s idea of a metaphysics of the future focuses on ‘fulfilment’ 
rather than ‘future’, it can be reinterpreted in the ‘present’ perspective, i.e. the final 
fulfilment is already in commencement and we are on the way. Second, Haught 
understands that all pain and suffering will be eliminated by God at the time of the 
new creation, but the problem of evil in the Zhuangzi is overcome by human beings 
for themselves through training for sagehood. If we find that humans do have a 
significant role in a final redemption, humans will become more responsible in 
bringing about unity and peace among all creatures, including reducing or trying to 
cease their pain and suffering. Finally, Haught and Zhuangzi have different emphases 
when it comes to time. As end implies new beginning in the Zhuangzi, if 
                                                 
699 I borrow Martin Heidegger’s term here to convey necessary relation(s) which may or not be 
consciously recognised. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, ed. Dennis J. Schmidt, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 84. 
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evolutionary theology can accept that the new creation is the commencement of a 
new revolution in this cosmic cyclical movement, we can give both the present and 





Throughout this thesis, I have tried to develop Christian theodicies for both the East 
and the West in a scientific age by comparing the evolutionary theodicy of Haught 
and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi. Now I will summarize my main ideas of this 
thesis, and explore the meaning and importance, as well as the limitations of this 
study. I will also provide suggestions for future comparative study between science 
and religion and between Christianity and Daoism. 
In chapter 1, the introduction, I examined the need for and purpose of my study. 
The need for this study is raised by the question of whether science and religion are 
clearly distinct in Asian religions because of their different understandings of 
Ultimate Reality and its manifest properties in each religion, and of the different 
understandings of the problem of evil among religions. Based on these divergences, I 
pointed out that the predominantly Western conversation between science and 
religion has limitations in application to East-Asian religions. The main purpose of 
my study is therefore to develop a Christian theodicy to inform both the West and the 
East in a scientific age by comparing the evolutionary theology of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi for a holistic synthesis. In order to do this, I 
suggested the necessity of a new methodology, and proposed five steps for the 
comparative work between religion and science and between Christianity and 
Daoism: description, comparison, generalisation, differentiation and 
supplementation. 
In chapter 2, ‘Evolutionary Science and Christian Theology in Haught’, I 
expounded Haught’s evolutionary theology from several angles: the evolution of life 
and a creator God, natural selection and divine providence, contingency, law, time 
and a transcendent personal God, cosmic evolution and divine promise, and finally 
evolutionary science and ecotheology. 
To summarize the evolutionary theology of Haught: Darwin’s theory of 
evolution is not contrary to Christian theology but rather serves as a guide for us to 
think again about God’s nature and His relationship to us and the cosmos in a more 
meaningful way. To be specific, Haught thinks that philosophical language should be 
distinguished from scientific language, and he most certainly rejects any dogmatic 
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‘scientism’. For him, a God who made a self-organizing world is considered as much 
worthier of our worship than a God who creates all things directly, once-and-for-all, 
in a top-down fashion, in the manner of a monarch. Regarding the issues of nature’s 
openness to accident and randomness, the law of natural selection and the enormous 
time involved in the process of evolution, Haught claims that they are compatible 
with theological ideas that portray God as humble, self-giving and promising love. 
The self-creativity of evolution through natural selection does not diminish God’s 
role of providence. As long as divine promise is concerned, Haught believes that the 
evidence of evolutionary biology can develop and add new depth to Christian faith 
when nature itself is regarded as promise rather than as static design. Finally, the 
evolutionary theology of Haught makes us rethink the importance of ecotheology. It 
is important for ecotheology to take evolution seriously because human stewardship 
of the universe makes it possible for all creatures to realise their inherent 
evolutionary potential for future unfolding.  
In chapter 3, ‘The Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Haught’, I provided 
elucidation of Haught’s thoughts on the problem of evil and his idea of theodicy in 
light of evolutionary science. First, I briefly summarized Christian theodicies related 
to Haught: process theodicy and the ideas of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Hans 
Jonas in particular. Next, I examined what evil means for Haught. We saw that 
original sin meant humanity’s habitual refusal to take its appropriate place in the 
continuous creation of the universe, and this understanding helps us to comprehend 
the inner meaning of original sin in consonance with evolutionary science. Haught 
divided evil into two types: the evil of disorder (caused by suffering, war, famine and 
death) and the evil of monotony (refusing to accept novelty). Finally, I expounded 
the evolutionary theodicy of Haught in its four aspects: creation as ‘letting be’, 
purpose or direction in evolution, divine kenosis and a metaphysics of the future. For 
Haught, the love of God that permits all creation to ‘become itself’ gives unlimited 
freedom to all creatures, and this even contains a capacity for evil. Haught also 
claims that God hopes that all creatures participate in the divine joy of creating the 
novel, so God does in fact want an uncompleted world for the sake of its completion 
together with His creatures. Moreover, for Haught, the passion of Jesus implies that 
God takes full part in the pain and suffering of the world. Haught develops his idea 
into a ‘metaphysics of the future’, arguing that theodicy after Darwin is best 
understood in the perspective of new creation with eschatological hope.  
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According to Haught, Darwin’s theory of evolution allows Christian theology to 
penetrate more deeply into the fundamentals of the Christian faith. Haught’s vision 
of the future can accommodate both the data of evolutionary biology and the claims 
of Christianity. Haught understands that an evolutionary understanding of the 
problem of evil, including the nature and origin of evil, is the most plausible theodicy 
in a scientific age.  
In chapter 4, ‘Daoism and Zhuangzi’s Philosophy’, I expounded Daoism and 
Zhuangzi’s philosophy. First of all, I explored what Dao and Daoism are: Dao is the 
origin of all beings, Dao contains both the positive and negative aspects of reality, 
Dao has a circular movement, which is immanent in all creatures and the cosmos, 
and Dao transcends space and time. Next, I examined the Daoist philosophy of 
Zhuangzi as pertaining to the central concepts of wuwei (non-action), ziran 
(spontaneity) and the relativity of names and definitions of things. Moreover, I 
expounded how the Zhuangzi can be understood from a scientific perspective: like 
natural science, the Zhuangzi is interested in the essentials of nature and the 
Zhuangzi contains ideas related to the scientific knowledge of the time of the author. 
We recall that Daoist ideas became the backbone of Chinese science. 
In the third section, I compared Dao in Daoism to God in Christianity in terms 
of ultimate reality as the origin and provider of all beings, the transcendence of Dao 
and God, the omnipresence of Dao and God, the indefinability of Dao and God, and 
personal and impersonal characterisations of Dao and God. As I related in this 
section, there are several similar manifest properties between God and Dao, and 
these provide clues for constructive dialogue between Christianity and Daoism. 
In chapter 5, ‘Zhuangzi on Evil’, I examined the conception of evil found in the 
Zhuangzi. I explored what the origin of evil is and how evil can be integrated in 
human experience for East Asian religions in comparison to Christianity. To sum up, 
in Confucianism, selfishness is considered the origin of moral evil, although it is 
debatable whether selfishness comes from social influence or human nature. In 
Daoism, intentional behaviours cause division, and these cause moral evil as a result. 
In Buddhism, evil arises from humans’ distorted perception of themselves; distorted 
behaviour arising from ignorance of the true nature of reality causes suffering. As far 
as natural evil is concerned, Confucianism accepts natural evil as fate (ming) or as 
the will of Heaven. Laozi does not consider natural disasters as evil, i.e. natural evils 
do not exist for him. In Buddhism, natural phenomena such as landslides and 
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earthquakes cannot be considered as evils because these are just a part of the law of 
karma.  
According to the philosophy of Zhuangzi, moral evil is the disharmony brought 
about by self-conscious action, and evil comes about when breaking the principles of 
non-action (wuwei), spontaneity (ziran), and oneness (daoshu). The Zhuangzi 
understands natural evil as the interaction between fate (ming) and harmony 
(liangxing). For the Zhuangzi, evil seems to be overcome when becoming one with 
the flow of Dao. Being one with Dao is to live in harmony with all beings. In 
addition, in the step of ‘sitting in forgetfulness’ (zuowang), and in the step of 
‘transformation of things’ (wuhua), the distinctions between things cease, and 
therefore the problem of evil will be overcome.  
After an overview of the understanding of evil in East-Asian religions and the 
Zhuangzi, I moved to the main part of the thesis, which was the ‘Comparison’. I tried 
to suggest the most plausible theodicies in a scientific age comparing the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi in Chapters 
6, 7 and 8. In chapter 6, ‘Evolution and Natural/Moral Evil’, I expounded the ideas 
between Haught and the Zhuangzi with regard to the emergence of life and 
natural/moral evil. To be specific, in the first section, I strove to develop the 
evolutionary theology of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi as they 
pertain to the emergence of life. Both ‘information’ in Haught and qi in the Zhuangzi 
account for the distinctiveness of life, in balance with the facts known from 
evolutionary science, in virtue of ‘gradational creation’. Both information and qi 
allowed for the emergence of genuinely novel lifeforms and properties in the 
universe (consciousness being the pre-eminent property) in virtue of a gradational 
process. Based on this similarity, I generalised it as the ‘abrupt but continuous 
change from the previous level’. This generalisation of the similar ideas of 
information and qi leads us to understand that living beings emerge out of the 
evolutionary process and that they simultaneously hold a more privileged position 
than inanimate objects in terms of cosmic history and divine providence.  
I did, however, also describe how the understanding of information or qi is 
different in either thinker, and these differences can in fact supplement the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught. First, Haught’s conception of evolution seems to be 
linear, but it is cyclical in the Zhuangzi. If Haught’s idea of information contains the 
cyclical structure of evolution, the uniqueness of human beings in the evolving world 
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will be revealed more fully. Second, Haught’s hierarchical understanding of the 
emergence of humans in the cosmos may be a tempting source upon which humans 
could pride themselves, and overestimate their position in the universe. If we can 
understand that information originated from one root and is itself immanent in all 
creatures in the world like the operation of qi in the Zhuangzi, Haught’s idea leads us 
to ecotheology. We saw that ecotheology provides a remedy for human egotism in 
the world, precisely because it places us within the same history as all other creatures 
and objects in this reality. Dao’s operation was finally revealed in the operation of 
both yin and yang. If we accept that information involves both positive and negative 
principles as qi does, then the evolutionary theology of Haught can be extended to 
various fields including animal pain and human crime.  
In the second section, I tried to expound the evolutionary theodicy of Haught 
and Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi by focusing on natural evil. In both Haught and 
the Zhuangzi, neither the grace of God and spontaneity (ziran) of Dao are 
synonymous with direct intervention, and both God and Dao create creatures 
continuously according to the processes of nature. Based on these similar 
understandings, I generalised them as the ‘natural state defence’. The ‘natural state 
defence’ suggests that natural evil emerging from natural selection is a part of the 
natural process and in part allows the boundless freedom of all creatures that a 
genuine theodicy aims to provide. Natural evil ceases to be a problem to be solved.  
However, I explored the differences between Haught and Zhuangzi in 
understanding actual pain and suffering, that is, pain that is actually experienced by 
creatures in the real world, which is of course the main issue confronted by 
Christianity and any theodicy. First, Haught understands that pain and suffering can 
lead to something higher if we look at that pain and suffering in light of a promised 
and imminent in the perspective of new creation. In contrast, the redemption of 
present pain and suffering is not postponed to the future in the Zhuangzi, with pain 
and suffering accepted as part and parcel of fate (ming). Second, good and evil are 
used in a ‘descriptive’ sense in the Zhuangzi rather than ‘evaluative’ sense unlike in 
Christianity, and thus judgment about good and evil is abandoned in the Zhuangzi. 
These differences can supplement the evolutionary theodicy of Haught: the 
Zhuangzi’s idea can help Haught to understand pain and suffering in the present 
perspective and the evolutionary theodicy of Haught can be modified to also 
concentrate on the ‘descriptive’ with the help of the Zhuangzi.  
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In the third section, I expounded the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi with respect to moral evil. Moral evil arises from 
humans’ distorted free will in Haught and from violation of non-action (wuwei) in 
the Zhuangzi, and both free will and non-action are regarded as morally and 
cosmically ‘good’ if they are manifest without distortion. I generalised this similarity 
between the two as the ‘free action defence’. The ‘free action defence’ implies that 
moral evil comes from humans’ distorted free will in Haught and from violation of 
non-action in the Zhuangzi, and therefore moral evil cannot be closely related to God 
and Dao in terms of any direct creation.  
I argued, however, that the ideas of moral evil are different in both Haught and 
Zhuangzi, and these differences can be used to supplement the evolutionary theodicy 
of Haught. First, free will in Haught brings about moral evil when it is distorted by 
selfishness or egotism, but all self-conscious actions in the Zhuangzi bring about 
moral evil. Second, some evolutionary theologians claim that human nature inclines 
to evil rather than good due to humans’ inherited tendency to sin, but in the 
Zhuangzi, spontaneous action always results in good behaviour. If the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught focuses on God’s good creation more than humans’ tendency to 
sin, human free will can have a similar meaning to non-action in the Zhuangzi, and 
thus the term ‘moral evil’ itself may become meaningless. 
In chapter 7, ‘Continuous Creation and the Theodicy of Harmony’, I examined 
the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi in the 
light of the notion of continuous creation. In the first section, I expounded the ideas 
between Haught and Zhuangzi with regard to immanence and care of God and Dao 
respectively. The kenotic God and the omnipresent Dao closely interact with 
creatures and they are both portrayed as self-humbling and passible. Moreover, both 
the kenotic God and the omnipresent Dao cultivate a bi-directional relationship with 
creatures, not just one-directional. Based on these similarities, I generalised them as 
the ‘suffering God defence’. The ‘suffering God defence’ argues that God cannot be 
accused of evils in the world because God participates in the pain and suffering of all 
creatures.  
Meanwhile, I examined the differences of the two thinkers. First, while the 
kenotic God is personal, the omnipresent Dao is non-personal. Second, the kenotic 
God seems to be affected by creatures, but the omnipresent Dao seems to be the 
independent being or principle of reality which cannot be defined in relation to 
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creatures, or affected by them. These differences can supplement the evolutionary 
theodicy of Haught. First, if we understand that God, existing in all creatures, has 
different properties in each creature as does the non-personal Dao, there is no 
implicit standard of evil and the problem of evil should be only referred to within the 
limited range of each God–creature condition. Second, if evolutionary theodicy can 
accept both the transcendence and immanence of God as is the case with Dao, the 
kenotic God of Christianity can be regarded as the One who will redeem the 
suffering and pain of all creatures in a ‘transcendent’ way in the future, and at the 
same time, suffer with creatures in an ‘immanent’ way now. 
In the second section of the chapter, I tried to develop the evolutionary theodicy 
of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi with respect to the problem of the 
responsibility for evil. God in Haught is portrayed as self-absenting and humble to 
creatures, and Dao in the Zhuangzi is understood as hidden and self-effacing power 
of the cosmos. Based on this similarity, I generalised it as the ‘hidden God defence’. 
The ‘hidden God defence’ means that the nature of God is regarded as self-absenting 
or humble as is the case with Dao, such that we cannot blame God for the existence 
of evil, especially the voluntary introduction of it into the world.  
However, I claimed that the understandings of ‘chance’ in evolution and of the 
properties of God and Dao respectively are different in Haught and the Zhuangzi. 
Haught believes that chance events in evolution are an intrinsic element of the 
cosmos and its capacity for novelty. In the Zhuangzi, chance is only regarded as an 
aspect of Dao’s operation. Moreover, Dao is not constrained by category, such as the 
categories of good and bad, of right and wrong, of beautiful and ugly, and for this 
reason it is quite different from the Christian God. These differences can supplement 
the evolutionary theodicy of Haught. First, if we think that there is no chance in the 
cosmos from the perspective of the divine, as in the Zhuangzi, demonstrating God’s 
‘unpredictable’ (in our perspective) work becomes easier. Second, if we accept that 
God’s yardstick for judgement between the good and the bad may be different from 
that of humans or that God goes beyond subjective and circumstantial feelings of fair 
and unfair, desirable and undesirable as does Dao, the problem of evil will no longer 
be a tricky question in evolutionary theodicy.  
In the third section, I expounded the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi in the light of cosmic harmony. The ‘dark side’ in 
Haught and the ‘shadow side’ in the Zhuangzi both pointed to a picture of cosmic 
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harmony and balance in virtue of the necessity of pain, evil and destruction for there 
to be comfort, goodness and creation. Based on this similarity between Haught and 
the Zhuangzi, I generalised it as the ‘harmony defence’. The ‘harmony defence’ 
means that the present world is one that is fundamentally in balance even if we 
cannot or do not want to perceive it as such. The dark side is an inevitable or 
necessary part of the functioning of the universe.  
However, while they are obviously conceptually similar, there are some 
differences between the dark side and the shadow side. In Haught, the dark side is 
associated with a negative meaning that is unavoidable for the best possible world 
and will be removed in the eschatological future. In contrast, in the Zhuangzi, the 
shadow side exists and will exist in the future as an important aspect of Dao. This 
difference can supplement the evolutionary theodicy of Haught: if we accept that the 
dark side may reveal the highest good of God’s creation (that is, the moral good that 
is made possible out of and surmounts suffering in contrast to it) and can be 
harmonized with the good effects caused by God’s self-emptying love, just as the 
harmony of yin and yang constitutes the highest good in the Zhuangzi, evolutionary 
theology can embrace the dark side in evolution more positively. 
In chapter 8, ‘New Creation and the Theodicy of the Metaphysical Future’, I 
explored the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi 
with regard to new creation. In the first section, I examined the evolutionary theodicy 
of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi in the perspective of purpose or 
direction in the process of evolution. We recall that Haught accepts purpose in 
evolution, if it means ‘a gradual rise in organized complexity’ rather than ‘heading 
straight toward a goal fixed from all eternity’. According to the Zhuangzi, the natural 
world proceeds toward increasing harmony and beauty through the operation of yin 
and yang if they are not hindered by humans’ wilful actions. Based on these similar 
ideas, I coined the ‘progress defence’. The ‘progress defence’ means that there is 
direction in the natural world as long as that direction implies going toward ‘beauty’ 
in Haught and the Zhuangzi, which means that we can hope for a better future 
regarding the problem of evil.  
Again, I pointed out the differences which remain between Haught and 
Zhuangzi in their understanding of purpose or direction, and I argued that these 
differences can supplement the evolutionary theodicy of Haught. In the Zhuangzi, 
changes of nature are not ‘intentional’ movements of Dao, and ‘direction’ which 
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implies progression of time and in time does not refer to anything significant because 
Daoism maintains a cyclical understanding of time and Dao obviously transcends 
time. Therefore, if evolutionary theology accepts that God does have a purpose or 
direction for nature in Himself beyond space and time, it can still hold that God 
closely enters into a relation with all creatures, including their pain and suffering, 
without the need for invoking future redemption as in Haught.  
In the second section, I explored the evolutionary theodicy of Haught and the 
Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi from the perspective of new creation and the final 
fulfilment of creation. First, in both Haught and the Zhuangzi, the lapse of time is 
experienced qua subjectivity. Second, both Haught and Zhuangzi provide for the 
salvation of all creatures, not just human beings. Based on these similarities, I 
generalised their ideas together as the ‘final fulfilment defence’. The ‘final fulfilment 
defence’ implies that we can expect a final fulfilment to settle the problem of evil by 
virtue of a promise in Haught or through Daoist meditative training (zuowang, 
wuhua) in the Zhuangzi.  
However, I expounded the differences between Haught and Zhuangzi 
concerning the final fulfilment of creation, and these differences can supplement the 
evolutionary theodicy of Haught. First, with regard to the ‘final fulfilment’ Haught 
concentrates on the concept of ‘time’ and Zhuangzi concentrates on that of 
‘fulfilment’. If Haught’s idea focuses on ‘fulfilment’ rather than the ‘future’, it can 
be reinterpreted in the ‘present’ perspective, i.e. the final fulfilment has already 
started – in fact, it is here and now, in an eternal present. Second, Haught believes 
that all pain and suffering will be removed by God in the time of the new creation, 
but the problem of evil in the Zhuangzi is overcome by human beings through their 
meditative training for sagehood. If we find our role in a final redemption, humans 
will assume more responsibility for unity and peace among the creatures of the 
world, including their pain and suffering. Finally, different from Haught, the 
Zhuangzi presents different ideas of time, and implies new beginnings in a cyclical 
cosmic movement. If evolutionary theology accepts that the new creation is the 
commencement of a new revolution, we can endow more importance to the present. 
Through the ‘Comparison’ part (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), I endeavoured to develop 
Christian theodicies to be persuasive in both the West and the East in a scientific age 
by comparing the evolutionary theology of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of 
Zhuangzi. I also tried to supplement the ideas of Haught with the ideas of the 
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Zhuangzi based on differences between the two. Now I want to propose the 
importance and limitations of this study, and I will finish this thesis by providing 
some suggestions for future comparative work between Christianity and Daoism 
pertaining to science and religion and theodicy.  
   
The Importance of This Study 
There have been many comparative studies between science and religion, but the 
religion has usually been Christianity in isolation from other world religions. I 
believe that it is time to move this comparative study to include different religions, 
worldviews and systems of thought in order for us to find out whether comparative 
study between religion and science can be applicable to other religious traditions.  
As I mentioned in the introduction, my interest in the problem of evil and 
theodicy arose from my practical experience as a military chaplain in South Korea, a 
country which is divided and often risks military crises. As a Korean, I felt that I had 
to explain the problem of evil to Koreans in their own religious terms, and I 
perceived that Daoist philosophy was the most suitable of the world’s systems of 
thought in persuading Korean Christians in virtue of the fact that it is a traditional 
religion of Korea and the wider East-Asian area that can be met without cultural or 
political resistance.700 I also thought that a contemporary theodicy comprising 
ancient Daoist principles with modern evolutionary theology might not only be heard 
by modern people but also be open to their assent when discussed in modern 
scientific terms. Thus my research question was this: how can I develop the most 
relevant Christian theodicy for both the West and the East in a scientific age? My 
study of theodicy became the comparative study between Christianity, Daoism and 
science. This multi-comparative study can, of course, provide more resources to deal 
with the problem of evil than the comparative study between theology and science as 
I provided in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
I think that Western evolutionary theodicy can very much benefit from 
engagement with Daoist philosophy. I also believe that the Daoist philosophy of 
Zhuangzi can be seen in a new light through conversation with the evolutionary 
theology of Haught and evolutionary science generally. I hope that this study can be 
                                                 
700 Concerning the relationship between Korean Christianity and Daoism, see footnote number 13.  
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a stimulant for future comparative study between religion and science and between 
Christianity and Daoism.  
My comparative study between evolutionary science, Christianity and Daoism 
is not totally new, however mainstream studies in comparative religious studies have 
generally not featured dialogue between science and religion until recent years. I 
hope what I have offered helps to diagnose the present situation and further benefit 
the purposes of the academic discussion across Western and Eastern traditions. This 
study is not just for East-Asian Christians for the enrichment of their own faith. 
Rather, comparative studies in East-Asian philosophy also enrich the conversation 
between science and theology globally, and will provide new currents of thought for 
the engagement between science and theology, and approaches to the ever-present 
the problem of evil. 
 
The Limitations of This Study 
In the parts dedicated to comparative study, I suggested what amounts to several 
theodicies to be adopted for both Christianity and Daoism, utilising concepts and 
developments in contemporary evolutionary biology. However, this comparative 
study is by no means comprehensive or final, of course. There are points that will 
inevitably require elaboration and questions will be raised that will need to be 
answered as the thesis meets the desks (or computers) of my interlocutors. Here is a 
brief list of the limitations of the present study that I recognise. 
First of all, science and religious studies (or theology) are different academic 
fields having different methodologies and research skills. The dialogue between 
science and religion that we see today surely penetrates into the deep mysteries of 
God in a scientific age – mysteries which would otherwise perhaps be beyond our 
reach. That said, we should admit the limitations of the conversation and have 
reasonable expectations of its results. For example, because of the difference in 
methodologies, the natural sciences cannot posit or defend the notion of a future 
promise, a qualitative, moral and spiritual notion that many evolutionary theologians, 
including Haught, place at the heart of their theology and religious perspective.  
Second, comparative study between Christianity and Daoism often meets with 
difficulties because of the great differences between the two religions. In particular, 
Christian theology does not compare well with East Asian philosophy because it has 
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different conceptions of ultimate reality and the good life. In addition to the general 
intention of comparing two very different religions, we need to select particular 
topics for comparative study. However, each religion uses different terms to express 
its ideas. For example, I chose the wide-ranging topic of ‘the problem of evil’ for this 
comparative study. As already recognised, the term ‘problem of evil’, is not, 
technically speaking, applied in Daoism directly because evil is not a problem in 
Daoism, and what Westerners understand to be ‘evil’ may not in fact exist for 
Daoism. Consequently, this comparative study had to be conducted in an ‘indirect’ or 
negative fashion, approaching evil in Daoism as that which is the opposite of ‘good’. 
Third, there are very obviously big linguistic differences between English and 
Chinese. It is impossible to convey the exact meaning of many Daoist concepts in 
English, and all translations are only approximate. In this thesis, I translated wuwei 
into non-action, ziran into spontaneity, yin into the shadow side, and qi into vital 
energy. Admittedly, people who are proficient in Chinese may find these translations 
cumbersome, despite their common use ever since the first translations of the texts in 
the West.  
Again, whatever English term or phrase that one employs in translating the 
Chinese words of Daoist philosophy, they cannot contain or express the whole 
meaning of the word, and in some cases may be regarded as distorting the original 
meaning. This is a problem facing all translators, and the natural consequence is a 
variety of sometimes differing interpretations and translations, affecting how the 
overall philosophy is conveyed. Chinese characters can have a surprising number of 
meanings due to the ‘radicals’ of which they are composed and the vast number of 
composite words which they themselves can compose.  
Finally, there are currently very few published studies in this field, which can 
admittedly give it the image of a ‘fringe’ study or area of research. There are several 
books and articles that compare Western philosophy and religion with Daoism,701 but 
most of them seem to be concerned with the moral life, of practical intelligence, and 
as such are not concerned with the problem of evil (Chapter 1:1), which in my 
estimation is a ‘foundational’ and deeper ‘existential’ topic to be investigated. 
                                                 
701 See footnote number 50.  
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Due to the limitations of my study as outlined above, some elements of my 
argument may strike my readers as merely speculative and without much relevance 
to our experience of suffering, but I believe that this kind of comparative study 
(between different academic fields, different times and different religions) affords us 
great insights which cannot be gained within the confines of our own narrow fields 
of expertise. And of course, the wider and deeper our knowledge is, the more our 
experience is itself informed and transformed.  
 
Suggestions for Future Study 
Many scholars of science and religion have focused on how science and religion can 
fruitfully engage in dialogue, or indeed, whether it is even possible that the two fields 
can dialogue. The hope is that by engaging in inter-disciplinary dialogue we can 
develop ideas and methodologies that are applicable in both science and religion. 
However, I think it is time to ask more fundamental questions: not only 
concerning the necessity of conversation between science and religion, but also how 
these conversations can contribute to each research area. How can these 
conversations, for example, practically contribute to discourse in and between 
physics and biology? How can we revitalise theology with the help of science, to 
meet the scientific age? Without these most pressing questions, the conversation 
between science and religion will be merely a fashion, not a continuous and 
intellectually beneficial discourse. 
Therefore, the conversation between science and religion should focus on 
practical advantages for both fields and their practitioners. Haught’s final category of 
‘confirmation’ is a good example in demonstrating the usefulness of religious ideas 
for science (Chapter 1:2). My categories of ‘generalisation’ and ‘supplementation’ 
also put the focus on practical interests in the conversation between science, theology 
and East-Asian religions. The more we are interested in the reasons for the inter-
disciplinary dialogue, the better conversations between science and religions will go 
in the future. 
 Second, I explored the problem of evil focusing on how Daoism contributes to 
the existing discussion between science and religion. This means that other religions 
such as Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Shintoism can also provide 
important ideas for the dialogue between science and religion, research that is not yet 
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to attract many scholars in the science-religion field.702 Considering the fact that each 
religion reflects a cultural system within a certain geographical area accumulated 
over a prolonged period of time, the dialogue between science and religions will 
enrich the existing conversation between science and religion, which has hitherto 
largely been restricted to reconciling Christianity and breakthroughs in our scientific 
understanding of the universe.  
Third, as I tried to develop the evolutionary theology of Haught with the Daoist 
philosophy of Zhuangzi in this thesis, I think that other religious ideas can provide 
significant ideas for evolutionary theology. This goes beyond the conversation 
between Islam and science or between Buddhism and science, and this conversation 
asks how the dialogues between Islam and science or between Buddhism and science 
can improve the current dialogue between theology and science more generally, and 
with wider ramifications. One is hard pressed to find studies looking at how other 
religious ideas and doctrines can contribute to the development of the relatively new 
field of evolutionary theology, and I hope that such studies will eventually be 
provided by other scholars.  
Now, I claimed several theodicies based on the similarities between the 
evolutionary theology of Haught and the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi: ‘the natural 
state defence’, ‘the free action defence’, ‘the suffering God defence’, ‘the hidden 
God defence’, ‘the harmony defence’, ‘the progress defence’ and ‘the final fulfilment 
defence’. These theodicies may provide answers to the problem of evil in both 
Christianity and Daoism in a scientific age, and especially for East Asian Christians, 
but as there is no theodicy that is persuasive to or meets both the intellectual and 
pastoral needs of everyone, my theodicies should also be reviewed by other religious 
scholars (including atheists) as well as by Christian theologians and Daoists.  
It should be said, finally, that my study cannot by itself comprise a comparative 
study between evolutionary theology and Daoism because Daoism, as both a 
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The reader is invited to explore the following works by eminent scholars in the field: Philip Clayton 
and Zachary Simpson, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); Nidhal Guessoum, Islam's Quantum Question: Reconciling Muslim Tradition 
and Modern Science (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); Taner Edis, An Illusion of Harmony: Science and 
Religion in Islam (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2007); Donald S. Lopez, Buddhism & Science: 
A Guide for the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Yitzhak Berger and David 
Shatz, Judaism, Science, and Moral Responsibility (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2006). 
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philosophical and religious tradition, includes many more thinkers than Zhuangzi and 
the work we have been focussing on here, that of the Zhuangzi. A study of the 
developments in Daoism, of the development of scientific ideas in East-Asia and a 
comparative study between the two would, in my estimation, require many volumes. 
This thesis is by no means an exhaustive study of the thought of John Haught, either. 
Nevertheless, I hope the present work serves as a catalyst for future comparative 
study of Daoism and evolutionary theology in broader terms, and I expect that such a 
kind of comparative study can be fruitfully expanded to other religions, other 
academic fields and other philosophical-theological issues, such as the relationship 
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